Note: The Reality of Large-Scale Intelligence Operations Conducted by the Soviet Union Against the United States During World War II

Previously, in a book review article titled "An Introduction to 'Pearl Harbor' (1962), Which Discussed the Difficulty of Removing Noise and Identifying True Signals in Intelligence Warfare," I mentioned that the intelligence evaluation the U.S. conducted on Japan suffered from the major problem of compartmentalized administration. It is now known that there were also significant issues regarding counter-intelligence, which is the aspect of preventing the adversary from obtaining critical information.

The co-authored book by John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, "Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America"(1999; Japanese translation 2010), is a research work that reveals the reality of Soviet intelligence operations against the U.S., based on the results of a Soviet code-breaking project initiated in 1943 with the authorization of Colonel Carter Clarke of the U.S. Army's Special Branch. At the time, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were allies sharing common enemies in Germany and Japan, but intelligence officers in the Special Branch received rumors that the Soviet Union was moving toward a separate peace with Germany and began the task of decrypting international telegrams that the Soviet Union was routing through the U.S. Decryption required an enormous amount of time and effort, and success was not achieved until 1946, after the war.

In other words, the code-breaking efforts did not contribute to the war effort in the end, but when the contents of diplomatic communications between the Soviet Consulate General in New York and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) were decrypted, they found evidence that the KGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate was operating numerous agents in the U.S. Because Soviet intelligence activities reached into the heart of the government, this information was treated as top secret and kept classified for a long time. However, declassification was realized in 1995, and researchers were able to read over 2,900 Soviet communications obtained through the Venona project. The volume exceeds 5,000 pages, and many Soviet spies active from 1948 through the 1950s have been identified by their real names.

What is interesting about this research from a counter-intelligence perspective is that it reveals the Soviet Union had established a robust intelligence network in the U.S. The authors point out that this was largely due to Communist Party USA political activist J. Peters, who expanded the underground organization of the Communist Party USA based on Soviet directives. The Communist Party USA had many members who operated without disclosing their party affiliation, and they sought employment in the federal government. At the time, President Roosevelt had to hire a large number of civil servants to promote the New Deal, an economic policy aimed at economic reconstruction, and sufficient background checks were not conducted. As a result, the Soviet Union was able to secure an intelligence network that reached deep into the U.S. government.

The fact that the U.S. failed in counter-intelligence also had a negative impact on the counter-intelligence of European countries. Noel Field originally worked for the U.S. State Department but later became a Soviet spy and joined the Unitarian Service Committee, a Christian international non-governmental organization. He began working in refugee relief at the office in Marseille, southern France, in 1941, but he used his refugee relief work to conceal communication tasks between the Communist parties of various European countries and the Soviet Union based on Soviet directives, traveling through Germany, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. This case shows that the American spies acquired by the Soviet Union were also operated outside the United States.

There was not just one reason why U.S. counter-intelligence did not function sufficiently. First, there was no executive order regarding the protection of government secrets, and the qualification screening for government employees with access to classified information was not clearly institutionalized. When it was discovered during World War I that Germany had provided funds to organize anti-war movements within the U.S., this issue was discussed within the government, but a consistent policy could not be established. Even entering the 1930s, the Army Intelligence Division, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) were carrying out their missions separately, and information was not being shared.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation seems to have paid attention to the Communist Party USA quite early on, but as of 1933, its personnel numbered only about 300, so there were limits to its counter-intelligence activities. It is believed that the fact that the U.S. government limited its most stringent counter-intelligence vigilance to the Axis powers, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, was a factor in overlooking Soviet spies.

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