Whether the balance of power can be overturned in war depends on the choice of strategy: An introduction to 'How the Weak Win Wars'

It is often assumed that military superiority directly translates into an advantage in war. However, strictly speaking, this is a flawed assumption. There have been cases where even a belligerent with overwhelming military capability has been forced into unexpected struggles or, in the worst-case scenario, forced to retreat.

Ivan Arreguin-Toft is a researcher who proposed a theory to systematically explain such phenomena. His book, 'How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict (2005), is the result of his research, which clarifies that the influence of strategy must be taken into account to explain why the outcome of a war sometimes cannot be explained by the superiority or inferiority of capabilities.

According to the author's theory, the important factor determining the outcome of a war is not the capability of each country, but the strategy that dictates how that capability is employed. Moreover, the effectiveness of that strategy changes depending on the type of strategy chosen by both the enemy and the ally. In other words, even if it succeeds in one case, there is no guarantee that the same strategy will have the same effect in another.

To explain the interaction of strategies, the author proposes categorizing a wide variety of strategies, such as blitzkrieg, war of attrition, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism, into two types: direct strategies and indirect strategies. A direct strategy is one that aims to reduce the enemy's combat power through physical killing and destruction, and can be understood as strategic action primarily involving regular forces. An indirect strategy is one that aims to lower the enemy's will to fight through psychological effects, and can be understood as strategic action primarily involving irregular forces, or guerrillas.

Based on this typology of strategies, the author argues the following: If both the attacker and the defender adopt a direct strategy, or if both adopt an indirect strategy, it is considered that the superiority or inferiority of military capability will directly determine the outcome of the war. This is because in such a war, each capability produces the intended effect, making it a simple power game. However, if only one of the attacker or defender chooses a direct strategy while the other chooses an indirect strategy, military superiority does not immediately lead to victory.

For example, let us consider a situation where the defender's forces engage in guerrilla warfare, repeatedly carrying out hit-and-run attacks against enemy units and disrupting rear support units. Against a defender that adopts such a fighting style, even if the attacker's forces aim for physical killing and destruction, it is difficult to capture the target itself, and even if they can be found, the scale of enemy units that can be destroyed in a single attack is limited. The attacker will be forced to continue a long-term war and will have to bear costs higher than initially predicted. To avoid this situation, the attacker also needs to switch their strategy from a direct strategy to an indirect strategy, but the author points out that this is not easy for political reasons.

For an attacker to adopt an indirect strategy means entering into counter-guerrilla warfare, where they must not only be prepared to sacrifice many personnel but also be willing to involve civilians as collateral damage. There are various reasons why the United States could not pursue a military victory in the Vietnam War despite possessing overwhelming military power, but the author interprets the humanitarian issues of this counter-guerrilla warfare as a major constraint. Operations that would allow for many casualties on both sides and involve numerous civilians as collateral damage in order to capture and destroy enemy units in guerrilla warfare in Vietnam were unacceptable to the U.S. government.

To verify the validity of his theory, the author conducted a quantitative analysis using data obtained from 1816 to 2003 and a qualitative analysis based on case studies. The results support the idea that weak forces can counter the direct strategies of powerful forces with indirect strategies, but I think it is necessary to emphasize that indirect strategies are not omnipotent. The author assumes that it is difficult for a major power to adopt an indirect strategy, but if an attacker commits overwhelming military force and embarks on a violent and destructive counter-guerrilla war, the outcome of the war should be determined by the superiority or inferiority of military capability.

The author states that for about 78% of the war cases investigated in the quantitative analysis, the belligerents did not switch strategies during the war. While there is room for debate regarding the content of this quantitative evaluation, even if this percentage were appropriate, readers should pay attention to the fact that the opposite possibility is by no means small. If there is a 22% probability that an attacker using overwhelming force will switch their strategy from a direct strategy to an indirect strategy, it is predicted that the defender will not only be forced into a tough fight but that a serious humanitarian crisis will occur.

Header image: U.S. Department of Defense

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