An Introduction to 'Truppenführung' (Army Command), the German Military Manual for Learning the Fundamentals of Modern Tactics

Tactics refers to the deployment, movement, and employment of units on the battlefield. In military science, while strategy and operations are also units used to analyze military employment, tactics are positioned below operations and deal with the actions of the smallest units. However, this does not mean they are of little value as a subject of study; rather, they can be considered the most fundamental area of research in military science.

World War I (1914–1918) was a landmark conflict that changed patterns of combat in various ways. Although Germany was defeated in this war and faced military restrictions from Britain and France, its officers continued to compile military history and study tactics. The culmination of these efforts was 'Truppenführung (Army Command),' (Part 1, 1933; Part 2, 1934). It was read as the German military's tactical manual throughout World War II (1939–1945) and remains a highly regarded document today.

Edited by the German Army High Command, translated by the former Imperial Japanese Army War College, supervised by Takeshi Oki, 'Truppenführung: German Army Combat Manual,' Sakuhinsha, 2018.

It is generally accepted that the prototype for 'Truppenführung' can be found in 'Hans von Seeckt,' who became Chief of the German Army Troop Office in 1919, and his publication 'Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen (Command and Combat of Combined Arms),' (Part 1, 1921; Part 2, 1923). This was a manual aimed at helping the interwar German military break away from the positional and trench warfare widely used in World War I, and it summarized the tactical principles for completing missions through maneuver warfare and mobile operations (this translation is also included in the referenced literature).

Ten years after the publication of the first part of Seeckt's manual, in 1931, Ludwig Beck, Werner von Fritsch, and Karl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel worked on its revision, resulting in 'Truppenführung'.

While it contains a variety of content, what is often pointed out by researchers is that it fully incorporates Auftragstaktik (Mission-type tactics). Mission-type tactics is a standard decision-making procedure where each unit commander, based on the intent of their superior, judges the situation unfolding before them and decides for themselves what needs to be done (Reference: The Essence of Auftragstaktik as Explained by Moltke).

To execute these mission-type tactics, it is necessary for commanders not to blindly follow orders, not to be fixated on prescribed procedures, and even to act on their own initiative. Therefore, at the beginning of the manual, it is stated that 'Warfare is an art, a free and creative activity based on science' (p. 434). For this reason, 'Truppenführung' carefully avoids forcing methods of problem-solving onto commanders by anticipating every possible situation. Because war is constantly changing, commanders must anticipate the emergence of new means of engagement. It states that the principles presented in the manual must also be applied according to the situation' (ibid., pp. 434-5).

'Truppenführung' begins by stating that the aptitude of 'personality' is required (ibid., p. 434). In other words, one must be able to 'show calmness, decisiveness, and courage in the face of the enemy,' and also 'be familiar with the feelings of subordinates, understand their emotions and thoughts, provide them with constant care, and earn their respect and trust' (ibid., p. 435). To execute mission-type tactics on the front lines, it is necessary to provide high-level tactical education to personnel who possess such excellent personality traits.

'Truppenführung' is valuable as a teaching material that skillfully systematizes the fundamentals that should be emphasized in tactical education, and its significance has not been lost even in the modern era. Here, let's look at the description of encounter battles as an example.

An encounter battle is a combat that begins without careful preparation when units on the march collide unexpectedly or as anticipated. Although it is a battle that proceeds while the enemy situation is unknown, 'Truppenführung' states, 'In an encounter battle, success goes to the one who seizes the initiative and forces the enemy to follow their lead' (p. 562). As stated here, the iron rule of an encounter battle is preemption, and it notes that waiting for the enemy situation to become clear before determining unit actions 'belongs to the exception' (p. 563).

For this reason, in an encounter battle, the initial actions of the vanguard, which precedes the main force to provide cover, become extremely important. According to 'Truppenführung,' an attack for the 'decisive seizure of key points' often yields results as an optimal initial action for the vanguard, but it also states that if the enemy force is superior, or if the vanguard's current position is too disadvantageous from a topographical perspective, some degree of withdrawal should also be considered (ibid.).

A naive reader might interpret the admission of such a withdrawal as contradicting the principle of preemption mentioned earlier. However, 'Truppenführung' states that 'the most certain initial foundation is preemption in combat preparation,' and if combat preparation is completed ahead of time, the enemy will be forced to engage our units from a disadvantageous position (ibid., p. 562). For example, if the enemy uses overwhelming firepower in a narrow space where units cannot deploy for combat, it is considered appropriate for the vanguard commander to disengage the units and aim to complete combat preparations in a more advantageous position.

Although 'Truppenführung' is a manual intended for the execution of mobile warfare, it was by no means one-sidedly focused on the offensive. Looking at the description of positional defense, it is clear that fundamental matters are covered comprehensively. Since the success or failure of a positional defense depends largely on the effectiveness of firepower, it is stated as a principle that positions must be set up to maximize the effect of fire as much as possible (ibid., p. 582). However, in positional defense, it is necessary to choose terrain that forces the enemy to attack and to construct positions accordingly. Otherwise, the enemy would not attack our defensive positions head-on while knowing the disadvantage. Regarding cases where the enemy attempts to bypass the defensive position, the need arises to deal with this using offensive methods, so the surrounding terrain and routes must be carefully analyzed when selecting a defensive position (ibid., p. 586).

Regarding the organization of defensive positions, they are divided into forward positions, combat outposts, and the main battle zone. Forward positions are positions intended to deceive the location of the defensive position, allowing the enemy's attacking units to deploy in front and also conducting observations necessary for artillery fire (ibid., p. 591). Combat outposts are units intended to secure time for the main battle zone to complete combat preparations, and they can deceive the location of the main battle zone (ibid.). Because the situation dictates where combat outposts should be positioned, how much force should be organized, and how long they should hold out, it is impossible to indicate a standard for this across the board. Combat outposts do not necessarily have to focus solely on defense; depending on the war situation, they may also launch limited attacks to disrupt the enemy's attack preparations and to probe the enemy situation (ibid., p. 592).

If the enemy enters the main battle zone, firepower is concentrated based on a pre-prepared fire plan. As it says, 'As the enemy approaches the main battle zone, firepower must be made increasingly dense,' it is considered important to systematically employ infantry and artillery firepower according to the stages of combat (ibid.). If the enemy succeeds in breaking into a part of the main battle zone, nearby units must launch a counterattack to repel the enemy (ibid., p. 596). If this fails, one must consider whether to use reserves placed in the rear to counterattack or to reorganize the front line.

What has been stated above is only a small part of the content of 'Truppenführung,' but I think it is clear that one can deepen their understanding of the deployment, maneuver, and employment of units in combat. As a manual written in pre-war Japan, the former Imperial Army's 'Operations Manual' is famous, but I feel that 'Truppenführung' includes even more in-depth explanations. Because it is a highly specialized work, it would be unsuitable as light reading, but for those who intend to learn tactics in detail from now on, I think it is a book worth obtaining.

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