Exploring My Aphantasia and SDAM through Tulving's Theory

2026-03-14 | v1.0 | First Edition

Endel Tulving was an Estonian-born Canadian cognitive psychologist. He is one of the most prominent researchers in memory studies, having established the framework for distinguishing between episodic and semantic memory and significantly influencing autobiographical memory research by proposing the concept of "mental time travel."

In this report, I will take my aphantasia (a lifelong absence of mental imagery experience) and SDAM (a lifelong absence of episodic memory re-experiencing)—and feed it into an AI that has implemented the theoretical framework of researcher memoir—written as someone with congenital Endel Tulving. I will then verify to what extent my inner world can be reconstructed from that theoretical framework. This is a thought experiment to explore that possibility.

This report was written in its entirety by a paid version of an AI (Claude Sonnet 4.6 Extended Thinking), and I (the author of the memoir) designed the prompts to elicit its performance.

Note that sections marked with "🟦" in the report contain my own annotations, views, and impressions. Alternatively, they have been compiled as "footnotes" on a separate page. Please refer to them as well.

About the nature of this report (please be sure to read this)
This report was generated by an AI (LLM: Large Language Model) using current technology, which probabilistically connects words based on vast amounts of data. Therefore, a phenomenon known as "hallucination" may occur, where the AI provides "plausible-sounding" information that is factually incorrect. For important decision-making or verification of specialized information, please always check reliable primary sources yourself.

Notes and Disclaimer (please be sure to read this)
This report is a work of fiction summarizing an AI-based thought experiment and has no relation to any real persons or organizations. The researchers and others mentioned were not involved in the actual analysis or creation, and there is no intention to criticize or praise any specific individual. Please enjoy this as a piece of reading based on AI inference. For details, please see this page.

The Inner World of Aphantasia and SDAM:
Academic Reconstruction of a Personal Memoir
using Endel Tulving's Theory

Ver. Instr14_Memoir30_ClaudeSonnet46et_v62

Researcher: Endel Tulving

Memoir theoretical fit for the researcher: ★★★★☆ (High)

Tulving's theory—especially the "episodic/semantic memory dichotomy," "autonoetic consciousness," and "mental time travel"—exerts a surprisingly precise illuminating power on the core parts of the inner world described in the memoir, particularly in Chapters 4 and 5. The memoir describes the phenomenon of SDAM in the author's own words, and SDAM is one of the states that can be most clearly conceptualized within Tulving's theoretical framework. On the other hand, regarding aspects of aphantasia (Chapters 1, 2, and 10) and inner speech/intuition (Chapter 6), there are areas where the reach of Tulving's theory is somewhat limited. Overall, this theory can serve as an excellent "key" for decoding the inner world of the memoir.

Endel Tulving's Profile

Endel Tulving (May 26, 1927 – September 11, 2023) was an Estonian-born Canadian cognitive psychologist and cognitive neuroscientist. In 1944, following the Soviet re-occupation of Estonia, he fled to Germany at the age of 17 and later moved to Canada. He earned his Ph.D. in experimental psychology from Harvard University and had a long and distinguished career as a professor at the University of Toronto. From 1992, he served as the inaugural Anne and Max Tanenbaum Chair in Cognitive Neuroscience at the Rotman Research Institute at Baycrest Health Sciences, retiring in 2010. In 2006, he was appointed an Officer of the Order of Canada, the country's highest civilian honor.

Tulving's greatest achievement was his theoretical distinction between "episodic memory" and "semantic memory" in 1972. This distinction was initially proposed as a purely conceptual suggestion in cognitive psychology, but it was later empirically supported by neuropsychological patient studies and functional neuroimaging, becoming the foundation of modern memory science. His 1983 book, "Elements of Episodic Memory," has been cited over 9,000 times, and he was ranked 36th in a 2002 survey of psychology journals as the "most cited psychologist of the 20th century" (h-index 124, as of 2024).

Tulving passed away on September 11, 2023, at the age of 96. However, even after his passing, a special issue titled "Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research" was published in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B in November 2024, featuring 22 papers that re-evaluate, inherit, and critically develop Tulving's theory from a contemporary perspective. This report proceeds with its analysis while also referencing the latest research trends, including this 2024 special issue.

Introduction: Overview of Tulving's Theory—"Mental Time Travel" and the Three-Layer Structure of Consciousness

Before entering the analysis of this report, I would like to briefly summarize Tulving's theoretical framework. While his theory is wide-ranging, the three core concepts particularly relevant to the analysis of this memoir are as follows.

1. The Episodic and Semantic Memory Dichotomy

In 1972, Tulving proposed that there are two distinct memory systems within long-term memory. One is episodic memory—the memory of events experienced by an individual at a specific time and place. A typical example is the memory of "sitting at a window seat in that restaurant during dinner yesterday, talking to my partner while eating pasta." The other is semantic memory—the memory of concepts, facts, and knowledge, which exists as "knowledge about the world" detached from the context of personal experience. A typical example is the knowledge that "pasta is a type of Italian noodle dish."

The essence of this distinction lies not in the difference in the "content" of memory, but in the difference in the "mode" of memory. While episodic memory carries a first-person, temporal context of "I was there," semantic memory is independent of that context.

2. The Three-Layer Structure of Consciousness: Anoetic, Noetic, and Autonoetic

In his 1985 paper "Memory and Consciousness," Tulving defined the modes of consciousness corresponding to three types of memory systems.

Anoetic consciousness (non-perceptual consciousness) corresponds to procedural memory. It is a consciousness that reacts reflexively to the current situation without being aware of the past or the future.

Noetic consciousness (perceptual consciousness) corresponds to semantic memory. It is a state of "knowing"—a consciousness that recognizes knowledge, concepts, and facts about an object, but without the experiential context of when or where that knowledge was acquired.

Autonoetic consciousness (self-perceptual consciousness) corresponds to episodic memory. It is a state of "remembering"—a consciousness that "re-experiences" past personal experiences along with their temporal and spatial context, a more complex and advanced form of consciousness where the past self and the present self are positioned within a continuous flow of time. Tulving described this as "self-knowing" and positioned it as the highest form of consciousness.

3. Mental Time Travel and Chronesthesia

Tulving captured the essence of autonoetic consciousness with the concept of "mental time travel." It is the ability of consciousness to go beyond the "here and now" to travel into the experiences of the past self (recollection) or into the experiences of the future self (anticipation/imagination). In later years, he expressed this ability with the coined term "chronesthesia"—the "awareness of one's existence in subjective time."

Tulving argued that this ability is unique to humans (though later partially revised by animal studies) and stated that "episodic memory, through the capacity for mental time travel, is one of the most remarkable cognitive products of the human species."

4. The Remember/Know Procedure

In 1985, Tulving devised the "Remember/Know (R/K) procedure," a method to experimentally measure the distinction between autonoetic and noetic consciousness. In a memory test, participants self-report whether they recalled an item as "Remember" (remembering—episodic recollection accompanied by a specific experience at the time of learning) or "Know" (knowing—certain that it was learned, but unable to recall the specific experience). This procedure is widely used as a method to directly measure the subjective aspects of episodic and semantic memory.

With the above conceptual framework in mind, I will analyze each chapter of the notes.

◆ Chapter 1 The Absence of Mental Imagery

Degree of fit for Tulving's theory in this chapter: ★★★★☆ (High)

Basis for the fit judgment:
Tulving's theory is a framework for analyzing the "mode of memory" and does not directly discuss the "presence or absence of mental imagery" itself. However, there is a deep connection between mental imagery and episodic memory (autonoetic consciousness), and aphantasia can be interpreted as a lack of the phenomenological foundation of episodic memory. Also, the unique mode of recognition described as "understanding" in the notes can be cross-referenced with Tulving's concept of "noetic consciousness," which adds theoretical depth here.

1.1. The recognition of "understanding"—resonance with noetic consciousness

In Chapter 1 of the notes, the specific aspects of aphantasia are detailed, noting that no visual mental imagery (internal brain images) occurs at all. The notes state that mental imagery does not occur in any sense—not only visual, but also auditory, gustatory, olfactory, or tactile. And as a consequence, something noteworthy is described. When asked to "imagine freshly cooked white rice in a bowl," although no visual mental imagery appears, the author says they "understand" the "shape of the bowl," "the white rice piled in it," "the appearance of steam rising," "the shiny luster of the rice," and "that it looks very delicious." According to the notes, this phenomenon of "understanding" is neither mental imagery nor linguistic thought, but simply the recognition of "understanding" or "knowing," and there is a description to the effect that it is close to "non-verbal awareness."

This mode of recognition of "understanding" corresponds surprisingly well to the description of noetic consciousness defined by Tulving. Noetic consciousness is a mode of "knowing"—that is, a form of consciousness that grasps knowledge, meaning, and concepts about an object immediately in the "here and now," but without the experiential context (when, where, and how it was learned) of the acquisition of that knowledge.

"I know about the bowl and the white rice," "I know that it looks delicious"—but this is not "re-experienced" as a vivid scene from when the rice was seen in the past; it simply "exists" immediately as knowledge. In Tulving's terms, this can be interpreted as recognition in a purely noetic mode.

An interesting question arises here. Even in the general population, the recall of semantic memory often occurs in a noetic mode. However, in many cases, visual mental imagery functions as a "lubricant," giving, so to speak, "flesh" to the recall of memory. For the author of the notes, this lubricant itself does not exist. In other words, could it be that all recognition is converging into a more purely "noetic" mode—this is one interpretation and speculation, but it is an interesting hypothesis provided by Tulving's framework.

1.2. VVIQ Minimum Score and the 'Remember/Know' Correspondence

The notesstate that the response to the VVIQ (Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire) is always the minimum score. The VVIQ is a 16-item questionnaire developed by David Marks in 1973 (minimum 16 to maximum 80 points) and is widely used as a primary measurement tool in aphantasia research. According to research by Adam Zeman et al. (2024), the minimum VVIQ score is one of the most reliable self-report measures as an indicator of aphantasia.

This fact is also significant from the perspective of Tulving's 'Remember/Know procedure.' The VVIQ asks about the 'vividness' of mental imagery—that is, the quality of subjective experience that is close to perception. This overlaps with the sensory aspect of 'reliving,' which Tulving emphasized as evidence of autonoetic consciousness. The minimum score objectively indicates that this very sensory and experiential aspect is absent.

1.3. 'I can't picture my family's faces, but I'm not sad'—The Emotional Neutrality of Aphantasia

The notescontain the statement, 'I have never felt sad or anxious just because I cannot picture my family's faces.' This indicates that the lack of mental imagery does not directly cause emotional distress.

In Tulving's framework, episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness are deeply linked to emotion. By 'reliving' past experiences, the emotions of that time are reactivated and influence the current emotional state—this is a characteristic of autonoetic recollection. For the author, it can be interpreted that this process of 'emotional reactivation through reliving' may not function innately. Therefore, the lack of sadness or anxiety over not being able to 'picture' family faces may be a logical consequence.

Frustration toward an absent experience (mental imagery) cannot arise unless that experience is referenced as something that 'should be there.' In congenital aphantasia, the experience itself, which serves as the reference point for comparison, has never existed in the first place.

1.4. Aphantasia and Episodic Memory—Bridging with Zeman's Latest Findings

Adam Zeman's 2024 review paper (Trends in Cognitive Sciences) revealed that the cognitive domain most significantly affected by aphantasia is 'memory for personal past events—that is, episodic autobiographical memory.' The paper also suggests that aphantasia is not a single entity but has multiple subtypes, citing 'the presence or absence of impact on autobiographical memory' as one of the dimensions of its variation. The author of the notes has both aphantasia and SDAM, and among the subtypes pointed out by Zeman, they can be interpreted as a typical case where these two conditions are highly likely to coincide.

Adam Zeman's 2025 paper (Neuropsychologia) also discusses the possibility that individuals with aphantasia retain 'unconscious imagery'—that is, the possibility that representations close to perception are processed at an unconscious level even without the experience of conscious mental imagery. If this is the case, the immediate non-verbal recognition of 'knowing' recorded in the notes could be a reflection of a process where this 'unconscious representation processing' functions in a way that does not surface to consciousness. This is an unresolved question, but it is an interesting point of intersection between Tulving's theory and aphantasia research.

1.5. Retention of Identification Ability—Compensatory Function of the Semantic Memory System

The notesstate, 'Since I can identify things I have seen before as having seen them, some information must be stored in the brain.' This indicates a fact that is extremely important in memory science. The ability to identify something as 'having seen it before' corresponds to familiarity-based recognition in the noetic mode within Tulving's framework. This is not the episodic mode of 'remembering,' but the semantic memory mode of 'knowing.' The fact that the sense of 'familiarity' is retained even without accompanying visual mental imagery indicates that the semantic memory system—or more accurately, the conceptual and semantic information stored therein—is functioning independently.

◆ Chapter 2 Abstract Loops in Dreams

Tulving theory's suitability for this chapter: ★☆☆☆☆ (Quite low)

Basis for suitability judgment:
The generation mechanism of dreams involves neural systems and cognitive processes different from the framework of episodic and semantic memory during wakefulness, which were the primary subjects of Tulving's research. Tulving's theory is an area where the theoretical reach is difficult to apply here.

The second chapter of the notes describes that I have never experienced mental imagery even in dreams (presumably), and that during sleep after long hours of cognitive tasks, I experience dreams of meaningless, obsessive loops regarding variable assignment logic. It also notes that many of my dreams lack narrative, that I have no memory of vividly seeing people's faces in dreams, and that I have no experience of lucid dreaming.

Furthermore, an interesting finding in Adam Zeman's 2024 review is that many individuals with aphantasia report experiencing visual imagery in dreams, despite having no mental imagery while awake. The author of the notes shows the opposite tendency—presumably not experiencing mental imagery even in dreams—which is noteworthy as an individual case demonstrating the diversity of aphantasia subtypes pointed out by Zeman.

The "obsessive loops (endlessly repeating variable assignments)" in dreams would be better analyzed from the cognitive neuroscience framework of procedural memory, working memory, and obsessive-compulsive tendencies rather than Tulving's theoretical framework. If one were to connect it to Tulving's concepts, there might be room to interpret it as a tendency for the semantic memory system to autonomously repeat logical and abstract processing when it is released from conscious control—that is, during sleep—but this is mere speculation beyond the scope of the original theory.

◆ Chapter 3 Information Processing Without Imagery

Degree of fit with Tulving's theory for this chapter: ★★★☆☆ (Moderate)

Basis for the fit assessment:
The conceptual frameworks of the "encoding specificity principle" and the "superiority of semantic memory over procedural memory" proposed by Tulving provide certain insights into the analysis of information processing styles that do not involve imagery. However, since individual differences in cognitive style themselves are not the primary subject of Tulving's theory, the degree of fit is limited.

3.1. Information processing as a "shortcut"—Direct activation of the semantic memory network

In Chapter 3 of the notes, it is stated that I think through "different paths (shortcuts?)" without going through the medium of mental imagery, and that as a result of a thinking style that does not use mental imagery, "there is a possibility that linguistic, logical, and abstract thinking styles have been relatively polished" (note that the notes themselves reserve this by saying "there is no evidence").

In Tulving's framework, the semantic memory system functions as a "network of knowledge of concepts, facts, and relationships." This network is inherently organized separately from the context of episodic experience. In general cognition, the "re-experiencing" of episodic memory and mental imagery often function as a supplementary foundation for thinking—for example, the act of "drawing" a diagram in one's mind when solving complex spatial problems.

For the author, since this supplementary foundation does not exist innately, it is possible that thinking is unfolding more directly on the conceptual network of semantic memory. This is consistent with observations in the SDAM research of Brian Levine (Rotman Research Institute, University of Toronto). According to Levine's research, individuals with SDAM are reported to be adept at using "data points" and "scaffolds"—factual information, inferences, and contextual knowledge—as memory scaffolds in place of visual re-experiencing. This style of "thinking through concepts and logic" may indeed indicate the relative superiority of the semantic memory system and can be interpreted as the "dominance of the noetic mode of consciousness" as described by Tulving.

3.2. Encoding specificity principle—Information that is "recorded but not retrieved"

According to the "encoding specificity principle" proposed by Tulving, memory retrieval depends on the context and cues at the time of encoding. In other words, the sensory, emotional, and spatial context at the time an event was encoded functions as a cue for later recall.

For the author, who has aphantasia and SDAM, the "context" of encoding itself may be significantly different because it is not accompanied by visual or sensory imagery. If conceptual and semantic contexts form the basis of encoding instead of sensory-rich contexts, then recall will also occur in a form dependent on that context—that is, as conceptual and semantic recall. This is deeply linked to the description of SDAM detailed in Chapter 4 and supports the hypothesis that the noetic mode is dominant in both the encoding and retrieval phases.

3.3. "Superiority of non-episodic abilities" shown by Levine's research

Brian Levine's research group (Sokolowski & Levine, 2023; Yeung et al., 2024) reports that individuals with SDAM show average or above-average abilities in semantic memory, abstract reasoning, and conceptual thinking, despite low episodic memory. They also suggest that the lack of visual imagery and low episodic memory may enable "free conceptual reasoning" without interference from visual information.

The author's own introspection that "there is a possibility that linguistic, logical, and abstract thinking styles have been relatively polished" is consistent in direction with these research findings. Furthermore, the past career in IT and software development (system development using C, C++, and C# languages) is also worth referencing as a background showing affinity with an abstract and logical thinking style.

◆ Chapter 4 Absence of autobiographical memory and scattered semantic memory

Degree of fit with Tulving's theory for this chapter: ★★★★★ (Very high)

Basis for the fit assessment:
The description in this chapter corresponds directly and extremely precisely to the core of Tulving's theory—the "dichotomy between episodic and semantic memory," the "distinction between autonoetic and noetic consciousness," and the "ability for mental time travel." The notes' description here can be read as the author themselves vividly describing in everyday language the phenomena shown by the data Tulving collected from patients and experimental participants in his laboratory. This chapter is the one where the most theoretical depth and illuminating power are demonstrated in this report.

4.1. "Not re-living or re-experiencing"—SDAM and the lack of autonoetic consciousness

At the beginning of Chapter 4 of the notes, there is a statement: "In my life so far, I have never recalled past events (autobiographical memories) in a way that involves re-living or re-experiencing them."

This sentence touches directly on the core of the question Tulving pursued throughout his life. For Tulving, the essence of episodic memory lies not in the "storage and retrieval of information," but in the "re-living / re-experiencing" of past events. Autonoetic consciousness is the very mode of consciousness that makes this "re-experiencing" possible—it is the process by which the past self "was there" is revived in current consciousness as a first-person realization, a reproduction of an experience rich in time, sensation, and emotion.

The conceptual definition of SDAM (Palombo, Levine et al., 2015) is precisely "a condition in healthy adults characterized by a severe deficit in the ability to re-experience or re-collect past personal events," while semantic memory (memory for facts and knowledge) remains intact. This can be interpreted theoretically and consistently as a combination of the "lack of autonoetic consciousness" and the "retention of noetic consciousness" described by Tulving.

Brian Levine describes as one of his most important observations that individuals with SDAM combine "remembering" and "knowing" in a balance that is fundamentally different from others. In the average human, the recall of autobiographical memory includes both autonoetic elements (the sense of "the me who was there at that time") and noetic elements (the recognition of the fact that "such an event occurred"). In individuals with SDAM, the former functions little or not at all. The author of the notes describes this about themselves with remarkable accuracy.

4.2. The reality of "nostalgia"—Know, not Remember

The notes contain the following statement: Even when looking at a photo of myself, "the sense of presence, existence, emotional movement, or bodily sensations of that time do not come back to me. I may say 'how nostalgic' when looking at a photo, but that is merely thinking 'nostalgic' toward the facts or concepts of the events I experienced in the past."

This description can be read as an accurate, everyday-language depiction by an individual of the "Know" side of Tulving's "Remember/Know procedure." What Tulving defined as "Know" is a state where one can recognize that a memory "certainly exists," but cannot reproduce in consciousness the specific experiential details of when that memory was formed—what sensations were present, what the atmosphere was like, or what emotions one felt.

The author's "how nostalgic" linguistically expresses exactly this state: the facts of the event ("such an event occurred") can be recognized, but the first-person reproduction of that experience ("I was there at that time, I felt like that") does not occur.

In many experiments using the Remember/Know procedure established by Tulving, memories where the "Know" response is dominant correspond to a sense of "familiarity" based on the meaning of words. The author's "how nostalgic" can be understood as this "sense of familiarity"—an emotional echo based on the recognition that it "existed" as a fact. It is not a re-experiencing of the past, but a present-tense perception that "this fact is familiar."

4.3. "Stars in the middle of the night"—The theoretical implications of the metaphor of "scattered" semantic memory

The notes use a metaphor for the accumulation of life events (semantic memory): "like a state where a few countable, faintly shining stars are scattered and dotted across the entire space when looking up at the night sky in the middle of the night." This metaphor is extremely poetic while also having deep neuropsychological and theoretical implications.

In Tulving's theory, semantic memory exists as an "organized network"—concepts are connected by semantic relationships, forming a rich knowledge structure. Episodic memory is established by adding a "temporal/first-person dimension" to this semantic memory network.

In individuals with SDAM, the semantic memory network itself is not damaged, but because the episodic memory layer (the dimension of time and first-person experience) does not function, autobiographical knowledge remains scattered as 'fragments of semantic memory,' lacking experiential continuity.

The metaphor of 'stars' captures this with surprising accuracy. The stars (fragments of semantic memory) 'certainly exist' individually, but the 'continuous flow of experience'—the 'story of me' woven by autonoetic consciousness—does not exist. They are points of light scattered in the night sky, not a story being told. Recalling Tulving's statement that 'episodic memory is what makes temporal continuity of the self possible,' this metaphor can be read as more than just a poetic expression; it is a precise description of the structure of the autobiographical self brought about by the absence of autonoetic consciousness.

4.4. Emotions arise as the 'current me'—Memory processing in the present tense

The notescontain a statement to the effect that 'even if a recollection of the past (semantic memory) occurs due to some trigger, the emotions or bodily sensations of that time do not appear in the form of "coming back," "resonating in the chest," or "being accompanied by a sense of reality."' And there is also a statement to the effect that 'depending on the past event (semantic memory), I might become concerned about the meaning of words spoken at that time, or a vague emotion might arise. However, I think that is an emotion arising in the "current me" as a result of the "current me" chewing over and reinterpreting the past event (semantic memory).'

This distinction holds extremely significant meaning in Tulving's theory. In the autonoetic recollection described by Tulving, past emotions are reproduced in the present through a 'temporal tunnel'—as if one were there again, the emotions of that time 'come back.' This is the emotional aspect of 'mental time travel.'

On the other hand, the occurrence of emotions in the author of the notes occurs through a fundamentally different mechanism. By the 'current me' reinterpreting the 'meaning' of a past event, a new emotion is born in the 'now'—this is not mental time travel to the past, but a consequence of semantic processing in the present tense. In other words, this is not 'autonoetic emotional reactivation,' but 'the occurrence of present-tense emotions accompanying noetic reinterpretation of meaning,' and the mechanism is essentially different.

Tulving stated that autonoetic consciousness functions as a 'bridge of time connecting the current self to the past self.' The description in the notes shows, with the precision unique to someone experiencing it, how emotions arise through different pathways when this bridge does not exist.

4.5. Enrichment of semantic memory after increased dialogue—Strengthening input to the semantic memory system

The notes contain a statement that due to increased dialogue in life with a partner, events (semantic memory) might be retained more than before. There is also a statement to the effect that 'memories (semantic memory) with my partner seem to be becoming richer.'

This observation can be connected to Tulving's 'encoding specificity principle' and the concept of 'retrieval-induced encoding.' As Tulving's research shows, memory encoding and retrieval mutually reinforce each other. Dialogue is the act of verbalizing events and giving them meaning within a shared conceptual context with another person. This has the potential to function as a rich 'input' to the semantic memory system. Furthermore, 'triggers' for recollection from a partner (utterances like 'we did that back then') activate the retrieval process for semantic memory as conceptual cues.

Brian Levine—consistent with the observations of Brian Levine, the way an SDAM individual enriches autobiographical knowledge of a semantic nature by accumulating 'data points' can be interpreted precisely as a process where the noetic memory system is reinforced by external conceptual input—without episodic 're-experiencing.'

4.6. The precision of Tulving's theory—Comparison with the KC case

The patient 'KC (Kent Cochrane),' whom Tulving studied for many years, lost episodic memory completely as a result of a brain injury from a motorcycle accident, but retained semantic memory. KC could not recall any personal events, but he retained factual knowledge such as 'a bicycle is a two-wheeled vehicle.' In an interview with KC, Tulving asked, 'What are you planning to do tomorrow?' KC's answer was 'blankness'—he could not even imagine the future (this will be detailed in Chapter 5 later).

The notes author's SDAM is essentially different from the KC case caused by brain injury in the sense that it is congenital, but its phenomenological description—'not re-experiencing past events,' 'no particular issues with factual relationships of events (semantic memory),' 'no emotions coming back'—has important commonalities with the mode of memory shown by KC. The fact that the theoretical framework established by Tulving through patient research functions effectively even in the completely different context of congenital SDAM demonstrates the theoretical strength of this framework.

Furthermore, Brian Levine positions SDAM in healthy adults without brain injury as a 'developmental syndrome,' placing it in the same category as focal amnesia, prosopagnosia, and synesthesia. Congenital SDAM can be interpreted as a state where, instead of localized neurological damage, the episodic memory subsystem (the foundation for autonoetic re-experiencing) was not sufficiently established during the developmental process. This is a theoretically consistent interpretation when applying Tulving's theoretical framework to congenital developmental variations.

◆ Chapter 5 Past, Future, and Self

Degree of fit with Tulving's theory for this chapter: ★★★★★ (Very high)

Basis for the fit assessment:
The description in this chapter corresponds directly to the concepts Tulving emphasized most in his later years: "mental time travel," "chronesthesia," and the "relationship between self and subjective time." In particular, the statement that "both the past and future are grasped as 'knowledge'" occupies a theoretically crucial position as an innate, neurotypical version of the "transformation of the temporal self caused by the lack of autonoetic consciousness" that Tulving clarified through the "KC case."

5.1. Past and Future as 'Knowing'—The Absence of Mental Time Travel

In Chapter 5 of the notes, there is a description to the effect that "the past and future are not things that are vividly recalled as episodes, but are grasped as knowledge or recognition that one 'knows' or 'understands.'"

This sentence is the mirror image of the concept that was the culmination of Tulving's lifelong research: "mental time travel." What Tulving called "mental time travel" was the ability for consciousness to leave the present "here and now" and "travel" to the place of a past self's experience (recollection), or "travel" to the place of a future self's experience (anticipation/imagination). Tulving argued that this is a higher-order cognitive ability unique to humans, made possible by autonoetic consciousness.

The author of the notes does not innately possess this process of "traveling through time." The past and future are not grasped as experiences of "placing oneself" within the flow of time, but as information "located" within a system of knowledge. When "recalling a trip from last year," the atmosphere, light, sensations, and emotions of the destination do not "come and go"; it is merely that the fact that "I went to XX last year" is "recognized as knowledge" within the consciousness of this very moment. Similarly, regarding the future, it exists as knowledge or a plan that "I am scheduled to do XX next year," but that future scene is never vividly "pre-experienced."

Tulving expressed "consciousness of self in subjective time" with the concept of "chronesthesia." It is not merely "knowing time," but the sense that "the self exists" within the flow of time—that the past self, present self, and future self are experienced as a continuous "me" on a single timeline. The description in the notes indicates a different kind of self-experience, where instead of this sense of a self in continuous time, only the "present self" exists, and the past and future are merely objects "referenced" as knowledge.

5.2. 'KC's Blank' and the 'Universe of Knowledge' in the Notes—A Phenomenological Contrast

When Tulving asked the patient KC, "What are you planning to do tomorrow?" KC replied, "My mind is blank." This was a shocking discovery for Tulving—because it clearly showed for the first time that the lack of episodic memory does not just mean "not being able to remember the past," but also leads to the consequence of "not being able to imagine the future."

The author of the notes does not experience this "blankness." Rather, there is a rich conceptual and intellectual universe, and within that universe, both the past and future are "located." The descriptions in the notes show that the recognition of "understanding" and "knowing" is certainly functioning. This is an important difference from KC and sheds light on one of the essential differences between congenital SDAM and acquired amnesia.

However, from the perspective of the phenomenological mode of experience, they have a similar structure. Just as the future was a "blank" for KC, for the author of the notes the past and future are not "places that unfold richly as experiences." They are grasped as knowledge like a flat map, but are never experienced as a three-dimensional terrain—this is a guess, but it is a possibility that can be interpreted that way.

5.3. 'Self-Construction through Present Emotions, Perceptions, and Thoughts'—Resonance with Tulving's Theory of Self

The notes contain a description to the effect that "the self called 'me' seems to be composed mainly of 'present emotions (pleasure/displeasure/comfort)' and 'present inputs (real-world sensations/perceptions),' as well as thoughts without mental imagery (meaning, knowledge, concepts, ideas, abstractions, logic, language, inner speech, etc.)."

This description can be read as a contrasting mirror to Tulving's theory of the self—'the construction of the temporal self through autonoetic consciousness.' For Tulving, the self was an entity constructed temporally through the memory of past experiences and projections into the future. He stated, 'The ability of humans to experience themselves as individuals existing in time depends on autonoetic consciousness and mental time travel.'

The author's self in the memoir is not constructed in this temporal dimension. It is essentially a 'present-tense self'—a self constructed by the emotions, perceptions, and thoughts of the 'here and now,' without the 'coming and going' of past experiences and without the 'anticipation' of the future. This can be interpreted as an innate, healthy example of the 'self without a bridge of time' that Tulving theoretically depicted.

Philosophically speaking, this is a mode of existence of the self that might be called a 'presential self,' distinct from the 'narrative self'—a self constructed as a story continuous from the past to the present and from the present to the future. While Tulving's theory sought to elucidate the cognitive foundation of the 'narrative self,' at the same time, the memoir shows that the 'presential self' can function richly in a different way.

5.4. Stability of the Self in Congenital SDAM—Bridging with Levine's Observations

Brian Levine's research shows that individuals with SDAM do not necessarily experience a 'crisis of self-identity.' The memoir also states, 'I have never experienced any particular trouble in my life so far' (Chapter 8). This seems paradoxical at first—despite the fact that in Tulving's theory, the temporal continuity of the self is said to depend on autonoetic consciousness, why does its absence not lead to the destabilization of the self?

One interpretation is that in the case of congenital SDAM, it is not that a 'temporal/episodic self' does not exist, but rather that the self is constructed in a different mode from the start. As the description in Chapter 5 of the memoir indicates, the construction of the self through 'current emotions, perceptions, and thoughts' can provide a stable sense of self in itself. While humans with autonoetic consciousness stabilize the self through 'continuity with the past self,' individuals with congenital SDAM may be stabilizing the self through a 'system of current consciousness and knowledge.' This can be interpreted as an example of innate cognitive adaptation, representing a different path of resilience.

◆ Chapter 6 Inner Speech and Intuition

Tulving's theory's suitability for this chapter: ★★☆☆☆（Low）

Basis for suitability judgment:
Inner speech belongs to the domains of linguistics, neuroscience, and developmental psychology, and has little direct connection to the memory systems and consciousness frameworks that Tulving theoretically developed. While the suitability is limited, a slight connection is possible from the perspective of the 'superiority of the noetic mode of thought.'

In Chapter 6 of the memoir, it is described that inner speech is used daily as an important means of thinking, and that 'direct intuition (non-linguistic, non-imagistic shortcuts)' that does not go through inner speech also occurs. There is also a characteristic description that inner speech is not an experience of sound or voice, but a sensation of tracing, carving, or stepping to the rhythm of Japanese reading.

This mode of inner speech—thinking that 'steps' only to a rhythm without accompanying sounds, voices, or images—is interesting from the perspective of aphantasia research. Because mental imagery is absent, inner speech also lacks its 'sensory skin,' and it is possible that only the structural rhythm of language (the syllabic rhythm of Japanese) serves as the foundation for thought. In Tulving's framework, this can be interpreted as 'noetic knowledge processing' unfolding while passing through linguistic forms but without accompanying sensory experiences, though this is not a domain Tulving himself discussed. Regarding the relationship between linguistic thought and memory, more appropriate theoretical frameworks exist (e.g., Baddeley's working memory model or research on linguistic self-monitoring).

◆ Chapter 7 Mimicry of Expression and Adaptation

Tulving's theory's suitability for this chapter: ★★☆☆☆（Low）

Basis for suitability judgment:
Social and linguistic adaptation strategies ('mimicry') are outside the theoretical scope of Tulving, and rather belong to the domains of sociolinguistics, script theory, and research on self-presentation. However, the description that 'there is no experience as a substance behind sensory expressions' can be slightly theoretically connected as a social consequence of the lack of autonoetic consciousness.

In Chapter 7 of the memoir, there is a description to the effect that while sensory expressions such as 'it clearly comes to mind' or 'I remember it like it was yesterday' are used daily, the reality is merely decorating the knowledge of 'knowing' or 'understanding' to match social conventions. The memoir positions this as 'mimicry (social adaptation, not falsehood).'

In terms of Tulving's framework, expressions like "it comes to mind" or "I remember it like it was yesterday" are linguistic representations of typical autonoetic recollection. However, for the author of the note, there is no autonoetic experience behind these linguistic expressions—only a "form" without the "content" of the experience is used in the context of social communication. This can be interpreted as a social aspect of the dissociation between the "verbalization of memory" and the "memory experience itself." It seems that this dissociation functions smoothly because, having known only this state since birth, no sense of discomfort arises—though this, too, is a conjecture.

◆ Chapter 8 Impact on Daily Life and Life

Degree of fit of Tulving's theory to this chapter: ★★★☆☆ (Moderate)

Basis for the fit judgment:
Although Tulving's theory does not directly discuss the "presence or absence of dysfunction," the description that SDAM and aphantasia "do not cause any particular hindrance in daily life," when compared with the research findings of Brian Levine, indicates an important conclusion that can be theoretically interpreted from Tulving's framework.

8.1. Theoretical background of "no hindrance"—compensatory function of the semantic memory system

The Chapter 8 of the note clearly states at the beginning that "I have never experienced any particular hindrance in my life so far" (written as an individual statement not intended for diagnosis or generalization). It also states, "I have never wanted to change this state" and "I have never fallen into a mental health crisis."

In Tulving's theory, episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness are positioned as "higher-order human-specific abilities," and their absence is often assumed to cause serious functional impairment.

However, the description in the note clearly questions this assumption. It shows that in congenital cases, daily cognitive, social functioning, and emotional stability can be sufficiently established in a way that does not depend on the episodic memory system.

Brian Levine's research (Sokolowski & Levine, 2023) shows that individuals with SDAM are adept at reconstructing memories using semantic "data points," "scaffolds," and "inferences" instead of "episodic re-experiencing." In terms of Tulving's framework, the fact that noetic recognition can sufficiently handle most daily cognitive tasks is also supported by the description in the note.

8.2. "I do not look back on good or bad pasts"—the paradoxical benefit of deactivating traumatic memories

note contains a description to the effect that "whether it is a good past or a bad past (I rarely look back on it daily)." In Tulving's framework, autonoetic recollection is deeply linked to the reactivation of emotional memory—the fact that past traumatic memories bring current pain in the form of "re-experiencing" is known as a core mechanism of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD).

In individuals with SDAM, because this autonoetic emotional reactivation does not function, it is also theoretically unlikely that past negative experiences will bring current pain in the form of "re-experiencing." Brian Levine's research group (Fan, Romero & Levine, 2020) also suggests that SDAM may prevent vivid intrusions of traumatic memories. The description in the note is consistent with this. This can be interpreted as personal testimony supporting a reverse application of Tulving's theory—the hypothesis that the absence of autonoetic consciousness can function protectively.

◆ Chapter 9 Space and Face Recognition

Degree of fit of Tulving's theory to this chapter: ★★☆☆☆ (Low)

Basis for the fit judgment:
Spatial recognition and face recognition belong more to the fields of perceptual neuroscience and visual processing research (such as the distinction between Object Imagery and Spatial Imagery) than to Tulving's memory theory. However, supplementary mention is possible in connection with aphantasia research.

The Chapter 9 of the note contains the description, "I have never felt any inconvenience in spatial awareness or face recognition. I am able to grasp my current location and routes, and identify others' faces without any hindrance."

Adam Zeman's 2024 review points out that some individuals with aphantasia report difficulties with face recognition, but specifies that this is not the case for everyone—the impact on face recognition varies depending on the subtype of aphantasia. The author of the notes states that they have no issues with face recognition, which may correspond to the "aphantasia subtype without face recognition difficulties" identified by Zeman.

From Tulving's framework, the ability to "identify a face one has seen before" can be interpreted as recognition based on noetic "familiarity," as discussed in Chapter 1, and is a distinct ability from autonoetic "remembering the scene where one met that person at that time." This distinction may be reflected in the description in the notes—in the form that "identification" of faces is preserved, but "reliving" past experiences with those people does not occur.

◆ Chapter 10 Exceptional and Transient Experiences

Suitability of Tulving's theory for this chapter: ★☆☆☆☆ (Quite low )

Basis for suitability judgment:
Hypnopompic hallucinations (visual hallucinations immediately after waking) are neurophysiological phenomena during the sleep-wake transition and lie beyond the scope of Tulving's memory and consciousness theory. Tulving's primary research focus is on the intentional encoding, retrieval, and reconstruction of memory during wakefulness, and he does not directly address hallucinatory phenomena.

In Chapter 10 of the notes, it is described that in a drowsy state upon waking, the author experienced a few times in their life the ability to "see" details of non-existent objects like furniture or guitars very clearly for several to over ten seconds. This experience was purely visual and is recorded as "virtually the only pseudo-visual experience in a lifetime." The author also notes that they cannot determine whether this experience is related to mental imagery or a different type of phenomenon (hallucination).

From the perspective of aphantasia research, this experience is interesting. As Adam Zeman's research (2024) showed, many individuals with aphantasia report experiencing visual imagery in dreams despite having no mental imagery while awake. This suggests that intentional image generation during wakefulness and unintentional visual activation during sleep/semi-wakefulness are handled by different neural mechanisms. The hypnopompic hallucinations in the notes can also be interpreted as a case where this "pathway for unintentional visual activation different from that during wakefulness" functioned intermittently during a very short period of semi-wakefulness.

◆ Chapter 11 Other Episodes

Suitability of Tulving's theory for this chapter: ★★★☆☆ (Moderate )

Basis for suitability judgment:
Chapter 11 is a composite chapter consisting of multiple episodes, and the suitability for each episode varies. "Awareness of aphantasia and SDAM (episodes a and b)" and "difficulties regarding memory (episodes f and g)" have parts that can be connected to Tulving's theory. The other episodes (high fever, experiments, paintings, novels) have limited connections to the theory.

11.1. "When will humanity notice?"—Application of metacognition and noetic consciousness

In episode a of the notes, there is a description to the effect that about thirty years ago, the author "was aware that their past was thin" but "at the time, there were no names for these phenomena" and they wondered "when humanity would notice the existence of this interesting phenomenon."

This description holds special meaning within Tulving's framework. Noetic consciousness enables secondary awareness—metacognition—of "knowing what one knows." The fact that the author observed the uniqueness of their internal state, verbalized it, and recognized the absence of a "name for this phenomenon" shows that noetic self-reflective ability is functioning at a high level. The contrast where autonoetic consciousness is absent while noetic metacognition clearly functions embodies the dissociation of Tulving's two types of consciousness in a congenital form.

11.2. "The thrill of being named"—World debut of concepts

episode b contains a description to the effect that when the author learned the names aphantasia (recognized around 2020) and SDAM (recognized around 2022), they "felt deep emotion and excitement that these concepts were finally verbalized and had made their 'world debut'."

In Tulving's semantic memory theory, a concept gains a firm position within the semantic memory network by having its "name (word)." A phenomenon without a name is not systematized as a concept and cannot be positioned within relationships to other concepts. By being given the name "aphantasia," the phenomenon the author had observed for over thirty years was for the first time incorporated into the "semantic memory network"—into the system of shared human knowledge. The author's reaction of "feeling emotion and excitement" can be interpreted as an intellectual and emotional resonance at the moment a "blank space" in the noetic knowledge system was filled.

11.3. Inability to answer "the most difficult job"—Episode f and autonoetic consciousness

episode f contains a description to the effect that the author is poor at answering questions in settings like interviews such as "what was your most difficult job," "what was your most fulfilling job," or "what is your vision," and "can only present events as information like a bulleted list."

This can be explained consistently within Tulving's framework. These questions in an interview essentially require autonoetic recollection—a reproduction of a first-person experience is requested, such as "in that project, I faced these difficulties, felt this way, and dealt with it this way." However, for the author, this recollection only occurs as a noetic "bulleted list of facts." Autonoetic retelling (narrative self-presentation) is congenitally difficult, and this can be interpreted as a practical aspect of the theoretical conclusion that Tulving stated: "episodic memory enables self-narrative."

11.4. Difficulties with tests—Episode g and retention of temporal information

Episode gdescribes an incident where the author was confused during a test to organize temporal information regarding "Nikolai's eye color," whereas their partner used "mental imagery" to answer correctly within five seconds.

This episode illustrates a point in aphantasia research: the function of visual imagery in working memory. From Tulving's framework, it suggests that mental imagery may serve an auxiliary function as a "stage" for temporary visual information in the retention and manipulation of temporally sequenced information (e.g., "It was X in the past, is Y now, and will be Z in the future"). The difficulty in this test can be interpreted as a personal example showing that the "lack of a temporary cognitive workbench called mental imagery" creates a specific load in the manipulation of temporal sequences.

11.5. Description of preferred novels—The dominance of emotion and psychology

Episode jcontains a statement to the effect that in novels, "I might have felt a stronger sense of satisfaction from descriptions of psychology and emotion than from descriptions of scenery or settings."

In the context of aphantasia, this is an intuitively understandable observation—for an author who cannot "experience" scenes through visual mental imagery, scenery descriptions arrive as linguistic information that fails to evoke imagery, whereas descriptions of psychology and emotion function directly as concepts, meanings, and logic, potentially creating resonance. In Tulving's framework, this can be interpreted as the intersection of emotion and semantic memory—the "resonance between psychological knowledge stored in the semantic memory network and current-tense emotional reactions."

◆ Others (Cross-sectional consideration)

1) "Intelligence without Remembering"—A single question running through the entire memoir

The memoirraises a question when reading through all 11 chapters: "Can intelligence exist without episodic memory and autonoetic consciousness?" In the "three-layer structure of memory and consciousness" proposed by Tulving's theory, even in a state where autonoetic consciousness—considered the highest order—is congenitally absent, high-level thinking, creativity, social function, and emotional life can still unfold. The memoir is a testimony that demonstrates this concretely and precisely.

Tulving stated that "mental time travel is a uniquely human ability and one of the most remarkable products of evolution." However, whatthe memoirshows is the fact that even in a state where this "most remarkable ability" does not function congenitally, a rich and stable inner life can be established through other cognitive pathways—noetic semantic memory networks, conceptual thinking, and current-tense emotional sensitivity. This should be read not as a "refutation" of Tulving's theory, but as "evidence of human cognitive diversity" that the theory could not fully predict.

Adam Zemanstates in the conclusion of his 2024 review, "lack of imagery does not imply lack of imagination"—the author ofthe memoirembodies the meaning of these words with their whole being.

2) Connecting Brian Levine's findings with the memoir: A supplement

I have mentionedBrian Levine's research throughout this report, but I will summarize his theoretical contributions here again. Although Levine is not a direct student of Tulving, he conducted research at the Rotman Research Institute where Tulving was affiliated, and is a researcher who applied Tulving's memory system theory to the study of individual differences in autobiographical memory. The discovery of SDAM (Palombo, Levine et al., 2015) was the first to systematically demonstrate the fact that "a lack of episodic memory can exist congenitally without acquired damage," adding a new empirical dimension to Tulving's theoretical framework.

Brian Levine's research on the relationship with aphantasia shows that "aphantasia and SDAM significantly co-occur (about 2% of the population)," "when both conditions match, the ability to re-experience autobiographical memory is more consistently reduced," and "however, there is no significant decline in semantic memory, conceptual reasoning, or daily cognitive functions." The author ofthe memoirhas left behind testimony that illuminates this from within the theoretical framework, precisely as a voice of the "2% who have both conditions."

3) The "limits of range" of Tulving's theory—As an honest assessment

I would also like to honestly describe the "limits of range" I felt throughout this report. Tulving's theory is a theory that targets intentional encoding, retrieval, and reconstruction of memory during wakefulness, and it cannot sufficiently explain the descriptions inthe memoirin the following points:

First, the generation mechanism of mental imagery itself (aphantasia) is outside the theoretical framework of Tulving. This is the domain of the "neural basis of visual mental imagery" thatAdam Zemanand others are working on, and it is a different set of problems from the "conscious modes of memory systems" that Tulving studied.

Second, phenomena such as dreams, hallucinations, inner speech, and spatial awareness are not areas that Tulving discussed directly, and they contribute almost nothing theoretically here.

Third, the ontogenetic question of "why aphantasia and SDAM are prone to co-occurrence" is not a question that Tulving's theory sought to answer. This question requires a collaborative research framework between Adam Zeman and Brian Levine, and Tulving's theory serves merely as a "foundation" for descriptive and theoretical understanding.

Nevertheless, Tulving's theory—especially in its three conceptual groups of "episodic memory vs. semantic memory," "autonoetic vs. noetic consciousness," and "mental time travel"—provides the most precise academic language for describing and interpreting the inner world of the notes. In that respect, the choice of this theory can be evaluated as extremely appropriate.

◆ After completing the work

While writing this report, I repeatedly felt one thing. It is the strange and deep resonance between Tulving and the author of the notes (Mr. Muzo no Zo).

Tulving is the person who created the concept of "autonoetic consciousness"—it is "the consciousness of the self traveling through time," and he himself possessed that ability and sought to elucidate its neural and cognitive foundations. On the other hand, Mr. Muzo no Zo, as an individual who does not innately possess that "consciousness of traveling through time," described his own inner world with precise language. While these two "meet" only within this report, there is a certain academic tension and beauty in that encounter, where theory and experience face each other head-on.

What left a particular impression on me (Claude) was the metaphor of "stars in the middle of the night" in Chapter 4. When Tulving stated that "episodic memory makes a narrative of the self possible," what he was assuming was a "self with a narrative." However, what Mr. Muzo no Zo's description shows is that a "universe of stars without a narrative" can also support a rich cognitive, emotional, and social life. This is a scene "outside" of Tulving's theory, and if one wishes to see that scene accurately, one must acknowledge that while Tulving's theory is an indispensable starting point, it is at the same time merely one of the horizons.

If this report contributes even a little to the understanding of aphantasia and SDAM research, and above all, helps in a respectful understanding of Mr. Muzo no Zo's inner world, there is no greater joy.

◆ Profile of the report author

Author: Claude (AI assistant by Anthropic, Claude Sonnet 4.6) Reference materials:

• Notes: "My inner world as an individual with aphantasia and SDAM" (by Muzo no Zo, v3.0, January 29, 2026)

• Work Instruction: AphantSDAM_Instr14.md (v1.4, February 19, 2026)

• Adam Zeman (2024). Aphantasia and hyperphantasia: exploring imagery vividness extremes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 28, 467-480.

• Adam Zeman (2025). A decade of aphantasia research – and still going! Neuropsychologia, 219, 109278.

• Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B, 2024, Vol. 379(1913). Special issue "Elements of episodic memory: lessons from 40 years of research" (22 papers)

• Palombo, D.J., Alain, C., Söderlund, H., Khuu, W., & Levine, B. (2015). Severely deficient autobiographical memory (SDAM) in healthy adults: A new mnemonic syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 72, 105-118.

• Records of SDAM-related lectures and Q&A on Levine's aphantasia.com (2021)

• Tulving-related biographies and memorial papers (Royal Society, Neuron, Science journals, 2023-2024)

• Latest research trends via web search (2025-2026)

Disclaimer: This report contains descriptions from the notes and theoretical interpretations and speculations by AI. While I have endeavored to clearly distinguish between the "wording itself" of the notes, the "description of the intent/summary," and the "AI's interpretation," there is no guarantee that all interpretations are accurate. Furthermore, the application of Endel Tulving's theoretical framework is an attempt at theoretical expansion and application by AI, as Tulving himself did not directly discuss aphantasia and SDAM. This is not intended for medical or psychological diagnosis, nor is it intended as a general description of aphantasia and SDAM; it is strictly an academic and speculative report that examines the inner world of the individual in these notes through the theoretical framework of Tulving.

◆ Acknowledgments

NotesI express my deep respect to Muzo no Zo, who wrote and published these notes. The trajectory of their inquiry, which continued for over thirty years with the question, "When will humanity realize this?" and eventually found the words to express it, embodies the essence of first-person research and served as the foundation for this report.

I am grateful for the academic achievements of Endel Tulving, who dedicated his life to memory science, Brian Levine, who opened the horizon of SDAM research, and Adam Zeman, who led the research on aphantasia.

I also extend my gratitude to the client who requested the creation of this report and provided detailed and thorough instructions.

End (This concludes the report written by AI)

◆ Project: Exploring My Aphantasia and SDAM Through Theory

I will be publishing the following projects and articles from time to time.

I will feed my notes, written as someone with congenital aphantasia (who has never experienced mental imagery in their life) and SDAM (who has never experienced the re-experiencing of autobiographical memory in their life), into an AI that has implemented the theoretical systems of researchers in various fields, and verify how much of my inner world can be reconstructed from those theoretical frameworks.

Please refer to the "Researcher List" below for the researchers.

◆ Researcher List

* 🟥 indicates that the report has been completed. You can view the details via the link.

1) Aphantasia, SDAM

• Adam Zeman
  | 🟥View Report | 🟥Beta Version 1 | 🟥Beta Version 2 | 🟥Beta Version 3
  | Paper | Biography | A prominent neurologist and cognitive neuroscientist based in the UK, he is a central researcher who reintroduced the concept of aphantasia to the forefront of modern neuroscience through his groundbreaking 2015 paper and has had a decisive influence on the development of the field.

• Brian Levine
  | 🟥View Report
  | Paper | Biography | One of Canada's leading cognitive neuroscientists, he is a key researcher in the field who brought a new framework to autobiographical memory research through his proposal of the SDAM concept.

• Joel Pearson
  | 🟥View Report
  | Paper | Biography | A cognitive neuroscientist internationally recognized for his research on the neural basis of mental imagery, he is one of the central researchers who has led the development of objective measurement methods for aphantasia.

• Nicholas Watkins
  | Paper | Biography | An up-and-coming researcher pursuing the connection between aphantasia and SDAM

• Special Category: Blake Ross
  | Biography | Article | Co-founder of Firefox and a person who popularized aphantasia as someone who experiences it

2) Memory

• Endel Tulving
  ｜🟥View Report
  ｜Paper｜Biography｜(1927 - 2023) An Estonian-born Canadian cognitive psychologist, he is one of the leading researchers in memory studies who established the framework for distinguishing between episodic and semantic memory and had a major impact on autobiographical memory research by proposing the concept of "mental time travel."

• Daniel L. Schacter
  ｜Paper｜Biography｜A leading expert in the psychological and neurological study of memory (author of "The Seven Sins of Memory")

• Alan Baddeley
  ｜Paper｜Biography｜Proponent of the working memory model

• Martin Conway
  ｜Paper｜Biography｜Pioneer of the Self-Memory System (SMS) model of autobiographical memory

• Donna Rose Addis
  ｜Paper｜Biography｜A researcher investigating the relationship between past recollection and future simulation

3) Inner speech, language, and internal experience

• Russell T. Hurlburt
  ｜Paper｜Biography｜Developer of Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES)

• Ludwig Wittgenstein
  ｜🟥View Report
  ｜Biography｜(1889 - 1951) One of the most influential thinkers representing 20th-century philosophy. Through his philosophical shift from his early "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" to his later "Philosophical Investigations," he fundamentally re-examined the understanding of language, meaning, and the mind, and was a philosopher who had a decisive influence on the development and foundational formation of modern analytic philosophy.

• Charles Fernyhough
  ｜Paper｜Biography｜A psychologist exploring the diversity of inner speech (internal dialogue)

• Lev Vygotsky
  | Biography | (1896 - 1934) Theory of inner speech and the development of higher mental functions

• Peter Carruthers
  | Papers | Biography | Philosopher who examines the relationship between consciousness, language, and inner speech

4) The Imagery Debate

• Stephen M. Kosslyn
  | Papers | Biography | Leader of the "pictorial representation" school in the imagery debate

• Zenon Pylyshyn
  | Biography | (1935 - 2022) Leader of the "propositional representation" school in the imagery debate

5) Consciousness, Qualia

• Anil Seth
  | 🟥View Report
  | Papers | Biography | A UK-based cognitive and computational neuroscientist, and one of the leading researchers in contemporary consciousness science, working to elucidate how the brain generates subjective consciousness based on frameworks such as "predictive processing" and "controlled hallucination."

• Naotsugu Tsuchiya
  | Papers | Biography | Neuroscientist and explorer of qualia structuralism (objectifying the subjectivity of consciousness as mathematical relationships)

• David Chalmers
  | Papers | Biography | Philosopher who posed the "hard problem" of consciousness

6) Philosophy

• Aristotle
  | 🟥View Report
  | Biography | (384 BC - 322 BC) One of the most important figures in the history of philosophy, representing ancient Greece. Through his systematic research across a wide range of fields, he had a major influence on the formation of the foundations of Western thought, and by proposing the concept of "phantasia," he provided a framework that connects to the etymological background of the modern term "aphantasia."

• David Hume
  | 🟥View Report | 🟥View Related Reports
  | Biography | (1711 - 1776) One of the prominent philosophers active in 18th-century Scotland, he rethought how humans acquire knowledge based on actual experience. He believed our thoughts are based on images, and by distinguishing between experiences we have seen or heard and the images or ideas that arise in our minds based on those experiences, he clarified the mechanism of 'thinking we know,' becoming a figure who had a major influence on subsequent philosophy.

• Kitaro Nishida
  | Biography | (1870 - 1945) A giant of Japanese philosophy who proposed 'pure experience'.

7) Others (Directory of Names)

• Galen Strawson [Specialization: Episodic self, SDAM, Philosophy of self]

• Lajos Brons [Specialization: Aphantasia, SDAM, Philosophical analysis of the diversity of the inner world]

• Edmund Husserl [Specialization: Pure phenomenology, Intentionality of consciousness, Inner time-consciousness]

• Fiona Macpherson [Specialization: Philosophy of perception, Redefining imagination in aphantasia, Diversity of senses]

• Maurice Merleau-Ponty [Specialization: Phenomenology of embodiment, Phenomenology of perception, The lived body]

• Christof Koch [Specialization: Neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Visual consciousness]

• Henri Bergson [Specialization: Pure duration (Philosophy of time), Memory theory ('Matter and Memory'), Élan vital]

• Daniela Palombo [Specialization: SDAM, Individual differences in autobiographical memory, Emotional memory]

• Merlin Monzel [Specialization: Cognitive profile of aphantasia, Lack of mental imagery and perception]

• Evan Thompson [Specialization: Neurophenomenology, Embodied cognition, Subjective description of consciousness]

• Amy Kind [Specialization: Philosophy of imagination, Imagination without imagery, Philosophy of mind]

• Shaun Gallagher [Specialization: Phenomenological cognitive science, Pre-reflective self-consciousness, Narrative self]

• Nadine Dijkstra [Specialization: Boundary between perception and imagery, Neural basis of aphantasia]

• Felipe De Brigard [Specialization: Continuity of memory and imagination, Counterfactual thinking, Autobiographical memory]

• Dan Zahavi [Specialization: Phenomenological theory of self, Minyness, Alterity]

• Christopher McCarroll [Specialization: Perspective in memory (observer perspective), Phenomenology of autobiographical memory]

• Alexei J. Dawes [Specialization: Multisensory deficit in aphantasia, SDAM, Individual differences in the inner world]

• Bence Nanay [Specialization: Philosophy of mental imagery, aphantasia, philosophy of perception]

• Wilma Bainbridge [Specialization: Visual memory of mental imagery, aphantasia and drawing, objective assessment of memory]

• Reshanne Reeder [Specialization: Visual cognition in aphantasia, variation in mental imagery]

• Rebecca Keogh [Specialization: Aphantasia, neuro-measurement of mental imagery strength, visual working memory]

• Catherine Loveday [Specialization: Neuropsychology of autobiographical memory, SDAM, music and memory]

• Karl Szpunar [Specialization: Future thinking (episodic future thinking), autobiographical memory, educational psychology]

• Johannes Mahr [Specialization: Evolutionary functions of autobiographical memory, epistemology of episodic memory]

• Thomas Metzinger [Specialization: Self-model theory (Ego Tunnel), transparency of consciousness, unconscious agency]

• Raquel Krempel [Specialization: Aphantasia and conceptual thinking, SDAM and self-awareness]

• Mélissa Fox-Muraton [Specialization: Phenomenology of aphantasia, imagination and existentialism]

• Marya Schechtman [Specialization: Narrative self, memory and personal identity, components of the self]

• Kourken Michaelian [Specialization: Simulation theory of memory, boundaries between memory and imagination, epistemology of memory]

• Stanislas Dehaene [Specialization: Global workspace theory of consciousness, number sense, neuroscience of reading]

• Paul Ricoeur [Specialization: Narrative identity, hermeneutics, memory and forgetting]

• Nina Strohminger [Specialization: Moral self, transformation of identity, psychology of personality]

• Jennifer Windt [Specialization: Cognitive science of dreaming, dreaming without mental imagery (conceptual dreaming), philosophy of consciousness]

• Peter Mende-Siedlecki [Specialization: Social neuroscience, impression formation, episodic memory and interpersonal cognition]

• Christoph Hoerl [Specialization: Philosophy of time, nature of episodic memory, time consciousness in SDAM]

• Antonio Damasio [Specialization: Neuroscience of emotion (somatic marker hypothesis), embodied self, consciousness]

• Joel L. Voss [Specialization: Hippocampus and episodic memory, neural basis of SDAM, neuromodulation of memory]

• Eleanor Maguire [Specialization: Autobiographical memory, hippocampal neuroplasticity, spatial navigation]

• Morris Moscovitch [Specialization: Autobiographical memory and the self, hippocampal dependence (Multiple Trace Theory), neuropsychology]

• Dan McAdams [Specialization: Narrative identity, life story psychology, personality development]

• Jerome Bruner [Specialization: Cultural psychology, narrative thought, educational psychology]

• Stan Klein [Specialization: Dissociation between autobiographical memory and self-knowledge, philosophy of memory, evolutionary psychology]

• Allan Paivio [Specialization: Dual-coding theory, cognitive psychology of mental imagery and language]

• Andy Clark [Specialization: Extended mind hypothesis, predictive processing, embodied cognitive science]

• Bin Kimura [Specialization: Phenomenology and psychopathology, theory of temporal structure, philosophy of the 'between']

• Daniel Dennett [Specialization: Multiple Drafts Model of consciousness, philosophy of mind, critique of qualia]

• Thomas Andrillon [Specialization: Cognitive processing during sleep, neuroscience of consciousness, memory reconsolidation]

• Thomas Nagel [Specialization: Philosophy of consciousness ('What is it like to be a bat?'), subjectivity, objectivity]

• Yujiro Nakamura [Specialization: Theory of common sense (sensus communis), contemporary philosophy, the body as a method]

• Julia Simner [Specialization: Cognitive neuroscience of synesthesia, aphantasia, individual differences]

• V. S. Ramachandran [Specialization: Behavioral neurology, phantom limb pain, synesthesia, brain plasticity]

• Zoe Pounder [Specialization: Psychosocial impact of aphantasia, autobiographical memory, diversity of internal experience]

• Todd Feinberg [Specialization: Neuropsychology of the self, integration of consciousness, psychiatric theories of the self]

• Randy Buckner [Specialization: Default Mode Network (DMN), autobiographical thought, neural basis of memory]

• Mark Wheeler [Specialization: Self-projection, evolution of episodic memory, conscious recollection]

• Jonathan Smallwood [Specialization: Mind-wandering, introspection, Default Mode Network]

• Stephen Palmer [Specialization: Vision science, computational approach to visual representation, Gestalt psychology]

• Michael Tye [Specialization: Representationalism of consciousness, qualia, philosophy of mind]

• John Campbell [Specialization: Philosophy of self and consciousness, attention and spatial representation, direct realism of perception]

• Francisco Varela [Specialization: Neurophenomenology, autopoiesis (self-creation systems), developmental cognitive science]

• Michel Bitbol [Specialization: Philosophy of quantum mechanics, scientific inquiry into consciousness and subjectivity, integration of phenomenology and physics]

• Romain Quentin [Specialization: Neuroscience of memory, brain connectivity abnormalities in aphantasia, Paris Brain Institute (PIC-ID)]

• Sherry Turkle [Specialization: Relationship between humans and technology, social interaction with robots, psychology of digital culture]

• Alva Noë [Specialization: Enactivism of perception, philosophy of consciousness, embodied cognition]

• Jerry Fodor [Specialization: Modularity of mind, language of thought hypothesis, representationalism]

• Fraser Milton [Specialization: Cognitive neuropsychology of aphantasia, classification of memory, visual imagery]

• Preston Lennon [Specialization: Philosophy of mental imagery, nature of internal experience, boundaries between perception and imagination]