Hideki Tojo: Testimony of History / Shoichi Watanabe

Finished reading "Hideki Tojo: Testimony of History / Shoichi Watanabe".
This book is one of the most shocking and memorable among books related to modern Japanese history. Based on Hideki Tojo's oral statements at the Tokyo Trial, the author, Mr. Watanabe, provides commentary while surveying Showa history. It details the situation surrounding Japan, the circumstances leading to the outbreak of war, and more. It is worth reading.

You can clearly see the process by which Japan was cornered day by day through repeated provocations by the United States, which had no intention of listening and made no concessions, even though Japan desired peace and continued diplomatic negotiations. There are people who loudly claim that "it should have been solved through discussion," but this made me think about whether it could have truly been solved through discussion at that time.

The core of Hideki Tojo's argument is that "Japan did not wage a war of aggression. It was for self-preservation and self-defense." MacArthur himself, who was the source of law for the Tokyo Trial, admitted after the trial concluded, before the U.S. Senate Joint Committee on Military and Foreign Affairs, that Tojo's argument was correct. Japan was not Nazi Germany. This is a fact that all Japanese people should know, and I want people all over the world to know it. P4-5

It could be said that no one was hated as much as Hideki Tojo in postwar Japan. People said, "What kind of man is Tojo to fail at suicide? If he really intended to commit suicide, he should have put the pistol to his temple and pulled the trigger. Who shoots themselves in the stomach?" But in fact, the truth seems to be a little different. It is said that Tojo intended to shoot himself in the heart and had a neighborhood doctor mark that spot for him. And he pulled the trigger when he saw the American soldiers coming. The pistol was one that his son-in-law, who was a military man, had used to commit suicide a short time before. However, it seems Tojo's heart was slightly offset from that of an average person. As for why he didn't shoot himself in the temple, it is said that he believed he would definitely be photographed for the world's newspapers after his death, and he did not want to ruin his face. P10

Regarding how Tojo advanced into central politics, at the time, what the Japanese government feared most was that junior officers would move troops on their own, causing the military to lose control. Since it is junior officers who move the troops, the most frightening thing is for those people to kill their superiors. When they looked around to see who could truly control the Army and maintain discipline, it was decided that Tojo was the most suitable. Therefore, it was not that Tojo himself had political ambition or anything of the sort; he had the ability as a superior to control those below him and maintain military discipline, and that was recognized, leading to his involvement in politics. That is also why he was deeply trusted by the Emperor; what the Emperor hated most was the occurrence of rebellions like the February 26 Incident. Because there was no possibility of rebel troops moving if Tojo was there, he was trusted immensely. And Tojo was also a person who was truly loyal to the Emperor. This is something everyone acknowledges. P32-33

He was called "Razor Tojo," but everyone acknowledged Tojo's intelligence. Setting aside his intelligence and his merits as a great politician, he was said to be so meticulous that he would write down and organize everything, so he had a clear grasp of everything, and his subordinates could never be sloppy.
The person who disliked this was Kanji Ishiwara. This man was a truly genius person, a brilliant mind who used his head in the exact opposite way to Tojo. Although both had near-genius talents, they used their heads differently, so the two did not get along. Because Ishiwara said such selfish things, when Tojo became the center of politics, Kanji Ishiwara was sidelined.
At the time of the Tokyo Trial, Kanji Ishiwara was in a position where he should naturally have been summoned as the person responsible for creating Manchukuo, but it was inconvenient for the Allied Powers to call him, and due to the fact that Ishiwara's illness was severe, he was only questioned as a witness at a temporary court set up in his hometown of Sakata City.
It is said that when he was asked a question to the effect of "It seems you did not get along with Tojo," he replied, "I have consistent principles and arguments. However, Tojo does not. In that case, there is no way for us to be in opposition." P33-34

At the Tokyo Trial, a telegram sent by Tojo one month before the outbreak of the China Incident in 1937 was made an issue. The prosecutor pointed out that Tojo had sent a telegram "regarding preparations for operations against the Soviet Union," but in reality, it was "regarding operations against the Soviet Union." This makes a completely different meaning militarily. Also, it says he sent a telegram "to attack Nanjing," but this was also actually "to deal a blow to the Nanjing government." The story is completely different. The prosecution likely wanted to claim that Japan had been planning an attack on Nanjing from early on, but this is stretching it too far. Tojo also pointed this out. P39

At the time, the Soviet Union had finished its second five-year plan and was said to have established a system to mobilize twenty divisions around Manchuria and Mongolia in a short period. Moreover, their main force consisted of mechanized units and poison gas units, and the Japanese military feared this greatly. The Japanese military stationed in Manchuria had only one division at the time of the Manchurian Incident. Since they could not possibly compete with the Soviet Union's twenty mechanized divisions and poison gas units, it was natural for Tojo, as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, to be very worried and express his opinions on operational preparations. P39

The Boxer Rebellion. This was an incident during the Boxer Rebellion in Qing, where foreign residents in Beijing were surrounded by Qing soldiers who had joined the rebellion and were nearly massacred. Various countries sent troops to rescue them, and it was Japan that took the lead in liberating Beijing. At that time, Russia also sent a large army, but despite being of little use in suppressing the rebellion, that large army remained in Manchuria even after the pacification and did not easily agree to the promise of withdrawal. Not only that, they kept increasing their military strength, and in effect, Manchuria became almost like Russian territory.
Japan protested, but it was not heard. So, Japan asked them that even if Manchuria could not be helped, they should at least not come into Korea. However, Russia ignored that as well, building a naval base in a North Korean port, seizing mining and logging rights in North Korea, and even going so far as to talk about building a naval base in Chinhae Bay, right under the noses of Japan's Iki and Tsushima islands. These things piled up, and the Russo-Japanese War broke out.
At that point, Manchuria had effectively become complete Russian territory. Proof of this is that when Qing officials at the time went to Manchuria, they needed the permission of Russian officials.
In the Russo-Japanese War, Japan drove the Russian army out of Manchuria and returned it to the Qing Dynasty. And Japan also took over the rights to the South Manchuria Railway and the leasehold of the Liaodong Peninsula that Russia had held. In this regard, Japan was truly gentlemanly. P40-41

After the Russo-Japanese War, Manchuria was in a peaceful state. Because Manchuria was well-governed, a vast number of Chinese people flowed into Manchuria. Until then, Manchuria was called a "forbidden land," and the migration and entry of surrounding ethnic minorities such as the Han, Mongols, and Koreans were not permitted, but that situation had also changed in a conciliatory direction. However, what changed that completely was the Russian Revolution that broke out in 1917. Once the Soviet Union was established, became a Communist regime, and the Comintern was formed, its influence entered the Chinese continent and Manchuria, inciting the ethnic consciousness of the Chinese people and instigating anti-Japanese movements. Those anti-Japanese movements became increasingly intense, and the situation on the Chinese continent became very unstable. We must not forget that the incidents where the lives of Japanese people living there were often threatened were all situations that occurred after the Russian Revolution. P41

Unbelievable obstructions began to occur frequently, such as Chinese people not buying goods from Japanese stores, Japanese children being in danger and unable to go to school, or Chinese people who sold land to Japanese people being sentenced to death. Then, in April 1928, the Jinan Incident occurred. The Japanese military was preparing defenses to protect Japanese residents in Jinan in response to Chiang Kai-shek's movement to resume the Northern Expedition, but when they lifted those defenses, a massacre of Japanese people occurred. Also, in the Nanjing Incident that occurred the previous year, the Chinese National Revolutionary Army, under the command of the Comintern's Borodin, attacked the foreign residential area of Nanjing, the concession. At that time, British and American warships on the Yangtze River fired, but the Foreign Minister of the Wakatsuki Reijiro Cabinet at the time, Kijuro Shidehara, was a thorough pacifist who advocated non-interference in China and had forbidden firing, so the Japanese warships could not fire and did not launch any attacks. As a result, the Japanese consulate was thoroughly ransacked, women and children were humiliated, and they just stood by and watched such a situation. P42-43

Shigeru Yoshida, who was the Consul General in Fengtian, said that negotiations are meaningless unless they are backed by military force. Looking back now, the Japanese central government's policy of coddling the Chinese people had the opposite effect, and they should have realized that a resolute attitude was the way to maintain peace. P45

The 1937 Marco Polo Bridge Incident. An agreement was reached once through negotiations. However, it was immediately broken. They reached an agreement again. It was broken again. This was repeated many times. In the meantime, more than 200 Japanese residents were killed in the Tongzhou Incident about three weeks after the Marco Polo Bridge Incident. From the beginning, Japan tried to suppress the incident so that it would not expand, but it was the Chinese side that kept repeating provocations. The Tokyo Trial, which was held to make Japan the villain, could not even hold Japan responsible for the outbreak of the China Incident. P46

The bad system of the system of active-duty military officers for the Ministers of the Army and Navy. If the Cabinet does not align with the Army's intentions, the Cabinet cannot be formed if they do not recommend a minister. Or, it is forced to resign en masse. The Yonai Cabinet was exactly that; it was forced to collapse because it did not align with the Army's intentions.
This was finally seen as problematic, and on June 13, 1913, by imperial decree, the regulations for the Army and Navy Ministries were promulgated, and the "active-duty" requirement was removed from the qualifications for appointing ministers and vice-ministers. If they don't have to be on active duty, there are many reserve generals and lieutenant generals, so the Prime Minister would not have trouble forming a cabinet even if there was opposition from the military.
However, it was the Hirota Koki Cabinet in May 1936, immediately after the February 26 Incident, that returned this regulation to its original state and revived the "active-duty system." The fact that Hirota was the only civilian sentenced to death at the postwar Tokyo Trial is considered to be one of the factors for this. P49-50

The problem of the right of supreme command. At the 1930 London Conference, Japan accepted the condition of a 10:10:7 ratio for auxiliary naval vessels between the U.S., U.K., and Japan. If you think about it with common sense, if the naval arms race continued without limit, Japan would never be able to compete with the U.S. and U.K. It was reasonable to think that it was better to sign a disarmament treaty even if it meant accepting some disadvantages. However, people in the Naval General Staff at the time, such as Kanji Kato and Nobumasa Suetsugu, strongly opposed this. Perhaps the Navy was unable to stomach it because the ratio of major ships had already been set at 5:5:3 between the U.S., U.K., and Japan at the previous Washington Conference, and the logic they brought up here was "violation of the right of supreme command," which would have a serious impact on Japan's subsequent path.
Article 11 of the Meiji Constitution states, "The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy," followed by "The Emperor organizes the military forces," and the Naval General Staff, which opposed the treaty, used this article as a shield to argue that it was a violation of the right of supreme command for the Cabinet to make agreements with foreign countries on its own regarding the organization of military forces, and that it was an infringement on the Emperor's rights. P51-52

The Prime Minister at the time was Osachi Hamaguchi. Hamaguchi replied that that was perfectly fine. This is because, under the responsible cabinet system, even if it is said that the Emperor is responsible for diplomacy, for example, the Emperor does not actually negotiate directly with foreign countries. Negotiations are conducted through the Foreign Minister or ambassadors. That is not called an infringement of the Foreign Ministry's diplomatic rights. Similarly, regarding military forces, if the Ministers of the Army and Navy determined by the Cabinet approve, it does not violate the right of supreme command. The Diet was also convinced by this.
However, people who heard that there was a logic called "violation of the right of supreme command" began to make noise. And Prime Minister Hamaguchi was shot with a pistol at Tokyo Station and died shortly after. Because of such things, an atmosphere was created where, before anyone knew it, if you opposed the "violation of the right of supreme command," your life would be targeted, and a situation arose where no one could oppose it publicly. P52

After the problem of the violation of the right of supreme command occurred, it happened that even the Prime Minister was not informed of the most important military operations. State affairs had been separated from supreme command before anyone knew it. The cause lay in the flaws of the Meiji Constitution. Nominally, all responsibility lies with the Emperor, but that is only nominal, and the Emperor does not get involved in government affairs.
Then, who actually makes the decisions and takes responsibility? It is the Cabinet, not the Prime Minister. Even if the Prime Minister is the chairman of the Cabinet meeting, he is not the supreme authority. Therefore, there was no one who should combine state affairs and supreme command to make important decisions. The fact that there was no basis to refute the sophistry that the right of supreme command belongs to the Emperor and the Cabinet should not interfere with supreme command, and that there was practically no one who could suppress the arbitrary actions of the supreme command, was Japan's greatest tragedy. P54

During the Meiji era, the people who carried out the Meiji Restoration and created the Constitution, as well as the Genro, were still alive, so there was no doubt that the government held the real power of war guidance, and the military only had to focus on strategy. However, the founding fathers and Genro of the Restoration died one after another. After the Genro Aritomo Yamagata died, there was only one court noble Genro, Kinmochi Saionji, and he did not have the power to control the military. After the problem of the violation of the right of supreme command occurred after the 1930 London Conference, those in charge of strategy began to believe that they had the same authority as, or even more than, those in charge of political strategy. P54-55

In the second Konoe Cabinet, the cabinet was in agreement that ending the China Incident was the top priority. And it was the Army that most wanted to end the China Incident.
Chiang Kai-shek made up his mind to show that he could defeat the Japanese military, invited German military advisors, and built pillboxes and trenches everywhere in the Shanghai area. His policy was to draw the Japanese military into the war and defeat them there. He intended to lure Japan into the war in the Shanghai area and crush them. P57-58

To attract the attention of the world, Chiang Kai-shek's army began bombing in Shanghai. They even dropped bombs on department stores. The targets were the Japanese concessions, but there was also bombing of hotels and public entertainment facilities. The Special Naval Landing Force fought back, but they could not hold out on their own. Therefore, the Japanese military urgently decided to dispatch the Army.
However, this was exactly what the opponent wanted. Shanghai was fortified with pillboxes and trenches. The battle began in August, and even in September and October, there was no resolution.
To break through this crisis, on November 5, Japan suddenly landed the Tenth Army in Hangzhou Bay to strike the enemy from the rear. They disrupted the enemy by dropping leaflets saying, "One million Japanese troops have landed in Hangzhou Bay." With the enemy suddenly appearing in their rear and being caught in a pincer attack, Chiang Kai-shek's army in Shanghai collapsed completely. P60

The Japanese Army wanted to end the incident as soon as possible. However, the communists and their sympathizers surrounding Prime Minister Konoe worked hard to prevent it from ending. In fact, before entering Nanjing, there were peace negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek's army known as the Trautmann mediation, but they eventually broke down. P64

It is certain that the Army wanted to stop the fighting. However, they could not stop it. In the meantime, the incident dragged on and expanded. The reason it could not be stopped was, above all, that Chiang Kai-shek was receiving generous aid from the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, so no matter how much he lost, he would just flee to the interior and would not agree to negotiations with Japan. P64

In the end, one year after the fall of Nanjing in October 1938, the Japanese military occupied Canton, the three cities of Wuhan (Hankou, Wuchang, and Hanyang). Furthermore, they also occupied Hainan Island. Since the start of the Shanghai Incident, the war had effectively ended there in one year and three months. Chiang Kai-shek was just cowering in Chongqing.
Originally, the war should have ended around the three cities of Wuhan, but aid to Chiang Kai-shek's army from the US and UK continued incessantly through British territories such as India and Burma, via routes like the "Chiang aid route." The Soviet Union also provided aid, so no clue to a solution could be found no matter how much time passed. In the meantime, Japan came to be at war with the United States, but the Army had never assumed from the beginning that they would be fighting a new war against the US and UK. P65-66

From Japan's perspective, the economic pressure from the US and UK meant that a country without raw materials was being strangled by trade. Japan was faced with the proposition of how to survive. At the Tokyo Trial, the prosecution argued that Japan had conspired to dominate the world, but at the time, Japan did not have the power to think of such an outrageous thing. There was a prosecution argument that Japan had a world conquest plan like Hitler's, but it is clear that this was absurd. P81

In July 1941, the United States began freezing Japanese assets in the US. This was followed by the freezing of Japanese assets including those in British colonies, the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, and the freezing of Japanese assets in the Dutch East Indies. It was no longer possible to operate under a free economy, and a rationing system was introduced. P84

"Hakkō ichiu" originates from what Emperor Jimmu said when he ascended to the throne at Kashihara Palace: "I shall cover the eight corners and make them one house." Hakkō means the eight corners, or all four directions, and in Japan at the time, it meant let us try to live together like one family. Emperor Jimmu came up from Kyushu and ascended to the throne near Nara, but the surroundings were all indigenous local clans. It has a moral meaning of unifying them and living together happily as one family. At the Tokyo Trial, the prosecution repeatedly insisted that this was also an ideology of aggression, but it was acknowledged by the Japanese defense team that this was a moral meaning and not an aggressive one. P86-87

There is an event where the "spirit of Hakkō ichiu" had a very important meaning. Hitler of Germany, which was an ally at the time, had a plan to eradicate the Jews, and there were frequent requests for Japan to persecute the Jews as well. There was a debate in Japan about how to respond, but at the Five Ministers' Conference, the Minister of War strongly insisted, "Japan has the spirit of Hakkō ichiu. Therefore, we must not persecute the Jews."
Hakkō ichiu literally meant treating other ethnic groups as members of one family. P87-88

Ever since the "independence of the supreme command" began to hold sway, the supreme command, which should have been under state affairs, began to seek a status equal to state affairs, and Japan no longer had a true leader to unite the government and the supreme command. Also, there was no one to unite both the Army and the Navy. Thus, Japan entered the war without a true war leader. As the China Incident dragged on and tensions with the US and UK rose, leading to the appearance of total war, the disadvantages of having no leader began to appear.
The Imperial General Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference was created to reduce these disadvantages as much as possible and to coordinate between departments. Later, the name changed one after another to the Imperial General Headquarters-Government Consultative Conference and the Supreme War Guidance Council, but since its essence was, as the name implies, a liaison conference, no one had decision-making power. Therefore, Japan continued to fight a great war without a real leader. P91-92

During the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese Wars, this was not the case, as there was a Genro (Elder Statesmen) Council. Although it is a system not written anywhere in the Constitution, the Genro were the people who created the Meiji government and the Meiji Constitution. The Genro recommended prime ministerial candidates to the Emperor and were effectively the people who formed the cabinet, so the authority of the Prime Minister was sufficiently permeated into the military. Since there were also the founders of the military such as Aritomo Yamagata and Tsugumichi Saigo, if someone had spun sophistry like "violation of the supreme command" in front of them, they would likely have been crushed with a single shout. P93

Zhou Fohai, who was Chiang Kai-shek's Minister of Central Propaganda, said, "One of the mistakes of the Japanese military was that they were trying to stop the war, stop the war, at any cost." If they had continued the pursuit after taking Nanjing, perhaps the Chinese army would not have been able to continue the resistance. However, in reality, the Japanese military stopped at Nanjing and did not pursue, so the Chinese army retreated temporarily and then attacked again. The Army was the most opposed to the war, but it could not be helped; Japan's restraint led to the Chinese side's underestimation.
When Japan considers the other party, is moral, and stops its advance aiming for an early end to the war, they think Japan lacks national power. The Chinese always think that way. They take Japan's consideration as weakness. That remains even today. P101

Coincidentally, it is Japan, Germany, and Italy that are modern states without raw materials. Initially, there was no idea of going as far as war to get them. They tried to talk things out and make trade possible. To import raw materials, one needs foreign capital, so before that, they had to be allowed to sell Japanese products. Despite the high tariffs imposed by the US and UK, Japan still tried every possible way to sell its products. It was a tariff barrier to prevent the other side from buying, but Japan was making tearful efforts. However, later on, it became a situation where Japan was not allowed to sell anything at all. When it came to this, it was the end of everything. P105-107

Regarding the Southern issue, looking back now, it is understandable to have doubts about why Japan advanced to such places. If one does not know these circumstances, a view of simple aggression may emerge. MacArthur testified as follows to the US Senate Committee on Military and Foreign Affairs.
He said that what Japan had as a modern state was only silkworms. That is, only the silk industry. They had nothing else. However, everything they needed was in the Southern region. Yet the US decided not to sell to Japan. If Japan continued like this, it would create 10 to 12 million unemployed people. Therefore, Japan entered the war primarily for national security. P107

In 1940, the Japanese military advanced into Hanoi. This is what is called the Northern French Indochina advance, and its purpose was to cut off the aid route to the Chiang Kai-shek government by the US and UK. If endless aid continued to be provided to the Chiang Kai-shek government, Japan would not be able to end the China Incident.
The United States would later experience the same thing. The United States could not defeat North Vietnam in the Vietnam War. The reason is that endless aid materials were being sent to North Vietnam by land from China and by Soviet ships entering Haiphong Bay.
As for the United States, they could not bomb the Soviet ships that were constantly carrying cargo into Haiphong Bay, let alone the Chinese mainland. Vietnam had no factories and could not produce weapons or bombs on its own, but the reason they were not at all short of weapons was because of that, and if so, there was no end for the attacking side. The reason the United States had to withdraw from Vietnam was that they could not strike the countries providing aid. The fact that the China Incident was exactly the same was something the United States learned in the Vietnam War. P123-124

What Japan needed to do to resolve the China Incident was to cut off the aid route to the Chongqing government by the US and UK, and along with that, to establish a self-sufficient system for Japan, they had to proceed with negotiations with the Netherlands, which held the South, especially Indonesia. In that case, a foothold in the South was necessary. This was another purpose of the Northern French Indochina advance. P124

The Northern French Indochina advance did not happen suddenly; since Vietnam at the time was a French territory, Japan advanced after negotiating with the French government. The negotiations were conducted between Foreign Minister Matsuoka and French Ambassador to Japan Arsène-Henry. It was something recognized after formal foreign ministerial negotiations. It is treated as aggression in the trial, but this is wrong. P126

An incident occurred where a Japanese battalion on the border between French Indochina and China crossed the border due to an unclear border. (As a result of an investigation at a subsequent court-martial, it was found that they had not crossed the border.) This was for border reconnaissance and not a single shot was fired, but the French Indochina side used this as a pretext to refuse to sign the detailed agreement. P127

The small clash between Japan and France that followed the border-crossing incident became a stimulus for the later independence of Vietnam. Until then, Vietnam had been subjected to harsh colonial policies from France. However, seeing the French military, which they thought could not be touched by white people, being easily defeated by a small number of Japanese troops, became the spiritual foundation for the Vietnamese people to rise up later. P130

Regarding the "unforeseen incident" and the clash between Japan and France, Tojo, as Minister of War, severely punished those responsible.
This was a characteristic of Tojo, and this is the biggest reason why the Emperor, Prime Minister Konoe, and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Koichi Kido believed that this was the only person who could rebuild the control within the Army, which had been in a state of paralysis since the February 26 Incident. This is because, receiving the Emperor's words to "be careful about the control of the military," Tojo, who was a lump of loyalty in that respect, strictly executed it. P132

On November 30, 1940, Japan concluded the Basic Treaty between Japan and China with Wang Jingwei's Nanjing government. Since most of China's major cities were already occupied, it was only natural to act quickly; Chiang Kai-shek, who remained in the mountains (Chongqing) relying solely on aid from Britain and America while abandoning his people, could be called irresponsible. If the Wang Jingwei regime had not existed, the entire Chinese mainland would have been placed under Japanese military rule. The question was a choice: was Chiang Kai-shek, who abandoned his people, better, or was Wang Jingwei, who created a platform for negotiation, better?
Wang Jingwei died of illness at the end of the war, but his wife was later put on trial in China. At that time, she stated her position with dignity until the end. She did not yield an inch, arguing that when the country was occupied by the Japanese military, the government was gone, and those responsible had fled deep into the mountains, a government was necessary to protect the Chinese people at all costs. P134-135

In the first place, the reason the China Incident dragged on for so long was that then-Prime Minister Konoe issued a statement on January 16, 1938, saying, 'We will not deal with the Chiang Kai-shek regime,' and the failure to resolve it at that point is what extended the incident to this extent. It was Konoe's brain trust that made him say that.
Following instructions from the Comintern, they infiltrated the core of the government and worked hard to ensure the war on the Chinese mainland was prolonged as much as possible and not resolved. From the Soviet Union's perspective, by keeping Japan tied down in China, they could concentrate on Europe without worry, and if Japan's national power were depleted as a result, they had the intention of entering Manchuria again. Konoe fell for that. P135

The military leadership had no objection to a full withdrawal, with some exceptions, if the China Incident could be resolved. However, even if one speaks of withdrawing troops, there were remnants of the enemy, so some had to be left behind for the sake of security in the rear. This is a story that can be understood if applied to America's occupation of Iraq; if one asks whether the occupation forces in Iraq could pull out immediately just because the war was over, the answer is no. As long as there are resistance forces, the American military cannot withdraw. It is the same thing. P139-140

Foreign Minister Matsuoka's visit to Europe. When Foreign Minister Matsuoka went to Germany, he found that tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union were at a breaking point, and the atmosphere was far from one that would allow the Soviet Union to align with the Tripartite Pact. In the first place, Germany had signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, but Hitler did not think of it seriously, viewing it merely as a tactic. Matsuoka was completely misguided.
After this, on his way back from Germany, he met with Stalin and concluded a neutrality treaty with the Soviet Union. Japan would come to realize, deep in its bones, immediately after the end of the war, that this treaty ultimately had no meaning. Including that, Matsuoka's trip to Germany was of no use. His foresight was entirely naive. Hitler only signed the non-aggression pact to lower the Soviet Union's guard, but foolishly, Japan took it seriously. P149

In February 1945, at the Yalta Conference, the fact that the Soviet Union, despite the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Treaty being in effect, promised the Allied side to participate in the war against Japan on the condition of acquiring our country's territory, was brought up at the trial.
This is a very major issue; even though Country A and Country B had signed a neutrality treaty, a third country, America, instigated the violation of it. For that alone, American President Roosevelt is a great war criminal.
Sixty years later, in 2005, when President Bush visited the three Baltic states, he made remarks criticizing this matter. Furthermore, the act of the Soviet Union attacking Japan while the neutrality treaty was in effect goes without saying.
Roosevelt, who forcibly broke the state of neutrality between two countries, and Stalin, who broke the treaty and invaded Japan for the purpose of territorial aggression, both committed criminal acts that correspond to the primary focus of responsibility pursued at the Tokyo Trial. P151-152

The basic attitude of Japan in negotiations with America was that it wanted to realize peace at any cost. After all, the prolongation of the China Incident was leading to the draining of enormous national funds, even without major battles. America also wasted vast military expenses in the trillions in the Iraq War, and it is the same thing. Moreover, since Japan at the time was suffering from economic pressure from America and Britain, the goal of the second Konoe Cabinet was, above all else, to conclude negotiations with America and resolve the China Incident quickly. If America did not aid Chiang Kai-shek, it would end immediately. Japan's earnest wish was that, upon doing so, America would continue trade with Japan and sell the necessary materials. P155

Among these, what was presented by America was the 'Japan-US Understanding Draft' of April 18. Government officials who received this draft all felt a sense of brightness regarding the future of the negotiations. Regarding the Tripartite Pact, it included things like Japan not taking action in the Pacific even if America entered the European war, and regarding the China Incident, it stated that the US President would recommend that Chiang Kai-shek sit at the table for Japan-China negotiations, and if he did not comply, America would stop aid to Chiang Kai-shek.
For Japan, this proposal seemed fully acceptable. However, it was much later that Japan learned that these Japan-US negotiations were merely a way for America to buy time to advance its war preparations. P158

Regarding Manchuria, there was an absolute confirmation among the Japanese that the Japanese way of thinking was correct. Manchuria was the land of the Manchus, not the land of the Chinese. The Xinhai Revolution occurred in China, which was being conquered by those Manchus. The Xinhai Revolution was an independence movement by the conquered Chinese people against the Manchu dynasty. Manchukuo was the restoration of his own country by the emperor who had been expelled by the independence movement, returning to his hometown. Japan cooperated with that.
One could call it a puppet state, but since the Manchurians were satisfied, there was no problem at all. From the Prime Minister down, the ministers were all Manchurians or people of the Qing Dynasty, and the Japanese were all vice-ministers and below. That was because they lacked administrative ability and needed assistance. P159

The Japanese like to nurture, so they lent their strength to training lower-level bureaucrats. Even on the Korean Peninsula, during the mere 30 years of Japanese rule, by the end of the war, many people of the level of prefectural governor had emerged even among Koreans, and there were even those who became military officers. Since there were even officers of the level of division commander, the Japanese were enthusiastic about the education of the local people. Manchuria was one of the most shining regions in the world. The speed of development was eye-opening. Therefore, the Japanese at the time did not think Manchukuo was bad. The Japanese who thought it was bad were left-wing intellectuals or communists under the influence of the Comintern. P159-160

The May 12 draft was what Japan submitted after making some modifications to America's April 18 draft. However, America subsequently spoke as if the April 18 draft and the like had never existed from the beginning. For Japan, there was plenty of room for compromise if it had been the April 18 draft. And then the hardline June 21 draft was issued. What can be said consistently throughout the Japan-US negotiations is that America did not make any concessions at all. P165

With the understanding of the French government, Japan stationed troops in southern Vietnam. Japan did not do this unilaterally, but rather it was a peaceful stationing after negotiations with the French government. However, America froze Japanese assets on July 25. Following this, on the 26th, Britain and the Philippines, and on the 27th, the Netherlands and New Zealand also froze Japanese assets. Since not only assets but also funds were frozen, trade became impossible. P168

The Tanaka Memorial was also brought up at the Tokyo Trial, but it was proven there as well to be a forgery. This is because the Tanaka Memorial contains the phrase 'after the attendance of Aritomo Yamagata,' but Aritomo Yamagata had died six years earlier in 1922. Giichi Tanaka was from Choshu, and Aritomo Yamagata was like his subordinate, so he would never make such a mistake. Even as a forgery, it can be called an overly childish and crude forged document. P169-170

It has recently been proven that this Tanaka Memorial was created by the Comintern. There is no original Japanese text. However, there is no trace of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs having actively conducted counter-propaganda that this was a fake. Perhaps because of that, the Tanaka Memorial is still recorded as a historical fact in Chinese history textbooks today. P170

Roosevelt was trying to enter into a war with Japan at any cost. That is the same tactic he used to try to help Britain and crush the Nazis at any cost. Roosevelt's aid to Britain was outside the bounds of a neutral country, and his aid to Chiang Kai-shek was also outside the bounds of a neutral country.
Japan, not knowing such things, made efforts to somehow appease Roosevelt, and thinking that if Matsuoka was an obstacle to negotiations, he should be removed from the cabinet, the second Konoe Cabinet resigned en masse. Japan had gone this far, even changing the cabinet, hoping for the conclusion of Japan-US negotiations. P170-171

Japan began stationing troops in southern French Indochina on July 28, 1941, but this was based on a joint defense protocol for which an agreement had been reached with the French government. We reached an agreement through discussion without relying on the use of force with the Vichy regime at the time, and stationed troops peacefully.
Incidentally, we were taught after the war that America's total oil embargo against Japan was due to southern French Indochina, but what has become clear is that the oil embargo had been decided before the stationing of troops. Even if Japan had not stationed troops, the oil would have been stopped. It was just a coincidence that Japan's stationing of troops was earlier. P179

Japan's oil only came from America and the Netherlands, but since America prohibited exports to Japan, the only remaining source was Indonesia. However, that too was stopped in 1941. P186

Britain and America had committed numerous hostile acts against Japan. Roosevelt not only declared aid to the Chongqing government but also announced a large amount of financial aid. Furthermore, he even stated that in order to repel the Tripartite Pact, America would become an arsenal for that purpose. He was in the process of having the Chongqing government purchase 200 American airplanes. With this, no matter how much Japan wished to resolve the China Incident quickly, it was absolutely impossible. P189-190

The America, Britain, and the Netherlands of the time were planning to strengthen their war preparations. By May 1941, America had carried out military expansion totaling over 33 billion dollars. This included Alaska and US territories in the Pacific, such as the Philippines and Guam. Furthermore, they built 51 airfields. These were bombing preparations and military expansion aimed at Japan. On May 27, President Roosevelt declared an unlimited national emergency. Furthermore, in the previous year, America had advised the evacuation of American women and children from Asia, and evacuations began from Shanghai. They stopped issuing passports for the Far East and closed the consulate in Nagoya. All of these are signs indicating that war was imminent, and can be taken as suggesting a determination to start a war. P192-193

Japan became unable to obtain materials necessary for survival. This was due to the obstruction by Britain, America, and the Netherlands. On July 26, 1939, a recommendation for the abrogation of the Japan-US Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was made. In July 1940, the export of scrap iron and oil was shifted to a permit system, in other words, restricted. Gasoline for airplanes also stopped coming. P194

Japan did its utmost in negotiations with the Dutch East Indies to secure oil, but the Netherlands gradually began to reveal its hostility. In early May 1941, the Dutch Foreign Minister made provocative remarks that the Dutch East Indies were prepared to respond to any challenge at any time. P197

The relationship between the Vichy regime in France and Japan was generally friendly, but during the negotiations regarding the stationing of troops in French Indochina, Japan once sought mediation from the German government, which was an ally and was occupying France. However, the German Foreign Minister refused this. Germany, which was supposed to be an ally in the Tripartite Pact, was actually hostile toward Japan. Germany only ever intended to use Japan. This attitude remained consistent thereafter, as if they were an enemy nation. In the negotiations between Japan and France, Germany never pressured France to provide side support. P202

The Japanese government had completely misread the situation. Rumors of a German-Soviet war had been circulating for some time, and Ambassador Oshima in Germany had sent a telegram after meeting with Hitler stating that "Germany has the intention to start a war." However, Foreign Minister Matsuoka did not believe such rumors, and Ambassador Tatekawa in Moscow also thought that "it would not reach the point of war." Japan completely misread it. Ten days before the outbreak of the war, the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact had just been concluded. It seems that the truth is that Japan was not only surprised upon hearing the news of the German-Soviet war but was actually rather angry. Prime Minister Konoe even suggested at a liaison conference that since Germany had invaded the Soviet Union without prior notice despite the Tripartite Pact, it was an act of bad faith, and that they should terminate the Tripartite Pact at this point. There was that little prior information regarding the German-Soviet war. P207-208

The third Konoe Cabinet continued negotiations with the United States, but the U.S. insisted that the stationing of troops in southern French Indochina was a step in the southward expansion policy against the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands. They knew that was not actually the case, but they insisted on it, accused Japan of having no intention of concluding negotiations, and hinted at the termination of Japan-U.S. negotiations. Furthermore, they also implemented the freezing of assets. P225

Japan responded properly to the demands of the United States. Since the stationing of troops in French Indochina was for the resolution of the China Incident, Japan would withdraw once the incident was concluded. Also, Japan would not touch the Philippines. There would, of course, be no military threat in the Southwest Pacific. In return, Japan wanted Britain and the Netherlands to do the same. Furthermore, Japan requested only that they cooperate because Japan could not survive without resources. In short, Japan hoped that the United States and Japan could return to normal diplomatic relations. P225

Japan did not initiate anything against the United States. In the first place, everything that made the relationship between the two countries go wrong, starting with the Immigration Act of 1924, came from the United States. Even after that, the United States did not concede a single step in its claims. Japan was saying that since the cause of Japan's advance into French Indochina was the British and American aid to the Chongqing government, they should stop that aid, but there was no sign that the aid would stop. The United States did not remove any of the causes that forced Japan to advance into French Indochina. P226

Prime Minister Konoe proposed a Japan-U.S. summit meeting using Ambassador Nomura and others to break the deadlock. At that time, he conveyed Japan's stance that the Tripartite Pact was not intended to take military action in coordination with Germany, that the issue of Japanese troops in French Indochina would be withdrawn as soon as the China Incident was concluded, and that Japan would be willing to discuss the issue of non-discrimination in international trade. However, the United States did not budge from its hardline stance, maintaining that it could not agree to a summit meeting without a basic agreement in advance. P227

There is the harsh fact that there were almost no resources within Japan to support a modern state. Therefore, unless Japan had oil, it would lose its so-called "elasticity," or in other words, its negotiating power. Even if the Combined Fleet was strong, warships could not move without oil. Even if the Zero fighter was built, it could not fly. The army planes that shot down over a thousand Soviet planes at Nomonhan could not fly either. Tanks could not run. Nothing could be done. P229

If oil runs out, Japan would not even be able to wage war, and would have to negotiate with the United States empty-handed, but this would lead to being taken advantage of and negotiations would not be possible. Therefore, it became necessary to set a final deadline for concluding negotiations while monitoring the remaining amount of oil. In preparation for the event that negotiations could not be concluded, a policy was decided to complete war preparations by late October to ensure self-preservation and self-defense. The goal was to resolve the situation through diplomatic negotiations to the very end, but it was decided that if that was absolutely impossible, they would have to be prepared to start a war. P231

If oil runs out, war becomes impossible. If war becomes impossible, one must say "yes, yes" to whatever difficult demands are imposed. For this reason, Japan desperately negotiated with the Netherlands, the suzerain state of Indonesia. At first, Minister of Commerce and Industry Ichizo Kobayashi was sent as a special envoy, but it did not go well, so a special envoy named Kenkichi Yoshizawa was sent. Even then, it did not go well, and news arrived that the negotiations had broken down. P232

When it becomes impossible to do anything through diplomacy, that is, when negotiations break down, the problem shifts to the department that moves the military. A decision on war or peace must be made and preparations completed before oil runs out and the military loses its functionality. There are also operational time constraints. In such a case, from a military operations perspective, starting a war in winter is difficult, so the best time would be early November, and it could somehow be managed until early December. After that, it is climatically difficult, and if it goes into spring, there is concern about the movements of the Soviet army in Siberia. In many ways, the options are narrowed down to the fact that a decision on whether to go to war or to submit without fighting must be made by early December. P243

At the Tokyo Trial, the Class-A war criminals were tried for having consistently engaged in a conspiracy to wage war against Britain and the United States since 1928. However, since the Meiji era, Japan had never even thought about going to war with Britain or the United States, and it was only 3 or 4 months before the start of the war, after oil was cut off, that Japan seriously considered a war against the U.S. and Britain. P251

Reading Hideki Tojo's written statement at the Tokyo Trial, it is clear that by the time Tojo became Prime Minister, the situation was already beyond his control. As far as he was concerned, he had been doing everything he could within those circumstances, believing it was the only way. By the time he became Minister of War, the course of events had already been largely decided. Nevertheless, he calmly accepted his responsibility for the war and finished the trial without making any excuses. Not only that, but the United States later acknowledged that what he said was correct. Tojo's argument has become an accepted historical view that is fundamentally correct. It is a historical perspective that all Japanese people must know. P257

Regarding the Class-A war criminals, there was a Diet resolution after the war, which meant that there were no more war criminals, and all those who were imprisoned were released. This was not something Japan did on its own; it was decided based on Article 11 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, with Japan obtaining prior understanding from the relevant countries and passing a Diet resolution. Those who were executed could not be released because they were already dead, but their honor has been restored. P257-258

After the decision of the Imperial Conference on September 6, 1941, Japan made various efforts, such as negotiating through Foreign Minister Teijiro Toyoda and Ambassador Nomura in the U.S., and sounding out a summit meeting between Prime Minister Konoe and President Roosevelt. However, the United States said it could not agree to a summit meeting without an understanding on basic matters. In short, since they were saying that a summit meeting could not be held until the four proposals were resolved, it was impossible to realize. Since June, there has been no sign of concession from the United States. Japan was in urgent need of survival, and as time passed, the oil was gradually decreasing. The United States could win just by sitting back if it pushed through its own convenient principles. So it did not concede a single step. If things continued this way, the United States would conquer Japan without fighting. P261-262

The third Konoe Cabinet did its utmost in negotiations with the United States, but there was no sign of any willingness to concede on the part of the U.S., and no results were achieved. Subsequently, due to differences of opinion between Foreign Minister Toyoda and War Minister Tojo, the Cabinet resigned en masse. That was on October 16. P263

The American response on October 2 to the Japanese proposal based on the September 6 Imperial Conference decision was to reject all concessions and push through its principles. The most difficult issue in the negotiations was the withdrawal of troops from China. Japan had approved the principle of withdrawal from the Chinese mainland from the beginning of the Japan-U.S. negotiations, and progress was being made through the Basic Treaty between Japan and China with the Wang Jingwei regime, but the American goal was completely different. The American demand was for unconditional withdrawal. They were demanding an immediate and complete withdrawal. If Japan withdrew unconditionally due to American pressure, the Chinese would insult the Japanese even more. There would be a fear that those involved in the Wang Jingwei regime would be purged. The Communist Party would engage in thorough anti-Japanese activities, and relations with China would likely worsen even further. P273

Also, if Japan withdrew, it would inevitably lead to a situation where a second or third China Incident would be caused. If Japan lost its prestige in this way, there was a possibility that the influence would extend to Manchuria, Korea, and everywhere else. Tojo stated that if the Foreign Minister had confidence in the success of negotiations with the United States, he might consider it, but since the decision of whether or not to go to war had a serious impact on the supreme command, he could not leave the decision to the Prime Minister. Looking at this issue now, it is easy to understand; the United States is desperate to withdraw its stationed troops from Iraq. However, it cannot do so. If it were to withdraw completely now, it is certain that the new government born from the elections held through American efforts would collapse. This is the same thing. P273

If Japan were to withdraw under appropriate conditions, I think there was a possibility that Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei could have reached an agreement. However, Japan could not do what the United States was demanding, such as an unconditional and immediate withdrawal. If it did, there would inevitably be a possibility of a second or third China Incident occurring. Under the circumstances at the time, I think it was a sound argument that withdrawal was impossible. P274

The cunning of the Navy and the Prime Minister who made War Minister Tojo the villain. Navy Minister Oikawa said, "Why don't we leave it to the Prime Minister to decide whether diplomacy will succeed or not?" This was cunning of the Navy Minister. It would have been the end if the Navy had clearly said, "We do not have the courage to fight a war in the Pacific." At the Five Ministers' Conference, they left the judgment of whether or not to wage war to the Prime Minister, and the Navy did not speak up. The person who was in the position to say "if it can't be done, it can't be done" was the one who escaped in that way. P274-275

At the time, it was said that War Minister Tojo was very hardline and dragged Japan into the war, but if you think about it a little, the Minister of War could not drag Japan into a war with the United States. The Army cannot fight a war across the Pacific. If the Navy says no, it cannot be done. Of course, the transport ships are also the Navy's. P275

Prime Minister Konoe is also dishonest. If Prime Minister Konoe truly had the intention to avoid war, he should have said, 'The Navy is saying this.' In any case, Prime Minister Konoe did not make his stance clear. He should have made up his mind and clearly stated that the Navy says it cannot go to war, and asked what the Army's position was. P275-276

However, the concern here was that if it were decided not to go to war due to the Navy's opposition, a second February 26 Incident might occur, in which Navy personnel would be slaughtered. I believe Konoe was afraid of that. If they chose not to go to war and surrendered to the United States, there was no telling what kind of riots might break out. I believe that in the Japan of that time, it was impossible to accept defeat without fighting. This shows just how significant the influence of the February 26 Incident was. P276

Army Military Affairs Bureau Director Muto and Secretary-General Tomita decided that they should have the Navy speak clearly at this point, so they spoke to Navy Military Affairs Bureau Director Oka. However, Director Oka remained as evasive as ever, sticking to the line that 'the Navy cannot say. We will follow the Prime Minister's decision.' P280

Tojo expressed his opinion that the Third Konoe Cabinet should resign en masse. The reason was the disagreement between the Foreign Minister and the Army Minister, but Konoe was used to abandoning cabinets, and he abandoned this one as well. P281

After the resignation of the Third Konoe Cabinet, the Chief Aide-de-Camp informed Tojo that the Emperor wished to see him. Thinking he would be asked for his opinion regarding the resignation of the Konoe Cabinet, he went to the palace with that in mind, only to be ordered to become Prime Minister. It was only after hearing from Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Koichi Kido that it was the Emperor's will that 'there is no need to be bound by the decision of the September 6 Imperial Conference' that Tojo accepted the premiership. Thus, Prime Minister Tojo was born. Since he accepted the premiership on the condition that the decision to prepare for war be wiped clean, it is clear that Tojo was not a warmonger who sought to drag Japan into war at all costs, as is often said by later generations. However, the fact that an active-duty Army Minister was becoming Prime Minister may have inevitably been perceived as a decision for war. P285-286

Having received the Imperial command that it was acceptable to 'wipe clean' the decision of the September 6 Imperial Conference, the Tojo Cabinet began to deliberate on the course the country should take once again. The first thing decided was the 'Draft Outline for Negotiations with the United States.'
There were three plans in that outline. The first plan was to carry through with negotiations with the United States. Even if negotiations with the U.S. did not go well, it meant not resorting to war and enduring it. This would ultimately mean surrendering to the United States without fighting and abandoning all the interests on the continent that Japan had legally acquired since the Russo-Japanese War. The second was to immediately break off negotiations and go to war. The third plan was to continue negotiations, but to go to war if they were unsuccessful. No matter who thought about it, there were only these three options. Furthermore, if they were to go to war, it could only be at the beginning of December. Therefore, it was agreed that diplomatic efforts would continue until then, and if a settlement was reached, operational actions would be immediately halted, even if they were underway. P300-301

Everything began with the China Incident. The situation on this day was the result of the measures taken by the government at the time in an attempt to bring it to an early conclusion. Tojo, who had absolutely nothing to do with the start of the China Incident, was the one attempting to make that final decision. P301

There is an opinion that it is inappropriate for Tojo to be enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine, and the basis for this is that he was the mastermind who started the war. How misguided that is. The root of the war was, to the end, the China Incident. The aftermath led to the war against the United States and Britain, and by the time Tojo formed his cabinet, there were almost no options left. P301

Looking at the actual military situation, Chief of the Naval General Staff Osami Nagano stated that if war were to begin in early December, they could win the initial battles, but it would eventually become a long-term war. In that case, the outlook was unclear. This is what made it different from previous wars. The wars of the Meiji era were all short-term, all lasting less than two years. However, the China Incident was long-term. This time, it would be an even larger-scale long-term war. And he was saying that he did not know what would happen in a few years.
The reason the Meiji wars ended in a short period was that Japan had the will and preparation to do so from the beginning, and had agency. In contrast, in the wars since the China Incident, Japan was constantly forced into a passive response, and while doing so, was dragged into a long-term, major war. P319

At that time, the Imperial Japanese Army had 51 divisions across Japan, with a total strength estimated at around 700,000. Many of them were unusable, and they were currently fighting on the Chinese mainland. In Manchuria, they could not afford to let their guard down regarding Soviet movements. Therefore, the number that could be utilized for a war against the U.S. and Britain was about 11 divisions, or about 150,000. The idea was to occupy the enemy's bases and, combined with securing maritime traffic, establish an invincible strategic position. There was no intention to invade the United States or Britain. Regarding the Soviet Union, maintaining the status quo was fine. Even if a southern operation occurred, there was little possibility of the Soviet Union moving. However, they had to be careful about sabotage and ideological propaganda by the Communist Party in Manchukuo and China. P320

In October 1941, British Far East Commander-in-Chief Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham, American Brigadier General Magruder, and General MacArthur met in Manila to discuss Pacific issues. They were the ones engaging in a joint conspiracy. The central theme was a joint operation between the Chongqing army and the British army to support Chiang Kai-shek via the Burma Road. Also, Admiral Layton, Commander-in-Chief of the British Eastern Fleet, announced that the naval base at Singapore would be made available to the U.S. military upon request, and Far East Commander-in-Chief Brooke-Popham headed to Australia. Australian Prime Minister Curtin announced that the Pacific joint front negotiations had been completed among the United States, Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Australia. An alliance had been formed here as well. Thus, the military and economic chain net against Japan was rapidly expanding. P330

Moreover, the armies and navies of the United States, Britain, Australia, and others were continuing major expansions. The United States announced that since 1940, it had established a construction plan for 2,831 naval vessels, and 968 were under construction. Japan did not have the machinery to build that many, nor the materials or private wealth, and was not building that many. At the time, U.S. Secretary of the Navy Knox announced that there were 346 warships available at that moment, 345 under construction or contracted, 323 auxiliary vessels available, 209 under construction or contracted, 4,535 aircraft currently in existence, and 5,832 under production.
Secretary of War Stimson announced a nearly threefold increase in aviation cadets and conscripts, and Australian Prime Minister Curtin announced the induction of 450,000 troops. It was a situation where war could break out at any time. P331

On November 17, 1941, Prime Minister Tojo delivered a policy speech in the Diet. Six months had already passed since the start of Japan-U.S. negotiations, the claims of both countries were clear, and the remaining issue was narrowed down to how much each side could compromise for the sake of peace in the Pacific.
The Japanese government's position was to prioritize the protection of Japan's independence and national dignity, and first and foremost, it wanted third countries not to interfere with the China Incident. If there had been no third-party intervention, the China Incident should have truly ended immediately.
Next, it wanted the military and economic pressure on Japan to be lifted. In addition, the United States was massively strengthening its navy. Furthermore, Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, and Britain were all joining this movement. It wanted these movements to stop and for things to return to normal.
Third, it wanted to ensure that the expansion of the European war did not reach Japan. P340-341

For the China Incident to end, Chiang Kai-shek just needed to show an intention for peace and discuss the conditions with Wang Jingwei. Wang Jingwei and Chiang Kai-shek had times when they were comrades before the China Incident, and times when they were enemies. They should have talked among themselves, and Wang Jingwei could have become the head of state with Chiang Kai-shek as vice president, or vice versa. Then they could have decided on a treaty with Japan, and the Japanese military would have withdrawn. However, since they could not withdraw immediately, they should have arranged for Japanese troops to be stationed in some important bases for a while. P341-342

Manchuria is an independent country, so there is no reason for third countries to have any say. Regarding Manchuria, there is the Tanggu Truce. Since they even concluded a treaty treating Manchukuo as an independent country during Chiang Kai-shek's time, Manchuria should not have been a point of contention. P342

Despite the fact that negotiations with Japan were ongoing, the United States was increasingly solidifying the encirclement of Japan. It was a scheme where they were negotiating at the table while making preparations for war with other countries under the table. On November 10, British Prime Minister Churchill stated that if the United States went to war with Japan, Britain would enter the war within an hour. Roosevelt also stated in a speech the day before that 'we will fight forever to maintain freedom.' The United States uses the term 'maintaining freedom' at any time. It means 'whenever the United States feels like it.' P345

100 Americans living in Tianjin evacuated in November. This clearly gave the impression of the eve of war targeting Japan. In fact, Roosevelt had given the green light to bomb Japan as early as September. Japan did not know this, but the situation was such that war preparations were steadily progressing on the American side. P347

The Hull Note arrived on November 26. This memorandum not only insisted on the U.S. position but also wiped clean the points that had been advanced in previous discussions, and for Japan, it was something that could not be accepted.
There were four main points: one was to unconditionally withdraw troops from all of China, including Manchuria, and from Indochina, including the Japanese Army, Navy, and police forces.
Second, to deny Manchukuo. At that time, dozens of countries, including those in Europe, recognized Manchukuo, yet they were told to deny it. When asked what would happen to the Emperor Japan had installed, they would not answer at all. They also did not take into consideration whether Manchuria would be incorporated into China or whether the Manchu people could be destroyed.
Third, to deny the Nanjing Nationalist Government. The Nanjing government was a regime established by Wang Jingwei, who had risked his life to escape Chongqing in response to the Japanese military, and it is clear that his motive was not to fawn over Japan, but out of patriotism that a government representing the Chinese people was necessary even under Japanese occupation. They were told to deny this.
This is the same as being told by the United States to deny a government established in Iraq. Or it is the same as denying the Kuwaiti government, and in terms of face and good faith, it was something that could not be swallowed. If Japan were to deny this government, it would mean that the leaders who were cooperative with Japan, or who had the same ideas as Japan, would all be slaughtered.
The final demand was the dead-lettering of the Tripartite Pact, but this was not a problem for Japan, as it was actually already a dead letter. P348-349

Although it was understood that Japan-U.S. negotiations were difficult, the Japanese government had not yet given up hope. In Japan's case, there were two options: if all demands were rejected, there was no choice but to go to war. However, they were willing to compromise if only the oil embargo was eased. In that case, if they would sell it, they wanted to buy at least 6 million tons. P350

On November 27, the contents of the Hull Note were revealed, and a liaison conference was held in response. The harshness of this proposal was staggering, and this American memorandum was clearly an ultimatum to Japan. They were forcing this upon Japan, knowing that it could not be accepted. Moreover, the United States was presenting this not just as its own opinion, but after closely unifying its intentions with Britain and other related countries. P352-353

It was clear that the United States had already decided on a war against Japan, and the content suggested that it would not be strange if the United States launched an attack at any time. Therefore, Japan reached the judgment that continuing negotiations was impossible. The conclusion was that there was no choice but to follow the decision of the Imperial Conference on November 5th, which was to go to war if a breakthrough through negotiations became impossible. P353

However, it was decided that this decision should go through not only the Liaison Conference but also the Imperial Conference, so it was finalized on December 1st, and it was decided that all cabinet ministers would attend from the government side. Because the matter was so grave, it was decided that all cabinet ministers would attend. P353

The circumstances at the time the Hull Note was issued. The U.S. government had succeeded in deciphering diplomatic communications and knew everything Japan was thinking. The U.S. State Department also knew that the Japanese proposal on November 20th was Japan's final notice. By the end of November 1941, the United States had not only decided on war together with Great Britain, but also believed that it would be diplomatically advantageous to have Japan make the first move. P356-357

The Hull Note was not created by Hull. Harry White, who was in the Treasury Department at the time, was a Comintern agent and had received instructions from Stalin to "draw Japan into the war at any cost." At the time, the Soviet Union was being hit by a fierce German offensive and had been pushed to the point where Moscow and Leningrad were in danger, so for Stalin, it would be a disaster if Japan made a move in the Far East. He ordered White to create a proposal that Japan could never accept and to suggest it to Roosevelt, with the goal of forcing Japan and the United States into war. P357-358

Roosevelt was already desperate to go to war with Japan. He had Hull at the State Department draft a negotiation proposal, but after seeing Harry White's draft, he decided that the latter was better. If they went with this proposal, Japan would definitely go to war. So he ordered Hull, "Do it with this." Hull simply handed it to the Japanese ambassador to the United States. Japan took this as an ultimatum. The other side also knew that it would be taken that way. P358

Regarding the Emperor's responsibility for starting the war, Tojo put particular effort into expressing his opinion to the prosecution at the Tokyo Trial. First, regarding the appointment of the Prime Minister, previously, candidates for Prime Minister were recommended by the Genro, and the Emperor would order the formation of a cabinet, but now that the Genro are gone, it is based on the advice of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal Koichi Kido. There has never been an instance where the Emperor rejected these recommendations and advice and ordered someone he liked to form a cabinet. In other words, Tojo is saying that it is not the Emperor's responsibility that he became Prime Minister. P388-389

Also, regarding the appointment of assistants to the High Command, in the Army, it is based on the opinions of the three chiefs—the Minister of War, the Chief of the General Staff, and the Inspector General of Military Training—and with the responsibility of the Minister of War, the Emperor's permission is obtained; this is the same for the Navy. There has never been a single instance throughout the Meiji, Taisho, and Showa eras where the Emperor rejected a proposal and issued a different order. In other words, he is making it clear that there is no responsibility on the part of the Emperor in this regard either. P389

Furthermore, regarding national administration, His Majesty never acted on national administration or military command on his own. In fact, the Emperor never exercised his veto power against the final decisions made by the Cabinet and the High Command with responsibility. The Emperor sometimes expressed his wishes or cautions, but that was done based on the advice of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. Moreover, the advisors and assistants who received those wishes or cautions examined them on their own responsibility and determined their appropriateness. And even when the Emperor received advice that differed from his own wishes or opinions, he never rejected it. In short, it meant that the Emperor was to agree to everything in form. P389

People often say that if His Majesty the Emperor had said "no" here, the war might have stopped. The prosecution at the Tokyo Trial also said this. They argued that since the Emperor ended the war, he must have been able to stop it from starting. But that is wrong. That is what people who do not know the Japanese system say. At the end of the war, Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki abandoned his duty. Even at the Imperial Conference, the responsibility for making the decision lies with the Prime Minister and below. However, when opinions were divided, if the Prime Minister had taken a vote at that time, he could have decided to end the war, but Prime Minister Suzuki feared the subsequent chaos and ran away. And he sought His Majesty's sanction. Therefore, the Japanese cabinet system ended there. Only then did the Emperor express his opinion, saying, "If so, I will speak," and the end of the war was decided. At the time of the start of the war, the Japanese government mechanism was working normally, so the Emperor also gave his sanction normally through those procedures. However, at the end of the war, the Japanese government function was gone. One must understand that difference. This is something that should be understood if one researches it a little, but despite that, I wonder why so many people insist on the Emperor's war responsibility. P390

The government was not involved in military operations. The implementation and preparation for the start of the war were carried out by the Imperial General Headquarters Army and Navy High Command, and the government could not be involved in the details. Regarding Navy matters, neither the Minister of War nor the Prime Minister could be involved. This is a system unique to Japan. The United States said "Tojo, Tojo" and treated him on the same level as "Hitler, Hitler," but it was completely different. The fact that there was no function anywhere to unify national administration and military operations was the very problem for Japan. The administration could not be involved in, nor could it take responsibility for, specific war preparations, operations, and other matters. P393

The issue of the delay in the declaration of war. Within the Japanese government, it was a unified opinion that the notification should be delivered before the attack, and I was convinced that even after the attack, it was correctly delivered by Ambassador Nomura according to the Foreign Minister's instructions. No one doubted that the people in the field would perform their duties with perfect accuracy. However, Tojo states that the Japanese government found it extremely regrettable to learn later that this was not the case. P400

Even though this became such a big issue, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not formally investigate this delay problem afterwards. P400

In the first place, the Pearl Harbor attack was a surprise attack, so there would be no point if the notification time was too early. However, at any rate, if the document severing negotiations had been delivered even a little earlier than the attack, the United States could not have condemned it as a "cowardly surprise attack." Although, if you ask diplomatic theorists, it seems possible to interpret that the United States had already declared war by interpreting the Hull Note itself as an ultimatum. P401

The United States called the attack on Pearl Harbor a sneak attack, and that stirred up the hostility of the American people. This was a mistake by the people who were at the Japanese Embassy in the United States at the time, and it is entirely their responsibility. The truth seems to be that they ignored the prior notice that "an important message is coming," and the night before, everyone went to a farewell party for a colleague. Moreover, they did not even set up a duty officer to receive the telegram. The next morning, they came to work leisurely, saw the urgent telegram, and made excuses that they couldn't make it in time for the attack because they were typing it, but it was enough if the content was conveyed to the other party, so they didn't have to type it. They should have just handed it over, handwritten or otherwise, but they didn't even do that. P401-402

Although Foreign Minister Togo had instructed Ambassador Nomura to "hand it over directly at 1:00 PM (Washington time) on the 7th," it was 2:20 PM when Ambassador Nomura handed it to Secretary Hull. If it had been 1:00 PM, there would still have been 30 minutes until the start of the Pearl Harbor attack. It is outrageous that they took time to type it and had the appointment with Secretary of State Hull, which had been set for 1:00 PM, postponed by an hour. P402

Far from taking responsibility, the diplomats who were at the Japanese Embassy at the time had the Ministry of Foreign Affairs hide everything, and all the people responsible at the time were subsequently promoted and received the Order of the Rising Sun. This is unforgivable. P403-404

By the way, the person who had the farewell party at the Japanese Embassy the night before the war started said that the next day was Sunday, and he went for a drive with his family and heard about the start of the war on the car radio. This is a problem of the quality of diplomats as human beings. Pre-war Japan was poor, and the standard of living was low compared to European standards. However, the countries to which they were sent as ministers and ambassadors were mostly first-class countries with high standards of living, as it was an era when colonies had not yet become independent. When they became officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they could go to such countries. Since they could enjoy a high standard of living not found in Japan, daughters of very wealthy families were happy to marry Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials before the war. The guys who went to America probably put more weight on enjoying life. P404

Japan formally declared war on only the UK and the US, but when counted after the war, Japan had been declared war upon by dozens of countries. Japan intended to face two countries, but it had been declared war upon by China, the Netherlands, Australia, and even South American countries. P408

Regarding the administration of occupied territories, the policy was as follows. First, military administration will be conducted for occupied territories. This is unavoidable. Next, as far as the political situation permits, and considering historical circumstances, independence or autonomy will be granted, and military administration will be abolished as soon as possible. And it states that they will be made to cooperate with the purpose of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and made to cooperate in the war as much as the situation permits. In fact, the Philippines and Burma were made independent during the war, and there were plans to make Indonesia independent as well. Then, it states that it aims for the restoration of public order in the occupied areas, the stabilization of people's livelihoods, and the rapid acquisition of important resources, but this of course means securing oil. Then, regarding the local governance by the occupying forces, instructions were given to respect ethnic customs and habits and not to interfere with religion. Also, third-country nationals living in the area will be made to cooperate with the military administration, and if they do not comply, they will be expelled. P411

Japan took the Hull Note of November 26th as a de facto declaration of war and began drafting the Imperial Rescript on the Declaration of War on November 29th. The draft was finalized and shown to His Majesty the Emperor on December 7th. The text was revised in two points at the Emperor's special request. One is the part "Chin ga kokoro naran ya (it cannot be my original intention)." This was added at the Emperor's strong request. The other is that "We expect to proclaim the great cause of the Imperial Way to the world" was changed to "We expect to preserve the glory of the Empire." This means that Japan's face will be protected. It means that Japan is not a nation that will be humiliated and submissive, rather than boasting about big things like proclaiming the great cause of the Imperial Way to the world. P419

If the American side truly believed that Japan would not go to war after being presented with the Hull Note, it can only be attributed to the arrogance of believing that colored people would eventually obey if threatened by white people. Albert J. Knock, an American historian, later stated that even a small nation like Monaco or Luxembourg would take up arms if presented with something like the Hull Note. P419-420

From the perspective of white people, the Hull Note was an unmistakable declaration of war. It is unacceptable to claim it was not. If they insist it was not a declaration of war, it is because of the arrogant assumption that colored people will say 'yes, yes' to whatever unreasonable demands are made of them. P420

What about the issue of the Japanese military's mistreatment of prisoners of war during the war? The incident on the Bataan Peninsula is exaggeratedly called the 'Bataan Death March,' but the one most to blame is General MacArthur, the U.S. commander who abandoned his troops and fled. The prisoners were in the jungles of the Bataan Peninsula. If left alone, they would all have starved to death. Therefore, they had to be taken to Manila, where there were internment facilities. However, the Japanese military did not have trucks, so they had to make them walk. Since Japanese soldiers were walking along with them, why should this be called intentional abuse? P432

It is a fact that some prisoners became weak or died of malaria along the way, and since Americans move by truck during advances, it is certain that the prisoners must have found it very difficult. However, I do not think this should be considered intentional mistreatment of prisoners. There was a local commander who was executed for allegedly feeding prisoners tree roots when he gave them burdock root while the Japanese military itself was not getting enough food. There are various strange translations, such as translating burdock (gobo) as 'ox tail' (since the kanji for burdock contains the character for cow, the interpreter apparently misunderstood) and claiming they were fed cow tails. Protests about being fed rotten beans are also a misunderstanding of being served miso soup. Because the character for 'rot' is in the word for tofu, it was translated as being fed rotten beans every day. However, for the Japanese, tofu miso soup was the best meal they could offer during times of scarcity. This is simply a difference in food culture. Even if the prisoners' food was bad, the Japanese military's food was just as bad, so the Japanese military had no intention of mistreating them. P433

The reason the Army forbade becoming a prisoner of war. The Army issued orders regarding the treatment of prisoners, stating that abuse and forced labor were not to be imposed, and also established labor regulations. They also distributed the Senjinkun (Field Service Code), which taught the duties of imperial soldiers. The Army was that concerned about the treatment of prisoners. The Senjinkun mentioned here contains a clause prohibiting Japanese soldiers from becoming prisoners of war. The reason for this is that it became known that Japanese soldiers who were taken prisoner by the Chinese were being killed in truly brutal ways. Even much later, during the China Incident, when soldiers who had been taken prisoner were discovered, they had been killed in ways too cruel to look at. For that reason, the Army ordered in the Senjinkun, 'Do not become a prisoner of war.' P437-438

Japan did not ratify the Geneva Convention's 'Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.' The Japanese concept of prisoners of war is different. For the Japanese, becoming a prisoner of war is a disgrace, but in foreign countries, it is not. There was a gap in perception. Conversely, foreign soldiers would gladly surrender to become prisoners of war.
As a result, even in places like Singapore, the number of prisoners exceeded that of the Japanese military. With enemy soldiers surrendering in droves, far outnumbering the Japanese military, there was also the circumstance that even though food was already scarce, it was impossible to properly care for them even if they tried.
Japan did not ratify the Geneva Convention because it feared it might give Japanese soldiers the misunderstanding that becoming a prisoner of war was encouraged. However, orders not to mistreat prisoners were issued many times. The Ministry of War stated that although it did not ratify the convention, it would treat prisoners in accordance with the Geneva Convention. The Japanese government had no intention of mistreating prisoners. P440

The construction of the Thai-Burma Railway was decided by order of the General Staff for the purpose of supplying the Japanese military in Burma and for trade and transportation between Thailand and Burma. Tojo, as Minister of War, agreed and at the same time gave his consent to the use of prisoners of war.
The area was not particularly unhealthy, and the Japanese military was also participating in the labor, just like the prisoners and other healthy people, so it was an act that should not have been a problem in the first place. However, after the war, it gathered criticism as the Japanese military's mistreatment of prisoners. But the real reason they considered it an act of cruelty was that the British felt it was a great humiliation to be made to do manual labor alongside colored people. The labor itself is not the issue.
Using prisoners for construction work that is purely unrelated to military operations is acceptable, except for officers. The Geneva and Hague Conventions prohibit the use of prisoners in areas related to operations, but the Thai-Burma Railway was not related to operations. P448

The pressure of the ABCD encirclement was only intensifying, and in such a situation, we had no choice but to seek measures for self-preservation and self-defense. In any case, it was not that the Indonesians did not want to sell oil to Japan, but that they could not because the Netherlands was occupying them. It was not that Thailand did not want to sell rice to Japan, but that it was under British influence and could not sell it as it wished. Therefore, the 'liberation of East Asia' became the objective for Japan's self-preservation and self-defense. P460-461

The Greater East Asia Conference was held in Tokyo on November 5-6, 1943. Very important people gathered there. Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand, Prime Minister Zhang Jinghui of Manchukuo, Chairman Wang Jingwei of the Nanjing Government, President Laurel of the Philippines, Prime Minister Ba Maw of Burma, and Subhas Chandra Bose attended under the title of Head of the Provisional Government of Free India.
From Indonesia, Sukarno (the first president after independence) and Hatta (the first vice president after independence), who were famous as national representatives, came to Japan. However, since the country was not yet independent, it was not an official participation. P465-466

During the Greater East Asia Conference, the Emperor invited Sukarno and Hatta, who could not attend as official members, to the Imperial Palace. At the time, Indonesians were severely looked down upon by their suzerain, the Dutch, so meeting the Queen of the Netherlands was something they could not even dream of. However, because they could meet the Emperor of Japan, who had easily defeated the Dutch military, the two were very nervous when they visited the palace. Then, the Emperor walked straight up to them and shook their hands. From then on, both Sukarno and Hatta became thorough Japanophiles. P466

The reality of racial discrimination in the pre-war world. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, Japan proposed including racial equality in the League of Nations Covenant, but this was buried. U.S. President Wilson crushed this proposal, saying that such important matters should be decided by unanimity, not by majority vote. While preaching the noble motto of national self-determination, he did not allow national self-determination in his own territories. P472

In the memoirs of Admiral Spruance, who became commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, it is written that in the U.S. Navy, colored people such as Asians and blacks were only used in the kitchen. In short, they were only allowed to cook on warships. If they fired cannons or participated in combat, they might get promoted and have subordinates, but since white people could not be subordinates to colored people, it is clearly written. On the other hand, Japan had a Korean lieutenant general at that time. A lieutenant general is the rank of a division commander. South Korean President Park Chung-hee also became an officer in the Japanese military. P477

In December 1942, the Tojo Cabinet established a new policy toward China. Following that, on January 9, 1943, the Japan-China Agreement concerning the return of all concessions held as imperial special rights in China and the abolition of extraterritoriality was concluded and implemented. Also, all assets of the United States and Britain held by Japan were transferred to the Nanjing government, Wang Jingwei. Furthermore, Japan renounced all stationing rights stipulated in the Basic Treaty between Japan and China, and promised that after the end of the China Incident, the Japanese military would withdraw completely without any stationing rights. It also promised respect for sovereignty and territory in an equal relationship.
Regarding this, Wang Jingwei, the Chinese representative at the Greater East Asia Conference, stated, 'Since January of this year, Japan has already returned concessions to China, abolished extraterritoriality, and recently replaced the Basic Treaty between Japan and China with the Japan-China Alliance Treaty, and at the same time discarded all various attached documents.' He continued, 'The Greater East Asia doctrine advocated by the Father of the Nation, Sun Yat-sen, has found light here. The desire that Sun Yat-sen had for Japan to help China and abolish unequal treaties has also been realized.'
Looking at this, it is natural that the regimes on the Chinese mainland after that would dislike being brought up about the Greater East Asia Conference, as they would have nothing left to say to Japan. P486-487

Japan granted independence to Burma on August 1, 1943. And it was decided to incorporate a part of the Malay region, which has a deep ethnic connection, into Burma. Chief Administrator Ba Maw rejoiced at the independence, saying, 'Today, at last, the day has come when our power is not only the power of 16 million Burmese, but the power of 1 billion East Asians.'
Next is the Philippines. On October 14 of the same year, the Philippines became independent. Japan agreed to President Laurel's wish that the Philippines would not participate in Japan's war and would not maintain a standing army. From this, it is clear that Japan did not have territorial ambitions toward the Philippines either. P497

Japan's war was only possible because of the oil in the Dutch East Indies. We had an oil base in Borneo. The last great naval battle off the Philippines by the Combined Fleet also used all the oil from Borneo. P499

At the Tokyo Trial, strangely, the Soviet Union became one of the judges and also sent a prosecutor. This is despite the fact that no other country has committed such a clear crime against peace and humanity by unilaterally breaking the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact and attacking. Not only that, but even after the war ended and the Japanese military surrendered in an orderly manner, the country that took 600,000 Japanese as prisoners, illegally abducted them, and caused tens of thousands of them to die of starvation and freezing, sent judges and prosecutors. Since the Soviet Union itself should have been judged, but this is overlooked, it is clear that the Tokyo Trial itself is a farce. P521

Japan never had any intention of invading Siberia, let alone doing so. However, the Soviet Union was eyeing the invasion of East Asia. Tojo said, 'Japan has been desperately trying to defend itself, and the founding of Manchukuo was also to ensure that Manchuria would not be invaded, and the essence of the Japanese Army's operations is defense against the Soviet Union.' P521

There was absolutely no plan for the Japanese military to cross Siberia and go to Moscow. Japan maintained a stance of maintaining tranquility toward the Soviet Union and was always extremely careful. When the Japan-Soviet Neutrality Pact was concluded, Japan tried to strictly observe it. Yet, it was the Soviet Union that broke it and invaded. P522

Why did Tojo, who was one of the people who knew the facts thoroughly, have to start a war that resulted in such great disaster for Japan? In conclusion, he states that it was caused by the provocations of the Allied powers, and as far as our country was concerned, it was a war of self-defense that could not be avoided. P530

The policy at the time was neither aggression nor exploitation. The legally elected cabinets of the time each handled this in accordance with the procedures stipulated by the Constitution and laws, but there were cold, harsh circumstances where they were hindered one after another by Britain and America, and they had to fight for national self-defense. Japan always responded passively, but was finally presented with the Hull Note and Japan gambled its fate and fought and lost. The responsibility for this war must be clearly distinguished from the responsibility for the defeat. Tojo insisted until the very end that this war was a war of self-defense and a war that did not violate the currently recognized international law. He flatly denied the Tokyo Trial, saying that it is inconceivable that Japan would be accused by the victors of the act of waging war itself as an international crime, or that individual officials would be personally denounced as criminals under international law or violators of treaties.
However, regarding the responsibility for the defeat, he stated that it was his own responsibility as the Prime Minister at the time, and that he not only accepts this responsibility in this sense, but wishes to bear it willingly from the bottom of his heart. P532

Why did I decide to write about Showa history based on Hideki Tojo's sworn testimony at the Tokyo Trial? It is because Tojo insisted that 'this war was a war of self-defense.' As far as this sworn testimony shows, one can understand the process by which Japan was driven into a corner step by step. There is no evidence anywhere that Japan started the war willingly. Rather, Japan's stance in negotiations with the United States was one of 'please, please, please.' P533

Before the war, Japan had no resources left. We even donated all our children's tin toys. It is impossible that a country would donate even children's tin toys to wage a war of aggression. P533

Japan entered this war because it was truly being strangled materially, and if it had continued to drag out negotiations like that, the Japanese Army and Navy would certainly have become unable to function. Since there was no oil or anything else, industry would also have been completely destroyed. He argues that it was because of such circumstances that they were forced to enter the war, and that it was entirely for self-preservation and self-defense. P534

MacArthur also later said, 'Japan's claims were correct.' This is the same as saying 'Tojo's claims were 100% correct.' In fact, MacArthur's words before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services have a magical effect.
When it was rumored that the history textbook (Fusosha) edited by the 'Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform' might be adopted, a question was put to the conservative-leaning Mayor Yamada in the Suginami Ward Assembly. A council member asked, in effect, 'Mayor, do you think the recent war was a holy war, or do you not think it was a war of aggression?' In response, Mayor Yamada stated, 'The enemy commander, MacArthur, clearly stated that the previous war was not a war of aggression but a war of self-defense,' and recited MacArthur's statement in the original English. The assembly hall, which had been noisy, suddenly went silent, and that was the end of it. These are magic words. Therefore, I want everyone in Japan to know this statement. P536-537