Introduction to 'Bombing to Win', which argues that airpower alone cannot achieve strategic effects

After the end of World War I, the Italian strategic thinker Giulio Douhet believed that aircraft, especially bombers, would determine the outcome of future wars. He argued that by launching strategic bombing against an enemy's political and economic centers at the start of a war, the enemy's population would lose the will to fight in a short period, forcing the government to surrender.

Professor Robert Pape of the University of Chicago, in his book 'Bombing to Win: Airpower and Coercion in Warfare' (1996), criticizes such strategic thinking as impractical and suggests that a more realistic approach to air strategy should be sought. This is a foundational text for examining modern air operations.

Many theories of air strategy originate from the aforementioned research by Douhet and have branched into various schools of thought. For this reason, even if strategic bombing concepts appear similar at first glance, there are different philosophies regarding target selection and targeting methods, and it was also necessary to comprehensively consider the effects of bombing that differ from strategic bombing. Therefore, the author proposes classifying air strategies that have coercion of an opponent as a political objective into four types.

The first is punishment, a strategy that intentionally targets civilians. The second is denial, which targets military facilities and military industrial bases to reduce the enemy's combat capability. The third is risk, which involves gradually escalating bombing to demonstrate the firmness of one's own resolve in negotiations. The fourth is decapitation, which targets the enemy's political leadership, command structure, and specific key individuals.

Based on this typology, the author analyzed cases of bombing in World War II against Germany and Japan, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Gulf War to examine what strategic effects airpower had.

According to the author's analysis, the effect of airpower alone in bringing a war to an end was limited. While bombing political and economic centers was effective in disrupting production activities, it was a level of disruption that governments could manage, and cases were found where weapons production continued tenaciously even while under bombardment. The public did not lose the will to fight when bombed; rather, they were more inclined to stand up with a desperate resolve.

In conclusion, the author's position is that bombing alone cannot be a decisive factor in forcing peace upon an enemy nation. However, it has been confirmed that within the types of strategic bombing, denial has limited effectiveness. This is explained by the fact that denial is a strategy carried out by bombing military targets.

According to the author's view, airpower is not an effective means for destroying political and economic centers. However, if used to destroy military targets, it can be expected to achieve significant results. Therefore, what must occupy the most important position in air force strategic thought is integrated operations, which should carry out air interdiction targeting rear support units operating behind combat units deployed at the front, and close air support targeting combat units deployed at the front, in coordination with friendly ground operations.

Regarding Pape's argument, U.S. Air Force officer John Warden has issued a thorough rebuttal, so I will briefly touch upon that as well. Warden countered many parts of Pape's strategic bombing argument, but he took a particularly strong stance against Pape's position that modern precision-guided munitions are not a significant technological innovation. Warden argues that this is a major mistake, asserting that the advent of precision-guided munitions enabled the U.S. Air Force to conduct accurate aerial bombing in the Gulf War (Warden 1997). Pape has also issued a counter-rebuttal to Warden, but I will explain that in a separate article.

References

Warden, J. A. (1997). Success in modern war: A response to Robert Pape’s Bombing to Win. Security Studies, 7(2), 172–190. doi:10.1080/09636419708429345

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