Introduction to 'The Political Economy of the LDP's Long-Term Rule' (2010), a Re-examination of the Strategy for the Liberal Democratic Party to Win Elections

The theory of clientelism is sometimes used to explain why the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has maintained power in Japan for such a long time. Clientelism is an electoral strategy in which the ruling party provides benefits to specific voters in exchange for their votes; for example, using administrative investment such as highway construction to induce benefits is a typical method. Scheiner's Democracy Without Competition in Japan is likely one of the representative achievements in comparative politics that analyzes these methods of clientelism in Japan.

Jun Saito's The Political Economy of the LDP's Long-Term Rule (2010) provides a critique of Scheiner's theory. This work points out that there are limits to attempting to explain the longevity of the LDP administration solely through clientelism. This is because once the LDP's long-term rule becomes entrenched and its position is no longer threatened by other opposition parties, LDP politicians are no longer in a position to be chosen by voters. Rather, it is considered that politicians are in a position to select voters. The author calls this a "reverse accountability system."

Chapter 1: The Mystery of the LDP's Long-Term Rule: Why Did the Administration Continue Despite Political Distrust?
Chapter 2: LDP-Style Vote-Gathering Organizations and Voting Behavior
Chapter 3: Demographics and Electoral Strategy: Political Responses to Long-Term Trends
Chapter 4: Fluctuations in Approval Ratings and Electoral Cycles
Chapter 5: Subsidies for Vote Gathering
Chapter 6: Pork-Barrel Politics and the Weakening of the LDP: The Myth of 'Railroad-Building for Self-Interest'
Chapter 7: Pork-Barrel Politics and Political Realignment
Chapter 8: Electoral System Reform and Policy Change: The Path to a Change in Government
Chapter 9: The LDP's Long-Term Rule as Contemporary History: The Consequences of the Reverse Accountability System

Under democracy, it is assumed that politicians compete for votes with the aim of getting elected, striving to maximize their vote count to gain even the slightest advantage. This is because there is a fear of losing to a rival candidate, and it is this fear that compels politicians to be accountable to voters. However, even in a democratic system, if the opposition parties are significantly weakened and the ruling party's politicians no longer worry about losing, it is thought that maximizing votes may no longer be a priority.

Once they have established a base where they can be stably elected in their own districts, voters are no longer in a position to choose politicians. Conversely, politicians can mobilize voters for elections and, after evaluating their degree of contribution, target benefits to groups of voters with high contribution levels. To carry out such selective benefit distribution, it is necessary to collect information on voters' attitudes, but in areas with small populations, it is easy to collect voter information through industry associations.

In the case of rural municipalities, Agricultural Cooperatives,National Chamber of Agriculture linked Agricultural Commissions,Land Improvement Districts,Agricultural Mutual Aid Associations are considered important vote-gathering organizations. In electoral districts in cities with larger populations compared to rural areas, it becomes somewhat more difficult to collect voter information, but there are industry associations such as Chambers of Commerce and Industry and Corporate Associations, as well as Junior Chambers composed of young business owners, and it is possible to conduct political activities through these. Emerging residential areas are the most difficult regions to monitor voters, but here, neighborhood associations and new religions are important vote-gathering organizations, and Soka Gakkai, the foundation of the coalition partner Komeito, has cooperated with the LDP in elections (Chapter 2).

In realizing the LDP's long-term rule, thoroughly distributing benefits according to voters' loyalty and contribution was a very important task. From this perspective, the author argues that the development of transportation infrastructure that contributes to regional economic development was politically disadvantageous for LDP politicians. This analysis is detailed in Chapter 6, "Pork-Barrel Politics and the Weakening of the LDP: The Myth of 'Railroad-Building for Self-Interest'," where the author uses Niigata and Shimane Prefectures as case studies to demonstrate that the more advanced the infrastructure development, the more the LDP's vote-gathering ability tends to decline. This chapter can be said to be the most interesting part of this book.

Niigata Prefecture had the base of Kakuei Tanaka, who practiced pork-barrel politics through public works projects; in 1978 and 1980, the administrative investment per capita in the prefecture was the highest in the country, and the development of Shinkansen lines, in particular, proceeded from an early stage (p. 130). This pork-barrel politics was thought to have led to the strengthening of the LDP's electoral base, but the author points out that from a long-term perspective, the LDP's vote share in Niigata Prefecture has been declining. Despite the tailwind for the LDP in the 44th General Election of the House of Representatives in 2005, LDP candidates won in only two of the six single-seat constituencies in Niigata Prefecture (p. 131).

Renowned as a politician who never lost in a House of Representatives election, Noboru Takeshita had established his electoral base in Shimane Prefecture. It is known that administrative investment per capita in Shimane Prefecture was also at a higher level than the national average (p. 133). However, unlike the case of Niigata Prefecture, which aimed to improve railway lines, the business field that was particularly focused on in Shimane Prefecture was the Nakaumi land reclamation and freshwater project. Although the impact of this project on regional economic growth was limited compared to the development of transportation routes such as highways and Shinkansen, the LDP has never lost a seat in Shimane Prefecture in the House of Representatives elections to this day, with opposition candidates only rarely winning back seats through the proportional representation system (p. 132).

Unlike distributing subsidies on a fiscal year basis, administrative investment in transportation infrastructure cannot be used for pork-barrel politics that distributes rewards only to voter groups that cooperated in the election. In other words, because transportation routes are highly public infrastructure that anyone can benefit from once completed, politicians cannot punish voters when they appear who no longer vote for them. Therefore, the author argues that even if high economic effects are expected, it is more rational as an electoral strategy for politicians to consistently avoid the development of transportation infrastructure. The author also points out that there is a low tendency for politicians elected from regions where infrastructure is undeveloped to leave the LDP (Chapter 7).

What becomes clear from this analysis is that even if regional voters are loyal to the LDP, it does not necessarily mean they will be rewarded. This is different from the relationship assumed in clientelism. Of course, this does not mean that such a relationship is absolute. The author explains that the LDP lost power in 1993, albeit for a short period, because politicians with bases in electoral districts where infrastructure development was well-advanced defected from the LDP (Chapter 8), and also points out that the effect of the LDP's electoral strategy diminished due to the subsequent electoral system reform.

The conclusion the author reaches at the end of the book is surprising. LDP politicians are encouraged to prevent regional economic growth in order to maintain voters who continue to vote loyally in their local areas. This tendency is more pronounced in regions where administrative investment for infrastructure development is needed, and despite being strong bases for the LDP, prefectures such as Wakayama, Nara, Kochi, and Akita remain behind in infrastructure development. On the other hand, it is argued that in order to secure resources for distribution, the LDP has come to promote infrastructure development in urban areas where higher tax revenue growth can be expected. The author concludes the book as follows.

"Since Schumpeter, it has been argued that because political elites compete to win or remain in power, citizens gain opportunities to voice dissent, and a healthy democracy functions. It is because competition occurs among those in power to provide policy benefits to the citizens they represent that domination over citizens is minimized in a democratic system, and the pursuit of the common good becomes possible. Because the LDP administration functioned as a reverse accountability system, a disconnect occurred between voting for the ruling party and the benefits received from public policy. Moreover, because the circuit of accountability from political parties to voters did not function, even when viewing democracy as a process of deliberation, the circuit of democratic accountability was hollowed out" (Ibid., p. 218).

The arguments in this book are supported by mathematical analysis based on game theory and the analysis of statistical data, and since the content of the analysis is quite specialized, it cannot necessarily be said to be easy to read. However, it is certain that this book is an original analysis of LDP politics based on the theories of modern political economy, and even if one cannot fully agree with its claims, I believe it is a volume that should be examined in detail.

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