Verifying Haba-tan Pay+ 5th Round | 12.9 Billion Yen, Identity Verification, and Misdirected Emails
【As of August 2, 2026】
The 5th round of Hyogo Prefecture's premium digital voucher, "Haba-tan Pay+," is a program where one unit of 5,000 yen allows for 7,500 yen in spending, with a limit of 4 units per person. There were 1,179,524 applicants. Excluding duplicate applications and similar issues, the prefecture granted all applicants their requested number of units. The usage period ended on July 31, 2026.
At Seikei Plus, we have covered the budget, identity verification, multiple accounts, and misdirected emails in several articles. However, because articles based on information available at the time of publication were scattered, terms like "registered," "won," "purchased," and "actually used" were mixed together. Some expressions, such as "arbitrarily increased by 2.6 billion yen" or "personal information leak of 190,000 people," require distinction from the official prefectural documents released later.
Therefore, in this article, based on the prefecture's budget documents, administrative specifications, gubernatorial press conferences, and the prefecture's verification report, we will organize and separate confirmed facts, points that cannot be confirmed, and Seikei Plus's assessment.
The system design of Haba-tan Pay+ and the issues surrounding 100% national funding and fairness have also been organized in past articles:The funding is actually 100% national tax!? The inconvenient truth hidden behind the heartwarming story of Hyogo Prefecture's "Haba-tan Pay+"
Conclusion first—what could and could not be confirmed
The following points have been confirmed.
The initial project cost for the 5th round was 10.285 billion yen, and due to an increase in applicants, the required amount reached 12.9 billion yen
The shortfall of 2.615 billion yen was first diverted from other budgets and then corrected through the June supplementary budget
In the budget documents, the final 12.9 billion yen was structured to be covered by the national government's Local Revitalization Grant for Priority Support against Rising Prices
Although the purchase is limited to Hyogo Prefecture residents, identity verification using My Number cards or driver's licenses was not adopted
On the other hand, measures such as two-step verification, warning displays, and duplicate checks combining surnames and addresses were included in the specifications
The email sent to approximately 190,000 people in January 2026 was a misdirected email that occurred in the 4th round's child-rearing support category, not the 5th round
In October 2025, a personal information leak actually occurred in the 4th round's application system where another person's information was displayed
Conversely, there are points that could not be confirmed from the public documents.
Actual cases where non-residents applied with false addresses, won, made payments, and completed store usage
Actual cases where the same person purchased with multiple accounts and used the premium portion multiple times
The number of people excluded as duplicate applicants in the 5th round
The number of cases invalidated due to fraudulent use or the number of cases consulted with the police
The final purchase amount, usage amount, usage rate, unused balance, and economic impact of the 5th round
There is insufficient evidence to conclude that 'fraud occurred.' However, the fact that the prefecture has not provided figures showing how well duplicate exclusion functioned in a system that does not use identity verification documents remains an issue that needs to be verified.
What kind of system was the 5th round?
The system overview based on the prefecture's 5th round official page and the secretariat operations specifications is as follows.
Target: Residents of Hyogo Prefecture. Limited to those who own a smartphone.
Sales unit: 7,500 yen worth for 5,000 yen per unit
Premium rate: 50%
Application limit: 4 units per person. Use up to 30,000 yen worth with a 20,000 yen deposit
Application period: From March 18 to April 12, 2026
Charge period: From April 24 to June 30
Usage period: From April 24 to July 31
Participating stores: Approximately 15,000 stores
In the prefecture's April 23 announcement, all 1,179,524 applicants were declared winners for their requested number of units. However, it is noted that duplicate applications by the same person are excluded.
The usage period for the 5th round has already passed. According to the secretariat specifications released by the prefecture, refunds or exchanges for cash after purchase are not permitted. As the final results were not confirmed as of August 2, this article will be updated once the prefecture releases them.
What is the difference between 10.29 billion yen, 12.9 billion yen, and 27.93 billion yen?
Three different figures are used in this project, each with a different nature.
10.285 billion yen — Initial project cost
The prefecture allocated 10.285 billion yen for the 5th round in the FY2025 December supplementary budget. In the prefecture's explanatory materials, this is rounded to '10.29 billion yen'.
This amount includes not only the premium funding but also administrative costs such as systems, public relations, call centers, store support, payment processing, and effectiveness verification.
12.9 billion yen — Required amount to allow everyone to win their requested number of units
Initially, about 931,000 people were expected, and if applications exceeded the budget, the number of winning units was planned to be adjusted from 4 to 3. However, there were approximately 1.18 million applicants, and the prefecture changed its policy to allow everyone to win their requested number of units.
At the April 15th gubernatorial press conference, it was explained that the required amount would be 12.9 billion yen, leaving a shortfall of 2.6 billion yen. The prefecture decided to divert funds from other budgets and then adjust the funding sources in the most recent supplementary budget.
Subsequently, a funding adjustment of 2.615 billion yen was included in the June supplementary budget for fiscal year 2026, and the original proposal was passed by the prefectural assembly on June 11th.
Therefore, the accurate sequence of events is not that "the governor increased the amount by 2.6 billion yen through executive decision." The prefecture first responded by diverting funds, and then the prefectural assembly voted on the supplementary budget to adjust the funding sources. Setting aside how one evaluates the process of announcing that everyone had won before the vote, the explanation of the procedures must be written in this order.
27.93 billion yen — The initial planned issuance amount
The secretariat's specifications state an initial planned issuance amount of 27.93 billion yen. Based on the number of units issued in the specifications, the breakdown is 18.62 billion yen to be paid by purchasers and 9.31 billion yen for the premium portion.
This is not the same figure as the 12.9 billion yen in project costs to be paid by the prefecture. Furthermore, 27.93 billion yen was the initial plan before the decision to grant everyone a win. While the same amount remains on the prefecture's official page updated on July 1st, the final issuance amount and final usage amount after the decision to grant everyone a win could not be confirmed as of August 2nd.
To what extent is "100% national funding" accurate?
The initial budget of 10.285 billion yen is listed entirely as "priority grants" in the prefecture's budget documents. Furthermore, in the June supplementary budget, the 2.615 billion yen handled through fund diversion was also adjusted to be funded by the national government's Priority Support Local Revitalization Temporary Grant.
For this reason, according to the budget documents, the final 12.9 billion yen is structured to be covered by national grants. The explanation that "Hyogo Prefecture newly invested 12.9 billion yen of its own independent funds" is not accurate.
However, national funds are also tax money. Just because it is a national grant does not mean that explanations to the prefectural assembly and the residents of the prefecture can be taken lightly. The prefecture should verify and demonstrate why 12.9 billion yen was allocated to premium-attached digital vouchers when there were multiple options, and how effective it was in supporting household finances and local consumption.
For an article that considers the same 12.9 billion yen in terms of priority relative to emergency medical care and hospital equipment, please also refer to Hyogo Prefecture using 'donations' for doctor cars—questioning the priority against the approximately 12.9 billion yen for Haba-tan Pay+.
Is there "no" identity verification?
Here, we need to distinguish between terms.
In the 5th edition, the submission of official identity verification documents such as My Number cards, driver's licenses, or certificates of residence has not been adopted. At the April 28th gubernatorial press conference, the governor explained that the operation involves having users self-report their address at the time of registration to confirm residency within the prefecture.
On the other hand, it is not the case that there is no verification at all. The secretariat's specifications list the following measures:
Measures such as two-factor authentication to prevent impersonation and fraudulent purchases by the same individual
Warning displays to prevent false registration
Duplicate checks combining surnames and addresses, etc.
Completion of duplicate checks for all applications between the end of the application period and the start of usage
The governor also stated that name-matching checks are performed for the same individual or impersonation, and if fraud is discovered, it will be invalidated, and in malicious cases, they will consult with the police.
Therefore, it is too broad to write that "identity verification was refused" or "there is no identity verification at all." More accurately, it is a design that does not adopt strict identity verification using official certificates, but instead confirms identity through self-reported addresses, authentication, and data matching.
What should be questioned is not just which method was adopted. It is the fact that the results—such as how many cases were excluded during duplicate checks, or how many cases of out-of-prefecture residency or false registration were identified—have not been made public.
Viewing the Multiple Account Issue in 4 Stages
In a past article, I introduced the point that fraudulent purchases could be made by using multiple phone numbers or email addresses. However, to verify the loopholes in the system, at least the following four stages must be distinguished.
Successfully registered an account
Successfully applied for gift certificates
Won the lottery and successfully topped up
Used it at a store and received the premium portion
Reaching the registration screen does not mean that fraudulent purchases or duplicate usage have been established. Even a winning notification alone does not mean that payment or usage has been confirmed.
In the public documents I was able to verify this time, there was no record confirming that the same person made multiple purchases under false names or similar, and actually used them at stores. Seikei Plus also does not have any materials that show the process from application to store usage in a way that a third party could verify.
On the other hand, as long as the system is based on self-reported addresses without using official certificates, it is natural that doubts remain as to how far data matching can detect duplicates or impersonation. The prefecture should at least publish the number of duplicate exclusions, the number of invalidations, the number of investigations, and the number of police consultations.
It cannot be said that "fraudulent purchase has been proven." However, it also cannot be said that "the mechanism has been sufficiently verified and proven to be problem-free." This is the current state of affairs.
Email to approximately 190,000 people was a misdelivery, not a "personal information leak"
On January 16, 2026, a notice intended for 24,308 people who had not yet topped up their accounts for the 4th round of the child-rearing support program was also sent to 192,812 ineligible app users. The total number of deliveries was 217,120.
According to the prefecture's verification results report, the person in charge at the sub-contractor made a mistake when extracting the target recipients, and the email was sent without the secretariat noticing the error during their confirmation. The prefecture states that it has instructed them to thoroughly implement double-checks and to report the check results to the prefecture every time a delivery is made.
This is a serious misdelivery that sent an unexpected financial notice to approximately 190,000 people. However, from the published report, there is no confirmation of facts indicating that the names or addresses of the recipients were leaked to other recipients via email. It is inaccurate to rephrase this as "190,000 pieces of personal information were leaked."
Separately, on October 23, 2025, a glitch occurred in the application system for the 4th round of the child-rearing support program, where another person's application information was displayed during a duplicate application. According to the prefecture's log analysis, the actual leak was confirmed to be 15 cases, involving 30 people including relatives.
In short, to summarize, there are the following two points:
October 2025: Personal information leak where another person's application information was displayed
January 2026: Misdelivery where payment notices were sent to approximately 190,000 ineligible users
The nature of the problems and the number of people involved are different. If you are going to criticize, you must do so without conflating them.
Furthermore, the secretariat for the 4th round was operated by the Kobe branch of Nippon Travel Agency, while the selected operator for the 5th round is JTB Corp. Kobe Branch. Because the operators are different, the incidents from the 4th round cannot be treated as the operational track record for the 5th round.
People without smartphones were excluded from the system
Although the 5th round is described as targeting "all prefectural residents," it is actually limited to those who own smartphones. To obtain the full premium, it is also necessary to be able to charge up to 20,000 yen in advance.
The prefecture provided in-person support at approximately 300 mobile phone shops and at prefectural, municipal, and chamber of commerce offices. On the other hand, in the prefecture's response regarding "Haba-tan Pay+", it explains that while they recognize there are people who do not own smartphones, paper gift certificates are difficult to implement due to administrative costs and the burden on stores.
Operational support is helpful for those who own smartphones but are unfamiliar with them. However, it does not enable people who do not own smartphones to participate in the system.
As long as this policy claims to be "supporting household finances for prefectural residents," the prefecture must show not only the usage rates by age and region, but also the scale of those who could not use the system, and compare its fairness with other methods such as paper gift certificates, cash benefits, or fee waivers.
Seikei Plus Evaluation—The biggest problem is the lack of verifiable data
A 50% premium rate is an easy-to-understand form of support for users. The fact that the number of applicants reached a record high and that it can be used at approximately 15,000 stores within the prefecture is expected to have the effect of supporting both household finances and local businesses. The decision to make payment processing fees free for participating stores is also significant.
On the other hand, since 12.9 billion yen in public funds is being used, simply stating that "many people applied" or that "people were happy" does not explain the policy's effectiveness.
At a minimum, the following figures are what the prefecture should disclose:
The number of people who actually charged their accounts and the total amount
Actual usage amount, usage rate, and unused balance
Ratio of first-time users to repeat users
Usage rates by age group and region
Number of duplicate applications excluded
Number of cases invalidated due to fraud
Final breakdown of administrative expenses and premium funding
Usage amounts by large stores, small and medium-sized stores, and region
The amount of pure consumption stimulated that was added on top of normal consumption
Cost-effectiveness compared to paper vouchers, cash benefits, and fee exemptions
Rather than repeating strong words, having these figures presented is more effective for verifying prefectural administration.
The decision not to adopt identity verification documents can be explained by comparing it to the speed of support and administrative burden. However, if a simple system is chosen, post-verification must be strengthened accordingly.
The 5th round ended its usage period on July 31. From here on, what is required of the prefecture is not promotion, but to show who received how much of the 12.9 billion yen, how much it increased regional consumption, what kind of people were excluded from the system, and to what extent duplication and fraud were prevented.
When those results are published, this article will also be updated.
Reference Materials
Verification Report on Haba-tan Pay+ Personal Information Leakage
Response to Prefectural Proposals: "Regarding Haba-tan Pay+"
Selection Results for 5th Round Secretariat Operation Business
▼ Related articles regarding Haba-tan Pay+
Explanatory articles on the Hyogo Prefecture issue, including this one, are compiled in the magazine below.
▼Read also
・Hyogo Prefecture's donation system | Doctor cars and Habatan Pay+ 12.9 billion yen
https://note.com/poliplus/n/nd52ade0106c3
・Kobe night view (Kamayamihi) account investigation
https://note.com/poliplus/n/n8e6beb33b6ba
▼Summary of this topic
・Hyogo Prefecture issue summary (General portal)
https://note.com/poliplus/n/ndae47bad720e
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