The Cold War and Historical 'What-Ifs' (2): The Three Kingdoms of the US, Russia, and China
I thought about including this in the event article with Masayuki Ienaga, but I decided it was a bit too much of a piggyback, so I put it in a separate piece.
In connection with the streaming program with Masanori Tsujita, the historical 'what-if' game I previously covered, 'Twilight Struggle: Turn Zero,' also includes a theme on the Chinese Civil War. The effect of the outcome most favorable to the US side is:
・The US promptly supports Chiang Kai-shek, and the Kuomintang maintains a stronghold on the Chinese mainland.
・The Soviet Union cannot use the '(Communist) China card' in the first turn.
・The US places 3 influence in Taiwan and controls it.
・Furthermore, Taiwan is permanently considered a major country and scores points at every scoring phase.
・The weak 'US-China Mutual Defense Treaty' card is replaced by the powerful 'Kuomintang China' card (header photo).
It is a staggering effect.
The (Communist) China card has an influence of 5 when used in the Asian region, but the 'Kuomintang China' card, while more limited in use, can be effectively equivalent to 6, making it just as strong. Perhaps the image is that the Nationalist government in Taiwan becomes not just an anti-communist bastion, but an anti-communist 'command center.'
Conversely, if the outcome is most unfavorable to the US (i.e., favorable to the Soviet Union), the Sino-Soviet relationship becomes solidified as an 'Iron Alliance,' and the card for the Ussuri River conflict (which occurred in 1969 in actual history), which is key to the US staging a comeback in Asia from the mid-game, is removed from the game. In other words, a fictional Cold War history where the Sino-Soviet split never happens unfolds.
Thinking about this scenario is important now, precisely in the world outside the game. While there is talk of a Sino-Russian rapprochement in the wake of the Ukraine war, what if the 1970s–2000s, when China and Russia were (roughly speaking) 'separated,' was actually an exceptional period in modern history?
Many call Kissinger, who orchestrated the US-China rapprochement in 1971–72, a 'diplomatic genius,' but the assessment of Masataka Kosaka, generally considered the representative pro-American intellectual of postwar Japan, was surprisingly cold. In his 1981 book, 'When Civilizations Decline,' he wrote that after the outcome of the Vietnam War was settled, the Soviet Union (Russia) had the upper hand in external expansion, and the US only moved to incorporate China because it had lost the ability to face China and Russia simultaneously.
In the lecture 'The Twentieth Century as History' (1990), which was published this month and has become a topic of discussion, the assessment of the US 'victory' is also dispassionate. From the mid-70s, the Soviet Union betrayed the promises of détente and began a reckless military expansion policy, and in response, the US also expanded its armaments under the Reagan administration in the 80s. The view is that as a result of such meaningless competition, the Soviet economy simply gave out first, and in fact, the US was also quite worn down.The Twentieth Century as History even.
Kosaka even states that it would have been 'far better' (p. 147) if the disarmament under détente in the early 70s had been maintained and the national fortunes of both the US and the Soviet Union had progressed stably, rather than the dramatic end of the Cold War that actually occurred. The 'victory' of the Cold War, which seemed to prove American supremacy, may have simply been a 'lucky break' caused by the Soviet Union (Russia) falling out with China and misjudging the scale of armaments it should have had.
This is the kind of thing that makes historians dislike me for, but I personally believe that the act of 'verifying' facts that occurred in the past no longer has any meaning in itself. The meaning of history is not to establish descriptions that will never be overturned for all eternity, but rather to relativize the scales of value that were assumed to be absolutely unchangeable. There is no era that makes me feel this more keenly than now, as the post-Cold War world order, which was supposed to be a self-evident premise, crumbles away.
Postscript (December 1st)
On the very day I happened to publish this article, the news of Mr. Kissinger's passing came in, and I was very surprised. Of course, memorial articles will inevitably lean toward reporting on his 'greatness,' so I hope this serves as a record that there were also 'colder perspectives' (not just my hindsight) from the time.