Paper Review: Democratic Developed Countries Tend to Prefer Maneuver Warfare Over Attrition Warfare

States attempt to choose the optimal strategy based on their respective domestic and international circumstances. Therefore, the content of strategies varies from country to country, and in a strict sense, no two are exactly the same. However, even if the time periods or regions differ, if there is a certain degree of consistency in conditions, there should be similarities in the direction and tendencies of the strategies chosen. This was clarified through a quantitative approach in the paper by Dan Reiter and Curtis Meek, "Determinants of Military Strategy, 1903–1994".

Dan Reiter, Curtis Meek, Determinants of Military Strategy, 1903–1994: A Quantitative Empirical Test, International Studies Quarterly, Volume 43, Issue 2, June 1999, pp. 363–387, https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00124

The purpose of this study is to identify the factors that influence the choice of strategy, particularly military strategy. While there are countless forms of strategy, to simplify the discussion, the authors use three typologies: maneuver warfare, attrition warfare, and punishment strategy.

Maneuver warfare is, as the name implies, a strategy that relies on maneuver, characterized by significant depth in operational activities within a theater of war. In an offensive, it involves penetrating deep behind enemy lines, bypassing defensive positions, and cutting off enemy units from their bases, lines of communication, and command posts. Attrition warfare is a strategy that relies on defeating the enemy, placing greater emphasis on outmatching the enemy in terms of unit size rather than maneuver.

The final category, punishment strategy, is a strategy that aims to lower the enemy's will to fight over time, which includes strategic bombing of political and economic centers and guerrilla warfare conducted by irregular forces. Although maneuver warfare is considered to have superior combat efficiency, it is known that only a small number of states actually adopted maneuver warfare in the 20th century, and explaining why states would choose a supposedly inefficient strategy has been a research challenge.

The authors state that there are multiple schools of theory explaining how states choose their strategies. One is realism, which suggests that states should choose a strategy that allows them to maximize their military capabilities, explaining that regarding military strategy, they choose the optimal one based on their own geographical characteristics. For example, it is thought that states engaging in combat in flat, featureless terrain would prioritize the choice of maneuver warfare.

Alternatively, it is thought that states exposed to strong threats are more likely to adopt maneuver warfare. However, because mechanized units must be organized to execute maneuver warfare, it is likely easier for industrialized states to choose it. Since not only equipment but also personnel must be highly educated and trained, it is considered likely that states capable of procuring such human resources will choose maneuver warfare.

Another theory explaining a state's strategic choices emphasizes domestic political systems. Generally, the more democratic a political system is, the more politicians will seek to avoid fatal defeats to avoid domestic criticism. In a democracy, politicians do not need to fear military coups, and the fact that they do not need to unnecessarily restrict military operations for political surveillance also facilitates the adoption of maneuver warfare.

However, if the regime is authoritarian, politicians are not held accountable and are therefore irresponsible regarding the human and material losses caused by defeat. Furthermore, because authoritarian politicians fear military coups far more than public criticism, they tend to strengthen political control over the military, which tends to reduce combat efficiency. Therefore, from the perspective of this theory, it is thought that the more democratic a country is, the easier it is to choose maneuver warfare.

To verify the validity of these theoretical explanations, the authors coded the military strategies chosen by countries that existed between 1903 and 1994 and conducted a statistical analysis combining conditions such as terrain, economic development, and political systems. As a result, it was confirmed that there is a strong tendency for democratic, industrialized, developed countries to choose maneuver warfare.

This tendency is particularly strong when there is past experience with war, and it was found that organizational learning makes it easier to choose maneuver warfare. The degree of external threats, the effects of terrain, and the level of military spending per soldier were also analyzed, but these were not found to be associated with the choice of strategy. The fact that there is no tendency for military regimes, where the military can exert significant influence on budget formulation and policy selection, to adopt maneuver warfare contradicts the view that the military has specific strategic preferences.

This study is important as an attempt to identify the factors influencing strategic choice through a quantitative approach. However, significant questions remain regarding the authors' method of categorizing strategies. In the first place, the categorization of maneuver warfare, attrition warfare, and punishment strategy was used by Stam (1996), but the criteria for these distinctions are not very rigorous, and the authors' classification may not be very valid when individual cases are examined in detail.

Also, while the authors believe that maneuver warfare is the most highly efficient military strategy, it is known that mechanized armies are often at a disadvantage in irregular warfare, so I believe readers should also pay attention to this point (for example, see Paper Review: Why is it difficult for mechanized regular armies to suppress rebel forces?).

Although there are limitations to the authors' analysis, it is significant that they showed that the choice of military strategy may be made according to the characteristics of a country's political system rather than from the perspective of military efficiency. In particular, the finding that strategy is not swayed by the degree of threat suggests that domestic politics is more important for strategy formation than international politics.

Header Image: U.S. Department of Defense

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