Disputatio 25 Close Reading Part 1: Disputatio 25 De concursu Dei cum causis secundis ad omnem earum actionem et effectum (Disputation 25 'On God's Concurrence with Secondary Causes in All Their Actions and Effects') Section 1
How is God involved in our choices?
This is a difficult question that has been asked repeatedly throughout the history of philosophy and theology.
It is said that humans have freedom, but for that to truly have meaning, it must be clarified how it aligns with 'God's omnipotence,' 'foreknowledge,' and 'providence.'
The 16th-century theologian Luis de Molina tackled this difficult question head-on. His major work, 'Concordia,' is a book that thoroughly discusses 'how to harmonize God's grace and human free will.'
From here on, we will read from Part 2, Disputation 25 of that 'Concordia,' based on the original Latin text, while performing translations, commentaries, and syntactic analyses (in separate articles).
As the first installment, we will introduce Section 1 at the beginning of Disputation 25. In this section, Molina defines the 'two modes of divine concurrence' (general concurrence and special concurrence), which are the focus of this entire discussion, and provides an overview of how they relate to human free will.
Now, let us begin.
Section 1
Constituta arbitrii nostri libertate dicendum est tum de concursu Dei generali quo cum causis omnibus secundis atque adeo cum libero arbitrio ad omnem actionem et effectum concurrit, tum etiam de particulari quo insuper arbitrium nostrum ad supernaturalia opera adiuvatur.
'Now that the freedom of our will has been established, we must speak next of the general concurrence of God, by which He concurs with all secondary causes, and thus with free will, to bring about every action and effect. And we must also speak of the special concurrence, by which our will is further assisted toward supernatural works.'
Commentary:
Building on the 'establishment of free will' discussed in Part 1, Molina moves on to the core theme of the concurrence between God and man (especially human free will).
According to him, no action of any creature can be accomplished without the participation of God's power. He calls this power of God 'general concurrence' (concursus generalis). On the other hand, he states that for supernatural acts such as faith, love, and grace, God's further 'special concurrence' (concursus specialis) is necessary. In summary, it might look like this:
General concurrence (concursus generalis):
God's universal and neutral involvement in all natural actions. God lends power to the workings of all secondary causes (causes of created things), including free will.
Special concurrence (concursus specialis):
God guiding the human will toward supernatural good (e.g., faith, love, grace) through special grace.
We will continue reading.
Sunt enim haec duo concursus Dei genera longe inter se diversa neque eodem modo ad nostrum arbitrium affecta.
'For these two kinds of divine concurrence are far removed from each other in kind, and they do not affect our will in the same way.'
Commentary:
This sentence clearly states the essential difference between the general concurrence and special concurrence presented in the previous sentence. Molina emphasizes that these two concurrences should not be equated because they 'do not affect our will in the same way.' We shall see (though it may take a long time) how these two concurrences are 'far removed from each other in kind.' However, this distinction is likely very important to Molina's intention of harmonizing divine providence and human freedom.
With that, let us look at the next sentence.
Ac sane, nisi modum utriusque perspectum habeamus, neque scire poterimus, quanam ratione libertas arbitrii nostri salva maneat et consequenter rerum contingentia quam una cum illa ostendere molimur, neque item qua ratione eadem arbitrii libertas cum divina gratia, praescientia, voluntate; providentia, praedestinatione et reprobatione consentiat.
'Therefore, it may be said that unless one can obtain a clear understanding of either [general or special concurrence], one will not be able to know in what way our free will, and consequently contingency, can remain unimpaired—for the contingency of things is what I am attempting to show is one with the freedom of our will. Nor will one be able to know in what way the freedom of the will can be reconciled with God's grace, foreknowledge, will, providence, predestination, and reprobation.'
Note:
This sentence succinctly summarizes the reason why Molina discusses the concept of concurrence.
Why is an understanding of 'concurrence' important?
Because unless one understands how God is involved in human actions (the mode of concurrence), one cannot answer the following questions:
Q. How can the contingency of things be compatible with God's foreknowledge, predestination, and providence?
Q. How can human free will be compatible with God's foreknowledge, predestination, and providence?
He states that unless the mode of God's concurrence is clarified, it is impossible to know how free will, contingency, and God's grace, etc., can be reconciled.
Molina's attempt: The 'harmony' between human free will and God's grace
Molina attempts to reconcile the preservation of free will with God's grace, foreknowledge, predestination, and providence.
These matters have been major issues in Christian thought and theology since ancient times, and they sparked a great controversy within the Catholic Church. The so-called 'Controversy de Auxiliis' (Controversia de gratia) occurred between Molina, who was a Jesuit, and Bañez, who was a Dominican. Since the controversy over grace requires a considerable volume of text, I would like to touch upon it gradually over time.
Furthermore, even in this single sentence, the weight of 'contingency' (contingentia) in Molina's thought is evident. For Molina, free will and contingency are closely linked.
Even if God knows future events, He does not predestine them deterministically; rather, God knows the results of free choices through 'middle knowledge' (scientia media)—this is his unique theory.
In other words, this sentence presents the entrance to the core question that permeates the entire 'Concordia':
'How can God's omniscience and human freedom be true at the same time?'
I believe this is the question it presents.
Now, let us proceed to the next sentence.
Denique ex notitia modi utriusque concursus complurium gravissimarum difficultatum cognitio explicatioque dependet.
'In short, the recognition and explanation of many extremely serious difficulties depend on understanding the manner of each concurrence (general concurrence and special concurrence).'
Commentary:
'complurium gravissimarum difficultatum' is a double emphasis on 'numerous' and 'most serious' problems. From this phrasing, it is clear that for Molina, the understanding of free will and God's concurrence is a strong claim that serves as the key to many other difficult problems.
'cognitio explicatioque' implies that because it is 'cognitio', it does not stop at 'superficial understanding' but includes 'theoretical explanation' and the 'establishment of rational consistency'.
This sentence is the concluding sentence of the introduction to Disputation 25. Molina states:
'Unless one correctly understands the mode of God's concurrence (general and special), many serious and difficult problems cannot be understood or explained.'
So, what are these 'many serious and difficult problems'?
Perhaps they are the following groups of problems:
Q. The relationship between free will and God's grace:
Do humans really choose freely? Or are they necessarily moved by God's grace?
Q. God's foreknowledge and the contingency of the future:
If God knows the future, is that future not already determined? What happens to contingency and freedom?
Q. God's providence and the existence of evil:
If God controls everything, why does evil exist?
Q. The consistency of salvation, predestination, and reprobation:
Why are some saved and others damned? Can that be called a 'free choice'?
According to Molina, what is required in common for these problems is a consistent understanding of concurrence (concursus) as God's causal involvement and the preservation of free will.
In this concept of concurrence, I believe the main questions being asked are as follows:
• In what way does God participate in human actions?
• Does that participation infringe upon human freedom?
• Conversely, if God is not participating, is it truly a 'world governed by God's providence'?
In summary, with this single sentence, Molina strongly declares that correctly understanding the modes of God's concurrence (general and special) is the key to solving the deepest problems of theology and philosophy.
And I believe these matters will be discussed little by little from Section 2 onwards.
The above was the presentation of Molina's basic position in Section 1 of Disputation 25. The difference between the two modes of God's concurrence is a key concept in considering the consistency between free will and grace.
God works together with all causes—but does that not deprive us of our 'freedom'?
How did Molina attempt to respond to this difficult question? Next time, in Section 2, we will delve even further into this inquiry.
I would be happy if we could continue to read through this profound text together, little by little.
Thank you for reading this article. I will provide supplementary information regarding more detailed syntactic analysis in the paid section separately.
Next time, through Section 2, we will approach the further development of Molina's theory of free will.