The Japanese Military After the War (Part 5)
The Showa Era of Emperor Showa, Who Stepped Down from Being a Living God
Advancing Both Peace and Resistance
Evaluating Emperor Showa during the war is a difficult issue.
When he was Crown Prince, the Emperor traveled to Europe and witnessed the scars of World War I firsthand. After ascending to the throne, he harbored distrust toward the military, which continued to intervene in politics, and he even moved to prevent the Tripartite Pact. However, in the end, he could not stop the military's runaway actions. Focusing on these points, one might conclude that Emperor Showa was a tragic pacifist.
However, in reality, Emperor Showa had a not-insignificant influence on the military's politics. During the war, he frequently offered his opinions on the military's operational actions.
For example, after the Battle of Midway in June 1942, Emperor Showa cautioned the Navy to refrain from passive behavior. Also, in February 1945, when former Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe submitted a memorial regarding peace negotiations, Emperor Showa rejected it, stating that the war results were not yet sufficient.
However, even in the Battle of Okinawa, they could not deal a major blow to the United States, and Germany surrendered on May 7. Emperor Showa shifted toward a theory of early peace and began to support promoting peace through the mediation of the Soviet Union. Although the peace efforts failed due to the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan, the decision to accept unconditional surrender was made when he issued the Sacred Decision to accept the Potsdam Declaration on August 10.
After the war ended through the Sacred Decision, Emperor Showa would live on in postwar Japan as a symbol of the state. However, immediately after the war, the treatment of Emperor Showa had not yet been decided. As the leader of Japan, there was a possibility that he would be held responsible for the war from its start to its end, and in the worst case, execution was even possible. Given such a situation, how did Emperor Showa walk through the postwar period?
The Truth Behind the MacArthur Meeting
After the war, key figures in the Japanese government and military were arrested one after another. Some were even sentenced to capital punishment at the Tokyo Trial. Regarding Emperor Showa, quite a few Allied nations, including the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and Australia, demanded severe punishment. American public opinion was similar; in a poll conducted in June before the end of the war, more than 60% were in favor of punishing the Emperor.
However, Emperor Showa avoided indictment at the Tokyo Trial. Why exactly?
One reason often cited is that "MacArthur, who had developed a favorable impression of Emperor Showa, did not approve of the indictment."
On September 27, 1945, a direct meeting between Emperor Showa and MacArthur was held at the American Embassy in Japan. Two days before the meeting, The New York Times had published an article stating that "the Emperor shifted the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor attack onto Tojo," but Emperor Showa told MacArthur, "I bear all responsibility for the war." This is the theory that MacArthur was moved by this honorable attitude and decided to stop pursuing Emperor Showa's war responsibility.
However, this theory has already been refuted by researchers. The reason Emperor Showa was not indicted was because the United States government itself wanted it that way.
On September 22, before MacArthur met with Emperor Showa, he had received strict orders from Washington to "avoid designating the Emperor as a war criminal until special instructions are given" (Article 17 of the "Directive Concerning the Arrest and Trial of War Criminal Suspects"). MacArthur's personal intentions and the continuation of the imperial system were not very related.
America's Intentions in Seeking Non-Indictment
Why did America decide not to indict the Emperor? It was to soften anti-American sentiment in Japan and to utilize the Emperor's authority for occupation governance.
Emperor Showa was deeply trusted by the people, and he was enthusiastically welcomed when he visited various parts of the country starting in the autumn of 1945. If he were to be judged by a trial, chaos within Japan would be unavoidable. With such thinking, the American government was cautious about how to deal with the Emperor. Rather, they shifted toward a direction of facilitating the occupation by continuing the imperial system.
To deal with American public opinion and pressure from major nations, the U.S. government and GHQ took measures. One part of this was Emperor Showa's "Humanity Declaration."
Emperor Showa denied the Emperor as a living god through the "Rescript on the Construction of a New Japan." This rescript was created jointly by GHQ and the Imperial Household. The aim was to check the movement to pursue war responsibility and abolish the imperial system by making the Emperor a symbol. Furthermore, the rush to create a new constitution that established a symbolic imperial system, which held no real political power and limited the Emperor's role to state acts approved by the Cabinet, was also to counter the pro-war-crimes-trial faction within the Far Eastern Commission.
Thus, on May 3, 1947, the Constitution of Japan was enacted.
The Issue of Emperor Showa's Abdication
America decided not to question Emperor Showa's war responsibility. However, within Japan, movements toward Emperor Showa's abdication also appeared.
Emperor Showa himself had considered abdication as early as August 29, immediately after the war. At that time, abdication did not materialize because Minister of the Imperial Household Koichi Kido, who heard the Emperor's words, persuaded him otherwise, but when 1948 arrived and the Tokyo Trial reached its climax, the abdication issue reached its peak.
The Ashida Cabinet at the time appointed Michiharu Tajima, an advocate of abdication, as the Director of the Imperial Household Agency (now the Imperial Household Agency) and tried to promote the democratization of the Imperial Court. It seems Ashida was trying to have Emperor Showa abdicate peacefully through Tajima's persuasion.
However, the Emperor had come to have a different way of thinking than he did immediately after the war.
On July 9 of that year, Emperor Showa, who had a conversation with Tajima, expressed his intention to remain on the throne. There were three reasons for this: the Crown Prince (the current Emperor Emeritus) was still young and there were no candidates for regent; there was no guarantee that GHQ would guarantee the continuation of the imperial system even after abdication; and it was not even clear if GHQ would allow abdication in the first place.
He chose to remain on the throne, fully aware of domestic and international criticism, and to cooperate with the stabilization of Japan's political situation and the reconstruction of the country. He is said to have replied that by doing this, he would fulfill his responsibility for the war. Tajima evaluated this attitude as "the very expression of a selfless person." On September 27, after a discussion with Prime Minister Ashida, Tajima turned to support his remaining on the throne.
On November 12, when the final verdict of the Tokyo Trial was handed down, Emperor Showa expressed his intention to remain on the throne in a letter to MacArthur. His reign was decided. However, Chief Justice William Webb of the Tokyo Trial criticized it, saying "(the exemption of Emperor Showa from trial) is based on the best interests of the Allied Powers." The abdication issue would continue to smolder for a while. Even so, Emperor Showa remained the symbol of Japan until his passing in 1989. The imperial system is still accepted by the Japanese people today in a form different from that before the war.
Excerpt from "The Japanese Military After the War" by Hiroaki Takaishi (Saizusha)
【Author Introduction】
Hiroaki Takaishi
Born in Osaka Prefecture in 1986. Has worked at an editorial production company since 2010, writing mainly about World War II, modern historical figures, and events. Also writes frequently about the Sengoku period and geography. Major books include "Mysteries of the Japanese Military Not Found in Textbooks" and "Lies of the Pacific War Common Knowledge" (Saizusha, co-authored), among others.