An Introduction to 'Strategem' (1969), a Military Study Analyzing How to Conduct Deception

In 'The Art of War,' a classic of military science established in ancient China, it is written that 'all warfare is based on deception.' This is the oldest description of deception regarding the misidentification of friendly posture, capabilities, actions, and intentions in order to force the enemy to take disadvantageous actions, and its military importance remains unchanged today. In this article, I will introduce 'Strategem' (1969), which is known as a research achievement regarding deception in modern military science.

Whaley, Baron. 2007(1969). Strategem: Deception and Surprise in War, Boston: Artech House.

Although deception has long been 'one of the variations of strategic methods of war' (Whaley 2007: 2), the definitions of its concepts and methods of classification have not necessarily been unified. Liddell Hart reaffirmed the importance of deception through his study of strategy and proposed methods for executing it by advocating the concept of the indirect approach, but he did not go so far as to establish concrete guidelines.

Based on an analysis of the indirect approach, Whaley assumed that the purpose of all deception is to ensure the success of a surprise attack, and he considered its execution to consist of two stages: (1) the stage of confronting the enemy with a confusing situation, and (2) the stage of having them adopt a course of action desirable for one's own side (Ibid.: 73).

In other words, deception is not simply about forcing options onto the enemy. In the preceding stage, it is important to provide the opponent with manipulated information that can be interpreted in some way, in such a manner that they believe it. According to Whaley's view, this manipulation of information is the foundation of deception, and its techniques can be broadly divided into two types: those aimed at showing something to the opponent and those aimed at hiding something from them. Furthermore, since each technique can be further divided into three types, a total of six types of categories are obtained.

The most effective method of showing deception is mimicking, where one thing is made to look like another; a method where a general is made to appear as if they are visiting a completely different headquarters falls under this. A second method, which is slightly less effective, is inventing, which creates a new situation; for example, repeating radio communications as if an airfield actually existed, or intentionally placing lights in a location where there is nothing so that they are visible to the enemy, corresponds to this. The third method, which is relatively less effective, is decoying to divert attention; a diversionary maneuver conducted by a field army in a war zone to prevent the enemy from realizing their destination is one example.

Methods of hiding deception are also subdivided into three types. The first is masking, which prevents the truth from being seen, and this is considered the most effective. For example, continuing diplomatic negotiations despite having decided to start a war, so that the enemy does not realize that preparations for the operation are underway, falls under this. The next most effective is the second, repackaging, which refers to using something very similar to what one wants to hide and disguising it. For example, disguising a warship as a merchant ship to hide its existence is a type of repackaging. The least effective is the third, dazzling, which refers to hiding information by confusing the opponent. Using a code that only one's own side can understand corresponds to this.

Which of these methods should be used depends on the situation, but as a major premise, it is necessary to investigate the enemy's information gathering in advance and use it systematically. The key to success is to identify the information source that the enemy considers most reliable. If information materials can be passed to the enemy from such a source, it will be a big step toward making the deception successful. However, since the enemy uses multiple information sources, the deception operation cannot be expected to yield results unless the information materials obtained from them are always consistent.

Whaley collects cases of deception recorded in military history, but it is pointed out that there are not a few cases where deception failed. What is interesting is that he points out the effectiveness of counter-deception, where deception is used in reverse after it has been initiated, and it is shown that this can deceive the enemy more effectively. Based on such research, it will be useful when thinking about how to act against an opponent who has initiated deception.

References

Related Articles