“HUMANE AND CONSIDERATE ATTENTION”; INDIAN REMOVAL FROM MISSOURI, 1803-1838

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Abstract

When the United States completed the Louisiana Purchase, there were thousands of indigenous people living in what eventually became Missouri. Over the course of the following decades, thousands more Indians from over a dozen different nations settled there in exchange for land east of the Mississippi River. By 1838, however, nearly all Native Americans had been expelled further west not because of the wishes of the federal government, but by the will of state and local officials. Empowered by the policy of forced immigration advocated by President Andrew Jackson, the combined influences of economics, immigration, and racial violence enabled local whites to expel practically all Indians from Missouri. This removal was a rare triumph of states' rights over federal policy.

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Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction

It will be my sincere and constant desire to observe toward the Indian tribes within our limits a just and liberal policy, and to give that humane and considerate attention to their rights and their wants which is consistent with the habits of our Government and the feelings of our people.
Andrew Jackson, First Inaugural Address, 4 March 1829.[1]

In the years 1836 and 1840 respectively, two European visitors, one from Great Britain the other from France, visited the Missouri River Valley and the territory of Kansas. The first, Englishman Charles August Murray, noted the scarcity of game along the river, and it was not until he reached Kansas that he saw any Native Americans, specifically members of the Kickapoo and Pawnee tribes. Victor Tixier, a Frenchman who followed a similar path four years later, noted that while he was in Missouri, he encountered exactly two Indians, members of the Osage tribe, both of them in St. Louis.[2] These visitors from Europe were surprised at the complete absence of Natives in a region that, only a few years earlier, had been the home to thousands of indigenous people.

Located at the confluence of the two greatest river valleys in North America, the Missouri and Mississippi, Native peoples lived, hunted, and traded there long before recorded history in the region. By the seventeenth century, the area attracted European explorers in search of trade, furs, game, mineral wealth, and farmland. White, and sometimes Indian, immigration increased from a trickle to a flood by the opening decades of the nineteenth century. The repeated influx of newcomers created a volatile, and often violent, dynamic with the indigenous people already in residence. The clash of cultures

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[1] Andrew Jackson, "First Inaugural Address," (4 March 1829), the Avalon Project: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jackson1.asp (accessed 3 December 2012).

[2] Charles August Murray, *Travels in North America during the Years 1834, 1835, & 1836, v. 1* (London: Richard Bentley, 1839), 236-237, 240, 252-255; Victor Tixier, *Tixier's Travels on the Osage Prairies,* John Francis McDermott, ed., Albert J. Salvan, trans. (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1940), 98.

that occurred in Missouri began long before the Louisiana Purchase. Interaction with the French, Spanish, and English all left a mark on the area and influenced the resident Natives, although Europeans never subjugated them. The situation drastically and permanently changed after the Louisiana Purchase, as the fledgling republic rapidly dominated the Mississippi and Lower Missouri River Valleys. Many factors assured American primacy, but there were two approaches to Native American relations; one personified by President Thomas Jefferson, the other by President Andrew Jackson. After examining the motivation, desires, and results of these two approaches, there is a clear difference in the treatment of Missouri's Native Americans in 1838 versus that in 1803. As the nineteenth century progressed, the majority of whites living in the state decided they could not live alongside the Indians. Most Americans shared this attitude, but Missouri was one of the rare states west of the Mississippi River that, despite the efforts of the federal government to stop the exodus, successfully ejected all Indians from their borders. Empowered by the policy of forced immigration Jackson advocated, the combined influences of economics, immigration, and racial violence enabled local whites to expel all indigenous people from Missouri, which resulted in a victory for states' rights over federal policy. While those who agreed with Jefferson did not always treat indigenous people as equals, they did generally treat them with respect. Those who championed Jackson's position rarely thought about Indian concerns or rights, considering Native Americans obstacles inhibiting the progress of American westward expansion.

Both the Jeffersonian and the Jacksonian "Ideals" had a direct impact upon the formation of Missouri. President Thomas Jefferson envisioned much of the area west of

the Mississippi as a land where the Indians could live completely separated from white society east of the river. During this separation, Indians could then abandon their tribal ways and embrace so-called civilized agriculture. Once Indians conformed to the American ideal, they could ostensibly integrate into American culture. This vision for Missouri, however, completely failed. By 1838, Americans of European descent claimed the entirety of the state. The removal of indigenous peoples from Missouri occurred in a short span of time, fewer than twenty years after statehood. This diaspora is a remarkable, if ignoble, feat considering that more than a dozen tribes comprised of thousands of individuals either hunted or lived in the territory of Missouri.

In 1803, Jefferson designed the first official American governmental policy of relocating Indians, one that encouraged them to become farmers and integrate into the Unites States as citizens. The Jeffersonian approach to Indian-white relations planned for assimilation after the Natives voluntarily relocated to the west. Jefferson and his disciples had differing opinions about the Natives but believed they had the same rights to life, liberty, and property as the whites, and expected the United States to uphold honorably all treaties and obligations between them. President Jefferson, while not the only advocate of the policy named in his honor, was the first executive given the power and authority by Congress to treat Native Americans as he saw fit.[3]

President Andrew Jackson epitomized the change in both attitude and policy toward the Native Americans. Frustrated at the slow pace of removal, Jackson supported the individual state's right to evict tribes forcibly and dispatch them west. Those who held to the philosophy of the Jacksonian Ideal felt no obligation to respect Indian rights

[3]Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The American Indian and the United States; a Documentary History, volume III* (New York: Random House, 1973), 2140, 2141, 2148.

or property. As with the Jeffersonian Ideal, many Americans shared this attitude long before Jackson's presidency, but due to the president's efforts, it became official policy.[4]

The Indian Removal Act of 1830 implemented by the Jackson administration gave the federal government the power to force Natives living east of the Mississippi River to trade their territory for land further west and required them to move to the new location.[5] Indian removal to the west had been part of American policy since the Articles of Confederation, but the 1830 Act marked a change from voluntary relocation, the Jeffersonian Ideal earlier in the century, to one of forced removal, or the Jacksonian Ideal. This change of strategy, a radical departure from the principles of the rights to life and liberty in the Declaration of Independence and the right of due process in Constitution, resulted from a realignment of American goals that took place in a relatively short period.

As the "Gateway to the West" for white immigration, Missouri presents an excellent setting to examine the transition from the Jeffersonian to the Jacksonian Ideal. While the territory became the pivotal point for westward expansion in antebellum America, the national government concurrently offered it as a permanent home to displaced tribes from the east. While neighboring states, namely Iowa and Arkansas, also exiled Native Americans from their borders, the wealthier, more populated state of Missouri, the governmental seat for the entire upper Louisiana Purchase Territory, was far more influential on American-Native relations and policy.

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[4]David A. Smith, *Presidents from Adams through Polk, 1825-1849* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2005), 48-49.

[5] U.S. Congress, *An Act to provide for an exchange of lands with the Indians residing in any of the states or territories, and for their removal west of the river Mississippi,* 21st Cong., 1st sess., 1830.

Too often in the study of early American history, there is a tendency to underappreciate the interaction between the white and indigenous cultures, especially when applied to the trans-Mississippi westward movement. When studying the great explorations and westward migration that, by the 1840s, evolved into the concept of Manifest Destiny, there is a tendency to ignore or marginalize the Native American tribes of the upper Louisiana Purchase area, especially in favor of the migrating nations from east of the Mississippi River. Considering the years of debate, legislation, and effort dedicated to solving the Indian "problem," overlooking the dynamics that shaped migration patterns and the westward movement is to ignore a large part of the American experience.

Another aspect of trans-Mississippi history that is often overlooked concerns the struggle between local and national government. The ascendency of the white population over Native Americans in Missouri illustrates a clear example of the triumph of a state's desires over that of the federal government, although one rarely discussed in states' rights history. Beginning in 1803 with President Jefferson, politicians in Washington tried to create an Indian territory within the borders of Missouri. By the time it became a state in 1821, local whites overwhelmingly rejected this policy in favor of complete expulsion. Even when the federal government made one final effort to create a reservation in the northwest of Missouri, regional officials, who coveted the area for themselves, were able to alter or nullify Congressional treaties in favor of the state. After they had achieved statehood, Missourians demanded—and were granted—additional land legally possessed by several Native American tribes. Unlike similar land grabs by states east of the Mississippi, the region was not territory owned or controlled by Indians within state

borders, but land that was unattached to Missouri. Local whites began to infiltrate and settle in the Platte area, while concurrently demanding the surrender of the land to the state, an effort tantamount to an invasion. Because of the larger Cherokee expulsion in the Southeast, followed by the tragedy along the Trail of Tears, Missouri's land grab often is overlooked in the larger picture of American history.

Another problem that arises when analyzing the the reasons for Indian expulsion from Missouri is the lack of original material from the victims of this crime. Almost everything that was written about Native Americans during this time, even when sympathetic to their plight, came from white males. Despite efforts to minimize the impact, this thesis does contain some of that bias. In an effort to present as balanced and scholarly work as possible, the author has consulted more than twenty-five monographs about indigenous nations in Missouri, many of them written by, or in conjunction with, Native American scholars.

Whenever possible, this thesis relies upon the original documents, legislative acts, or writings of the principle figures involved drawing conclusions or providing support for its arguments. Diaries and letters of Thomas Jefferson, William Clark, and George Sibley provided insightful glimpses into their attitudes toward the Natives and their thought processes in their approaches to Indian-white relations. Most of the Congressional Acts, presidential proclamations, and state and local resolutions used in this thesis are online at either at the Library of Congress or the Yale Law School Avalon Project websites.

Although this work provides a narrative of the events leading up to the expulsion of Native Americans from Missouri, the purpose is to examine the reasons and changing

attitudes that led to the expulsion. There are several excellent monographs written about the major influences on Missouri's Native American policy, most notably Jay Buckley's *William Clark: Indian Diplomat*, Landon Y. Jones's *William Clark and the Shaping of the West*, and Ora Brooks Peake's *A History of the United States Factory System, 1795-1822*. Many prominent treatises have been written on the various nations that resided in the state including W. David Baird, *The Osage People*, Louis F. Burns, *A History of the Osage People*, Berlin Basil Chapman, *The Otoes and Missourias: A Study of Indian Removal and the Legal Aftermath*, Greg Olsen, *The Ioway in Missouri*, Kristie C. Wolferman, *The Osage in Missouri*, and especially the works of Wilcomb E. Washburn, who laid a groundwork for modern studies of American-Native interaction. Using the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian lens is common when examining the treatment of indigenous people in the opening decades of the nineteenth century. There is, however, no monograph or article examining the entirety of Native American removal exclusively in Missouri. This thesis offers a framework for further study of the issue.

In the next chapter, there is a brief exploration of the history of recorded European contact with local indigenous tribes. The genesis for much of American policy originated with the French, and especially the Spanish, explorers, traders, and government officials and their interaction with the Indians. The most feared and respected Missouri nation, at least by Europeans, was the Osage. The French allied with them while the Spanish tried to destroy them, and the consequences of both actions had a direct impact on President Jefferson's strategy for dealing with tensions between Americans and Indians in Missouri. The efforts of Europeans contributed to the eventual economic and military dominance by the United States.

Chapter 3 begins with the Louisiana Purchase and explores the first attempts to establish a relationship between Americans and Missouri tribes. Included in this chapter are an examination of federal Indian policies and the creation of the factory system, the economic lynchpin Jefferson believed essential for inducing Eastern tribes to move west. The word "factory" was used to describe the government owned and controlled trading posts. These factories were not places of manufacturing, but outposts around which Indians, not white settlers, could live, trade, and interact with one another and government officials. From 1803 to 1811, land exploration in preparation for future settlement occurred, new policies were established, and treaties signed that shaped the growth of Missouri. It was a time when the Jeffersonian Ideal had its best chance of success. Violence, the failure to fulfill promises made to the Indians, and the inability to bind the tribes in total economic dependence on the United States contributed to the failure of Jefferson's plan.

The transitional period in American and Native relations from 1812-1820 is explored in Chapter 4. The War of 1812 escalated violence and fear of Indians in Missouri. Unlike most of the nation, however, raids and hostility continued after the war ended. A realignment of power, not just in the state, but also across the continent, enabled the United States to forge new treaties that placed Native nations at an even greater disadvantage than those previously signed. During this transitional period three major factors—the escalation of Indian violence, the transition from government control of trade to privatization, and the rapid influx of white settlers—all eroded support for the Jeffersonian Ideal in favor of the Jacksonian.

Chapter 5 begins with Missouri achieving statehood in 1821 and continues until the final major expulsion of Indians from the state in 1838. At this time, the Jacksonian Ideal achieved final dominance over the Jeffersonian. The vast majority of national and local policies: the Removal Act, the Intercourse Act of 1834, the Black Hawk War, and the Platte Purchase just to name a few, are all examples of the change in attitude toward the future of Native Americans. In Missouri, the triumph of capitalism over the factory system, the failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the tacit cooperation for expulsion by a succession of presidents, and the Platte Purchase, combined to enable the final removal of Indians from the state.

The conclusion briefly touches upon the fate of some of those officials who tried to uphold Jeffersonian Ideals, as well several of the former nations of Missouri. Also explored are some minor dealings between the state and the vanishing number of remaining Natives, as well as the transition from concerns over Indians to that of slavery.

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Chapter 2: French and Spanish Control; the Missouri Territory 1673-1803

Neighbors, friends, and fathers…No wrong will ever be done you by our nation…
Thomas Jefferson to the Osage Chiefs, 16 July 1804.[6]

There was scarcely a more coveted area of land in North America west of the Mississippi River from 1673-1803, than the Missouri Territory. The potential wealth was staggering. Located at the conjunction of two of the largest, most expansive river systems in the world, this natural trade route connected millions of square miles of interior land to the Gulf of Mexico. Soil along the river valleys was among the most nutrient-rich on the continent. The region straddled three diverse ecosystems able to supply numerous game and fur needs: beaver, otter, muskrat in the streams and marshes, deer, elk, weasel, and bison from the prairie, and bear from the Ozark Mountains. Even rich lead mines offered a metal supplement to the trade, fur, and agricultural cornucopia within the 69,686 square miles that became the state of Missouri. The Native American tribe who controlled the region, the Osage, was one the most feared and respected in North America. The struggle either to ally with or destroy the Osage defined European-Indian relations from the first contacts to the sale of the Louisiana Territory in 1803 to the United States. The consequences of French and Spanish actions had a direct impact on President Thomas Jefferson's strategy for dealing with tensions between Americans and Indians. The Spanish failed economically or militarily to dominate the Osage, but their efforts enabled the United States to do both in the decades after the Louisiana Purchase.[7]

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[6]Thomas Jefferson, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, volume XVI,* Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed. (Washington: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), 405-410.

[7]William E. Parrish, Charles T. Jones, Jr., and Lawrence O. Christensen, *Missouri: The Heart of the Nation* (St. Louis: Forum Press, 1980), 1, 23; J. Frederick Fausz, "The Osage Indians: First Gateway to the West," *Journal of the West*, 43, no. 3 (Summer 2004): 32-33.

The key to understanding the evolving relationships between the United States government, the Native Americans, and the arriving immigrants in the early nineteenth century lies in what previously occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth. It is also especially essential to examine this history and nature of the Osage, the pivotal tribe of Missouri, as the American policy toward it was a reflection of the actions the French and Spanish took. For purposes of clarity, references to Missouri, or the territory of Missouri includes all the lands currently within the state's borders, unless otherwise written.

There were thousands of languages among the Native American peoples of North America, almost all derived from a handful of base root systems. The tribes in Missouri belonged to one of two language groups, the Algonquian, or Algic, and the Siouan. The Algonquian base dominated the lands east of the Mississippi River and included such tribes as the Delaware, Shawnee, Illinois, Kickapoo, Ottawa, Miami, Peoria, Pottawatomie, Cheyenne, and Sac,[8] and Fox. Between 1673 and 1838, members from all of these tribes lived in Missouri and were at some point at war with the Osage tribes. The Osage belonged to the language group that dominated the Missouri River valley known as the Siouan, which included the Crow, Dakota Sioux, Ioway, Kansa[9], Missouria, Omaha, Oto, Winnebago, and Quapaw. Language group was often the basis for friendship or enmity between tribes, but was only one factor. For example, during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Osage were enemies of the Ioway, who in

[8]Also spelled Sauk.

[9]Also known as the Kaw.

turn allied with the Sac and Fox. In general, however, tribes tended to ally more often within their own language group.[10]

Two distinct cultures also dominated the area. Semi-agricultural tribes, such as the Osage, planted crops in the spring and left them to grow unattended as the tribe hunted for the summer. In the fall, the group returned to gather what had survived and grown to maturity. The other culture, the Plains Indians, including the Comanche, Kiowa, Apache, and Cheyenne, were nomadic, horse-mounted, entirely dependent on the bison, did not gather wild berries and roots, and only rarely fished. The aforementioned plains tribes occasionally visited Missouri, either trading and warring with the Osage, or hunting bison. Even before the arrival of Europeans, the Missouri territory was a mélange of conflicting languages, cultures, and tribal loyalties that alternated between seasons of trade and conflict, but dominated by and centered around the Osage tribes.[11]

Although the Osage were the predominant tribe in Missouri, they were not the only Natives who lived and hunted the land. Others, like the Missouria, Ioway, and Illini, were significant enough to have territory named in their honor, but for various reasons failed successfully to challenge the ascendency of the Osage. The first documented case of European visitors to the area was two French missionary-explorers, Father Jacques Marquette and Louis Jolliet in 1673. The most powerful tribe near the junction of the Missouri-Mississippi Rivers, as far as the two Frenchmen knew, was the Missouria, or Missouri, tribe, thus the river and region became so named in their honor. At the time, the Missouria Indians lived on the Grand River, northwest of the Osage and south of the

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[10]Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., *The Indian Heritage of America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968), 17, 18.

[11]Josephy, 114, 116-117.

Otoes. The Otoes never permanently settled in Missouri, but they did hunt in the northwest corner. The Missouria Indians, beset on all sides by enemies, quickly allied themselves with the French, but before the end of the eighteenth century virtually disappeared due to small pox and attacks from the Sac and Fox tribes. By 1823, fewer than one hundred remained, integrated, and scattered among other tribes like the Osage, Kansas, and especially the Otoes. The last full-blooded Missouria died in 1907.[12]

The Ioway, namesake of the state of Iowa, and the Oto tribes lived and hunted along Missouri's northern border. The latter occasionally forayed along the Nodaway River until near the end of the eighteenth century. The Ioway, a semi-nomadic tribe, alternated living in Iowa and Missouri. By the early nineteenth century, however, enough members of the tribe settled in northern Missouri that the American Ioway Indian Agency, the bureau responsible for relations with the tribe, was located on the Platte River above Kansas City, Missouri. Around the time of the American Revolution, the Ioways, along with the Sacs and Foxes, drove the Osage away from the Missouri River down to the Osage River but were not strong enough to claim the territory for themselves. For several decades, the acreage north of the Missouri River remained a kind of "no man's land." All four tribes used the area as a hunting ground, but none could lay claim making it exclusively their own. The lack of one dominate nation was the reason

[12]J. Brewton Berry, "The Missouri Indians," *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly* 17, no. 2 (September 1936): 113, 115, 119-120; Berlin Basil Chapman, *The Otoes and Missourias: A Study of Indian Removal and the Legal Aftermath* (Oklahoma City: Times Journal Publishing, 1965), xiii; Carl H. Chapman, *American Indian Ethnohistory: Plains Indians, Osage Indians IV* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1974), 38, 40; The story of the Missouria tribe is described by Lewis Clark, in *History of the Expedition under the Command of Captains Lewis and Clark, to the Sources of the Missouri, thence Across the Rocky Mountains and down the River Columbia to the Pacific Ocean, vol. 1* (Philadelphia: Bradford and Inskeep, 1814), June 13, 1804.

American explorers Meriwether Lewis and William Clark found no occupied Indian villages on the Missouri River until reaching the Nebraska territory.[13]

Until 1681, the Illinois, or Illini, tribe controlled the northeastern border of Missouri. Frequent warfare with the Iroquois, enemies of their French allies, broke the Illinis' power enough that members of the Fox tribe, followed soon after by Sacs, began moving into western Illinois. The latter two tribes' victimization continued until the Illini fled the area around 1728. Soon after the Illini exodus, the Sacs and Foxes allied into one greater tribal unit, began hunting in northeast Missouri, and became the Osage's most intractable enemies.[14]

North American Indian tribes kept no written records then, but according to tribal legend, the Osage people originally lived east of the Mississippi, driven west across the river because of attacks by a stronger tribe, possibly the Iroquois. By the mid-eighteenth century, they had established themselves as the most powerful tribe south of the Sioux nations, controlling the greater portion of what became four mid-western states. Their hunting grounds began at the Mississippi River, and eventually included all of central and southwest Missouri, as far south as the Arkansas River, northeast and central Oklahoma, much of Kansas, and ending near the Colorado border. Between 1678 and 1803, mainly through warfare and intimidation, the Osage actually tripled the size of lands they controlled. They were not the most numerous people in the area, but they succeeded for two reasons: their central location and fighting prowess.[15]

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[13]Berlin Chapman, 1; Clark, *History of the Expedition*, July 22; Buckley, 51; Greg Olsen, *The Ioway in Missouri* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2008), 19, 25.

[14]David B. Stout, Erminie Wheeler-Voegelin, Emily J. Blashingham, *Sac, Fox, and Iowa Indians II: Indians of E. Missouri, W. Illinois, and S. Wisconsin from Proto-History Period to 1804* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1974), 19, 54-56, 95-95, 108-109.

The men of the Osage tribe were tall, averaging in height above six feet, many reaching seven feet, or taller. Europeans and Americans making contact with them were usually impressed by their stature and bearing. President Thomas Jefferson, for example, who at six feet, two inches was well above average height, wrote after meeting with twelve Osage chiefs in July 1804, that they were the "finest and most gigantic men" he had ever seen. Although accomplished equestrians by the 1740s, the Osage stamina was legendary, with recorded instances of walking and running up to forty miles in one day. Combined with this height and endurance, the male Osage culture revered combat. Enemies of the tribe spoke often of their fearlessness, savagery, and aggressive nature.[16]

By the time the French had established contact with the Osage in the first decades of the eighteenth century, the tribe had split into two groups called the Big, or Great, and the Little Osage. The division occurred decades before contact with Europeans, after a flood destroyed settlements along the Missouri. Those who left the area to live on the higher grounds of the bluffs called themselves the "above" people, mistranslated as Big. The Osage who continued to live on the flood plain became the "down" people, mistranslated as Little.[17] Even the designation Osage is a mistranslation. They called themselves the *Ni-U-Ko'n-Ska,* Children of the Middle Waters. The French first encountered members of this tribe while trading with the Illini, who called them *Wah-Sha-She*, which Father Jacques Marquette Anglicized as *Ouazahgi*. When the English

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[15]W. David Baird, *The Osage People* (Phoenix: Indian Tribal Series, 1972), 2; Louis F. Burns, *A History of the Osage People* (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 2004), 30-31, 37; Alice Marriott, *Osage Indians II* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1974), 7, 154.

[16]Indian Claims Commission, *Osage Indians V: Commission Findings on the Osage Indians* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1974), 90-91; Burns, 121, 140.

[17]Baird, 12; John Joseph Mathews, *The Osages: Children of the Middle Waters* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1961), 145.

later copied French maps, they spelled the tribal name as *Ozazge*, which became the common pronunciation "Osage." By the end of the eighteenth century, even members of the tribe called themselves by this name.[18]

Because of their central location, the Osage controlled access to the plains and upper Missouri River Indians, as well as Spanish-controlled territory, therefore the French had either to ally with the Osage or drive them off the lands. For various reasons, the French quickly chose the former. The first French visitor to an Osage settlement, Claude-Charles DuTisne, cemented the friendship between the two nations in 1719. At this time there were five permanent villages along the Missouri River, four of them Big and one belonging to the Little. While the Osage welcomed the French, intermarriage was common; the tribe would not tolerate trespassing on their lands without prior consent. The Osage showed no mercy upon those who did not secure permission to hunt, trap, trade, or even cross their territory, selling captured Indians to the French as slaves and beheading Europeans.[19]

The French discovered lead deposits in Missouri in 1715, but the growing fur trade proved more profitable for the French. The Osage were not just commerce partners, their predilection for combat made it easy to induce them east to participate in European and Indian conflicts. They were among the French allies, for instance, who drove the attacking Fox tribe from Fort Detroit in 1712. By mid-century, however, English merchants courted the tribe with cheaper, higher quality, merchandise, as well as promises of alliance, although they were unable to entice the Osage away from the

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[18]Baird, 3, 12; Mathews, 7, 108

[19]Kristie C. Wolferman, *The Osage in Missouri* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1997), 18, 24; Indian Claims Commission, 104; Burns, 89, 102; Terry P. Wilson, *The Osage* (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1988), 13, 21-22, 24.

French. During the French and Indian War from 1754 to 1763, trade was sporadic at best west of the Mississippi, and the Osage remained loyal to their French allies. There were two hundred Big and Little tribesmen defending Fort Duquesne (contemporary Pittsburgh) in 1755, a battle noted for the death of the English commander Major General Edward Braddock and the injury of Colonel George Washington.[20]

In the 1763 Treaty of Paris, which ended the war, France ceded the Louisiana Territory to Spain. It took the Spanish several years to establish control over or even benefit from the territorial gain. The first Spanish administrators did not arrive until 1770, and even then all but two of the agents licensed to trade in Missouri remained French. In 1764 Jean Jacques Blaine d'Abbadie, his stepson Auguste Chouteau, and Pierre Laclede founded the settlement of Saint Louis, which quickly became the focal point for all trade and commerce along the lower Missouri and upper Mississippi Rivers. In 1770, the city became the central headquarters and trading post for all the Indians in the upper Louisiana Territory under the new Spanish governor, Antonio de Ulloa.[21]

Although the Spanish and Osage had traded for years, even before the arrival of the French, it had been through intermediate tribes such as the Comanche, Apache, Cheyenne, and even the Sac and Fox. All of these tribes occasionally traded with the Osage, but were more often bitter enemies. Therefore, almost everything the Spanish knew about the Osage filtered through enemy prejudices, especially the Sacs and Foxes. By the time the Spanish finally established a government in St. Louis in the 1770s, they

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[20]Baird, 14; Fred W. Voget, *Osage Indians I* (New York: Garland Publishing Inc., 1974), 21; General Lewis Cass, "The Siege of Detroit, in 1712, Official Report," in William R. Smith, *The History of Wisconsin*, v. 1 (Madison, WI: Beriah Brown Printer, 1854), 320; Wolferman, 29; Wilson, 26; State Historical Society of Missouri, *Historic Missouri, a Pictorial Narrative* (Columbia, MO: State Historical Society of Missouri, 1988), 8.

[21]Wolferman, 31; Indian Claims Commission, 104; Marriott, 155; Mathews, 27.

believed that the Osage were vicious, not to be trusted, and were seeking a trading alliance with the English. As the Osage controlled the only access to the lucrative fur trade along the Missouri River, Governor de Ulloa, like his French predecessors, had either to ally with or destroy the Big and Little tribes.[22]

The choices confronting the Spanish were difficult. Since the end of the French and Indian War, the Osage fur and bear oil trade was among the most profitable of all European-Native commerce. The highest quality and quantity of furs passed through Osage territory, surpassing in value that of all other tribes in the entire Louisiana Purchase combined. Unfortunately for the Spanish, the Big and Little tribesmen were as enthusiastic of warriors as they were traders and considered raids on other tribes and the right to bestow instant death to any trespassers on their lands as their natural prerogative. At first, Governor de Ulloa simply ordered the Osage to stop all warfare with neighbors. The Osage pledged loyalty to the Spanish but ignored the order to abandon raids against other tribes. In frustration, the governor decided to destroy or enslave the Children of the Middle Waters. The Spanish, however, were not able to accomplish this annihilation by themselves. In 1770, there were approximately fifteen hundred European males spread across the entire Louisiana Territory. The estimated total number of Osage warriors in Missouri alone numbered at least eight hundred. To annihilate the Osage, the Spanish needed Indian allies.[23]

Beginning in 1779, the Spanish actively encouraged tribes east of the Mississippi River to relocate closer to St. Louis. Their strongest ally was the Sac and Fox tribe, a

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[22]Indian Claims Commission, 105; Burns 95.

[23]Marriott, 177-182; Indian Claims Commission, 110-111, Wolferman, 35-36; Wilson, 27, 29; Burns, 119.

people with a long history of enmity with the Osage. Until 1780 most of the Sac and Fox lived around the Green Bay, Wisconsin area, but encouraged by the Spanish a large number relocated along the Rock River in northern Illinois, joining the hundreds who had lived there since driving off the Illini. This more populous settlement became a staging area for raids into Missouri. While the Americans were fighting a war for Independence against Great Britain, the Ioway, Sacs, and Foxes, encouraged by the Spanish, raided Osage and Missouria villages along the Missouri River. By the time of the Treaty of Paris in 1783, there were no more occupied Native villages along the lower Missouri River. The few remaining Missouria fled north to assimilate with the Otoes and Ioways, while the Little Osage joined their Big brethren along the Osage River. A Spanish census confirmed that there were no remaining Indian villages within two hundred miles of St. Louis.[24]

Although driven away from the Missouri River, the Osage were not defeated. The Big and Little declared peace with the Sac and Fox tribes, but began to raid against the Spanish. After one particularly brutal attack in 1787, Governor Estaban Miro, who had replaced de Ulloa a few years earlier, officially declared the Osage as enemies and forbade all trade with them. He also issued a call for immigrants, both American and Indian, to settle in Missouri as a counter-balance to Osage primacy. In response, the Big and Little tribes began to trade with the British actively, something that previously occurred only occasionally. A possible alliance between the English and the Osage dismayed the French and Spanish agents in St. Louis. Unwilling to lose their most lucrative source of furs, many of the Missouri traders ignored the governor's order.[25]

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[24]Indian Claims Commission, 106; Voget, 43-45; Stout, et. al., 183-184, 189, 195, 199.

The Spanish call for immigrants, meanwhile, did not pass unheeded. Daniel Boone and other white immigrants from the United States settled the land for only the cost of accepting Spanish citizenship. Indians also migrated. Since the end of the French and Indian War, Shawnee tribes living in Ohio and Indiana grew increasingly concerned over encroachment from the American colonies. After the Revolution, most remained loyal to the British, but a large minority wanted to remove themselves further west to avoid confrontations with the white people. Blocked by the Caddos, Quapaws, and especially the Osage, however, no mass migration was possible unless backed by the United States, Spain, France, or Great Britain. After the American defeat of the Western Confederacy of Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794, the Spanish governor invited members of the Shawnee tribe to resettle in Missouri, hoping to secure them as allies against the Osage. A group known as the Western Shawnee, who were convinced they could no longer maintain their way of life in Ohio, accepted the invitation and settled on twenty-five square miles near Cape Girardeau. The Western Shawnee became the first tribe to relocate from east of the Mississippi River to lands in Missouri at the request of an outside nation.[26]

Close on the heels of the twelve hundred Shawnee émigrés arrived six hundred Delawares from Ohio. By 1795, the Spanish had also settled Natives from the Piankashaw, Miami, Peoria, Ottawa, and Abnaki tribes, all from the Old Northwest and Indiana along the western banks of the Mississippi River in Missouri. Furthermore, members of the Creek, Chickasaw, Choctaw, and Cherokee tribes settled in Arkansas.

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[25]Indian Claims Commission, 107-108; Wolferman, 38-39; Stout, 205.

[26]Stephen Warren, *The Shawnee and Their Neighbors, 1795-1870* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 69, 71, 75; Olsen, 29.

The Spanish encouraged these newly settled Indians to attack the Osage, but few bothered. The Natives had moved to this new land with the understanding that the Spanish would protect them, not the other way around. Only the Sac and Fox renewed their hostilities in Missouri, but the ferocity and bloodshed between them and the Osage more than compensated for lack of action further south.[27]

The Sac's most famous warrior, Ma-Ka-Tai-Me-She-Kia-Kiak, better known as Black Hawk, later described the animosity of the fighting between the Sacs and Foxes and the Osage in his autobiography. This time of warfare marked the beginning of Black Hawk's career. The famous war chief noted that normally raids and battles occurred because of hunting ground trespasses, usually followed by retaliatory raids by relatives of any enemy braves killed. The Sacs, however, hated the Osage, and Black Hawk himself articulated a desire to exterminate the tribe. He still harbored the hatred nearly fifty years after the initial hostilities began, indicating the ferocity of the conflict.[28]

By the end of Spanish rule in 1800, the conflict produced results that benefited the United States rather than Spain. Warfare with the Sac and Fox tribes broke, but did not destroy, Osage leadership and power. Periodic meetings of tribal leaders called "Little Old Men" maintained unity among the Osage, especially between Big and Little settlements. This group preserved harmony, settled disputes, and historically kept the Osage as one against a myriad of enemies. By 1800, however, several key members of the "Little Old Men" had died or been slain. Emerging from this void came two rival Big

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[27]John P. Bowes, *Exiles and Pioneers: Eastern Indians in the Trans-Mississippi West* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 26, 34-35; Voget, 153, 155; Indian Claims Commission, 108; Stout, 209.

[28] Black Hawk, *Autobiography of Ma-Ka-Tai-Me-She-Kia-Kiak, or Black Hawk,* edited by J. B. Patterson (public domain book accessed via Kindle, originally published 1833), 148, 156, 183, 203, 712.

leaders: Clermont, or Claremore, and Papuisea, or White Hair. Weary of repeated raids by the Sacs and Foxes on the settlements along the Osage River, Clermont led an exodus of one fourth of the Big Osage south to settle along the Arkansas River in central Arkansas. Even more Osage followed in 1802 at the encouragement of two French traders, Auguste and Pierre Chouteau. The reason why so many Osage followed the advice of these two brothers was the result of nearly a decade of close ties between the traders and the tribe.[29]

By 1793 Auguste Chouteau, who along with his stepfather founded St. Louis, and his younger brother Pierre[30], had established themselves to the Osage as their most trusted European trading contacts. During this time, Auguste Chouteau visited Francisco Luis Hector, barón de Carondelet, Governor Mira's replacement, and convinced the new administrator to give the Chouteau brothers a six-year monopoly on trade with the Osage. In return Auguste promised to establish a fort and trading post that would not only ease tensions in Missouri, but also keep Indians from attacking settlements on the Mississippi River. At this time the Osage, who regularly raided the area, were at peace with the Sacs and Foxes and the Shawnee, and other tribes had yet to arrive in Missouri. Since he had no Indian allies ready to fight the Osage, Carondelet agreed. The brothers kept their word and completed construction of Fort Carondelet in 1795 in Vernon County near the Osage River. The Osage, for their part, were pleased with the proximity of the trading post for by this time they were already heavily dependent on European trade, and did scale back their raids. Had the Spanish left the situation alone, years of peaceful trading might have followed. Instead, they continued to encourage raiding on the Osage villages

[29]Burns, 132-133; Chapman, 212; Wilson, 29.

[30]Sometimes Americanized at Peter.

by the Sac and Fox tribes, as well as resettlement on Big and Little territory by eastern tribes. Unable to let this challenge to their autonomy go unchecked, the Osage again went on the warpath, attacking white settlements, stealing horses, and killing other Indians. Most of the bloodiest fighting occurred in northeast Missouri between the Big and Little and the Sac and Fox tribes.[31]

In 1800, with no troops to spare to govern their vast North American holdings, more than enough troubles in Europe, and under considerable pressure from France, Spain ceded the Louisiana Territory to the original European owner in the secret Third Treaty of San Ildefonso. The French First Consul, Napoleon Bonaparte, wanted to stop American expansion and extend his empire along the Mississippi. Napoleon, however, had no more time, money, or troops to spare in North America than had the Spanish. By this time too, other traders in the St. Louis area were jealous of the monopoly and great wealth enjoyed by the Chouteaus, and a few were determined to break the brothers' stranglehold. In 1802, Manual Lisa convinced the new governor, a fellow Spaniard, to grant him exclusive trading rights along the Missouri and Osage Rivers. The Chouteau brothers were angered but realized that Lisa's contract was only along the two rivers, not an exclusive deal with the Osage, as they enjoyed. The Big Osage under Chief Clermont living in Arkansas were not included in Lisa's monopoly, thus the Chouteau brothers determined to move as many of that tribe south as possible. If they could convince the Osage to move out of Missouri, Lisa's contract would become worthless. The brothers'

[31]Indian Claims Commission, 109; Mathews, 233, 265, 281, 283, 287; Marriott, 168.

efforts met with limited success and nearly half of the Big Osage eventually settled in Arkansas.[32]

It was only a matter of time before the newly created United States of America had to deal with the Indians living in Missouri. The Treaty of Paris (1783) extended the new nation's border to the Mississippi River, including free navigation of the waterway. This new situation was immediately disadvantageous to the Osage; in 1790, the population of the United States was four million, while estimates placed the total population of both the Big and Little tribes at no more than fifteen thousand, with only ten thousand actually living in Missouri. In addition, America, unlike Spain, France, or Great Britain, was on the same continent as the Natives.[33]

The American approach to what many considered the "Indian problem," was an extension of European policies combined with idealism and pragmatism, a theme explored further in the next chapter. Treaties forged within the first years of the nation became models for those that came later. The Treaty of Greenville in 1795, for example, signed after the Battle of Fallen Timbers, became the example for the first treaty signed in Missouri in 1808. William Clark, the architect of Missouri Indian treaties, was present at the signing of the settlement and used it as a foundation for his own contracts.[34]

In April 1796, the United States Congress established trading houses, known more commonly as factories, for the Indians within the United States and its territories. The factories remained under the supervision of the Department of War's Public Supplies

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[32]Mathews, 291, 295-296; Indian Claims Commission, 109, 111; Marriott, 169, 173, 182-183, 195; Stephen Aron, *American Confluence, the Missouri Frontier from Borderland to Border State* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2006), 109.

[33]Wolferman, 37, 48; Burns, 118; Baird, 23.

[34]Landon Y. Jones, *William Clark and the Shaping of the West* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2004), 82-83, 168.

Division until 1806 when responsibility shifted to the newly created Office of Indian Trade. The bill authorized the President to establish the factories within any territory or state belonging to the nation and to appoint supervisors to run them. The American government justified the right to trade and make treaties with the Indians from the internationally recognized Doctrine of Discovery, upheld by the United States Supreme Court in 1823, as well as sovereignty established through legal purchase of land. In the beginning, all transactions with Natives--legal, trade, and acquisition of property--were the exclusive right of the United States government. Eventually, states and private individual participated as well, thanks in large part to events in Missouri, another theme explored further in the next chapters.[35]

When the United States purchased the Louisiana Territory in 1803, because of Spanish and French policies, the situation in Missouri was immeasurably more favorable for the Americans than it had been for the Europeans. Vastly outnumbered and with reduced power, the Osage ability to defy American authority was a fraction of what it had been under the French and Spanish. Half of the tribal population lived in Arkansas; those who remained settled in the western half of Missouri, reserving the eastern half as hunting grounds. White and immigrant Indian settlements had increased along the Mississippi and, with the reduction of Osage raids the newcomers could usually travel with impunity. There were no Indian settlements along the length of the Missouri River, enticing an advance of white expansion. The vast Missouri fur trade, amounting to more than $200,000 a year in 1804, remained. With such potential wealth and land ostensibly

[35]Buckley, 46, 48-49.

free for the taking, it was not long before Americans began flooding into the newly acquired territory.[36]

To extract wealth from the Missouri territory, the French allied with tribes in Missouri but were unable to dominate them. The Spanish used Indian alliances to threaten tribes, specifically the Osage, who refused to bend to their will, but like the French, also failed. The United States used both approaches, and eventually expelled all Natives from Missouri. The total American dominance occurred for many reasons, but the foundation for that success rested upon the policies of the European powers that came before them.

[36]Indian Claims Commission, 112; Mathews, 350-351; Wolferman, 25.

Chapter 3: The Jeffersonian Ideal, 1804-1811

…to carry on the benevolent plans which have been so meritoriously applied to the conversion of our aboriginal neighbors from the degradation and wretchedness of savage life to a participation of the improvements of which the human mind and manners are susceptible in a civilized state.
James Madison, First Inaugural Address, 4 March 1809.[37]

The United States of America officially assumed control of the city of St. Louis and the territory of Missouri on March 10, 1804. Within two months, Meriwether Lewis left St. Louis to join with William Clark on their expedition to explore the upper Missouri valley hoping to find an all-water passage to the Pacific Ocean. Within four months, Zebulon Pike set off on a separate mission to explore the Mississippi River to its source. Despite these expeditions, most Americans remained largely unaware of the volatile situation in Missouri, a result due in large part to the machinations of the Spanish. Inter-tribal raids, encouraged by the former rulers of the territory, placed peaceful settlers, both white and Native, in danger. One of the few nations friendly with the Osage, the Missouria, was destroyed, while enemies both traditional and newly arrived surrounded the Big and Little tribes. To the west, Kansa and Pawnee tribes threatened the peace. The Potawatomis, Kickapoos, and Quapaws, all tribes from the eastern bank of the Mississippi River, joined the Sacs and Foxes, already raiding the Osage. Even the peaceful Shawnee and Delaware settlements made efforts to secure the friendship of the Kickapoos, Miamis, and Ottawas against their aggressive Big and Little neighbors. For the Jeffersonian Ideal of peaceful integration of Native culture into American to succeed,

[37]James Madison, *James Madison, Writings,* Jack N. Rakove, ed. (New York: The Library of America, 1999), 681.

it was essential that inter-tribal fighting end. [38] The continued violence, the failure to fulfill promises made to the Indians, and the inability to bind the tribes in total economic dependence on the United States all contributed to the failure of Jefferson's vision and the eventual triumph of the Jacksonian Ideal.

President Jefferson was unaware of the Osage's tenuous hold on power across the Mississippi. Jefferson believed the Missouri Territory represented an excellent opportunity to solve the "Indian problem." To most Americans, the Natives were a chaotic, barely post-Stone Age people who occupied, but did not own or improve their land. The Jefferson Ideal envisioned turning a hunter-gatherer people into citizen-farmers by ending savage behavior and peacefully enticing all Eastern tribes to move voluntarily west of the Mississippi. Not only would this transfer end conflict in the Appalachian region and Northwest Territory, it would give the Indians several generations away from encroaching white settlers, to learn, with the help of missionaries, teachers, and cultural agents, the benefits of the American agricultural civilization.[39]

Jefferson's goal of integration, however, was achievable only if several conditions became reality. The first was to induce all the eastern tribes to move west of the Mississippi River. Second, inter-tribal warfare, as well as raids against white settlements, needed to cease. Third, the Indians must, after moving, remain separated from all white populations while adapting to an agrarian culture. The division transcended mere racism. Jefferson was aware that unscrupulous traders were willing to sell alcohol and firearms to

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[38]Warren, 74; Mathews, 350-351; Voget, 198; Elihu H. Shepherd, *The Early History of St. Louis and Missouri from its first Exploration by White Men in 1673 to 1843* (St. Louis, MO: Southwestern Book and Publishing Company, 1870), 35-36.

[39]Willard Hughes Rollings, *Unaffected by the Gospel; Osage Resistance to the Christian Invasion (1673-1906): A Cultural Victory* (Albuquerque, NW: University of New Mexico Press, 2004), 35; Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The Indian in America* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975), 165-166.

Natives, a volatile combination that often led to tragedy. He also wanted to keep other European powers from weaning the tribes away from American dependency. If Britain or Spain continued to supply and trade with the Natives, the entire plan failed. The Jefferson Ideal was more optimistic than realistic, for there were too many unforeseen variables unfolding to overcome, and too many assumptions about the cooperative nature of humanity. One of the glaring problems was that the majority of the white population never accepted tribes that successfully adopted the mores of the larger American society. Not surprisingly, a culture who casually overlooked the enslavement of Africans did not easily embrace coexistence with others not of European descent. In 1804, however, President Jefferson had reason to believe in his plan's eventual success.

The integration was possible, to Jefferson's way of thinking, because he believed the North American Indian was equal in mind and body to the European. As early as 1785, in a letter to Francois-Jean de Chastellux, an officer with the French expeditionary forces fighting against the British, the future president disputed the naturalist Georges-Louis Leclerc, Comte de Buffon's assessment of the Indian as an inferior. In an 1802 correspondence to Brother Handsome Lake, a Seneca war chief, Jefferson declared the United States would not force Indians to sell their land, nor allow private citizens to purchase directly from the tribes. This promise became federal law that same year.[40]

Jefferson's ideas on white-Indian relations came from his own experiences and ideas but also from previous presidential strategies and English and American legislation. Section IX of the Articles of Confederation granted Congress the sole right to manage all

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[40]Thomas Jefferson, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, volume 8, 25 February to 31 October, 1785,* edited by Julian P. Boyd, Mina R. Bryan, and Elizabeth L. Hutter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953), 184-186; Amy H. Sturgis, *Presidents from Washington through Monroe, 1789-1825* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 108-109, 111.

dealings, including trade, with the Indian, as long as it did not supersede the rights of the individual states. The Ordinance for the Regulation and Management of Indian Affairs in 1786 established three Indian districts governed by superintendents responsible for implementing government policy. Article III in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, read,

> The utmost good faith shall always be observed toward the Indians; their lands and property shall never be taken from them without their consent…they never shall be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and humanity shall…be made for…preserving peace and friendship with them.[41]

To those who followed the Jefferson Ideal, the Indians also had inalienable rights, among them life, liberty, and especially, property.

After the United States adopted the Constitution in 1789, Congress continued the policies begun under the Articles. The only other important legislation dealing with Native Americans in the last decade of the eighteenth century was the Intercourse Act of 1790, which forbade trading with Indians unless a private citizen obtained a trading license, issuable only by the President, Secretary of War, or one of the Indian Affairs superintendents. The statute also prohibited committing crimes against, or trespassing upon, any "friendly" Indian or their property, and more importantly, disallowed any private citizen or state from purchasing land from Natives. Another Intercourse Act in 1802, urged upon Congress by Jefferson, and based loosely on King George III of England's Proclamation of 1763, set the final stage for American-Indian relations until the 1830s. This law established the Mississippi River as the official boundary line between whites and Indians, forbid Americans from hunting or entering the western territory without prior permission, prohibited white settlement upon Indian lands, and

[41]Washburn, *The American Indian and the United States; a Documentary History, volume III*, 2140, 2141, 2148.

established the death penalty for the killing of an Indian. It also forbid anyone except a duly authorized government agent from forging treaties with the Natives, and transferred power in dealing with the Indians from Congress to the President, granting the executive branch the sole discretion to deal with indigenous peoples as that office saw fit. While some of the provisions in the act changed after the Louisiana Purchase, the last two points remained in full effect, explaining why presidential policy was so important to Indians.[42]

The United States factory system, as mentioned in the last chapter, was established in 1796 already under the control of the executive branch; thus by the time of the Louisiana Purchase, President Jefferson had full authority to interact economically, militarily, and legally with all Natives. Although he was the first president with the official policy of moving the Indians westward, he was not the first actually to propose the formula. In 1796, George Washington outlined a vision of Cherokee assimilation into white culture in a letter to the chiefs of that tribe in which he pointed out that due to the scarcity of game, the only avenues to ensure tribal survival were either removal to the west or the embracing of agriculture. The Cherokee in the southeastern United States took the latter advice and soon became an example of a Jeffersonian "civilized" tribe; they converted to Christianity, adopted the use of the English language, sent children to school, and formed a republican government with a court system and police force. Some Cherokee even owned slaves. By the time Jefferson proposed the voluntary relocation of all eastern tribes, the Cherokee people were not interested in moving; they had already achieved the Ideal.[43]

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[42]Washburn, *American Indian and the United State; a Documentary History, v. III*, 2151-2163.

In Missouri, meanwhile, the year 1804 marked a turning point in the history of the region. Exploits during that year, including three expeditions, a new Congressional Act, and a treaty, dramatically affected the relationship between the United States and the Indian nations, not only in Missouri, but also throughout the Louisiana Territory.

President Jefferson initiated the most famous expedition, that undertaken by Meriwether Lewis and William Clark, before the United States owned the Louisiana Territory. Clark, who later became the single, most important figure in Indian-American relations in Missouri, joined the expedition in July 1803, three months before Congress ratified the purchase. While the Lewis and Clark expedition was more important for the nation as a whole than to Missouri, which proved the least eventful portion of the journey, there was one discovery of later significance. On 23 July, the explorers observed a high bluff overlooking the river, which Clark noted would be advantageous for a "fort and trading house with the Indians." Five years later, he himself oversaw the construction on that very site of Fort Osage.[44]

Lewis and Clark's epic journey was actually delayed a few months to help arrange for another expedition, this one from west to east. When the Osage received the news by letter that the American President was their new "father and friend," dubious warriors burned the dispatch. Captain Lewis saw the failure to acknowledge and pledge support to the new power as a serious threat to commerce, since that tribe controlled half of all the fur trade in the Louisiana Territory. Upon learning of the Indians' reaction,

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[43]Theda Perdue, "Indians Utilizing a Strategy of Accommodation," in Elizabeth Cobbs and Jon Gjerde, eds., *Major Problems in American History, Volume I to 1877* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2002), 220-222, 224-225.

[44]Clark, *History of the Expedition*, 607.

Lewis suggested that Pierre Chouteau escort some of the Osage to Washington to meet with President Jefferson. While in St. Louis, the captain also arranged for the safe passage of the Osage Chiefs, which included White Hair, Grand Piste, Cheveux Blancs, and nine others. These preparations were so important that Lewis delayed the start of his own, more famous, expedition until arrangements were complete.[45]

On 16 July 1804, President Jefferson met for the first time with Osage Indians. During their talk, the president assured the Indians of American friendship, the desirability of trade between the two nations, the promise of a trading house—known as a factory—on Osage lands, and promised to help the Missouri Natives reunite with the Arkansas tribes. When Jefferson met with the Osage Chiefs again in December 1806 to assuage concerns over the implementation of previous promises, the president reiterated the same points. Jefferson was highly desirous of cordial relations with the Osage, considering them "the great nation south of the Missouri…as the Sioux are great north of that river."[46]

It was not Jefferson, but rather General James Wilkinson, the new American governor of the Louisiana Territory, who conceived a plan for the third expedition. In 1804, Wilkinson began planning a military mission to explore the Arkansas and Red Rivers, as well as to establish contact with the Natives of the area. In 1806, Wilkinson placed Zebulon Pike, back from his failed mission to find the source of the Mississippi River, in charge of the expedition. During Pike's overland hike across Missouri, he, with

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[45]Wolferman, 55, 57, 67; William Clark, *Westward With Dragoons: The Journal of William Clark On His Expedition to Establish Fort Osage, August 24 to September 22, 1808,* ed. Kate L. Gregg (Fulton, MO: The Ovid Bell Press, Inc., 1937) 4; William Clark, *Dear Brother, Letters of William Clark to Jonathan Clark,* ed. James J. Holmberg (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 81.

[46]Jefferson, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* 405-420; Burns, 139.

the help of Pierre Chouteau, who in 1804 became agent of Indian Affairs in Upper Louisiana, further cemented the friendship between the Osage and Americans. Pike's explorations took him to the Rocky Mountains and down into Spanish-controlled Mexico, where he was for a time held as a spy. The publications of his travels in 1811 described the lands he journeyed across as the "Great American Desert," which for several decades convinced most Americans that the lands of Kansas and Oklahoma were unfit for agriculture.[47] Although this spurious description had little impact on immigration to Missouri, Pike's misrepresentation of the American Plains was pivotal to Indian relocation proposed later by those who followed the Jacksonian Ideal, an issue discussed further in Chapter Five.[48]

Legislatively, Jefferson's proposal for voluntary Indian removal became law in March 1804. The Removal Act divided the Louisiana Territory into two governmental regions; one controlled through New Orleans, the other centered in St. Louis. The Act also confirmed the right of the executive branch to establish trading houses as well as granting Indian leaders the privilege to visit the president. Originally granted access in 1800, the Removal Act reiterated diplomatic rights, but this time provided for protection and food for Natives during the journey. Section 15 of this provision granted the president the ability to negotiate with the Indians for land east of the Mississippi in exchange for land west of the river, provided the tribe remove itself and settle on the new property. In doing so, the tribe placed itself under protection of the United States and

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[47]For more information about Pike's missions, see William L. Harris and Jay H. Buckley, eds., *Zebulon Pike, Thomas Jefferson, and the Opening of the West* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2012).

[48]Mathews, 355-356, 370-380; Marriott, 187, 202; Indian Claims Commission, 119; Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, *The Territorial Papers of the United States, volume XIII, 1803-1806,* ed. Clarence Edwin Carter (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1948), 31-33, 243-244.

therefore could no longer enter into agreements with any other foreign power, state, or individual. The transactions were voluntary; there is no mention of compulsion of any kind. This legislation served as the basis for Indian removal until 1830 when replaced, at the behest of President Andrew Jackson, with an act that gave the federal government the legal power to remove to the west those tribes who refused to relocate under the 1804 law.[49]

The last of the pivotal events for Missouri in 1804 occurred in November of that year. While trying to secure the release of one of their tribe accused of killing a white man, four members of the Sac and Fox tribe signed a treaty they most likely did not understand, one that eventually had an enormous impact across the Midwest. The 1804 treaty was the first land concession by Natives to America west of the Mississippi River. Signed by William Henry Harrison, governor of the Indiana territory and superintendent of the Indian district there, and Quashqueme, a Sac chief, the treaty transferred almost all Sac and Fox lands, including the northern half of Illinois and the northeastern portion of Missouri, to the United States. It also obliged the tribe to declare peace with the Osage, terms both Native societies largely ignored. Later bitterly renounced by many other Sac and Fox leaders, most notably Black Hawk, the treaty convinced most of that tribe to side with the British during the War of 1812, and later provided the genesis for the Black Hawk War in 1832.[50]

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[49]U.S. Congress, *An Act Erecting Louisiana into Two Territories, and Providing for the Temporary Government Thereof (a)* (Eighth Congress, 1st Session, Ch. 47, 1804).

[50]Black Hawk, 72, 239; Stout, 11-12, 214, 236; Indian Claims Commission, 117; William T. Hagan, *The Sac and Fox Indians* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 19-20, 24-25,80, 228.

The major tribe in Missouri, however, was still the Osage. Despite white fears to the contrary, the Big and Little tribes proved receptive to American overtures. The estimated non-Indian population living in Missouri in 1804 was 6,500 whites, with a potential 2,000 available for militia duty, as well as 1,380 slaves. There were various estimates as to the number of Osage still residing in Missouri, but it was generally believed to be at least equal to the white population, not including thousands of Natives from other nations within the borders. Although still feared by the white settlers, the Big and Little tribes were reduced in power through an internal diaspora and by years of attacks from all directions including the Sacs and Foxes and Ioways from the northeast, Comanches from the southwest, and Pawnees, Kansas, Potawatomis, and Otoes from the northwest. There were also occasional skirmishes with white settlers in the east. By 1806, when representatives from several Indian groups including the Otoes, Sioux, and Osage, travelled to Washington to meet with Jefferson, the Little tribe at this point was willing to trade some land in return for protection against their enemies. Americans wanted closer ties with the Osage, not only for the lucrative fur trade but because both Spain and Great Britain actively sought alliances with the Children of the Middle Waters. The threat of European interference from both of those empires was a real and tangible fear that overshadowed the first ten years of Osage-American relations in Missouri.[51]

Jefferson attempted to fulfill his promises to the Osage. The president instructed both Secretary of War Henry Dearborn, and the governor of the Louisiana Territory, General Wilkinson, to heal the breach between Missouri and Arkansas Osage. While this effort seemed to run counter to American interests, that of weakening tribal strength, it in

[51]Parrish, 14; Mathews, 402-403; Wolferman, 60; Indian Claims Commission, 116, 120-121; Burns, 133-134, 144; Voget, 72.

fact served two purposes and attested to Jefferson's diplomatic acumen. First, the promise reassured the Osage of the friendliness of their new neighbors. Second, fearing that Spain might dispute the Louisiana Purchase, or possibly recruit the Arkansas tribe into a trade and military alliance, the presence of a united Osage people, historically anti-Spanish, might possibly make that European nation less likely to oppose the sale. Governor Wilkinson especially wished to heal the breach, for he was concerned about raids from the Comanche, whom he described as "the most powerful nation of Savages on this Continent."[52] A united Osage tribe, perpetual enemies of the Comanches, could serve as a mighty ally against the southwestern Natives. Wilkinson appointed Pierre Chouteau to attempt to reunite the Osage, and Chouteau suggested a trade embargo against the Arkansas to induce them to return north. The Americans began a half-hearted attempt to stop the trade, but as the threat from Spain diminished, so did interest in reuniting the Osage. They remained separated until all of the members of the tribe departed from Missouri and Arkansas in 1825 and moved to the Kansas Territory.[53]

Jefferson's other promise, that of a trading factory for the Osage, proceeded at a slower pace but was vastly more successful, at least for a while. The factory system began in March 1795 when Congress authorized trading houses to supply the Natives with goods in return for fur. The factories appropriated the Indian trade from the private business sector and ostensibly placed it exclusively in the hands of the government. Designed to secure the friendship and goodwill of the Indians, factories enabled the government to limit Native access to alcohol and some firearms. By law, factory traders provided quality goods to the Indians at cost, a rule not applied to the private

[52]Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, 170.

[53]Carl H. Chapman, 212, 213; Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, 231-232.

businessmen who overcharged the Indians whenever possible. Factories also became bloodless weapons by withholding goods from hostile tribes, thus providing the blueprint for economic sanctions.[54]

The executive branch had exclusive power over the factories, empowered to place them anywhere in the United States and hire agents to run them. The agents reported to the Treasury Department, swore oaths of scrupulousness, were required to keep accurate records, and, beginning in 1806, file quarterly reports. Never designed as a permanent solution, the factory system required periodic approval from Congress to continue operations. The Trading House Act of 1806 authorized the president to establish factories outside the borders of the United States and directly preceded the establishment of factories in Missouri. To Jefferson the trading house program was the essential lynchpin for the success of his voluntary Indian removal policy. In a letter to Indiana Territory Governor William Henry Harrison dated 27 February 1803, the president outlined his goals by alluding to the public record, but informing the governor that because this communique "--being unofficial and private, I may with safety give you a more extensive view of our policy respecting the Indians."[55]

In this letter, Jefferson explained to Harrison that in order to achieve the goal of "perpetual peace with the Indian," the United States must pursue friendly relations and do everything legally and morally possible to protect them from injuries inflicted on them by Americans. It was imperative, Jefferson continued, that the Indians become civilized

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[54]Ora Brooks Peake, *A History of the United States Indian Factory System 1795-1822* (Denver: Sage Books, 1954), 1-3, 45.

[55]Thomas Jefferson, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, Volume X,* Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed. (Washington: The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1904), 369; Peake, 2; Washburn, *The American Indian, a Documentary History,* 2164.

farmers (men), and weavers (women). To become farmers, the government must induce the Indians to leave their vast hunting and gathering territory to accept small parcels of private property. The best way to achieve this goal was through trading houses established by men of probity. The goal of these trading houses, he explained, was not profit but rather to ensure Indian reliance on white goods. Either the Natives would use the tools of civilization wisely as farmers, or become so indebted by their reliance on American goods that their only recourse would be to sell tribal lands. In this way, tribes either would join the United States as citizens, or trade land in the east for land west of the Mississippi River. This policy of indebting the Indians in order to induce them to move, Jefferson asserted, was the humane way of solving the problem of uncivilized Indians within the nation's borders.[56]

Between 1808 and 1822 Missouri had five factories: Fort Osage, Arrow Rock (near the Osage River), Belle Fontaine (near St. Louis), Marais de Cygnes (near Missouri's western border), and Fort Johnson (near Hannibal). The items Indians most desired included blankets, jewelry, rouge (war paint), kitchen utensils, groceries (salt, sugar, flour, raisins, tea, coffee), drugs and medicines, tobacco, pipes, guns, and powder. While the factories offered agricultural supplies, few tribes took advantage of them. The Indians could purchase anything they desired from the factories, with the exception of playing cards and alcohol, by placing an order with the trading agent. To pay for the purchase of desired goods, Indians in Missouri provided all types of furs and pelts including deer, muskrat, beaver, bear, buffalo, mink, otter, raccoon, bobcat, panther, elk, wolf, fox, porcupine, groundhog, wild hog, and rabbit. Natives also produced goods that

[56]Jefferson, *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson, v. X*, 368-373.

many Americans desired, such as deer tallow, bear oil, beeswax, feathers, snakeroot, lead, maple sugar, cattle, cotton, corn, feather mats, buffalo horns, deer antlers, and handicrafts. The Osage buffalo tallow candles, for example, were so popular that even the White House in Washington used them.[57]

The first factory in Missouri at Fort Belle Fountaine, or Bellefountaine, located about fifteen miles west of St. Louis, opened in 1805. Fort Belle Fountaine was the first factory west of the Mississippi River, and the first American fort as well. Designed to serve the needs of the Sac and Fox, Ioway, and Osage tribes, it proved too distant from any of those tribes to conduct regular trade. In addition, raids against each other, as well as white settlements, continued by all three tribes during their treks to and from the factory. To separate the tribes, the War Department authorized the building of two new factories closer to each Native settlement, Fort Madison in Iowa, and Fort Osage in Missouri.[58]

The responsibility for implementation of this policy fell to America's most famous explorers. In 1807, Meriwether Lewis became governor of the Louisiana Territory and William Clark became a brigadier general and Superintendent of Indian Affairs for all tribes west of the Mississippi, with the exception of the Osage. Pierre Chouteau remained the Osage's Indian agent, although Clark was Chouteau's superior. Manuel Lisa, who had lost his monopoly on trade in the Missouri Valley when the United States took over the Territory, received a private license and led the first American trading expedition up the Missouri River. Lewis, however, was little interested in tribal

[57]Peake, 11, 56-65, 68, 132-134.

[58]Buckley, 72-73.

affairs and gladly let Clark deal with the Natives. Thus began Clark's long and illustrious career as America's premier Indian diplomat.[59]

The purpose of Fort Osage was, like all factories, to cement Native reliance upon the United States. Since the Big and Little tribes lived exclusively west of the Mississippi, the intention was not to entice them to move but rather to cede their claims to land in Missouri so that eastern tribes could settle there. Both Governor Lewis and the Secretary of War also instructed Clark to stop the Osage from conducting further raids. The new superintendent believed the threat of ending the trade upon which both the Big and Little tribes needed for survival would be sufficient enticement to accomplish what the Spanish were never able to achieve.[60]

Of the more than four hundred treaties between the United States and various Indian nations penned between 1778 and 1871, Congress ratified 370. William Clark authored more Indian treaties than any other individual in American history. The first one was with the Osage in 1808, a year that became, like 1804, a turning point in the state's history. During that year, the Big and Little tribes ceded three quarters of the land that comprised Missouri to the United States. As a Superintendent of Indian Affairs, William Clark had full authority to conduct negotiations with all Indians in the Louisiana Purchase Territory and forward any agreements reached to Congress for approval. Between 1808-1825, he negotiated five more treaties with the Osage in Missouri.[61]

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[59]Buckley, 66, 69-70, 72, 113; John Upton Terrell, *The Six Turnings: Major Changes in the American West, 1806-1834* (Glendale, CA: the Arthur H. Clark Company, 1968), 50; Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, *The Territorial Papers of the United States, volume XIV, 1806-1814,* Clarence Edwin Carter, ed. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1949), 108-109.

[60]Indian Claims Commission, 114-116, 135, 137; Mathews, 389.

[61]Burns, 167-168, 370.

When 1808 began the Osage were at war with the Western Shawnees, Delawares, Kickapoos, Sioux, Ioways, and Sacs and Foxes. Clark, charged with maintaining peace in Missouri, moved to St. Louis to end the fighting. The frontier town suited the superintendent well, and he remained a citizen of that city for the rest of his life, even after retiring from government service. For the present, however, he was frustrated with the Osage's unwillingness to end their raids, for despite the fact that constant warfare had weakened the tribe, most of the warriors, especially those from the Big, considered combat one of their inalienable rights. This constant raiding among the Indians sometimes spilled over and involved white settlers, encouraging the first public rumblings against Indian removal from the Missouri Valley. At the urging of Frederick Bates, Secretary of the Louisiana Territory and later second governor of the state of Missouri, the president reluctantly agreed to military retaliation for the first time against the Osage. Governor Lewis, anxious to maintain peace, sent a message to Chief Grande Piste, one of the travelers who met with Jefferson, informing him that if raids did not stop, trade between the two nations would cease and their tribe declared outside of United States' protection. Due to the high profitability of the Osage fur trade, the American government until this time had done everything short of military involvement to discourage attacks on the Children of the Middle Waters. With this missive, however, Governor Lewis let the Osage know he was willing to ignore attacks on the Big and Little by the many enemy tribes that surrounded the Osage.[62]

To avoid forced military involvement, Superintendent Clark quickly proceeded with his plans to build a factory close to the Osage. A firm Jeffersonian, he believed the

[62]Wolferman, 62-64; Burns, 145.

quickest and best way to end Native raids was irrevocably to bind them to economic dependence on the federal government. He was also concerned about the influence of the British, whose traders had for years surreptitiously made overtures to the Osage, and the Spanish, who, although their influence had greatly waned, still posed a threat of alliance with Native tribes in the area. In August 1808, Clark, along with a military force under the command of Daniel Boone's son, Nathan, and the man the superintendent chose to run the factory, a fellow believer in the Jeffersonian Ideal, George Sibley, arrived at the bluff on the Missouri River written in the Lewis and Clark expedition journals five years earlier.[63]

While the fort and factory were under construction in September 1808 invitations to trade at the post were sent to Natives from several surrounding tribes, including Big and Little Osage, Kansa, Oto, Maha, Pawnee, Sioux, Ioway, and Sac and Fox. At first only the Osage responded. On 13 September eighty Osage arrived from two villages, and Clark immediately held a council with the Indians, with Pierre Chouteau and his friends Paul Loise and Noel Magrain acting as interpreters. Clark explained to the Osage that due to "theft, murder, and robory (sic) on the Citizens of the U.S. in this Territory…I shall propose a line to be run between the U.S. and the Osage hunting lands…" This line, the superintendent explained, would begin at the fort and run south to the Arkansas River, and all land south of the Missouri River and east of this line would be "…given up by the Osage to the U.S. forever."[64]

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[63]Burns, 145; Jones, 165-166; Clark, *Westward With Dragoons,* 13, Buckley 73; George Sibley, *Seeking a Newer World: The Fort Osage Journals and Letters of George Sibley, 1808-1811,* Jeffrey E. Smith, ed. (St. Charles, MO: Lindenwood University Press, 2003), 12, 58, 73, 77.

[64]Sibley, 77-79; Clark, *Westward With Dragoons,* 38-39.

The Osage agreed and everyone met again on 14 September to sign the treaty Clark wrote overnight. The superintendent carefully read the provisions of the treaty to the gathered Osage, after which Clark and Sibley, both anxious to preserve the honor and good faith of the United States, independently wrote that the Natives eagerly signed. The twelve articles contained the following provisions: The fort would provide protection to the Big and Little Osage who dwelt near it, and the factory would provide goods as long as the Natives conducted themselves in a friendly, peaceable, and honest manner toward the citizens of the U.S. and their allies. No other tribe could trade at the factory unless they had "smoked the Pipe of Peace," with the Osage.[65] Furthermore, the U.S. agreed to furnish the tribe with a blacksmith and mill, pay the tribes a lump sum for the land as well as an indemnity of $1000 per annum for the Big, and $500 for the Little, minus compensation for any thefts or raid damages caused by members of the tribes, and assume liability for all legal claims made against them.[66]

With his work completed, Clark headed back to St. Louis, leaving the as-yet completed fort under command of Captain Eli Clemson and the factory under sole responsibility of George Sibley. Within a few weeks, the Arkansas branch of the Osage signed a similar treaty. This first version signed at the fort was never ratified. Several Osage Chiefs, including the dominant war chief Big Soldier, were absent in September. Clark arranged for a meeting with the remaining Osage leaders and presented them with a similar treaty signed at the fort. Because they had never been defeated in battle, many of the remaining Osage were reluctant. It took a year and the threat of a trade embargo to convince the remaining chiefs to sign. The main difference between the two versions

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[65]Clark, *Westward With Dragoons, 64-68.*

[66]Sibley, 80-81; Clark, *Westward With Dragoons,* 64-68; Buckley, 75-76.

was the addition of a few more miles to the Osage territory around the fort, and the removal of a special, and illegal, land grant for himself that Pierre Chouteau had included when transcribing the original treaty. Congress ratified the second treaty in 1810 and with it the American government purchased, at about ten cents an acre, fifty thousand square miles of land that included three quarters of Missouri and the northern half of Arkansas. The only land the Osage still retained exclusively for themselves in Missouri was a band fifty miles wide running vertically along the western border from the Missouri River to the Arkansas border.[67]

President Jefferson, finishing his last remaining months in office, believed his plan for voluntary Indian removal was unfolding successfully, and his successor, James Madison, was content to continue his predecessor's policy. The white population west of the Mississippi River grew fast. The 1810 there were 20,845 American citizens, concentrated mainly around New Orleans and St. Louis. In Missouri, Clark's expectations of a cessation of inter-tribal fighting did not take place. While the Osage had agreed to give up settling the eastern portion of the region, they still claimed hunting rights in the Ozarks, and bands of hunters often could not resist raiding the settlements of relocated eastern tribes. Some of the immigrant tribes conducted raids of their own. In 1810, for example, a band of Potawatomis killed four Americans near Boone's Lick, Missouri. At Fort Osage, close to five thousand Indians gathered to live and trade, and as tribes historically hostile to the Big and Little arrived, tensions flared. A tribe of one thousand Kansa Indians proved so violent and insolent that Sibley barred them from the

[67]Indian Claims Commission, 152, 154; Buckley, 75-78; Landon, 168-169, 176; Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, *The Territorial Papers of the United States, volume XIV*, 224-225; Clark, *Dear Brother*, 154, 157.

factory. Others who had "smoked the peace pipe" with the Osage and thus allowed to trade included Otoes, Mahas, Pawnees, Missourias, Sioux, Ioways, and even Sacs and Foxes. Not all of the Osage were happy living among so many former enemies, however, and in 1811 all of the Big tribe, and a few of the Little, moved south to live along the Marias des Cygnes River. During this same year, Clark allowed the Osage to attack Ioway tribes who harassed white settlers north of the Missouri River. Even the peaceful Shawnee living along the Mississippi River were beginning to be viewed with suspicion, especially when it became known that Tecumseh, a war chief allied with the British in the Ohio Valley, had visited the settlements attempting to recruit warriors. The Missouri Shawnee rejected the overtures, however, preferring to live in peace with their white neighbors.[68]

Despite occasional horse and property theft, Indian attacks on whites in Missouri before the War of 1812 were rare. In 1806 two Kickapoo were hanged in St. Louis for killing an American near the Osage River. While a third Indian was implicated, President Jefferson's policies forbade the execution of more than two Natives for the killing of one white. In 1809 President Monroe pardoned two Sac Indians on the recommendation of William Clark in return for a promise by the tribe for better behavior in the future. Whites who killed Indians did not face indictment, although Clark often paid the injured tribe an indemnity against any future retaliation. Unless it affected trade or white settlements, the government ignored Indian-on-Indian violence in the territory except when the Natives themselves sought legal aid. This supplication for white justice happened nine times before Missouri statehood, and in two cases in 1806, resulted in

[68]United States Census Bureau; Olsen, 41, 45; Jones, 189-190, 196-197; Mathews, 394; Sibley, 85, 88, 142-143; 154-155, 159, 170; Wolferman, 83-84; Warren, 79-80; Clark, *Dear Brother,* 259.

execution. This lack of concern by the majority of whites only encouraged inter-tribal violence. As the white population continued to grow and expand, however, they invariably became the target for more and more raids.[69]

By 1811, the Jeffersonian Ideal of peaceful, voluntary removal from the east to the west, where the Indians would become farmers, still seemed a viable goal. Already, several tribes had relocated to Missouri, which now was home not only to the Osage, but the Kaskaskia (an Illini tribe), Ioway, Delaware, Shawnee, Sac, Fox, Miami, Kickapoo, Wea, and even some Cherokee along the southern border. Trade at Fort Osage was brisk and relatively free of problems. Although there were white settlers in the territory, there were not enough to cause many clashes with the relocated and resident Natives. There were, however, storm clouds gathering on the horizon. British traders, indifferent to Jefferson's plans, countered much of factory's influence. Jay's Treaty of 1794 allowed British traders to ply their goods on American soil as long as they obeyed federal law. The British often hinted, or even told the Natives, that the United States wanted to take all of their lands. In addition, but they often supplied superior goods, were willing to extend credit, and would trade whiskey. The latter two were not allowed in the American system.[70]

Although government factories were essential to indebt the Indians, private traders, once they obtained a license, could also trade with the Natives. The competition created a problem because the factories were necessary to the Jefferson Ideal in order to "civilize" the Natives, while private traders were only interested in profit. In Missouri,

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[69]Harriet C. Frazier, *Death Sentences in Missouri, 1803-2005* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2006), 11-12.

[70]Wolferman, 3, 76; Buckley, 103.

the dominant traders were Auguste and Pierre Chouteau, Manuel Lisa, Joseph Rubidoux (founder of St. Joseph), and John Jacob Astor, who was quickly growing in influence and wealth. These private traders, especially Astor, were a greater threat to the Jeffersonian factory system than the British. When Congress finally ended the factory system in 1822 it also destroyed any hope of achieving the Jeffersonian Ideal.[71]

By 1811, the British military also posed a threat to Jefferson's plans. The failure by the United States economically or militarily to enforce peace gave many tribes the false idea that the English would support traditional Native existence. As Great Britain attempted to draw different tribes across the Ohio Valley and Old Northwest into an alliance against America, Superintendent Clark and others were acutely aware of the danger of something similar happening in Missouri. Clark sent George Sibley to the Platte River area to convince the Natives, especially the Pawnee, to continue their friendly relations with America. Although the Western Shawnee had rejected Tecumseh's overtures, the superintendent seriously considered "dispersing" the tribe across the territory just in case. The Osage seemed content with their American alliance, but the tribe was notorious for ignoring promises of peaceful cohabitation. The proximity of the Sac and Fox tribes posed an immediate threat to St. Louis. Not only were their settlements near, but many of the Natives had never forgiven the United States for the Treaty of 1804. If war came with Britain, Clark was certain many Sacs and Foxes would ally with America's enemy.[72]

From 1803-1811, the Jeffersonian Ideal seemed the perfect solution to American-Native relations. The War of 1812 and its aftermath across the Mississippi River basin,

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[71]Sibley, 511, 161, 120, 133, 174-175.

[72]Mathews, 401-403; Clark, *Dear Brother,* 259.

however, ended for many the optimistic hope for peaceful coexistence. Even nature itself seemed intent on proclaiming the coming change. On December 16, 1811, and again on February 7, 1812, earthquakes estimated between 8.4 and 8.7 on the Richter magnitude scale, devastated lands along the New Madrid fault line. The powerful shocks were felt as far away as Quebec and New York and caused the Mississippi River to briefly flow backwards. The quakes seemed to mark a catalyst for Indian-white relations in Missouri, heralding the end of semi-equanimity and marking the beginning of dominance by those of European descent.[73]

[73]Aaron, 148-150; Jones, 201; Buckley, 125.

Chapter 4: Transitions: The War of 1812 and Tribal Conflict, 1812-1820

…it is our duty to make new efforts for the preservation, improvement, and civilization of the native inhabitants. The hunter state can exist only in the vast uncultivated desert. It yields to the more dense and compact form and greater force of civilized population; and of right it ought to yield, for the earth was given to mankind to support the greatest number of which it is capable, and no tribe or people have a right to withhold from the wants of others more than is necessary for their own support and comfort.
James Monroe, First Annual Message to Congress, 2 December 1817.[74]

The War of 1812 began in June when the United States declared war on Great Britain. In Missouri, however, tensions between white settlers and Indians allied with England had already transformed into violence. As discussed in the previous chapter, the Osage and Ioway were at war, Tecumseh tried unsuccessfully to recruit Western Shawnee, and violent confrontations in general became more frequent. While no British soldier ever set foot in Missouri, the threat of invasion by the United Kingdom allied with local tribes cast a shadow over the region. In contradiction to the east, where the fighting was relatively brief, and peace quickly restored, conflicts in Missouri continued long after the Treaty of Ghent. During this time of transition from 1812-1820, when Missouri officially became a second-tier territory, those who clung to the belief of peaceful, voluntary Indian relocation were beginning to be overwhelmed by calls for forced removal further west, or even for the extermination of the Indians. Three major factors—the escalation of Indian violence that convinced many Americans that all Natives were untrustworthy, the transition from government control of trade to privatization, and the rapid influx of white settlers—eroded support for the Jeffersonian Ideal during the time Missouri was a territory.

[74]James Monroe, *The Writings of James Monroe, Volume VI, 1817-1823,* Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed. (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1902), 33-43.

Not long after the second New Madrid quake in early 1812, a gruesome display greeted residents near Boone's Lick, Missouri; the disembodied head of a local white farmer atop a twenty-five foot pole, placed there by a band of Indians who had raided the farm and killed the family. The crime shocked the inhabitants, for until this time local whites, including the slain family, had lived on relatively peaceful and friendly terms with Natives in the region. A band of armed men gathered to track down the raiders but quickly dispersed after Indians ambushed the vigilantes. Over the next few months, Indian raids on farms and settlements increased to almost daily occurrences and included anything from theft of corn and livestock to outright murder. As the death toll rose, panic spread across the region. In desperation, the settlers banded together and built five hastily constructed forts, while sending desperate pleas for assistance to St. Louis. Help was slow to arrive, the territorial capital was vulnerable to Black Hawk's Sacs and Tecumseh's Shawnee raids, and the situation around Boone's Lick remained so volatile from 1813-1814 that trade ground to a halt along the Missouri River. Encouraged by the war between the United States and Great Britain, an estimated one thousand to fifteen hundred Sac, Fox, and Ioway Indians gathered in the area determined to drive away the settlers. For nearly two years the Indians kept the whites confined to the forts, sniping at them whenever the opportunity arose and occasionally attacking the fortifications outright with several hundred warriors at once. Soldiers under the command of General Henry Dodge finally arrived in 1814, but most of the Native combatants had been forewarned and had already retreated east across the Mississippi. The only Indians left in the area was one village of Miami who, when captured, comprised mainly frightened women and children. Angry locals wanted to massacre the Indians, but the general

refused. Dodge organized the citizens into a militia, but once it became obvious the raids had ended, a sense of peace and calm returned to the area.[75]

Even so, trust and acceptance of the Indians were gone forever. To local whites, peaceful co-existence was no longer an option. The bloodshed at Boone's Lick was not unique. In February 1812, a band of Indians from east of the Mississippi murdered nine whites in the St. Charles district near St. Louis. In northern Missouri, James B. Taylor, known locally as the "Christian Hermit," wrote of his experiences near the villages of Adron and Waltersville, both of which no longer exist. In late 1811, Taylor was part of a group that tried to exact revenge on the Indians for the scalping of a male and the abduction of a woman and thirteen-year-old boy. Failing to retaliate or secure the return of the abductees, violence between the Natives and the whites continued for several months, culminating in two battles that resulted in the deaths of more than 150 people. Taylor described in lurid detail the torture techniques practiced by the Indians of piercing bound captives with dozens of pine splinters and setting the slivers of wood afire.[76]

After the Treaty of Ghent, the local Indians declared they would "lay down the tomahawk in peace." Within a few months, however, a band of Indians attacked Taylor and his family's secluded homestead, killing the farmer's wife and two of his children. After a harrowing escape, aided ironically enough by an Indian from a different tribe, Taylor and his remaining children reached the safety of a white settlement. In

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[75]Judge Joseph Thorpe, *Early Days in the West* (Liberty, MO: Liberty Tribune, 1924), 9-11, 13-19.

[76] William E. Foley, *A History of Missouri, volume I, 1673-1820* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 148; James B. Taylor, *A Narrative of the Horrid Massacre by the Indians, of the Wife and Children of the Christian Hermit, a Resident of Missouri, with a Full Account of His Life and Sufferings* (St. Louis: Leander W. Whiting & Co., 1840), 6-7.

summation, Taylor decried the "…folly of attempting to civilize the savage," ignoring, perhaps, that the farmer survived only due to the aid of one of these "savages."[77]

Accounts of the fighting and raids on isolated farmsteads spread across Missouri influencing the opinions of Americans who did not experience any of these depredations. According to a claim for remuneration submitted in 1826 by Missouri Senator Thomas H. Benton, Chairman of the Committee of Indian Affairs, the tribes that had allied with Britain during the War of 1812, and thus blamed for all of the devastation, were the Sac, Fox, Kickapoo, Piankashaw, Potawatomi, and Ioway. Benton reached back even further in his memorandum, asking for compensation from raids by the Delaware and Osage before the war, all based in the clause that the aforementioned tribes signed treaties with the United States in which the government assumed all claims against the Indians. For legal purposes, this document named the specific tribes causing trouble in Missouri, but to the minds of a growing number of settlers, the distinctions were irrelevant. Indians, no matter their declared intent, could not be trusted.[78]

During the period before the War of 1812, there were Americans who worked diligently for peace. Despite misgivings about the Sacs and Foxes, by the time war erupted, William Clark had managed to secure the offer of an alliance from of a large number the tribe. As the majority of hostile Sacs and Foxes lived just north of lightly defended St. Louis, Clark felt a positive relationship with that particular tribe necessary for the safety of his city. However, Benjamin Howard, the first territorial governor, flatly refused to consider a partnership with the Sacs and Foxes. Pierre Chouteau suggested

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[77] Taylor, 8-15, 24.

[78]U.S. Congress, Senate, *Memorial of the State of Missouri, and Documents in Relation to Indian Depredations upon Citizens of That State*, 19th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1826), 3, 5, 7.

arming the Osage, as he had secured a promise of 260 volunteer militia from the tribe. This plan had the support of Secretary of War John Armstrong. Governor Howard rejected this idea too, despite, or perhaps because of, the fact there were less than 250 regular soldiers in the entirety of the state. He, and others like him, were uncomfortable with the idea of armed Natives, even if they proclaimed support for the U.S. Shortly after this decision, Howard resigned his office to become the general in charge of the Eighth Military Department, the army headquarters for the region. General Howard formed a ranger militia, which included Nathan Boone, and attacked the Sac and Fox tribes. Clark, appointed the second, and last, governor of the Missouri Territory, continued his efforts to keep the peace in Missouri, but events outpaced him. Despite Howard's attack, Clark managed to obtain a promise of neutrality from some of the Sacs and Foxes and sent a band of around fifteen hundred, soon to be known as the Missouri Sac and Fox, to settle near Jefferson City. Within months of this accomplishment, however, Black Hawk and his Sac allies, those Indians who refused Clark's offer of friendship, assaulted and destroyed Fort Madison in Iowa, which left Missouri's northern border, including St. Louis, vulnerable to attack.[79]

Although the Indian attack on Fort Madison was the only major battle west of the Mississippi River during the War of 1812, the fear of a British invasion into Missouri spread across the territory. This apprehension was not entirely unfounded. Black Hawk planned an attack on St. Louis, but British commander Colonel Robert Dixon stopped the Indian war chief. Dixon knew St. Louis was poorly defended and home to hundreds of women and children, who would likely suffer horribly in the event of an attack. The colonel convinced Black Hawk that once the British controlled Detroit, St. Louis would

[79]*Memorial of the State of Missouri,* 55; Buckley, 69-70, 89, 100-101; Jones, 211-212; Foley, 149.

capitulate without a fight. Dixon and his allies, however, failed to capture Detroit, and Black Hawk gave up his planned St. Louis attack, realizing he would receive no support from his the British. Over in the Ohio Valley, Tecumseh, despite his failure to reunite the Western Shawnee to his own tribe, also posed a great Native threat to Missouri. Only after the Indian leader's death in October 1813, was the government in St. Louis able spare troops to address the Indian and white violence in Missouri.[80]

The War Department, meanwhile, judged Fort Osage to be in little danger, and reassigned Captain Eli Clemson and his military garrison further east in 1813. George Sibley, the factory proctor, was unable—and unwilling—to run Fort Osage alone and so removed himself east, too. The closing of Fort Osage, which under the 1808 treaty could only happen with tribal consent, angered the Big and Little people. Not only was their only source of trade goods blocked, there were hundreds of former enemies living near them with no American presence to guarantee the peace. In frustration, several members of the Little tribe travelled north to Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin and, briefly, allied and traded with the British. About two months after the closing of Fort Osage, however, Sibley opened a makeshift trading factory at Arrow Rock, about eighty miles to the east. This effort assuaged some of the Indians hard feelings, although it proved too distant from their villages for a permanent site, and in 1815, Fort Osage reopened.[81]

Even as fighting continued west of the Mississippi River, future president John Quincy Adams led the American delegation's negotiations over ending the war. During the talks, the British suggested the formation of an independent Indian territory or state in the upper Ohio Valley. Adams flatly refused, arguing for the sovereignty of the United

[80]Black Hawk, 364, 391; Jones, 216, 218.

[81]Wolferman, 84-85, 88; Mathews, 404, Baird, 30; Peake, 22, 162.

States over all Indian nations. This attitude was nothing new for Adams. As early as 1802, he had declared that those of European descent had the right to "encroach upon the possessions of the aborigines."[82] Despite opposing violent Indian removal, Adams was no friend to the Natives. As Secretary of State, he defended future rival Andrew Jackson's harsh campaign against the Creek Indians in Spanish Florida, and as president, Adams proclaimed American sovereignty over all Indians as the only way to protect them from hostile state and local governments.[83]

Back in Missouri, Governor Clark wrote to the Secretary of War in the fall of 1814, informing him that the British were attempting to exert control over the Osage, Kansa, Oto, and various Sioux tribes to induce them to attack Americans in his Territory. As the British had recently attacked and burned the Capital, the Secretary ignored this missive. Clark wrote the Secretary of War again in December of 1815 informing him that the British were still trying to induce Indian violence, especially among the Sioux and Pawnee, against Americans, but assured the Secretary that he, Clark, was countering these attempts by increasing trade with those tribes and, in extreme cases, with threats of force. The war in Missouri, as in New Orleans, continued past the ratification of the Treaty of Ghent on Christmas Eve, 1814.[84]

Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent proposed the return of *status quo ante bellum* for the Natives, much the same as between Great Britain and the United States. The treaty demanded that upon ratification by Congress and notice of the terms given to the tribes,

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[82] Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Union* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 79-80.

[83] Washburn, *The Indian in America*, 166.

[84] *The Territorial Papers of the United States, volume XIV,* 787-788; Territory of Louisiana-Missouri, *The Territorial Papers of the Unites States, volume XV, 1815-1821,* Clarence Edwin Carter, ed. (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), 96-97.

all hostilities between whites and Natives must cease. The article pleased few people in Missouri. The Indians who had allied with the British felt abandoned and believed, correctly, the English had left them at the unfriendly mercies of the United States. Many settlers, now organized into militias and bolstered with regular troops, began retaliatory raids and criticized the federal government for attempting to stop what the locals felt as their right to defend their own property. Both sides, in fact, ignored the Article 9 provision. The first six months of 1815 were bloodier than anytime during the war. Black Hawk and his Sac warriors were especially active, attacking not only the Osage but also raiding in such places as Lincoln County, just north of St. Louis, in which the dead and scalped bodies of the slain floated down the Missouri River as a warning to other white settlers.[85]

Indian violence, however, was unsustainable. Despite Clark's fears the British made no real effort to arm and supply their former allies. Spain, dealing with revolutions across the Latin American Empire, could barely sustain its own power, let alone project any threat to the United States. Although the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 marked the official end of new colonialism in the Western Hemisphere, the War of 1812 effectively finished all European support for North American Indian tribes. Largely unaware of the greater forces at work, Governor Clark moved quickly to end the violence through voluntary pledges of peace and closer economic dependence by the Natives on American trade.

During the summer of 1815 Clark invited all the Indian tribes under his authority in the Upper Louisiana Territory to Portage des Sioux, a town just north of St. Louis. Over the course of three months, representatives from thirty-seven tribes signed a treaty

[85]Foley, 160-161; Jones, 225-226.

with the United States. In this agreement the Indians pledged themselves to peace and friendship while the U.S. reaffirmed Article 9 of the Treaty of Ghent guaranteeing the return of all rights, property, and privileges possessed in 1811. Among those who signed included the Piankashaws, Potawatomis, Omahas, Kickapoos, Big and Little Osage, Missouri Sacs, Foxes, Ioway, and Dakota and Lakota Sioux. A few tribes were absent—the Ojibwas, Menominees, and the Winnebagos—while Black Hawk and his Rock River Sacs flatly refused to join. By September 1815, in order to secure food and safety for his followers, the famed Sac leader added his mark to the agreement. Like the Treaty of 1804, Black Hawk remembered this humiliation, which became yet another reason leading to his war with the United States in the early 1830s.[86]

Governor Clark was determined to honor the terms of the treaties. In December 1815, he declared the forcible removal of any white squatters on Indian lands. This decision resulted in a storm of protest. Colonel Alexander McNair, head of the state militia, refused to move against settlers on Indian lands. The dispute went to the Secretary of War. In a move that stunned the governor, in the spring of 1816, President James Madison signed a law that permitted squatters to remain on Indian lands until such time as it was put up for sale. This disregard for signed treaties and Indian property marked the first official defeat for the Jeffersonian Ideal in Missouri.[87]

Governor Clark then faced a quandary. The white population of the Missouri Territory grew rapidly after the War of 1812, while at the same time the immigration of eastern tribes into Missouri and Arkansas also increased. By 1817, the governor

[86]Buckley, 110; Jones, 233;

[87]Foley, 173; Jones, 236.

supervised an estimated population of 73,750 Indians in the upper Louisiana Territory. The federal government passed a law protecting the squatters, while simultaneously sending more Indians to the same area near Cape Girardeau. After the defeat of Tecumseh and his brother Tenskwatawa, also known as the Prophet, more Shawnee came from Ohio. Along with the Shawnee arrived more Delawares, Miamis, Weas, Potawatomis, Wyandots, and Peorias. Just below the Missouri border, an influx of Cherokee, Quapaws, Chickasaws, and Choctaw resulted in warfare between the newcomers and the Arkansas Osage. The growth of both the Indian and white population not only increased the violence between them, but also between indigenous tribes and newly arrived Natives. One raid in 1817 comprised mainly of Quapaws and Caddoes, but including a few Cherokee and Americans as well, destroyed an Arkansas Osage village resulting in the dozens of deaths and the seizure of over one hundred prisoners, almost all of them women and children.[88]

As more Indians arrived, ill will toward the Natives among the white population increased. The *Missouri Gazette*, the territory's leading newspaper, demanded that raiding tribes such as the Sac and Fox be "Jacksonized." This euphemism referred to Andrew Jackson's massacre of Creeks near Horseshoe Bend, Alabama in 1813. In January 1817, the Territorial Congress introduced a resolution declaring that, as the prosperity and population of the counties of St. Genevieve and Cape Girardeau were inconvenienced and impeded by the Shawnee and Delaware tribes, the Legislature should relieve all Indians of their claims to the land in return for land outside of Missouri's borders. One politician, Henry Carroll, declared in 1818 that since the Osage Treaty of 1808 occurred before the official organization of the territory of Missouri, the

[88]Jones, 234, 242, 247-248; Buckley, 126-127, 129; Mathews, 420.

government of Missouri did not have to recognize Big and Little claims to any of that tribe's remaining lands. Both of these proposals conveniently ignored the fact that, by law, the Federal government conducted all tribal contracts, which superseded any state and local legislation. The Territory of Missouri had no legal right to make new treaties with the Indians, or dispute existing statutes and the United States Congress ignored the declarations.[89]

To forestall yet more violence Governor Clark acquiesced to the inevitable and once again began negotiations with the Osage for more of their territory as a place to send tribes from eastern Missouri. The Children of the Middle Water were in no condition to refuse. Since the end of the War of 1812, the Big, Little, and Arkansas Osage suffered raids and trespasses on their hunting grounds by enemy tribes, as well as legal actions by the Cherokees. Members of the Cherokee tribe would file claims against the Osage charging the latter with theft and destruction of property. The Osage, with little understanding of the white man's legal process and disdaining the charges, which were often false, almost inevitably failed to file a counter-claim or respond to a court summons. As a result of these lawsuits, the Cherokee acquired a large portion of the Osage annual annuities. The Osage, desperate to protect their hunting rights and growing more destitute by the year, grudgingly signed a new treaty with Governor Clark in 1818. This treaty ceded approximately 600,000 acres of Osage territory to the U.S. including land in Kansas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and about six thousand square miles in southwest Missouri, in exchange for four thousand dollars and the privilege to continue hunting in the Ozarks. The Federal government then set aside a large portion of the land in

[89]*The Territorial Papers of the United States, volume XV*, 236-237, 440-444; Jones, 218; Buckley, 104.

Oklahoma and sold it to the Cherokee for two million dollars. Such deals were a two-fold insult to the Osage; not only did the government sell the land for an enormous profit, this particular transaction placed an enemy tribe close to Big and Little settlements.[90]

With new lands available Governor Clark began a micro-removal by enticing Indians in eastern Missouri to move to western Missouri and Kansas. Both President Monroe and Congress supported this plan in 1819 granting ten thousand dollars "for the purpose of providing against the further decline and final extinction of the Indian tribes…and for introducing among them the habits and arts of civilization."[91] The Shawnee and Delaware moved to the Ozarks, but finding the hunting there sparse, eventually demanded and were granted land in eastern Kansas. Other tribes, such as the Quapaw, Kickapoo, Piankashaw, and Peoria followed the same route to the Ozarks and into Kansas. In the north, the Sac and Fox tribes drove their former allies, the Ioway, out of the Iowa territory. After several nomadic years along Missouri's northern border, the Ioway eventually settled in the area later called the Platte Purchase region.[92]

Violence led to changing attitudes and legislative action, but there were other factors leading to changing attitudes as well. As wild game in Missouri diminished, most tribes relied more and more upon trade and annuities for survival. Several believers in the Jeffersonian Ideal continued their attempts to transform the Natives into "civilized" farmers. Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas L. McKenney instructed all the territorial governors to promote the benefits of civilization. In addition, several Christian

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[90]Burns, 157-158, 168; Wolferman 89.

[91]Buckley, 133.

[92]Buckley, 131-132; Warren 87-88; Olsen, 65.

churches, such as the Missouri Baptist Association, began to lobby Congress for permission to Christianize the Natives. Others, such as George Sibley, urged the legislature to grant every Indian family a plot of land to encourage agriculture and assimilation. Those who continued to advocate for the peaceful integration between Native and white in Missouri, however, fought a losing battle against increasingly aggressive policies of removal in the territory.[93]

The most glaring example of local actions that affected even national policy occurred not in agriculture, however, but in trade. The decision to close Fort Osage in 1813 was not entirely a military judgment. The Embargo Act of 1807, which forbade American exports to Europe, completely disrupted trade in Missouri, a region where the primary source of income at that time derived from the sale of furs. Congress eventually replaced the Embargo Act with the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 and Macon's Bill No. 2 in 1810, which restored trade to other nations and finally to France and Britain. The reversals in policy did not avert the recession to the fur market. During the War of 1812, pelts and furs bound for Europe stockpiled in New Orleans. Even merchandise that was shipped seldom made it to the port of destination. British privateers seized much of the cargo en route. The war also caused a shortage of English-manufactured blankets, the main staple purchased at the factories by Indians. The depressed value of furs in turn weakened Native procurement power, even when desired goods were available. The withdrawal of the military garrison only exacerbated the social and economic reasons to close Fort Osage. There was little local white good will to spare the Natives, and, because of the depression, no commercial motivation to continue trade. The situation

[93]Buckley, 133-134.

leading to the closing of Fort Osage was not unique; most trading houses shut their doors during the war. Many factories, especially in the Ohio Valley and Old Northwest, suffered violent raids from Indians, often resulting in bloodshed.[94]

After the signing of the Treaty of Ghent, there was opposition in Congress to reopening the factories for various reasons. In areas west and south of the Appalachian Mountains, the idea of co-existence was unpopular, and the trading houses attracted thousands of Indians. Warfare with Native tribes allied to Britain and Spain convinced many whites that peaceful assimilation was either neither desirable nor possible. While many had long thought this way, Americans now had an advantage that they did not possess before the war. With the withdrawal of European support, Indians no longer had an ally able to resist the advance of American settlement. With the Natives isolated and a majority of westerners in support of separation, a more aggressive policy of removal was both politically and militarily expedient. In Missouri, for example, evaporating Osage power lessened fear of that tribe, and the rise of privatized trade reduced the necessity of reliance upon Big and Little trade. Across the nation, many also questioned the effectiveness of the factory system. If the goal were to solidify Indian reliance on peaceful American trade, then the war proved the factory system a failure because it did not keep Indians from fighting Americans. Even those mainly concerned with economics began to withdraw their support since most of the government-run factories generally did not earn a profit during economically depressed times.[95]

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[94]Paul S. Boyer, Clifford E. Clark, Jr. Joseph F. Kett, Neal Salisbury, Harvard Sitkoff, and Nancy Wolock, *The Enduring Vision, 6th Ed.* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2008), 234-235; Peake, 155-156, 159-161, 163.

[95]Wolferman, 86-87; Peake, 184.

There was still enough support, including from Presidents Madison and Monroe, that Congress did reinstate the factory system for a few more years. Both William Clark and Thomas McKenney strongly advocated the return. Their counter-arguments pointed out that, without European interference, Indian reliance on American trade would now increase. The main goal of the trading houses was not profit but to create a reliance on American goods. A few of the factories did provide the government with a surplus. Of the ten factories reopened across American territory after the War of 1812, three operated at a profit, and Fort Osage was the most lucrative of all of them.[96]

Although temporarily stymied, there remained a growing opposition in Congress to the factory system, and the legislature began to cut costs wherever they could. When Sibley returned and reopened Fort Osage in 1815, he did so without the military guard. Despite his anxiety about the factory's vulnerability without armed support, the Indians coming to his trading post remained friendly and cooperative. Unfortunately for the Osage and other Native tribes, business and industry in Missouri rapidly changed. In 1817, the first steamship sailed along the eastern border on the Mississippi River and in 1819 on the Missouri River. Not long after Missouri's statehood, this new mode of transportation replaced rafts and flatboats as the main source of river transportation, further eroding reliance on Indian trade. The fur business in Missouri remained economically important, but it no longer dominated the local economy. Agriculture, and to a lesser extent the slave trade, replaced furs as the primary source of wealth. As the fur trade was the only business in which most of the Natives in Missouri engaged, their fortunes remained tied to the decline of that commodity. In addition, privatized fur

[96]Peake, 189, 193-194.

trading, which represented a small minority of all traffic since the beginning of the Louisiana Purchase, rapidly expanded during the War of 1812. Disruptions in trade, the absence of government posts, and white mistrust of the Indians, enabled private individuals to supply the Indians with goods both legal and restricted. The privateers either trapped fur on their own or purchased a license from the government allowing them to trade for pelts directly from the natives. Traders for profit had far less scruples than the government proctors when dealing with the Indians. Often operating with forged or phony credentials, they supplied Indians with whiskey and other banned contraband or charging inflated prices, which in turn created more poverty and alcoholism among the tribes. Individual commerce continued and expanded after the war, as it once again became extremely profitable. In the scramble over the growing market on privatized fur trading, one man, John Jacob Astor, eventually bankrupted his competition and created a monopoly that controlled the entire industry.[97]

Despite the growing problems and competition, Governor Clark still believed in the factory system. In 1817, he wrote Secretary of War John C. Calhoun arguing that the Indian policy needed reevaluating and overhauling. Clark proposed a powerful government-controlled trading company that would end all private and remaining British trade. He also wanted the continued acquisition of western lands for the voluntary relocation of tribes from east of the Mississippi, and proposed the creation of an Indian Territory located either in the Ozarks or the Great Plains which would become the genesis of an Indian state. Calhoun flatly rejected the proposals in favor of Astor's urging for the privatization of all fur trade. In 1816, Astor lobbied Congress into enact a law prohibiting all foreign agents from trading with the Indians in American territory. By

[97]Wolferman, 89; Foley, 167; Peake, 197, 204; Terrell, 112.

the time Clark's letter reached Calhoun, Astor had already consolidated his power as the world's most successful fur trader and, in anticipation of the ending of the government monopoly, moved his company headquarters to St. Louis that same year. The factory system ended in 1822, largely due to the actions of two men, Astor and Senator Thomas Hart Benton, though for different reasons. The cumulative effect, however, further marginalized the Indians and contributed to the call for their removal from Missouri.[98] The next chapter further explores the closing of the government factory system.

Another reason for the changing attitudes of whites toward Indians in Missouri resulted from the rapid increase of American immigration. After the War of 1812, the estimated population of Osage in Missouri, the largest tribe in the Territory, placed their numbers between six and eight thousand. There were around twenty-five hundred Western Shawnee and around half that many Delawares living in the Ozarks. Other tribes, such as the Missouri Sac and Fox, Ioway, Miami, Cherokee, and Wea, were even smaller. The population of people of European descent in Missouri reached 19,218 males by the 1817 census. In 1819, the Legislature of Missouri sent an official resolution to Congress claiming, since the territory's population was nearing one hundred thousand, that recognition of statehood would strengthen the frontiers of the Platte and Des Moines River against "Indian incursions." Missourians knowingly overestimated their population; the 1820 census revealed there was little more than sixty-six thousand in the state, of whom close to ten thousand were slaves. By that time, however, the debate over

[98]Jones, 242, 243, 263; Buckley, 116, 142; Warren, 94; Peake, 165; Terrell, 138.

slave and free state admission that led to the Missouri Compromise overshadowed any concern over population.[99]

Deceptions aside, by the time Missouri attained statehood in 1821, the white population clearly outnumbered the Indian. Although fear of depredation by the "savages" remained, there was a confidence that such raids would result in swift and overwhelming retaliation. Most Indians understood their survival depended on the whims of a semi-hostile majority, and the traditional Osage, Ioway, Piankashaw, Sac, and Fox raiding practically ceased. Vigilante justice notwithstanding, there were fewer indigenous people placed on trial for violence after 1817, and after 1821, none were executed. A declension of Indian arrests might have been an indication that the Jeffersonian Ideal of peaceful assimilation was working. The viewpoint, however, became less popular each successive year.[100]

One other factor that played an indirect part in removal of Indians from Missouri was that of distraction. President Jefferson had a clear, if overly optimistic, vision of Anglo-Indian relations, along with a plan that did occasionally succeed in fully integrating Natives into the greater American culture. His successors during this period, Presidents Madison and Monroe, had little interest in the Natives, and were content to continue Jefferson's policies without adjustment for changing realities. The net result allowed the Secretary of War and the separate territorial governors to follow their own policies rather than a federally mandated one. This lack of a guiding national vision undermined the factory system and placed the onus of fulfilling promises to Natives on

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[99]Chapman, 276; Bowes, 132; United States Census Bureau; *Memorial and Resolutions of the Legislature of the Missouri Territory, and a Copy of the Census of the Fall of 1817: Amounting to 19,218 Males,* 16th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1819), 3, 6.

[100]Frazier, 12.

local governments. In Missouri, William Clark tried his best to honor his nation's promises to the Indians, but as time passed, he received less and less support from Washington. Locally, the issue of slavery gradually replaced concerns over Indians, sparked by the argument of statehood that resulted in the Missouri Compromise. The Era of Good Feelings did not extend to Native Americans, and national politics distracted a presidency that rarely had direct contact with Indians.

After Missouri became a state in 1821, federal policies often ended at loggerheads with local agendas. Due to the continued apathy toward conditions in Missouri by a successive series of presidents, officials on the state level dictated the policy toward Indians. Local policy in turn became the *de facto* reality the federal government accepted resulting in a victory of states' rights at the expense of the Native American.

Chapter 5: The Jacksonian Ideal, 1821-1838

Be it enacted…by Congress assembled, That it shall be lawful for the President of the United States…to cause such aid and assistance to be furnished to the emigrants as may be necessary and proper to enable them to remove to, and settle in, the country for which they may have exchanged…
Indian Removal Act of 1830, 21st Congress, 28 May 1830.[101]

The question of Missouri's admission to the Union from 1819-1820 created an unprecedented national crisis. For the first time, the delicate, rarely discussed balance between slave and free states was in peril. The question of slavery, largely ignored since the three-fifths compromise of the Constitutional Convention, became the topic that divided the nation and continued to do so until settled through five bloody years of civil war. In Missouri itself there was another pressing problem of equal importance to the slavery question, and that was what to do with the Indian population. Although Governor Clark successfully, if temporarily, separated whites and Indians in the state—Americans in the center and east, Natives in the south and west— most local white leaders began advocating removal to allow for white expansion. Once the Missouri Compromise settled the legality of slavery, the primary goal of state leaders was two-fold: the complete expulsion of Indians from their borders and the acquisition of the Platte River area in northwest Missouri. The latter issue directly tied to the former, for the land later called the Platte Purchase was the federal government's last effort to create a reservation within what became the borders of Missouri. The failure of the United States to deliver upon its promise of a permanent home in Missouri to Native Americans is a clear example of a rare state's rights victory. In Missouri, the triumph of capitalism over the factory system, the failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the tacit cooperation for

[101]U.S. Congress, *An Act to provide for an exchange of lands with the Indians residing in any of the states and territories, and for their removal west of the river Mississippi*, 21st Congress, 2nd Session, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=004/llsl004.db&recNum=458.

expulsion by a succession of presidents, and the Platte Purchase, all combined to enable the final removal of Indians from the state by 1838.

In order to preserve the balance between free and slave states, Congress admitted both Maine and Missouri as states in 1820. Furthermore, the agreement read that, except for Missouri itself, there would be no slavery above the 36° 30´ latitude line, the southern border of the state. Matters did not progress smoothly, however. While Congress finalized the state borders, local officials attempted two grabs for extra land, one of which was immediately successful; the other took another fifteen years to complete. At the request of resident citizens, the state's southern border incorporated the northeastern section of Arkansas, the area known as the "boot heel." The western border was originally a straight line extending north to Iowa. Missourians tried to include the area later called the Platte Purchase, but Congress denied this request, for the federal government had other plans for the area. Eventually, however, it did become part of the state, a process discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. Another problem arose when Missourians submitted their constitution for approval, because it included a statute barring the emigration of free blacks, which prompted representatives from several northern states to deny support for admittance to the Union. After dropping the offending provision, Missouri officially became the twenty-fourth state on 10 August 1821.[102]

Once it became obvious that slavery would continue, the pressing issue for most Missourians was Indian removal. Despite the fact that Natives had practically ceased all raiding and fighting and rarely crossed paths with whites, except in St. Louis, many Americans considered the Indians lazy and immoral. Thomas Hart Benton, one of

[102]Boyer, et. al, *The Enduring Vision,* 243-244; *The Missouri Constitution of 1820,* http://clio.missouristate.edu/FTMiller/LocalHistory/Docs/MOConst1820.htm.

Missouri's first two senators, called them "useless and dangerous."[103] As early as December 10, 1820, the territorial assembly passed the "Resolution concerning the extinguishment of the Indian Title to Lands within the limits of this State." This bill requested that Congress dismiss all Indian claims to land within Missouri and remove them outside the borders. The federal government, still in the process of sending Eastern tribes to Missouri, ignored the resolution. In March 1821, the Missouri legislature tried unsuccessfully to get the measure passed through Congress again. At the same time, Senator Benton also wrote to David Barton, President Monroe's Secretary of War, asking for his help in ending the continuing Indian exodus to Missouri and removing those already in residence.[104]

The Natives were aware of the growing appeals for their removal from lands they owned, which in turn increased tensions between different tribes. There were many reasons for the hostile inter-tribal feelings. Indians sometimes blamed each other for causing problems with the whites or believed that whites respected select nations more than the rest. In addition, the proximity of so many traditional enemies confined to such a small area created as much discord and mistrust among themselves as did contact with the whites. Ephraim Chapman, a missionary at Marias Des Cygnes ministering to the Big Osage, wrote several letters to his friends and colleagues stating his belief that the U.S. government favored the Cherokee over the Osage and expressed concern over the rising tensions between tribes in the area. Since the government refused to station troops at the factory, he wrote, and there were now so many traditional enemies of the Big and Little

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[103]Perry McCandless, *A History of Missouri, volume II, 1820-1860* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1972), 51-54.

[104]*The Territorial Papers of the United States, volume XV, 1815-1821,* 682, 706.

living at Fort Osage that the Children of the Middle Waters no longer felt safe trading there. Furthermore, he was certain there would be a renewal of bloodshed, especially since the Delaware tribe now lived on the Osage hunting grounds in the Ozarks.[105]

Chapman was correct in many of his observations. The Delaware tribe allied with the Cherokee in 1821 and prepared for war with the Osage, who in turn appealed to the Missouri Sac and Fox tribe for support, but the latter refused. Increased white immigration only intensified tensions on all sides. For the Indians this time, however, there was no sympathetic Governor Clark to diffuse the situation. As the territory went through the process of becoming a state, Clark originally did not intend to run for governor; he wanted to return to private life and care for his ailing wife Julia. Upon her death in 1820, with Clark's concern for the future of the Native Americans in Missouri, he reluctantly placed himself in candidacy for governor. Although well respected throughout the state, many believed Clark favored Indian rights over those of whites. His opponent, Alexander McNair, was the officer who refused to evict squatters from lands the Shawnee and Delaware tribes owned. With the election of McNair as the state's new governor, winning with seventy-two percent of the vote, Missourians rejected the Jeffersonian Ideal of peaceful co-existence. Although Clark no longer had state power, in 1822 he became a federal superintendent of Indian Affairs, and from this position, he once again became the leading advocate in the state for peaceful co-existence.[106]

While the battle of politics and shifting alliances played out in Missouri, in the nation's capital several powerful men worked toward the final destruction of the factory system. By 1821, the Big Osage at Marias Des Cygnes' call for their own factory was

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[105]Voget, 210-212.

[106]Voget, 221; Buckley, 136-138, 146.

successful, although the trading post stayed open only a year. According to many, including Superintendent of Indian Trade Thomas McKenney, there were two men primarily responsible for its demise: Senator Benton and America's first self-made millionaire, John Jacob Astor. Benton wanted the Osage and Marais des Cygnes factories closed as a precursor for the removal of Indians from his state. The absence of Indians, he believed, would create more plantations, which in turn would increase the number of slaves and Missouri's profits from the slave trade. Benton, in fact, introduced the bill to Congress that officially ended the factory system. The Senator's ally in this fight was the head of the Missouri Fur Company. Astor, who for years had consolidated or co-opted nearly all other private traders into his organization, argued that the original intent of the factory system to lure trade away from the British and to keep liquor and arms from the Indians was, after the War of 1812, invalid. The Indians would never become farmers, he argued, if they could continue to purchase items necessary for survival in trade for furs obtained from hunting. His argument convinced many already sympathetic to the Jacksonian viewpoint, and his call for the privatization rather than the governmental control of the fur trade appealed to those more concerned with commerce than the welfare of the Natives.[107]

The triumph of capitalism over government control occurred when it did because of an international event. In 1821, Mexico won its independence from Spain, and many Americans wanted the United States to be its primary trading partner. The original trail to Mexico began at Fort Osage. The arriving merchants did not appreciate thousands of Indians surrounding them, and their call to close down the trading post added weight to the anti-factory argument. Those opposed argued that ending government-controlled

[107]Aron, 207, 209; Wolferman, 90; Peake, 204; Jones, 263-264; Buckley, 155.

trading posts would not only be beneficial for private business, it would also create the need for new agreements with the Indians. Closing the factories violated many existing treaties necessitating the making of new ones, which suited both Benton and Astor. Different treaties might actually remove Indians from the state, and if Fort Osage, the most profitable of all factories, closed; there was no economic reason to keep any of them open. Unfortunately for most Native Americans, private citizens purchasing furs directly from the Indians, or whites trapping them on their own, made a few men wealthy, but pauperized already impoverished tribes. In the end, Congress supported business over Indian rights and in June 1822, voted to close all factories.[108]

In August 1822, Fort Osage permanently shut its doors to Indian trade, and inexperienced bureaucrats sold the remaining goods at a loss to any and all buyers from the east. With the ending of factories, a new system of managing Indian affairs emerged. In 1824, President James Monroe signed a bill establishing the Bureau of Indian Affairs, a bureaucracy for the implementation of federal policy. William Clark, appointed superintendent of Indian Affairs, was responsible for managing all the Natives west of the Mississippi River and north of Missouri's southern boundary. There were three other superintendents, in Michigan, Florida, and Arkansas, but Clark had the largest area in both size and population. In Missouri alone, there were still an estimated 8,500 Osage, over 14,000 Shawnee, Delaware, Kickapoo, and Cherokee in the southern portion, along with thousands of Sac, Fox, Ioway, and various others in the north. By this time, Clark was highly respected among the Native population, and many Indians would not negotiate a treaty unless he was personally involved. Clark's services were in high demand, for the explosive American westward expansion created the necessity for dozens

[108]Jones, 263, 273, 364; Buckley 157; Wolferman, 90.

of new treaties. Clark's position was not an easy one; the closing of the factories made it much more complex to threaten trade embargos, the former governor's favorite negotiating tactic. The privatization of the fur trade also meant alcohol was much easier to obtain for the Natives. The incessant demand for whiskey destroyed tribal culture just as readily as white encroachment.[109]

As superintendent, Clark had responsibilities other than negotiating treaties. He also issued licenses and passports to all traders and travelers to Indian country, used the United States army to arrest lawbreakers, established tribal boundaries, and arbitrated disputes between tribes. Helping in this task were fifteen agencies overseeing thirty-six nations. He reported to Thomas McKenney, the first Commissioner of Indian Affairs. The former governor of the Missouri Territory served in this position under Presidents James Monroe, John Quincy Adams, and Andrew Jackson. Until the Indian Removal Act of 1830, Clark continued his best to uphold Jeffersonian Ideals, even as his ability to stem the growing tide of changing attitudes made this harder. In Missouri, his first task was to renegotiate a settlement with the Osage.[110]

Between 1822 and 1825, the Missouri Big, Little, and Arkansas Osage signed three treaties. In the Treaty of 1822, the Indians officially accepted the closing of Fort Osage for a lump payment. Upon signing this agreement, most of the remaining Children of the Middle Waters moved southwest, along the Neosho River in Oklahoma, leaving Marais des Cygnes the only Osage settlement left in Missouri. The continued immigration of Shawnee and Delaware, as well as white settlers into the Ozarks and the western part of the state led to increased tensions whenever members of the Big and

[109]Wolferman, 101; Peake, 205, 209; Buckley, 146-148, 156, 162; Warren, 91.

[110]Jones, 243, 265;

Little tribe tried to hunt. In 1825, Clark, with the help of former trade factor George Sibley, negotiated the treaty that ceded all lands in Missouri and Arkansas the Osage still owned to the United States, and the tribe moved about twenty-five miles into the interior of the Kansas Territory. The agreement also committed the Osage to remain at peace with the Delawares, Shawnees, Kickapoo, Wea, Cherokees, Piankashaw, and Peoria, mainly by designating specific hunting lands to each tribe. Subsistence farming was encouraged by limiting annuities to twenty years. The third treaty signed that year pledged the Osage to protect white travelers along the Santa Fe Trail, which ran for hundreds of miles through their territory. The treaties of 1825 were a triumph for the Jacksonian Ideal of forced Indian separation and segregation from the rest of American. Superintendent Clark felt the terms so hypocritical and harsh that he wrote to Jefferson that, "It is to be lamented that the deplorable situation of the Indians do not receive more of the humane feelings of the nation."[111]

The expulsion of the Osage nation from the state after centuries of residency was a "victory" for the whites, but a relatively minor one. There remained an estimated 18,917 Natives in Missouri and Arkansas, with more arriving each year, courtesy of a federal government unsympathetic to state and local desires to move them further west. Thomas Hart Benton, still determined to rid his state of the "savage," introduced a bill to the Senate to organize a separate Indian Territory to the west of Missouri, where all Indians could live, become civilized, and then enjoy the legal benefits of any other territory, including application for statehood. Although passed by the Senate, the House of Representatives, which had its own similar bill, rejected it. Negotiations continued

[111]Burns, 160, 164, 168; Wolferman, 101; Rollings, 9; Mathews, 519-520; Voget, 222-223; Washburn, *The American Indian; a Documentary History, v. IV*, 2395; Buckley, 169-170, 177; Wolferman, 102-103; Mathews, 522.

until 1830 when an official Indian Territory was created, one controlled by whites which at first stretched from south of the Platte River in Nebraska to north of the Red River in Oklahoma. Thanks to Zebulon Pike's description of the land as the "Great American Desert" in 1811, few believed any white settlers would be interested in living there, thus it was a perfect place to settle the Natives. Although some tribes welcomed what they perceived as a step toward acceptance into American culture, others were less enthusiastic. The Cherokee did not want to cede the sovereignty of their nation, which they feared would be lost in the merging of so many cultures. Ironically, the nation eventually became the preeminent one in the Territory. The Osage, with similar concerns, refused to join the loose confederation known as Five Civilized Tribes—Cherokee, Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Seminole—as it feared a loss of independence also meant the lessening of power and prestige. The creation of an actual Indian "homeland," however, convinced many local whites that it was only a matter of time before Eastern tribes sent to Missouri were exiled west to the Indian Territory.[112]

Between 1824 and 1830, Clark busily forged removal treaties with tribes living in not just in Missouri, but also Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, and Arkansas. The Ioway and Missouri Sacs and Foxes waived claim to land in Missouri, but many refused to go west. In 1827, the Ioway Indian agent reported that members of the tribe lived forty miles inside Missouri. The next year they were along the Missouri River and by 1834 lived next to the Platte River. The Kansa nation gave up claim to lands in Jackson and Clay counties in Missouri but already lived outside the state border. Others, like the Kickapoo near Cape Girardeau and the Delaware in the Ozarks, moved west, joining the Western

[112]Warren, 73; Burns, 174.

Shawnee, who had already migrated to Kansas. During this period, however, more Shawnee arrived from Ohio to settle in Missouri, but local whites forced them westward within months of their appearance. Like some giant, invisible, assembly line, the federal government continued to flood Missouri with Natives from east of the Mississippi, including the Peoria, Kaskaskia, and Piankashaw, whereupon local whites forced them to continue on further west.[113]

Clark and McKenney were not the only people trying to honor the treaties forged by the United States with the Indians. Private citizens, such as Reverend Isaac McCoy, also contributed. A Baptist missionary, McCoy had been instrumental in convincing the Michigan Potawatomi tribe to sign a treaty with the government. In 1828, he arrived in Missouri, residing at first in St. Louis and later in Westport where his son helped found Kansas City. During the 1830s, he helped tribes who transferred to Missouri, such as the Potawatomi, Ioway, Missouri Sac and Fox, and Ottawa, relocate to Kansas.[114] His mark on Indian removal in Missouri came from his 1829 work, *Remarks on the Practicability of Indian reform.* In his treatise, McCoy argued that even though they did not live the same way as whites, Indians had the same rights to their lands. Exploiting their legal naiveté was no different from taking advantage of a child. Even if their land was not stolen outright, purchasing land at twelve cents an acre and selling it for $1.25 was not Christian. Finally, he argued that the only feasible plan to save the Natives was to concentrate all of the tribes in an Indian territory which would forever more be granted as

[113]McCandless, 54-55; Buckley, 150, 168, 170-171, 196-187, 218; Edward E. Hill, *The Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1880: Historical Sketches* (New York: Clearwater Publishing Company, Inc., 1974), 81; Jones, 280-281, 293; Bowes, 133.

[114]Anna Heloise Abel, "Indian Reservations in Kansas and the Extinguishment of Their Title," *Kansas State Historical Society*, no. 8 (1904): 73-74, 82.

their own land. The best place for the Indians was the area just west of Missouri and Arkansas.[115] Congress followed some of McCoy's advice. Oklahoma and Kansas became Indian Territory. The idea that the land belonged exclusively to the Indian, however, was discarded in favor of white settlement as the nineteenth century progressed.

After the official declaration of an Indian Territory, Superintendent Clark and his boss, Commissioner McKenney, increased the pace of sending Indians past Missouri's western border. Well aware of the prevailing mood in the state, they believed the Natives faced extermination if they remained. Their fears were well founded. By the end of Madison's administration, there were four basic approaches to the "Indian problem:" assimilation, annihilation, confining to reservations, or exile to the Indian Territory. There were six general principles that guided the Bureau of Indian Affairs: protection of Indian lands from white encroachment, regulation of trade, prohibition of the sale of liquor to Natives, oversight of crimes committed between the races, allowing only the federal government to purchase their land, and promoting education and civilization to the tribes. Despite its lofty goals, however, the Bureau failed to achieve nearly all of its aims. There were many reasons for its lack of success, including greed for land, incompetence of agents, poor federal government oversight, and public apathy over the fate of Natives. The foundation for failure, however, rests with the executive branch of the federal government, simply because the president had the preeminent authority over Indian policy.[116]

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[115]Isaac McCoy, *Remarks on the Practicability of Indian Reform, Embracing their Colonization* (New York: Gray and Bunce, 1829), 5, 8, 19, 24-25, 30.

[116]Buckley, 165; Burns, 174; Wilcomb E. Washburn, "Indian Removal Policy: Administrative, Historical, and Moral Criteria for Judging its Success or Failure," *Ethnohistory*, 12, no. 4 (Summer 1965): 274-278.

As early as 1828, Commissioner McKenney asked the Secretary of War to elucidate a clear and official policy toward the Indians, for in the few short years of existence the Bureau had allowed extermination, separation, isolation, and forced removal. His frustration was evident when he wrote, "What are humanity and justice in reference to this unfortunate race?" If a policy was not determined soon, he feared Indians would be beyond help.[117]

Agents like McKenney had reason for frustration. There had been no clearly defined policy since the Jefferson administration. In 1825, Monroe presented a migration bill once more proposing the removal of Eastern tribes. The only difference was that this time the final location was west of Missouri. He was not in favor of forced removal, however, commenting that Cherokee migration from Georgia should only proceed, "peaceably and on reasonable conditions."[118]

The judicial branch also failed to solve the crisis. In three cases brought before the Supreme Court in the 1820s and 1830s, Chief Justice John Marshall ruled that the U.S. had the right to land along the Missouri, Kansas, and Arkansas Rivers while the Indians only had the right of occupancy. The court ordered that as Indians were becoming farmers, surplus land for hunting was no longer needed and thus should be ceded to the government. President John Quincy Adams supported educating the Indians and advocated the primacy federal policy above the desires of individual states, but failed

[117]"Report from Commissioner of Indian Affairs Thomas L. McKenney, Nov. 1, 1828," in Wilcomb E. Washburn, *The American Indian in the United States; a Documentary History*, *volume 1* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, Press, Publishers, 1973), 9-10.

[118]Sturgis, 182-184.

to issue any definitive overriding policy which, in effect, allowed states to proceed with plans for Natives as they saw fit.[119]

During Andrew Jackson's first term in office Indian policy radically, and officially, changed. In his first inaugural address, Jackson indicated that he intended to continue Jefferson's policy of respecting Indian rights, but by the time of his second annual message to Congress in December 1830, Jackson had evolved his interpretation of the Jeffersonian Ideal. He reaffirmed the "benevolent" policy of Indian removal outside the borders of the United States. This separation would be beneficial for both whites and Indians, he reasoned, as it would lead to eventual Christianization and civilized behavior by removing them from "oppressive" state laws.[120] While Jackson closely echoed what Jefferson advocated, gone were the provisions guiding the civilizing process, as well as the option of voluntary removal. The fate of the indigenous peoples no longer concerned most Americans. There was no real interest in assimilation, education, or honoring American obligations.[121]

Jackson fired Jeffersonian idealists such as William Clark and Thomas McKenney from the Bureau and replaced them with men willing to move Indians out west as quickly and efficiently as possible. The New Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Elbert Herring, wrote to Jackson in November 1831, on the necessity of the president's wise policy by claiming, "Gradually diminishing in numbers and deteriorating in condition; incapable of coping with the superior intelligence of the white man, ready to fall into the vices, but

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[119]Buckley, 167; Smith, 17-19; Sean P. Harvey, "'Must Not Their Languages Be Savage and Barbarous Like Them?' Philology, Indian Removal, and Race Science," *Journal of the Early Republic* 30, no. 4 (Winter 2010): 523-524.

[120]Jackson, "First Inaugural Address"; Smith, 48-49

[121]Smith, 48-49.

unapt to appropriate the benefits of the social state."[122] Left in contact with the white man, the Indian would go extinct, not because of the actions of Americans, but because Natives were incapable of properly functioning in society. Having stated his preferences, Jackson was satisfied to let Congress, the states, and the Bureau proceed as they wished. In the president's second inaugural address, there was no mention of Indians.[123]

The death knell of the Jeffersonian Ideal occurred with the passage of the Removal Act in May 1830. The bill did not proceed without opposition. Senator Theodore Frelinghuysen of New Jersey argued that Indians still held title to all lands not legally purchased and that, as a nation of law, the United States had to respect Native American rights. He ridiculed the notion that Native land used for hunting was free for squatting. If, he asked, a white man owned land used for only for sport; did this lack of cultivation give other white settlers the legal right to squat? Did Americans have the right to ignore the legal rights of non-whites? His argument, directed toward a Congress that seated many slave-owners, fell upon deaf ears.[124]

The passage of the Indian Removal Act in May 1830 authorized the president to exchange Indian property east of the Mississippi River for land further west. More importantly, "to cause such aid and assistance to be furnished to the emigrants as may be necessary and proper to enable them to remove to…the country for which they may have exchanged."[125] In other words, if the Indian nations removed themselves peacefully, the

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[122]Washburn, *The American Indian, a Documentary History, Volume 1*, 18.

[123]Andrew Jackson, "Second Inaugural Address," the Avalon Project: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jackson2.asp (accessed 3 December 2012); Washburn, *The American Indian, a Documentary History, Volume 1*, 19-20, 23.

[124]Smith, 49-50.

[125]U.S. Congress, "An Act to Provide for an Exchange of Lands…"

United States would not interfere. If they resisted, as was the case with several Southeastern tribes, the United States authorized itself to use military force to evacuate them. Congress went even further with the Intercourse Act of June 1834. In this decree, the United States no longer legally recognized Indian claims to any land east of the Mississippi. Congress also authorized the use of military force to prevent tribal wars and more succinctly defined Indian country. Not only was Missouri no longer forced to accept emigrant tribes, but the Acts of 1830 and 1834 also encouraged state leaders to pursue two final goals to claim their land from the Natives; the Platte Purchase, and the final expulsion of all remaining Indians on their soil.[126]

By the late 1820s, through force, coercion, and treaty, Missourians had expelled nearly all Natives south of the Missouri River. The northern part of the state, however, spiraled into a test of wills between the people of Missouri, Indian tribes, and the federal government. When it became a state in 1821, Missouri's western border was a straight vertical line from Arkansas to Iowa. Just northwest of Kansas City, from the western border to the Missouri River including what later became Andrew, Atchison, Buchanan, Holt, Nodaway, and Platte counties, lay thousands of acres of potentially high-yield farmland. As early as 1819 there were public demands for this land. The *Missouri Intelligencer,* published in St. Louis, argued that Congress should include the Indian Platte River territory as part of the state since it would be impossible to keep white settlers out of such fertile acreage. Although the newspaper's prediction was correct, the federal government refused to include the Platte area when drawing the state lines for several reasons. Missouri was already one of the largest states, and after the battle that resulted in the Missouri Compromise, the North was leery of giving potential extra

[126]Washburn, *The American Indian; a Documentary History, volume III,* 2172-2179.

members in the House of Representatives to one that allowed slavery. Also by this time, the federal government selected the Platte area as a permanent Indian reservation for Eastern tribes and white settlement there declared illegal. Finally, the mapmakers in Congress preferred straight lines for borders, as is obvious when one considers the shape of states west of the Mississippi. All of these considerations proved too great of an obstacle for Missourians to overcome in 1821.[127]

Although defeated, many Missourians refused to give up dreams of attaching the Platte area to their state. During the 1820s, most of the land belonged to the Ioway tribe. Like the Osage, the nation found itself surrounded by enemies, including the Sac and Fox, Piankashaw, and Sioux, and violent confrontations were common. By 1824, the fighting reached such a crescendo that Superintendent William Clark sent a delegation of chiefs from each of the tribes to Washington to meet with President Monroe in hopes of reaching an agreement. As a result, the Ioway tribe agreed to cede their remaining territory in the northern half of Missouri in return for payments similar to those the Osage received in their 1808 treaty. The Treaty of 1824 also required the tribe to relocate to the Platte Purchase area, which, at that time, was not part of Missouri. The majority removed themselves, joining others who had lived there since the end of the War of 1812. As mentioned before, however, there were Ioway who refused to leave the state, and for the next few years wandered along the Missouri-Iowa border. These remaining Indians eventually joined their nation further west. Not only was game scarce in Missouri, they were often the target of Sac and Fox raids. When white settlers attacked them near

[127]Buckley, 227; Floyd Calvin Shoemaker, *Missouri's Struggle for Statehood, 1804-1821* (Jefferson City, MO: Hugh Stephens Printing Co., 1916), 57-58; H. Jason Combs, "The Platte Purchase and Native American Removal." *Plains Anthropological Society* 47, no. 18 (August 2002): 269-270.

Kirksville in 1829, the remaining Ioway permanently left the state. By this time, however, local leaders were once again pushing for annexation of the Platte area.[128]

The Indian Removal Act of 1830 and the Black Hawk War of 1832 proved to be the catalysts that enabled Missouri to expand its borders. With the former, the Bureau of Indian Affairs offered several Eastern tribes the Platte area for settlement. The district was originally part of the newly designated Indian Territory. To insure against claims of ownership from Western tribes, Clark orchestrated the Prairie du Chien (Wisconsin) Treaty of 1830, which the Sac and Fox, Omaha, Ioway, Oto, and Missouria tribes signed. These nations ceded large swaths of territory, including the Platte region, to the federal government, which in turn promised much of the land would remain a communal hunting ground. In addition, the tribes received land in Kansas and Nebraska as compensation. Ironically enough, not all of the transplanted Natives liked their new home. In 1831, the Wyandot tribe was resettled from Ohio into the Platte area, but due to the scarcity of game and lack of maple trees, the group demanded—and was granted—land further to the west in Kansas.[129]

Undeterred by the efforts of the federal government to turn the Platte area into a reservation, Missourians went forward with their plans of annexation. They amended the state constitution to include the territory and openly debated the reasons that necessitated purchasing the area. These justifications included not only economic and political rationales, but defensive reasons as well. Natives sometimes attacked white settlers' that illegally moved into the area. In 1832, Governor John Miller officially called for the annexation for economic purposes, as the area contained rich farmland and large tracts of

[128]Olsen, 68, 84-85, 92-93, 95, 97; McCandless, 55.

[129]Combs, 266, 269; Bowes, 93.

lumber. When the federal government signed treaties with the Chippewas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis, granting them the right to settle in Indian Territory in exchange for lands east of the Mississippi, the two Missouri senators successfully argued for an amendment that specifically barred any of them from inhabiting the Platte purchase area. Nearly all of the Potawatomis protested this exclusion and demanded the federal government honor the original treaty. The agreement remained in limbo until 1835, when Congress ratified the treaties anyway. Several thousand Potawatomi in turn ignored the amended treaty and moved to the Platte area in 1835 and 1836.[130]

The results of the Black Hawk War also accelerated the call for annexation. In 1832, Sac war chief Black Hawk and his followers tried to reclaim land in Illinois illegally ceded, from the Indian point of view, to the United States in 1804. The war consisted of only three battles, all east of the Mississippi, and lasted but a few months. Fear of the Sac and Fox, who had raided across northeastern Missouri since the turn of the century, however, spread across the state, convincing even more white residents of the necessity of expulsion. As a reward for remaining American allies during the Black Hawk War, several tribes moved to the Platte region. At the same time, white settlers were pouring into the area in anticipation of annexation. The proximity of thousands of people of different cultures opposed to the settlement of others in the same area caused yet another wave of violence, which culminated in the final expulsion of Indians from the state.[131]

Originally, the federal government designated the Platte region for the Sac and Fox tribe. After the Black Hawk War, the Bureau of Indian Affairs promised the land to

[130]Combs, 269-272.

[131]Olsen, 97, 104-105.

the Potawatomis instead as a reward for their help against the Sacs, a gift Missouri Senators Thomas Hart Benton and Lewis F. Linn opposed. The defiant Potawatomis ignored Benton and Linn's protests and, along with several hundred Missouri Sac and Fox Indians, those who had nothing to do with Black Hawk, joined the Ioway already living in the Platte region. The tensions between what the state desired, what the Bureau of Indian affairs wanted, and the lack of clear leadership by President Jackson, who largely ignored the fight, made a volatile situation even worse.[132]

In 1835, a band of Americans attempted to steal horses from the Potawatomis, resulting in the death of two whites and an Indian. Outraged at the attack on Americans, Missouri governor Daniel Dunklin called for two hundred volunteer militia to drive out all the Indians from the Platte area. Federal troops from Fort Leavenworth, however, refused to let them enter the territory. In Washington, both Secretary of War Lewis Cass and President Jackson both supported Dunklin and Missouri's call for annexation of the Platte area. Although Cass was concerned about the poor precedent it might set by breaking so many Indian treaties at once, in the end, the president sided with the white population rather than the Native. To give it the air of legality Cass claimed that the Platte region could be used for purposes other than Native settlement provided the tribes who had signed the Treaty of Prairie du Chien agreed to this provision. In September 1836, William Clark negotiated his thirty-seventh, and last, treaty. Believing that if they remained in the state, more Indians would be killed, he convinced the Ioway, Missouri Sac and Fox, Oto, and Potawatomi to give up all claim to the Platte region in return for land in Kansas and Nebraska. In an ironic twist of fate, the federal troops from

[132]R. David Edmunds, *The Potawatomis, Keepers of the Fire* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978), 249-250; Combs, 266.

Leavenworth originally sent to protect the Indians in the Platte area, instead escorted them out of it. About 130 Ioway near Tarkio refused to leave and remained until 1840, when Nathan Boone and his militia forcibly evicted them. That same year Senator Linn petitioned and received from Congress compensation for the calling of two hundred mounted volunteers to confront the "troublesome" Indians in the Platte Purchase area.[133]

Although referred to as the Platte Purchase, it was the federal government that paid the parting Indians a lump sum rather than the state. In 1837, newly elected president Martin Van Buren officially proclaimed the region as part of Missouri. This border change was an odd occurrence in American history; an existing state, already one of the largest at the time, expanded its borders. Coinciding with this states' rights victory, the final triumph of complete expulsion of all Indians from Missouri was nearly complete. Besides a few small pockets of Indian settlements, some Indians continued to hunt within the borders as allowed in individual treaties, others crossed the border to trade, and occasionally tribes from forced migration rested within the borders. The last state-sponsored threat of violence against the Natives occurred in 1838. Newly elected Governor Lilburn Boggs, who like his predecessor Dunklin was a firm Jacksonian, reacted to rumors of attacks in 1837 and 1838, and sent militia to southern Missouri. The troops discovered Osage, Shawnee, and Delaware Indians engaging in their legal rights to hunt in the Ozarks. The white locals, however, dubbed the activity as the "Osage War." The militia rounded up all the Native hunters they could find, escorted them at gunpoint

[133]Combs, 269-270, 272; John W. Hall, *Uncommon Defense; Indian Allies in the Black Hawk War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), 258; Olsen, 118-119; Hall, 81-82; Buckley, 227; McCandless, 117; Edmunds, 251-254; U.S. Congress, *Documents Relating to the Claims of Wallis and Arthur, and Others, for Compensation for rations furnished to, and the use of wagons, etc. by the Missouri volunteers, who were called into service of the United States for 18 days in 1836, against Sac and Iowa Indians,* 26th Congress, 1st Session (Washington: Blair & Rives, 1840).

to the border, and warned them never to return. As for the Cherokee, in the process of traveling along the "Trail of Tears," a few crossed into Missouri in November 1837, followed by thousands more in the winter of 1838-1839, whereupon they were almost immediately forced to slog across the snow-packed landscape into Kansas and Oklahoma. The Cherokee was not the only tribe forcibly marched across Missouri that winter. Evicted from their homes in Indiana en route to Kansas, nearly one thousand Potawatomis left nearly forty dead, mostly women and children, during their journey across the state. President Van Buren hailed removal as humane since it was in everyone's best interest to separate the two races, in order to give Indians time to progress toward civilization.[134]

What had begun as Jefferson's grand solution to solve the problems arising from the cohabitation of aboriginal peoples alongside an industrializing, nationalistic, slave-holding society had failed. Rapid American immigration into Missouri, economic and political factors, fear of violence, and racism ensured the vanquishing of the Jeffersonian Ideal of eventual peaceful assimilation and voluntary removal. To those who accepted the Jacksonian solutions, Indians were obstacles in the way of achieving the goal of Manifest Destiny. While the Federal government struggled with finding a workable solution that best served national interests, Missourians accomplished a *de facto* expulsion of Indians from their state.

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[134]Combs, 265, 273; Olsen, 118; McCandless, 55-56, 97, 101; Buckley, 227-228; Joan Gilbert, *The Trail of Tears across Missouri* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1996), 56, 60; Shirley Willard, "Death at Jackson County's Doorstep: Potawatomi 'Trail of Death' crossed Jackson County," *The Jackson County Historical Society Journal*, v. 48, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 8; Major L. Wilson, *The Presidency of Martin Van Buren* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1984), 186-187.

Chapter 6: Conclusion

Why did the Great Spirit ever send the whites…to drive us from our homes and introduce among us poisonous liquors, disease, and death? How smooth must be the language of the whites, when they can make right look wrong and wrong look right.
Black Hawk, Sac War Chief, 1833.[135]

By 1838, practically all Native Americans had left Missouri, some voluntarily, but many others by threat of force. Privatization of the fur trade had eliminated the dependence on Indians to supply that particular commodity. Most Natives were unable to adjust to the changing economic realities created by an industrializing economy. The explosion of a white population who had reached 383,702 by 1840 rapidly overwhelmed the remaining hundreds of Indians in Missouri during the 1830s, enabling the final stages of expulsion to proceed quickly and relatively cheaply.[136] Although inter-tribal violence and raids on white settlements had ended years earlier, the image of the bloodthirsty "savage" was too ingrained upon the imaginations of the populous for the majority of Missourians to accept co-existence. It was President Jackson's change in policy, however, that enabled the state government to achieve its goal of complete expulsion.

Indian removal in Missouri was a clear example of the triumph of states' rights and the Jacksonian Ideal of forced removal and separation. Beginning with President Jefferson, the federal government had designated the state as the permanent home for Eastern tribes. Local residents, however, refused to accept cohabitation and forced the national government to relocate tribes further west. Missourians also demanded the addition of territory outside of their federally mandated borders. President Van Buren granted their wish, despite the fact the land belonged to several Indian nations.

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[135]Black Hawk, 305, 867.

[136]United States Census Bureau. http://www.census.gov/; accessed 7/14/12.

Missourians accomplished the expulsion not in spite of, but because of, support from the federal government, especially President Jackson.

Ironically, the peace and prosperity gained from the Native American diaspora was only temporary. Soon it was replaced by an even more violent racial problem, that of slavery. As the debate over human bondage tore the nation apart, the fate of the Indians grew less and less important to white society with each passing decade. During the Civil War, more than twenty thousand Indians served in the armies and navies of both the North and South.[137] Although the majority fought for the South, there was no victory even for those who remained loyal to the Union. The result of that bloody debate culminated in 1865 with a constitutional guarantee of citizenship for former slaves, followed soon after with the triumph of the vote. While the Jim Crow laws blunted much of this victory and blacks had a second-class status forced upon them, they were at least legal residents. The Fourteenth Amendment granted citizenship to any person born in or naturalized to the United States, but this guarantee did not apply to the indigenous population.[138] Universal citizenship for Indians did not occur until 1924.[139]

After 1840, Missourians no longer had to concern themselves with Native Americans, and, except for the names of geographic locations, even the memory of Indian residency faded. Of the nearly two-dozen Indian tribes who lived or hunted in the state, almost all relocated to Kansas, Nebraska, and especially Oklahoma. Some Indians, living on the eastern border of Kansas, occasionally traded or co-mingled in Missouri.

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[137]Laurence M. Hauptman, *Between Two Fires: American Indians in the Civil War* (New York: The Free Press, 1995), x.

[138]Fourteenth Amendment, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/amend1.asp#13 (accessed 2 February 2013).

[139]U. S. Congress, *An Act to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to issue certificates of citizenship to Indians* (Sixty-Eighth Congress, 1st Session, 1924).

During the 1840s and 1850s, members of the Shawnee, Delaware, Wyandot, and Potawatomi tribes were not an unusual sight in Clay and Jackson County, especially at the trading center in Westport. By the time of the Civil War, however, Indians faced arrest if they entered the state.[140] As the division over slavery increased, tensions on the Missouri-Kansas border exploded into bloodshed. Although most Native Americans along the border tried to avoid involvement in the slavery issue, whites on both sides of the issue agreed that they did not want Indians in the area, forcing some nations to migrate further west or south to Oklahoma.

After the treaties of 1825, most remaining Missouri Osage moved to Kansas. In 1839, the Arkansas band joined them, reuniting a people split from the time of the American Revolution. While retaining mineral rights to their lands in Kansas, by 1870, the majority of Osage lived in Oklahoma, resisting attempts at "civilization" for decades. They were the last tribe to give up exclusive settlement rights to their reservation in Oklahoma in 1906, which cleared the way for the territory to become a state. Oil was discovered on Osage land in Kansas in 1907, and up until World War II, the 2,229 remaining members of the tribe were among the wealthiest people in the nation. By mid-century, however, the fortune had largely vanished, much of it swindled from them by unscrupulous investors.[141]

Of the Americans who struggled to fulfill President Jefferson's vision of Indian integration into white society, most found their services no longer needed during the Jackson administration. George Sibley, former administrator of the Fort Osage factory, and his wife Mary, moved to St. Charles and founded the Linden Wood School for Girls,

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[140]Bowes, 107-108.

[141]Wolferman, 105-107; Burns, 165; Wilson, 36-37, 59, 62-63, 84.

later known as Lindenwood University.[142] Pierre Chouteau, the main liaison and interpreter between the Osage and white Americans continued his involvement in the fur trade. He owned slaves of Native American descent but was sued by one of them for her freedom, which eventually led to the ending of Indian slavery in Missouri in 1838. He died at the age of ninety in 1849.[143] Jackson dismissed Thomas L. McKenney as Superintendent of Indian Trade for publically disagreeing with the president's removal policies. He went on to co-author the three-volume ethnography *History of the Indian Tribes of North America,* considered one of the major works on Indian studies in the nineteenth century. He died in 1859.[144]

William Clark, the man who authored almost all of the Indian treaties in Missouri, finally left public service in the 1830s to become a banker. Most Native Americans who lived in or travelled through Missouri, however, still held Clark in the highest esteem. Most called him "Father," or "Sandy-haired Father." Only presidents, called the "Great Father," received more respect. Clark's fame even spread to Europe, and more than one traveler stopped at St. Louis to visit him and gaze upon his collection of hundreds of Native American artifacts. He did not live long past his last treaty and died in St. Louis in September of 1838.[145]

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[142]For more information, see Kristie C. Wolferman, *The Indomitable Mary Easton Sibley, Pioneer of Women's Education in Missouri* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2008).

[143]For more information, see Shirley Christian, *Before Lewis and Clark: the Story of the Chouteaus, the French Dynasty that Ruled America's Frontier* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004).

[144]For more information, see Herman J. Viola, *Thomas L. McKenney: Architect of America's Early Indian Policy: 1816-1830* (Chicago: Sage Books, 1974).

[145]Buckley, 182; Murray, 236-237; Aron, 210.

Missouri remained among the most populous and pivotal states west of the Mississippi in the *ante bellum* period. As the crossroads of the nation, there are influences and cultures from all over the world within its borders. Besides the names of some natural landmarks, however, little remains of the Native civilizations. Most North American tribes relied upon an oral tradition to pass on knowledge, history, traditions, and ceremonies. Over the centuries, decimation by disease, forced removal, alcoholism, and white suppression of Native languages destroyed countless lifetimes of accumulated wisdom. Even among modern scholars, many historians disdain or overlook oral history as unreliable. Unless this attitude is changed, humanity runs the risk of the loss of even more Native American culture. Only more study and attention devoted to the history of indigenous cultures can avoid the loss of the remnant that has survived.

The interaction between Indians and white immigrants shaped the formation of Missouri, which in turn influenced the idea of Manifest Destiny and the settlement of the Great Plains. The ability to outmaneuver federal policy concerning the Indians may even have influenced locals, not just in Missouri but across the South, to stand firm on the issue of the states' right to determine the issue of slavery. Even the violent interaction between Natives and Americans further west after the Civil War was a reflection of the actions and policies originating in states such as Missouri. By understanding the changes in attitude, policy, and reality in Missouri, historians may gain greater insight into the westward movement that helped shape the larger American history.

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