Can the outcome of war be predicted? Three reasons why Clausewitz was skeptical

When a war breaks out, people try to predict its outcome using various methods, but the 19th-century Prussian military officer Carl von Clausewitz believed that predicting the outcome of war was an extremely difficult endeavor. There are three main reasons for this.

The outcome of war changes due to differences in the political situation

First, Clausewitz argues that in war, the wills of the enemy and one's own side interact, and the result is something that fluctuates depending on the political situation. For example, even if a war were repeated twice between the same belligerents, the public's reaction to them could be completely different depending on the circumstances. For this reason, Clausewitz also argues that it is necessary to pay attention to the characteristics of the people.

This is because the outcome of a war is considered to vary significantly depending on which belligerent's military actions the public supports (see On War, Book 1, Chapter 1, Section 10). If the public is more active, energetic, and vigorous in their cooperation with the war effort, and in some cases adopts a form of fighting like a nation-in-arms, there is a risk that the scope of the war will expand, even if the military forces used between the states appear minimal on the surface (for a strategic perspective on the nation-in-arms, see the previous article "What are the conditions for the success of irregular warfare? Introducing Clausewitz's analysis").

War never goes exactly as planned

Military scholars call the nature of war, where it never proceeds exactly as planned, friction. Clausewitz, who first proposed this concept, stated that physical danger and fatigue are important causes of friction, but he also pointed out the incompleteness of information in a state of war.

Clausewitz explains that this does not simply mean a lack of information. In other words, in a state of war, accurate and inaccurate information become intertwined, so no one knows which information to select to gain a correct understanding. Clausewitz explains that in war, illusions frequently occur, such as objects appearing very large or strange when viewed in the dark.

Furthermore, Clausewitz points out that people plagued by fear have a psychological tendency to believe in the bad aspects of things rather than the good, and states that this causes a tsunami of information regarding danger (see Book 1, Chapter 6). When examined one by one, friction appears to be a trivial phenomenon with only a very small impact, but in actual war, countless frictions occur simultaneously, making it necessary to revise plans many times during the war.

Chance, not necessity, governs war

Clausewitz emphasizes that chance is the very essence of war. Human actions in war are always taken with risk in mind. Making appropriate judgments in such situations is difficult, and commanders are forced to rely on their common sense, experience, or intuition. Clausewitz acknowledges that relying on probability is one possibility for dealing with contingency, but he believed that "nothing strictly mathematical" provides a firm foundation for the actual art of war (Book 1, Chapter 1, Sections 20 and 21).

Rather, the foundation for action in such situations is courage, which Clausewitz considers a quality for maintaining the ability to act in a war governed by chance (How did Clausewitz analyze courage in war?). A mediocre commander can barely reach the correct conclusion when keeping a distance from danger and responsibility and imagining the war situation in a war room, but once the war situation moves and their own troops are driven into a dangerous situation, they do not know what to do in an uncertain situation and become unable to make the necessary decisions (see Book 3, Chapter 6).

Summary

Following Clausewitz's views, I have explained how war can lead to unexpected results due to the influence of three elements: politics, friction, and chance, but this does not mean he thought every aspect of war was unpredictable.

Clausewitz believed that predicting the outcome of war as a whole was difficult, but for example, in tactical analysis regarding combat, he emphasized the importance of gaining superiority in force ratio over the enemy by concentrating troops. This is consistent with his recognition that it is relatively easier to build theories in the realm of tactics than in strategy.

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