What Was Cold War Nuclear Strategist Bernard Brodie Thinking?

American researcher Bernard Brodie (1910–1978) was a researcher who achieved significant results in the study of nuclear strategy and is highly regarded, particularly for his analysis of deterrence. While he is well-known among researchers specializing in security in Japan, his books have never been published in Japanese translation.

Therefore, in this article, I would like to introduce Brodie's representative works, "The Absolute Weapon" and "Strategy in the Missile Age," to explain what kind of strategic thinker he was.

"The Absolute Weapon" (1946)

"The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order" is not a single-authored book by Brodie, but it contains two papers that develop his nuclear strategy theory. It was written just weeks after the United States used atomic bombs against Japan in 1945. It was not only a timely study that forced many researchers to consider the military significance of the atomic bomb, but it also accurately predicted the future development of world affairs.

When an atomic bomb is dropped from a bomber onto a city, it is technically impossible to defend that city; all facilities and assets are destroyed, and many residents are killed or injured. Brodie foresaw that weapons with such capabilities would likely spread not only to the United States but to countries around the world within a few years. He believed that even if only a few bombs fell into the hands of other countries, the United States would no longer have a strategic advantage, even if it possessed a large number of atomic bombs. This is because, even if one has more atomic bombs than the enemy, it is impossible to protect cities from them.

Based on this understanding, Brodie proposed separating the operation of nuclear weapons from conventional weapons, positioning them as weapons for deterrence, and placing them under a special operational system. In Brodie's view, nuclear weapons should not be used by units like other conventional weapons. This is because, to achieve the goal of deterrence, it is necessary to maintain a posture that ensures retaliation even after receiving a nuclear attack from an enemy country. For this, it is essential to establish a highly reliable command and control system separate from the units that operate conventional weapons, and to disperse deployments to increase the survivability of nuclear weapons.

This was a highly visionary argument, showing that Brodie correctly identified the direction in which nuclear strategy would develop at that time. Incidentally, his prediction that nuclear weapons would proliferate globally was proven correct by the Soviet nuclear test RDS-1 three years later in 1949.

"Strategy in the Missile Age" (1959)

Brodie further advanced his research on nuclear strategy in "Strategy in the Missile Age" (1959). In this work, he discusses the air strategy of the Italian military officer Douhet to point out the limitations of conventional strategic research. Douhet proposed the concept of strategic bombing, which would force an early surrender by intensively conducting air attacks on the political and economic centers of enemy countries, and predicted that in future wars, the outcome would be decided by an air force independent of the army or navy.

Although Douhet's strategic concept had a significant impact on U.S. military air operations in World War II, Brodie states that it cannot be evaluated as having had a decisive influence on the outcome of the war. Furthermore, Douhet's strategic concept had limitations in that it did not anticipate a world situation where nuclear weapons had proliferated. Brodie's argument from "The Absolute Weapon" that nuclear weapons must be positioned as weapons of deterrence is repeated in this work, and concerns are raised about the bias towards the offensive that characterized traditional strategic thought.

What is necessary to achieve deterrence is not the ability to attack, but the ability to defend. In particular, measures such as placing counter-attack units on early warning alert and civil defense measures, such as issuing warnings to citizens in target areas to encourage evacuation and increase their chances of survival, are considered important. Brodie acknowledges that there is a significant possibility that deterrence could fail. This is because when using nuclear weapons, the belligerent that launches a first strike ahead of the enemy gains a tremendous advantage.

However, if one tries to prevent the opponent from gaining the advantage of a first strike, it becomes difficult to stabilize U.S.-Soviet relations, and in the worst case, it was predicted that both sides would be destroyed in a nuclear war. Therefore, Brodie's position was that it is necessary to solve the problem by improving defense and counter-attack capabilities without showing aggressive intent. This can be said to be the basic idea of modern nuclear strategy.

Since the PDF file can be downloaded from the RAND Corporation, I will also provide a link to it.

Summary

Brodie opposed wars involving the unlimited use of nuclear weapons and strongly urged that the direction of U.S. military nuclear strategy be reconsidered to achieve deterrence. Research on nuclear strategy continued to focus on deterrence thereafter, but Brodie's theories were referenced as important research findings.

The details are examined by Barry H. Steiner (1991) in "Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy." This work delves into what kind of strategic thought Brodie held and also mentions that he highly valued Clausewitz's military thought.

• Steiner, B. H. (1991). Bernard Brodie and the Foundations of American Nuclear Strategy. University Press of Kansas.

Related Articles