Research Note: How does military science analyze decisive points?

A decisive pointis a geographic location that allows one to gain a significant advantage over an enemy. While some military literature considers when a decisive point occurs in the flow of time rather than in space, it is more common to discuss geographic locations; therefore, this explanation is limited to geographic decisive points.

First, in military science, there are two ways to analyze decisive points. The first is the method of Carl von Clausewitz, who sought to identify decisive points based on the degree of strategic influence, and the second is the method of Antoine-Henri Jomini, who emphasized classifying decisive points by their nature and form.

According to Clausewitz's method, to identify a decisive point, one must determine the enemy's center of gravity and identify the area that has a significant impact on that center of gravity (for more on the center of gravity, see What does the term 'center of gravity' mean in military science?; Paper Introduction: How did Warden change the concept of center of gravity analysis in strategic studies?). Usually, a decisive point is considered a location that offers an advantage in protecting one's own center of gravity or in striking the enemy's center of gravity. If the enemy's center of gravity is in the capital, then to strike that capital, one must occupy the surrounding defiles or high ground, which could be judged as decisive points.

However, according to Jomini's method, decisive points are divided into geographic decisive points and maneuver decisive points. Geographic decisive points are permanent because they are defined by the geographic features of the theater of operations, while maneuver decisive points appear temporarily based on the posture of friendly and enemy forces. For example, a junction of main roads could be a geographic decisive point, while a base of operations located in the enemy's rear could be a maneuver decisive point. Jomini's argument emphasizes the significance of maneuver decisive points, suggesting that forces should be employed in a direction that makes it possible to capture and destroy the enemy army in the theater of operations at once. It could be said that, unlike Clausewitz, political, economic, and social influences are not heavily considered.

Although these two differ, there are many points on which their views on the analysis of decisive points agree. That is the part where a decisive point is both an objective for operational action and likely to be an objective for tactical action. As military orders are issued and the level of employment shifts from strategy to operations and from operations to tactics, consistency is created in the actions of each unit by having all units focus their efforts on the decisive point.

Furthermore, both Clausewitz and Jomini proceed with their arguments under the assumption that a point is not worth calling a decisive point unless it has a significant ripple effect, and they agree that caution is required in making that judgment. This is because there have been many cases in actual operations where decisive points were misidentified, leading to incorrect employment. Clausewitz emphasized the danger of regarding high ground with no value as a decisive point and devoting all efforts to occupying it.

To avoid misidentification, it would be ideal to have some kind of comprehensive evaluation criteria to judge decisive points more clearly, but it is widely believed that such criteria would not be useful in practice even if they were created. The characteristics of theaters of operations vary widely, and it is not uncommon for experts to disagree on which locations can be called decisive points.

For example, in regions with temperate climates like Europe, where waterways and roads are spread throughout the interior, securing nodes in the transportation network over the long term can be said to have great strategic significance. However, in arid regions like the Sahara Desert, where logistical support is extremely difficult, it is inefficient to have units occupy nodes in transportation routes for long periods. Rather, holding onto a strategically worthless position may lead to the dispersion of forces, hindering effective employment. Thus, concentrating forces on a decisive point while ignoring the characteristics of the theater of operations can significantly reduce the efficiency of a strategy.

If one wishes to judge a decisive point, one must have a deep understanding of geography. Jomini believed that one could not cultivate a strategic eye without reading maps in detail, and he pointed out the importance of knowledge of transportation geography in particular. In fact, it is known that transportation geography is closely related to military geography, and Alfred Thayer Mahan analyzed that the superiority or inferiority of a nation in strategic action changed significantly depending on whether it could utilize maritime transportation.

Geographer Halford Mackinder developed an analysis that the importance of the Heartland, which corresponds to the interior of the Eurasian continent, increased dramatically due to the development of railways (for more on the Heartland, see Paper Introduction: Mackinder's Heartland theory was derived from the history of nomads; Research Note: Outside the Eurasian continent, there is another Heartland).

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