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The Japanese Military After the War (Part 6)

Political Maneuvering Around the Establishment of the Self-Defense Forces

Japan-US Talks After the Establishment of the National Safety Force

Even after the establishment of the National Safety Force, the United States continued to demand further rearmament from Japan. The US's desires were reflected in NSC 125/2, presented by President Harry Truman. This document clearly specified the expansion of the National Safety Force to a scale of 10 divisions and 300,000 personnel. The next president, Dwight Eisenhower, followed this policy and continued to demand rearmament from Japan.
The Japanese government continued to refuse, citing the priority of economic recovery, but the United States did not give up. The Mutual Security Act (MSA), which stipulated that the US would provide economic aid in exchange for the strengthening of Japan's military power, also became a bargaining chip, further complicating Japan-US negotiations.
In October 1953, the Ikeda-Robertson talks began in the United States. The US had requested that Japan submit a long-term defense plan. In response, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida's special envoy, Hayato Ikeda, presented the "Ikeda Private Plan." It included a plan to increase ground forces to 180,000 personnel over three years. However, Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson expressed dissatisfaction, insisting on an expansion to a scale of 300,000, with the 180,000 figure serving only as an intermediate goal. In the end, no agreement was reached even after a month of negotiations (the MSA was signed the following year).
Meanwhile, domestically, the public and conservative groups were growing increasingly resentful, feeling that the ruling government was leaning toward subservience to the United States. Conservative groups would go on to campaign fiercely, demanding rearmament and constitutional amendment.

Conservative Parties and the Public Opposing the Cabinet

It was the conservative parties that became the standard-bearers for realizing rearmament. When politicians who had been purged from public office returned to the political scene, they openly opposed Yoshida's policy of relying on the United States for defense. The vanguard of this movement was the Progressive Party, led by former Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu. Other influential conservative figures such as Tanzan Ishibashi, Ichiro Hatoyama, and Nobusuke Kishi also turned to criticizing Yoshida, aiming for the establishment of a self-defense military, the withdrawal of US forces, and constitutional amendment.
Supporting this movement was the public's anger toward the Japan-US Security Treaty. Many citizens perceived the stationing of US forces in Japan, as decided by the treaty, as a continuation of the occupation by the Allied forces.
Moreover, American soldiers at the time often behaved poorly, frequently committing crimes against residents living near bases. Furthermore, land issues arose regarding the securing of sites for training grounds and radar facilities. A representative incident from this period was the "Uchinada Struggle" of 1952, which centered on the construction of an artillery firing range in Ishikawa Prefecture. Two years later, the exposure of a fishing boat to radiation from a hydrogen bomb test at Bikini Atoll (the Lucky Dragon No. 5 incident) occurred, causing anti-American sentiment to rise sharply. Following the peace treaty, a strong headwind was blowing against Yoshida's policy of subservience to the United States.

Government and Non-Governmental Moves Toward Force Development

Yoshida's predicament was also reflected in election results. In the general election of April 1953, the Liberal Party's seats decreased from 222 to 199. Facing a crushing defeat that left them without a majority, Yoshida was forced to cooperate with the Progressive Party, which had become the largest opposition party. Thus, at a party leaders' meeting on September 27, it was agreed to establish an organization capable of countering aggression and to create a long-term defense plan.
Behind the political movements, the business world and the National Safety Force were also advancing their own rearmament plans. The Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren), having lost special procurement demand due to the armistice in the Korean War, was pinning its hopes on the defense industry as the next market.
In February 1953, "A Draft Proposal for the Development of Defense Capability" was created with former generals from the Army and Navy Ministries serving as advisors. The plan was to develop a total of approximately 600,000 ground, maritime, and air personnel for 2.9 trillion yen. This proposal was actually sent to the US Department of Defense.
Meanwhile, the National Safety Agency also created a draft proposal through its System Investigation Committee. The first draft for fiscal year 1953 envisioned a large-scale military force of 300,000 ground personnel and 6,744 aircraft. The plan underwent repeated revisions, reaching a 10th draft. However, it was rejected entirely by the government as being financially impossible.
With the government and those outside it moving significantly toward rearmament in this way, the Cabinet began to concretize the expansion of the National Safety Force.

The Birth of the Self-Defense Forces and the Future

From December 1953, the three conservative parties—the Liberal Party, the Progressive Party, and the Japan Liberal Party—began discussions on revising the National Safety Agency Law and establishing a new defense organization. The Progressive Party, which led the talks, insisted on rearmament without being fixated on constitutional amendment. On the other hand, the Liberal Party, fearing that it would be misunderstood by the public as a shift toward rearmament, aimed to establish a public security force with a toned-down military character. Bureaucratic forces, fearing the collapse of civilian control, also joined in, and the establishment of a "military" was avoided.
On July 1, 1954, the Self-Defense Forces Law and the Defense Agency Establishment Law were enacted. With this, the National Safety Agency became the "Defense Agency," and the National Safety Force became the "Self-Defense Forces." The laws clearly stated that the mission of the Self-Defense Forces was to defend Japan from direct aggression.
Reflecting on the runaway military of the pre-war era, the Self-Defense Forces were placed under strict civilian control. For public security deployments in anticipation of terrorist acts or defense deployments against acts of aggression, approval or ex-post facto approval from the National Diet must always be obtained.
Also, a compromise was reached with Article 9 of the Constitution. The succeeding Ichiro Hatoyama Cabinet presented views such as, "The Constitution of Japan does not deny the right of self-defense," and "Establishing a force with a mission for self-defense and within the necessary and reasonable scope for that purpose is not a violation of Article 9." Then, through a "strictly defensive" policy that rejects preemptive strikes, the Self-Defense Forces maintained the facade of being a defense organization.
From then until the present, the Self-Defense Forces have undergone various transformations, including the conclusion of a new security treaty, the strengthening of remote island defense, the start of overseas dispatches, and organizational restructuring through the elevation of the Defense Agency to a ministry. Currently, the main defense challenges are the military development of China and Russia, the North Korean missile issue, and dealing with cyberattacks. Seventy years after its birth, the Self-Defense Forces continue to transform in response to the times.

Excerpt from "The Japanese Military After the War" by Hiroaki Takaishi (Saizusha)


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【Author Profile】
Hiroaki Takaishi
Born in Osaka Prefecture in 1986. Has worked at an editorial production company since 2010, writing mainly about World War II, modern historical figures, and events. Also writes frequently about the Sengoku period and geography. Major books include "Mysteries of the Japanese Military Not Found in Textbooks" and "Lies of the Pacific War Conventional Wisdom" (Saizusha, co-authored), among others.

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