The Basis of Maneuver Warfare is Making Decisions Ahead of the Enemy: Lind's Tactical Considerations

When military researchers analyze combat, they sometimes contrast the characteristics of attrition warfare with those of maneuver warfare. Attrition warfare is a method of fighting that involves systematically employing personnel and equipment according to pre-established plans, reliably concentrating combat power, and accumulating results; whereas maneuver warfare can be described as a method of fighting that involves operating units rapidly and agilely, responding immediately to changes in the situation while allowing for deviations from the plan.

However, the term "maneuver" in the military concept of maneuver warfare does not only mean the movement of units; it also implies the strategy of skillfully deceiving the enemy. There is a school of thought that emphasizes the latter, arguing that the essence of maneuver warfare does not lie in the movement of units. For example, William S. Lind argued in his Maneuver Warfare Handbook (1985) that the key to practicing maneuver warfare is to occupy the position of initiative.

The foundation upon which Lind develops his theory of maneuver warfare in his work is a model proposed by a military officer named John Boyd. Boyd emphasized the importance of viewing the time a commander spends making any decision during combat as a cost of unit action. In his model, a commander's decision-making is explained as starting from Observation of the situation, followed by Orientation, Decision, and Action, before returning to the initial observation, and is named the OODA loop. It is believed that the more time required to complete this cycle, the more likely a unit's actions will lag behind changes in the situation.

Lind considered the essence of maneuver warfare to be executing the OODA loop faster than the enemy, and he argued that to achieve this, it is necessary to shift the military toward a more decentralized organization. The more centralized an organization becomes, the more units deployed on the front lines must coordinate with adjacent units and follow the combat guidance of higher-level units, which inevitably slows down the OODA loop.

Thorough reporting and communication before taking action can be understood as an attempt to pursue certainty on an uncertain battlefield, but Lind points out that unless lower-level unit commanders are allowed to act based on their own judgment, one cannot surpass the enemy in the speed of the OODA loop.

Of course, Lind did not simply argue that maneuver warfare could be conducted by promoting the decentralization of the military. This is because the difficulty of conducting maneuver warfare lies in securing a large number of commanders who have mastered the tactics of small units such as platoons and companies. This is a major challenge for military education and training, and Lind argued that there is a need to review the U.S. Marine Corps' education system.

He argued that a culture that values creative thinking must be introduced through military education, and he specifically proposed actively incorporating military history and wargaming, and having lieutenants commanding platoons understand the operation of a battalion. This is because if they do not understand how a battalion is moving in combat, they cannot understand how they should act when leading a platoon.

Of course, there is no need to change the content of education and training regarding the use of firearms or map reading, which are useful in any situation, but Lind argued that quite significant changes are necessary in the way combat training is conducted.

Since the principle of maneuver warfare as Lind sees it is to cycle the OODA loop faster than the enemy, even if an enemy position can be captured through an assault, it is not permitted to report to higher-level units and wait for the next order there. Commanders at each level are required to act with initiative and autonomy so that they can exploit success as much as possible within the scope of their respective authority.

Header image: U.S. Department of Defense

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