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. 2020 Apr 21;117(16):8804-8812.
doi: 10.1073/pnas.1918128117. Epub 2020 Apr 6.

The European Union Emissions Trading System reduced CO2 emissions despite low prices

Affiliations

The European Union Emissions Trading System reduced CO2 emissions despite low prices

Patrick Bayer et al. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. .

Abstract

International carbon markets are an appealing and increasingly popular tool to regulate carbon emissions. By putting a price on carbon, carbon markets reshape incentives faced by firms and reduce the value of emissions. How effective are carbon markets? Observers have tended to infer their effectiveness from market prices. The general belief is that a carbon market needs a high price in order to reduce emissions. As a result, many observers remain skeptical of initiatives such as the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), whose price remained low (compared to the social cost of carbon). In this paper, we assess whether the EU ETS reduced [Formula: see text] emissions despite low prices. We motivate our study by documenting that a carbon market can be effective if it is a credible institution that can plausibly become more stringent in the future. In such a case, firms might cut emissions even though market prices are low. In fact, low prices can be a signal that the demand for carbon permits weakens. Thus, low prices are compatible with successful carbon markets. To assess whether the EU ETS reduced carbon emissions even as permits were cheap, we estimate counterfactual carbon emissions using an original sectoral emissions dataset. We find that the EU ETS saved about 1.2 billion tons of [Formula: see text] between 2008 and 2016 (3.8%) relative to a world without carbon markets, or almost half of what EU governments promised to reduce under their Kyoto Protocol commitments. Emission reductions in sectors covered under the EU ETS were higher.

Keywords: EU ETS; carbon markets; policy evaluation; synthetic control.

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Conflict of interest statement

The authors declare no competing interest.

Figures

Fig. 1.
Fig. 1.
Cost of 1 ton of CO2 in the EU ETS, 2005 to 2016. The plot shows EU Allowance (EUA) settlement prices in future markets for permits of December 2007 (blue), December 2012 (yellow), and December 2016 (gray) maturities. The dashed vertical lines mark trading periods. As permits could not be carried forward from the first into the second trading period, prices dropped to 0 by December 2007. Source: Intercontinental Exchange (ICE Futures Europe), accessed through Quandl (CZ2007, CZ2012, and CZ2016).
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2.
Effect of the EU ETS over time. (Top) The mean CO2 emissions paths for actual (black line) and counterfactual (yellow line) emissions. (Bottom) The estimated ATT of the EU ETS (blue line) and bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (gray area). The thin and thick black lines mark years 2005 (start of pilot period) and 2008 (start of second trading period).
Fig. 3.
Fig. 3.
Effect of the EU ETS on different sectors covered under the EU ETS. The plots show the mean ATT estimate of the EU ETS (blue line) and bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (gray area) for four sectors: (Top Left) energy, (Top Right) metals, (Bottom Left) minerals, and (Bottom Right) chemicals. The thin and thick black lines mark years 2005 and 2008 for the start of the EU ETS pilot period and the second trading period, respectively.

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