Introduction to 'Dictators at War and Peace', which explains the conditions under which authoritarian states use force

Associate Professor at the University of Wisconsin, Jessica L. P. Weeks is a researcher who has analyzed the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. Her 2014 book published by Cornell University Press, 'Dictators at War and Peace', presents a model explaining how authoritarian states with dictatorial political systems decide to use force, and is a study supported by quantitative approaches and case analyses.

Jessica L. P. Weeks, Dictators at War and Peace. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014.

According to the author's theory, there are two points to focus on to determine whether an authoritarian state is prone to deciding to use force. One is the strength of the power that the leader heading the regime can exercise, and the other is the attributes of the elites who make up the regime. Based on these two factors, the author categorizes the political situations of authoritarian states into four patterns.

(1) Civilian machines: Collective leadership, civilian elites
(2) Military juntas: Collective leadership, military elites
(3) Bosses: Personal leadership, civilian elites
(4) Strongmen: Personal leadership, military elites

According to the author's explanation, authoritarian states with a high probability of using force are those in patterns (2), (3), and (4). In particular, the pattern (4), which combines personal leadership and military elites, is the most prone to resorting to the use of force, while conversely, the analysis results show that authoritarian states in pattern (1), which combines collective leadership and civilian elites, are much more cautious about using force than democratic states. Pattern (1) is a very interesting pattern, as it is shown not only to have a strong tendency to avoid the use of force but also to have a low probability of failing in the use of force.

The author argues that authoritarian states that adopt personal leadership have a higher probability of failing in war compared to those with collective leadership. This is thought to be because losing a war creates a political risk of losing power. Conversely, it is also shown that leaders who adopt personal leadership methods do not need to be held accountable for military actions, so they may take military action even without a prospect of success. It is also explained that military elites may take a positive attitude toward war because they can expect to profit from war through the expansion of military budgets.

In the book's case studies, typical dictators such as Iraq's Hussein and the Soviet Union's Stalin are featured. They were not only politically similar in that they thoroughly implemented personal leadership, but they were also similar in that they did not sufficiently consider the risks of failure in their decision-making regarding military actions.

Hussein invaded Kuwait in the 1990 Gulf War, but there was no evidence that he considered the risk of U.S. military intervention in the policy-making process, and none of his aides at the time pointed out the risks of the operational plan. Stalin also used force against Finland in 1939, but there was no evidence that the costs of the invasion were sufficiently evaluated within the regime. In the end, the Soviet military suffered heavy losses in this war, but Stalin retained power and invaded Finland again in 1941.

I think this book is significant in thinking about the relationship between domestic politics and international politics. It has long been pointed out that authoritarian states have a higher risk of using force than democratic states, but the author demonstrates that there are variations among authoritarian states, and that in particular, the leader's power and the elites' preferences are important factors in predicting foreign policy. From the perspective of deterrence theory, it is a serious problem that leaders who thoroughly implement personal leadership do not fear the failure of operations.

To deter the use of force by such countries, simply causing military operations to fail may not be enough.

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