Do Proper Names Not Exist?

In this paper, I will present the conclusion that proper names do not exist. The basis for this is that although proper names should be distinguished from mere noise or meaningless strings of symbols, they lack a definitive characterization to make such a distinction. I will explain this below.

Propositions and Modality

First, as a preface, I will explain propositions. A proposition is a statement that has a truth value, either true or false. A statement is composed of a subject and a predicate, such as 'S is P.' For example, 'Socrates is white' is a statement. Furthermore, 'Socrates is white' is also a proposition. This is because one can ask whether 'Socrates is white' matches the fact that Socrates is white. Being able to ask whether it matches a fact is what we call 'having a truth value.' On the other hand, 'is white Socrates' is not a Japanese sentence, so its truth or falsity cannot be questioned (= it has no truth value). Also, 'Stand up!' or 'Is Paris burning?' are sentences, but they are not propositions. This is because they are in the imperative or interrogative form, which is not a format whose truth or falsity can be questioned.

I have confirmed the definition that a proposition is something that has a truth value. In this provision, whether the content of the proposition is simply reality (fact), necessarily true, contingently true, or impossible (necessarily false) is undefined and irrelevant. In other words, it can be said that a proposition is a sentence that has meaning (= truth value) regardless of how the content of the proposition is evaluated from the perspective of possibility (= modally).

Proper Names and Referents

Next, I will focus on proper names. A proper name (for example, a proper noun like 'Joe Biden' in everyday language) is merely noise if it does not have a referential relationship with its referent. Therefore, if noise that is not a word is mixed into a sentence, that sentence does not have a truth value. In other words, a sentence containing such noise would not be a proposition.

Here, proper names seem at first glance to presuppose the (actual) existence of a referent. This is because if the referent does not (actually) exist, the proper name fails in its characteristic function of reference, misses the referent, and seems to become nothing more than noise or a string of symbols.

Our Intuition Regarding Proper Names

However, on the other hand, 'Shakespeare,' who no longer exists, and 'Sherlock Holmes,' who is a fictional character and never existed in history, are perfectly accepted as proper names in reality. This is because this aligns with our intuition. That is, we are actually able to use these proper nouns without any problems and without agonizing over philosophical matters.

Therefore, if we follow everyday intuition, we must say that proper names like 'Shakespeare' or 'Holmes' function without trouble even without presupposing the actual existence of a referent, and that sentences containing such proper names have the status of propositions (= have truth values).

Pure Proper Names?

If so, how should we think about the positioning of proper names and the mechanism of their meaning?

If we consider, for example, what a 'pure' proper name is, we can list several characteristics. (1) First, a proper name transcends the characteristics (intension, concept) of the referent. This is because, for example, even if the town of Dartmouth ceased to exist at the mouth of the Dartmouth River, it would continue to be called Dartmouth; thus, proper names are used independently of the state of the object.

(2) Next, as can be seen from the example of 'Shakespeare,' a proper name can fulfill its referential function regardless of whether it is present or absent, whether it is right in front of us and can be pointed to.

(3) Furthermore, as can be seen from the example of 'Holmes,' proper names transcend existence and non-existence.

And finally, (4) fourth, proper names also transcend modality (possibility/impossibility).

In other words, a 'pure' proper name would exist independently of the existence, modality, and concepts (characterization, intension, definition) of the referent. Yet, it must still be clearly distinguished from mere noise or mere strings of symbols. This is because we almost never agonize over whether sentences or texts containing proper nouns are meaningless.

However, looking at it this way, since a 'proper name' ultimately coincides with noise or a string of symbols itself, it becomes impossible to distinguish despite the fact that it must be distinguished. If so, could it be that it can no longer be called a part of language? In other words, might it be that proper names do not actually exist?