Learning Japanese History with ChatGPT, Night 2 - Part 17: Rethinking the Meaning of Ryōtō Tetsuritsu (Alternating Succession) - Why Did the Problem Become Irrecoverable?
When discussing imperial succession at the end of the Kamakura period, the system known as "Ryōtō Tetsuritsu" (alternating succession between two imperial lines) is unavoidable.
In this article, rather than asking "who was at fault," we will re-examine the meaning of this alternating succession from the perspective of "why the problem became irrecoverable."
While the "two-stream" policy of Hōjō Tokimune may leave room for doubt if viewed solely in terms of rationality, it did possess a certain logic in terms of securing a "reserve succession line." However, as a result, both the Jimyōin-tō and the Daikakuji-tō became "substantive regimes" equipped with authority, economic power, and political influence, and the problem transformed into something extremely difficult to resolve.
Furthermore, this article presents a perspective that could be called the "Shogunate entanglement theory"—that the primary actors in the struggle over imperial succession were in most cases the Royal Family (the Imperial Court), while the Shogunate (the samurai) remained basically passive—and organizes the positions and constraints of both the Court and the Shogunate.
We will look at how the relationship between the Court and the Shogunate was maintained within such a delicate balance, where being too weak was a problem, and being too strong was also a problem.
In addition, we will organize the political tendencies of the Daikakuji-tō's "emphasis on personal rule" and the Jimyōin-tō's "emphasis on deliberation and procedure" based on their differences in governance styles regarding the system of imperial council decisions, and clarify the difference in their distance from the Shogunate. We will also touch upon the fact that the Jimyōin-tō was not merely a "figurehead regime" through the miscellaneous litigation decrees and the development of the record office during the reign of Emperor Fushimi.
In conclusion, this article stands on the structural understanding that "no one—not the Royal Family, the Imperial Court, or the Shogunate—could recover from this problem," and brings to light the preconditions for the later emergence of Emperor Go-Daigo.
Next time, we plan to focus on "Emperor Go-Uda" as the nodal point and explore how the alternating succession led to Go-Daigo.
※Approximately 1200 characters
Introduction
Last time, as a supplement to the history of the Kamakura Shogunate, I briefly touched upon it from the perspective of the "fourth Minamoto Shogun."
To express it in modern terms, it is well known that the Minamoto clan (the Yoritomo family), the "founding family" of the Kamakura Shogunate, effectively died out after two generations and three people. The "fourth person" referred to in this series points to the person known in textbooks as "Prince Koreyasu".
Koreyasu is considered the eldest son of Prince Munetaka, the sixth Shogun and the first of the "Imperial Shoguns." After his father Munetaka was dismissed from the Shogunate and left Kamakura in 1266 due to some political circumstances, he received the Shogunal proclamation at the age of only three and became the seventh "Kamakura-dono."
At this point, he had not yet received the proclamation as an Imperial Prince and was "Prince Koreyasu," but in 1270, he was demoted to subject status, granted the Minamoto surname, and became "Minamoto no Koreyasu". This is the "fourth Minamoto Shogun" referred to in this series.
Since Koreyasu is the grandson of Emperor Go-Saga (Retired Emperor), it is possible to position him genealogically as the "Go-Saga Minamoto clan", but because this lineage did not survive or continue as a "house," it is not usually called that.
Here, the Kamakura Shogunate recreated the system from the time of its founding, which had been half-deified (legendary), of "Minamoto Shogun and Regent (Hōjō family head)." This was by no means a coincidence, but due to the clear will and purpose of Hōjō Tokimune.
It is thought that Tokimune sought to enhance his own authority and legitimacy as Regent by re-enacting the system that could be called the primal experience for the retainers: the "Minamoto Shogun (Yoritomo) and the Regent (Yoshitoki) who assists him." This was part of the concentration of power in Tokimune himself, but we also confirmed that there were unavoidable circumstances in facing the unprecedented national crisis of the "Mongol invasions" with a "national unity" system.
This simultaneously showed the "limits" of the power of the Hōjō clan, especially the Tokusō family. No matter how powerful the Tokusō family was in exercising real power and boasting influence, it was only as a "proxy for Shogunal power", and it could not have been established without the existence of the "Shogun," its greatest source of power.
Therefore, Tokimune treated Minamoto no Koreyasu, who held no real power and was almost "just there," with great courtesy. At the celebration of the completion of the new palace, he took the initiative to descend to the garden himself, and the various retainers followed suit and lined up below, performing the "etiquette of lord and vassal".
This structure of the "source (basis) of power" can be organized as a multi-layered structure where the Kamakura Shogunate itself was in a relationship of "Imperial Court (Royal Family) → Shogunate," and from there further to "Shogun → Hōjō clan (Tokusō family)" and "Tokusō family → Miuchibito (inner retainers)."
As is clear from this structure, it was theoretically impossible for the Shogunate, the Hōjō clan, or the Miuchibito to transcend their own "source of power," and rather, "enhancing the authority of their superiors" was directly linked to the amplification of their own authority and power.
The result of adding the logic peculiar to samurai (the "logic of the samurai" that I frequently use in this series) of "protecting one's own interests (rights) and face (honor), and passing them on to descendants" is the phenomenon that appeared on the surface of Kamakura Shogunate history. That is precisely why, as I have repeatedly stated in this series, it is possible to understand that the Kamakura Shogunate was not a "nationwide unified government" but a "limited regime that acted as a proxy for the military and police powers of the Imperial Court."
This system of "shared governance by various powers with the Emperor at the apex" in medieval Japan is academically called the "Kenmon Taisei (Gate/Power Structure) Theory" and is currently considered the most influential understanding.
I will omit the details of the history of the theory as it is not the main point, but it can be said that the understanding of the Kamakura Shogunate as a "nationwide unified government that transcended the Imperial Court" is no longer considered influential today.
Also, last time, we returned to the situation of the "Ryōtō Tetsuritsu" (alternating succession between two imperial lines) and touched upon the point that the Hachijō-in territory, a powerful royal estate, was inherited by Retired Emperor Kameyama through the shogunate's ruling. As a result, it is believed that the Kameyama imperial line gained a secure economic foundation and came to exist as a political entity known as the "Daikakuji-tō."
With this, the royal family faced a situation where the "imperial line" and "economic power" were divided and inherited separately, and the extremely sensitive issue of the Jimyōin-tō and Daikakuji-tō, both possessing real substance, competing for the imperial throne and the position of the Chiten no Kimi (retired emperor in power) became a reality.
Hōjō Tokimune, who could be called the source of this problem, passed away at a young age without resolving it, though his true intentions remain unclear.
To state the conclusion first, the royal family itself, the aristocratic society that supported it, and the shogunate, which was originally an outsider, all failed to resolve this issue, and the system of "Ryōtō Tetsuritsu" continued almost out of inertia.
Rather, the shogunate headed toward its own destruction as if it were being crushed by the great tree that grew from the seeds it had sown itself. That great tree was none other than Emperor Go-Daigo.
Therefore, this time, I would like to briefly look at how Emperor Go-Daigo became that "great tree." For this reason, we will once again go back in time, but I ask for your patience and company.
Was there any logic to the Ryōtō Tetsuritsu?
Now, in the 5th installment of the second night series, I raised the question, "Could it be said that there was any positive merit in the Ryōtō Tetsuritsu itself for the shogunate?" Furthermore, I expressed the idea that Hōjō Tokimune's decision, "It would be good if they took the throne alternately between the two lines," may have included emotional elements such as "kindness," "chivalry," and a certain degree of "confidence" to a non-negligible extent, in addition to rationality and highly political calculations.
The "confidence" referred to here is an imagination of the possibility that Tokimune had a concept, or expectation, that he could appropriately control the situation of the "two lines" through his own political skill and eventually lead it to some form of resolution. However, this is neither explicitly stated nor hinted at in historical documents.
Although it is unclear what exactly this "concept" of Tokimune's was, the act of "maintaining multiple imperial lines" itself cannot necessarily be called a wrong idea.
Considering that the Go-Takakura imperial line, which was established due to political circumstances to exclude the Go-Toba imperial line after barely suppressing the Jōkyū War—the greatest crisis for the existence of the shogunate (Hōjō clan)—died out in just three generations and about 20 years, and that the Juntoku imperial line, which was considered the right-wing of the "anti-shogunate (Hōjō clan)" in the Jōkyū War, was about to resurface, it can be thought that stably protecting and maintaining the Tsuchimikado imperial line, which was relatively easier for the shogunate to handle even among the Go-Toba imperial lines, was important for protecting the foundation of the shogunate's existence.
As I mentioned at the beginning, the source (basis) of the shogunate's power lies in the Imperial Court (royal family). Since that is the case, although the image of the words is not good, forming "two lines" in the sense of securing a "reserve succession line" cannot necessarily be called absurd from the perspective of risk management.
The fundamental idea of the later "Gosanke" (three houses of the Tokugawa clan), "Gosankyō," or the "Miyake" (princely houses) in the Imperial Family also lies in securing a "reserve succession line." From this point of view, it is possible to understand the "two lines" as a similar idea.
The problem was that the "two lines" possessed "substance," including economic power, to almost the same degree. This can be seen as one of the major factors that made the issue of Ryōtō Tetsuritsu "difficult to recover."
I would like you to recall the "three guarantees" that supported the authority and power of Retired Emperor Go-Saga, which I mentioned before; one of them was that "the person in power was governing earnestly," in other words, political power.
During the Ryōtō Tetsuritsu period, both the Jimyōin-tō and the Daikakuji-tō were governing earnestly as the "Chiten no Kimi," and as a result, like the Go-Saga reign, the Imperial Court continued to be a "government (power) with substance."
And this, at least initially, can be considered a situation that contributed to the stability of the shogunate's foundation (basis) of existence.
The aftermath of the "In-gi Jōtei-sei" (system of retired emperor's council) that supported Go-Saga
In the 6th and 7th installments of my series, I outlined the "In-gi Jōtei-sei" as the source of the "political power" that supported the power and authority of Retired Emperor Go-Saga.
I will omit the process of the establishment of this system and the specific procedures here due to space limitations, but I think that if you refer to past articles, your understanding of this manuscript will become more three-dimensional.
What I would like to point out in this article is not the history or institutional design of the "In-no-Hyojotei" (Imperial Council) system itself, but rather the subsequent operation of the "In-no-Hyojotei during the Go-Saga period." In other words, it is the point that while the Kameyama Imperial Lineage (Daikakuji-to) inherited the aspect of "Imperial decision (direct ruling) by the retired emperor" more strongly, the Go-Fukakusa Imperial Lineage (Jimyoin-to) is thought to have placed greater importance on and inherited the "system of a council-based government."
As a result of the succession dispute after the passing of Go-Saga, Emperor Kameyama inherited the position of "Retired Emperor" (Chiten no Kimi) with the approval of the Shogunate. The mechanism of the "In-no-Hyojotei" was inherited almost as it was into Kameyama's direct rule, and after his abdication in favor of Prince Yohito (Emperor Go-Uda), the "In-no-Hyojotei (Imperial Council)" was held during his own administration as a retired emperor.
Under this system, Retired Emperor Kameyama engaged in active political activities and also carried out institutional reforms, such as dividing the Imperial Council into "Tokusei (virtuous government) Council" and "Zasso (miscellaneous litigation) Council." These reforms achieved a certain level of success, and his good governance came to be evaluated by the aristocratic society as "strict administration" and "promotion of virtuous government."
Note that the "Tokusei" referred to here is unrelated to the Tokuseirei (debt cancellation decrees) of later generations, and refers to "government with virtue" in the original sense, that is, government based on virtue.
If we consider this in conjunction with the "inheritance of the Hachijo-in territory" mentioned in the previous article, it can be understood that of the "three guarantees that supported the Go-Saga court" that we have organized in this series, the Retired Emperor Kameyama had secured two: "economic power" and "political power."
On the other hand, what Kameyama lacked was the third guarantee, "cooperation with the Shogunate," that is, a stable pipeline through the Kanto Moshitsugi (Shogunate liaison). As I have mentioned several times, Kameyama was said to be on bad terms with Saionji Sanekane, the Kanto Moshitsugi, and in this respect, it can be said that he was in a disadvantageous position compared to the Go-Fukakusa Imperial Lineage (Jimyoin-to).
Furthermore, the strong power and authority formed through active political activities could also become a factor in inviting vigilance from the Shogunate (samurai) side as a "too strong Retired Emperor" reminiscent of Retired Emperor Go-Toba. If the "weak relationship with the Kanto Moshitsugi" is added to this, it is quite possible that the Shogunate viewed Retired Emperor Kameyama as a risk, as a "Retired Emperor who is difficult to control or could become uncontrollable."
In addition, combined with the fact that he was said to be close to the Adachi clan, who would later perish in the Shimotsuki Incident, the pressure from the Shogunate intensified, and as a result, the abdication from Emperor Go-Uda to Prince Tanehito (Emperor Fushimi) of the Jimyoin-to and the transfer of the position of "Retired Emperor" to Retired Emperor Go-Fukakusa took place.
After that, Prince Tanehito, the son of Emperor Fushimi, was named Crown Prince, and a monopoly system of "Emperor," "Retired Emperor," and "Kamakura-dono" by the Go-Fukakusa Imperial Lineage (Jimyoin-to) was established, and the Kameyama Imperial Lineage (Daikakuji-to) would spend a "time of misfortune" for a while.
Did the Shogunate have a motive?
Of course, it should not be understood as a simple composition where the Shogunate (Hojo clan) spontaneously and actively applied pressure to the Imperial Court (Royal Family) due to the vigilance against the "too strong Retired Emperor" Kameyama mentioned in the previous section. I believe it is necessary to be fully aware of the possibility that strong requests from the Jimyoin-to preceded this.
In fact, the Daikakuji-to, or to narrow the scope a little more, the Kameyama Imperial Lineage, had a structural weakness that could be more disadvantageous than the weakness of the pipeline with the Kanto Moshitsugi compared to the Go-Fukakusa Imperial Lineage (Jimyoin-to).
That is the point that Kameyama was the "younger brother" of Go-Fukakusa, and in terms of lineage, he was not in the position of the direct line, so to speak, in a "branch-like position."
In the case of the Hojo clan, it had a structure similar to the "flaw in legitimacy" caused by the "unilateral succession of the main family by a branch family (Ema family)" during the time of Yasutoki, and the "succession of the family head by a line that is not the direct line (younger brother)" during the time of Tokiyori, which resulted in instability manifested as confrontation and conflict with the influential branch family, the Nagoe clan (family).
In Kameyama's case, it is not that there were many clear influential branch families like the Hojo clan, but he was placed in a position where he was constantly confronted by the Go-Fukakusa Imperial Lineage (Jimyoin-to) with the claim, "We, the direct line, are the legitimate ones, and isn't it strange for the Daikakuji-to, which is not the direct line, to remain on the throne?"
In other words, as mentioned in previous articles, for Emperor Go-Daigo, who inherited this Kameyama Imperial Lineage, it should be kept in mind to some extent that he was an existence that carried a "double weakness related to legitimacy," in that he was in a "non-direct position" of the Kameyama Imperial Lineage, and in addition, the Imperial Lineage itself was placed in a "non-direct position."
Then, how did Hojo Tokiyori, who also carried a "flaw in legitimacy," deal with this? As already mentioned, Tokiyori eventually overcame this problem by "crushing it with force."
Emperor Go-Daigo also chose the path of "crushing with force" as a result, but this cannot be explained solely by the problems of Go-Daigo's personal character, such as his lack of thought or short temper; could it not also be understood that his options were structurally extremely limited from the beginning?
The "bud" that is Go-Daigo
I have jumped ahead a bit and touched on a part of Go-Daigo's circumstances, but here I would like to state one important premise for understanding.
In this series, when considering "Ryoto Tetsuritsu" (alternating succession), I have adopted an understanding that could be called the "Shogunate Entanglement Theory" for convenience. This is based on the premise that the primary actors in the succession disputes were, in most cases, the Imperial family (the Imperial Court), while the Shogunate (the samurai) basically remained only passively involved.
This is not the current mainstream academic theory, but rather my own personal synthesis and understanding; however, I have constructed the overall logic of this series, including the previous one, upon this premise and perspective.
The powerful interference in imperial succession carried out as post-war processing after the Jokyu War, and the strong rejection of the Juntoku imperial line, were both responses to emergency situations that risked the very "existence of the Shogunate." Furthermore, if we view Hojo Tokimune's intervention in the imperial succession issue as part of a "national unity" response to the unprecedented national crisis of the Mongol invasions, this can also be understood as a response to an emergency.
If we think in this way, it is possible to organize the idea that the Shogunate's active and proactive intervention in the affairs of the sovereign was basically limited to "emergency situations."
In that sense, the policy of "two imperial lines" left behind by Tokimune can be said to have become a major "curse" for later Shogunates, acting as a constraint that "neither imperial line must be allowed to go extinct." In fact, Shigeaki Mori, a leading researcher on the Southern Court, points out in his general-audience book "A Complete History of the Southern Court" (Kodansha Bunko) that the reason Ashikaga Yoshimitsu insisted on a form of "merger and absorption" rather than simply subjugating the Southern Court was because this policy of "no extinction of the imperial line" was still in effect.
In the same book, Mori presents an understanding to the effect that if the Shogunate were told, "If things continue like this, our imperial line will go extinct," they would have had no choice but to act. From this point as well, we can find grounds to speculate that the Shogunate, in its heart of hearts, may have wanted to remain non-interventionist if possible.
Conversely, if it is a government with actual substance, it could be said that for the Shogunate, it did not matter whether it was the Jimyoin-to or the Daikakuji-to; furthermore, it is conceivable that it would have been even more desirable if the line were convenient and easy for the Shogunate (or the Tokuso family and the Miuchibito) to handle.
Regarding the aforementioned "exclusion of the Kameyama imperial line from the mainstream," if we understand it as the Shogunate seizing an opportunity when it arose in response to a "request from the Jimyoin-to that seemed convenient for the Shogunate," then no contradiction arises with the logic presented so far in this series.
Naturally, it is more natural to think that both lines were conducting active lobbying while discerning such circumstances on the Shogunate's side. From this point as well, it is appropriate to understand the relationship between the Court and the Shogunate during the Kamakura period not as a simple confrontation or conflict, but as a relationship that repeated cooperation and friction on top of complex conflicting interests.
Scratching each other's backs?
Last time, I touched upon the unusual and unique career of Koreyasu, which went from "Prince Koreyasu" to "Minamoto no Koreyasu," and then back to "Imperial Prince Koreyasu." At that time, I introduced the view that emphasizes the convenience of the Imperial family (the Court), which suggests that "the granting of the Minamoto surname (demotion to subject status) was carried out to avoid the occurrence of imperial succession rights, even if he was nominally an imperial prince" (Ai Sogabe, "Politics and Structure of the Medieval Imperial Family").
This point can also be understood as part of the "cooperation based on the complex interests of the Court and the Shogunate" mentioned earlier.
Now, as mentioned earlier, the Daikakuji-to (Kameyama imperial line), which had spent a period of misfortune due to various circumstances, soon succeeded in a comeback and reclaimed the throne and the position of Chiten no Kimi (the retired emperor in power) from the Jimyoin-to.
At this time, what the Daikakuji-to is said to have brought up was the "Last Will and Testament of Retired Emperor Go-Saga." In other words, they developed the argument that "the true intention of Retired Emperor Go-Saga was for succession by the Kameyama imperial line, and for the Jimyoin-to (Go-Fukakusa imperial line) to ascend the throne for two consecutive generations is an act of injustice and disloyalty that goes against his will."
However, in reality, after Emperor Fushimi, Prince Tanehito (Emperor Go-Fushimi), who had already been named Crown Prince, ascended the throne, and the cloistered government by the retired Emperor Fushimi, who had abdicated, began. The Daikakuji-to succeeded in installing "Prince Kuniharu (later Emperor Go-Nijo)," the first son of Go-Uda, as the Crown Prince to Go-Fushimi, and managed to connect the imperial line.
Here, let us look back at the operation of the "system of imperial council decisions." As mentioned earlier, while the Daikakuji-to emphasized the "personal judgment of the Chiten no Kimi," it is thought that the Jimyoin-to tended to place more importance on the "system of a council-based system."
According to records, it cannot be confirmed that systems such as the "Tokusei Hyojo" (Virtuous Government Council) and "Zasso Hyojo" (Miscellaneous Litigation Council), which were said to have been established during the Kameyama cloistered government, as well as the "Bundenteichu," a subordinate body of the Zasso Hyojo, were inherited as they were by the Jimyoin-to. It has also been confirmed from sources such as "Kanchuki" (the diary of the court noble Hirohashi Kane-naka) that cases handled by the Zasso Hyojo during the Daikakuji-to period were processed by the Tokusei Hyojo during the Jimyoin-to period.
This means that the way the system of imperial council decisions (In-hyojo) was conducted had been "rewound" from the form of the Kameyama cloistered government to that of the Go-Saga cloistered government, and at the same time, it suggests that the personal judgment by the Chiten no Kimi was also more restrained and limited than during the Daikakuji-to period. From these points, one can understand why the Jimyoin-to is evaluated as having valued the "accuracy of administrative documents, including litigation" and the "propriety and legitimacy of procedures."
This stance, combined with the circumstances in which the continuation of the imperial line became possible through the intervention of Hojo Tokimune, can be said to be a manifestation of the fact that the Jimyoin-to placed more importance on "cooperation with the Shogunate." In other words, it can be expressed that they effectively possessed all "three guarantees" that Retired Emperor Go-Saga had: "economic power" based on the Chokodo-ryo estates, "political power" based on the system of imperial council decisions (In-hyojo), and cooperation and coordination with the Shogunate, i.e., the "Kamakura-dono."
This situation could be said to have been a kind of "spring" for the Jimyoin-to, as they effectively monopolized the "Emperor," the "Chiten no Kimi," and the "Kamakura-dono."
However, as I have discussed at length up to this point, including in the introduction, this does not mean that the Imperial Court, including the Cloistered Emperor, became a mere shell under the reign of the Jimyoin-to line. While their direction differed slightly from that of the Daikakuji-to line, the Jimyoin-to line remained a 'substantive government' nonetheless.
One manifestation of this was the various reforms reportedly carried out by Emperor Fushimi, who received the throne from the Daikakuji-to line.
The 'Roots' of Go-Daigo
In fact, it is said that the Retired Emperor Gofukakusa did not follow the customs of the time and declined to conduct a full-scale cloistered government as the sovereign in charge (chiten no kimi). The reason for this is not clear, but it is understood that, as a result, 'direct rule by Emperor Fushimi' was carried out. In other words, Emperor Fushimi became the sovereign in charge 'in both name and reality.' Note that the term 'sovereign in charge' (chiten no kimi) also referred to the Emperor himself in terms of the word's meaning.
This direct rule by Emperor Fushimi is said to have been part of a 'virtuous government' (tokusei) implemented in response to natural disasters that had continued for two years at the time. A 'Zasso Gijo' (Council for Miscellaneous Litigation) was established, inheriting the form of the 'Zasso Hyojo' (Council for Miscellaneous Litigation) from the Kameyama cloistered government period, and the council members were organized into 'three shifts' (a three-rotation system).
A feature of this Zasso Gijo is that high-ranking court nobles such as the Kampaku (Chief Advisor to the Emperor) participated as 'Tonin' (heads/persons in charge). This means that 'miscellaneous litigation' (zasso), which mostly consisted of lawsuits regarding land rights, was positioned as the most important issue in national politics.
As I have touched upon in previous articles, the greatest political issue for both the Imperial Court and the Shogunate at the time was the adjustment of interests surrounding land rights. In that sense, even when the imperial line shifted from the Daikakuji-to to the Jimyoin-to, it can be understood that there was no major change in the basic structure where the Imperial Court and the Shogunate shared the responsibility of dealing with 'miscellaneous litigation' (shomu-sata).
Another reform reportedly carried out by Emperor Fushimi was the opening of a 'Teichu' (courtroom) within the 'Kirokujo' (Records Office). As mentioned in a previous article, the 'Teichu' was a place that functioned similarly to a modern court of law, or an 'Oshirasu' (magistrate's court) in the Edo period.
As for what the 'Kirokujo' was in this case, it is thought to be a revival of the name 'Kiroku Shoen Kenkeijo' (Records and Manor Deed Office). This agency, known in conjunction with the Manor Consolidation Act of the Emperor Gosanjo period, was responsible for investigating illegal manors and confiscating manors with incomplete documentation, but it is believed to have disappeared after the death of Emperor Gosanjo, and after several subsequent revivals and disappearances, it was absorbed into the cloistered government mechanism (In-no-cho).
The 'Kirokujo' established by Emperor Fushimi had almost no direct continuity with this system from the Gosanjo period and is understood to have been organized mainly as a department specializing in handling miscellaneous litigation (shomu-sata). Institutionally, it had a character very similar to the 'Bundono Teichu' of the Kameyama cloistered government period, and it was a mechanism where mid-to-low-ranking practical bureaucrats would summon the plaintiff and the defendant, conduct a 'taiketsu monchu' (oral cross-examination), and report the results to the higher-ranking council.
From the above points, it can be evaluated that Emperor Fushimi of the Jimyoin-to line, and even the Retired Emperor Fushimi after his abdication, also governed earnestly as the sovereign in charge and achieved certain results. It could be said that the difference from the Daikakuji-to line was merely a 'difference in temperature' in their governing stance, or to what extent they valued 'direct judgment by the sovereign in charge.'
However, as a general trend, while a political style premised on cooperation with the Shogunate was strongly seen in the Jimyoin-to line, it is also a fact that the Daikakuji-to line had a relatively stronger orientation toward independence and self-reliance from the Shogunate.
Therefore, the fact that the later Emperor Go-Daigo was strongly committed to direct rule and aspired to overthrow the Shogunate—that is, the 'self-reliance and independence of royal power'—can also be understood by placing it on the extension of the 'political style and tendencies of the Kameyama imperial line (Daikakuji-to)' that we have seen so far.
Conclusion
In this article, I have mainly re-examined the significance of the 'alternating succession of the two imperial lines' as an amateur. While I said in the introduction that I would 'briefly look at how Emperor Go-Daigo became that 'great tree',' far from a great tree, I have only touched upon the 'sprout' and a part of the 'roots' of Go-Daigo.
As I touched upon in a previous article, I stated that Hojo Tokimune's policy of 'having the two lines alternate so that the throne is occupied,' or the 'alternating succession of the two imperial lines,' while leaving some doubts from the perspective of rationality, can be considered to have 'some merit' from the perspective of securing a 'backup succession line.'
This can be imagined as being somewhat similar to systems such as the 'Gosanke' (Three Houses) and 'Gosankyo' (Three Lords) in the later Edo Shogunate, or the 'Miyake' (princely houses) in the royal family.
However, we also confirmed that these 'two lines' resulted in both becoming 'substantive governments' with the same degree of 'authority,' 'economic power,' and 'political power,' which was one of the factors that made the problem extremely 'difficult to recover.'
Nevertheless, for the Kamakura Shogunate, which relied on the Imperial Court for the 'greatest source (basis) of power,' the stability of the Imperial Court (royal family) was directly linked to the stability of the Shogunate's power. They needed to control the relationship between the Court and the Shogunate within a delicate balance of 'we are in trouble if the sovereign in charge is too weak, but we are also in trouble if they are too strong.'
Also, I reaffirmed that in this series, as an important premise for understanding the 'alternating succession of the two imperial lines,' I am taking the position that 'in many cases, the royal family (Imperial Court) was the main actor in the disputes over imperial succession, and the Shogunate (samurai) basically remained only passively involved,' which can be called the 'Shogunate entanglement theory' for convenience.
The shogunate (the samurai) intervened in the "affairs of the sovereign" actively and independently only in "emergencies involving the shogunate's own survival." It is believed that, as a rule, or at least as a matter of genuine intent, they maintained a policy of "non-intervention" regarding matters concerning the Imperial family and the Imperial court.
Regarding the "boundary dispute" between Mount Koya and Kongobu-ji Temple in Kii Province that occurred during the regency of Hojo Tokiyori, which I mentioned in a previous article, Tokiyori decided that while the shogunate would judge the "violence that occurred incidental to the dispute," the boundary dispute itself should be "subject to imperial decision", meaning it should be "judged by the Imperial court (outside our jurisdiction)." This judgment can also be seen as an example of the shogunate's consistent stance that "matters of the Imperial court (Imperial family), including the affairs of the sovereign, should be handled by the Imperial court (Imperial family)."
Furthermore, I touched upon the "weakness in the legitimacy of the Daikakuji line in terms of genealogy" that the later Emperor Go-Daigo faced, and cited the fact that Hojo Tokiyori of the Hojo clan (the Tokuso family), who faced a similar weakness, ultimately "crushed it with force." I presented the perspective that Go-Daigo, too, may not have had "many options available" due to this structural weakness.
I also focused on the "system of imperial council" that supported the authority and power of Retired Emperor Go-Saga, and pointed out that while the Kameyama imperial line (Daikakuji line) inherited the aspect of emphasizing "direct imperial decision (chokusai)" more strongly, the Go-Fukakusa imperial line (Jimyoin line) tended to place greater importance on the "system of deliberation."
I provided an overview of how these tendencies converged into differences in political style—the Daikakuji line's "emphasis on personal rule" versus the Jimyoin line's "emphasis on procedure and legitimacy"—and further, into differences in their sense of distance from the shogunate, characterized by "autonomy and independence from the shogunate" versus "strong cooperation with the shogunate."
However, this does not mean that the Jimyoin line can be evaluated as a "mere decorative government that relied solely on the shogunate." As an example that the Jimyoin line, like the Daikakuji line, "governed earnestly," I briefly touched upon the establishment and development of the "miscellaneous litigation council" and the "court of the record office" during the reign of Emperor Fushimi.
In this way, it can be said that the Jimyoin line also maintained a "substantive government" under a somewhat warmer climate of court-shogunate cooperation. On the other hand, while I have stated that the Daikakuji line had a stronger tendency to aim for "autonomy and independence from the shogunate" compared to the Jimyoin line, it cannot be denied that the Daikakuji line also relied on the Kamakura shogunate and, at times, "utilized" it significantly.
Next time, I would like to focus on "Emperor (Retired Emperor) Go-Uda" as a prime example of this, and provide an overview of how he utilized the shogunate and how that "ended up" leading to "Go-Daigo."
The main themes are scheduled to be "the split of the imperial line within the Daikakuji line," "the reign of Go-Uda and the concept of imperial succession," and if there is time, "how these led to Go-Daigo's overturning of the table," but it is possible that the topic might change entirely.
We are finally entering the second half of the discussion on the Kamakura shogunate and the alternating succession. It is a roundabout way of arguing as always, but I would appreciate it if you could continue to bear with me.
Well then, look forward to the next installment.
※ This text was created through a collaboration where I wrote the original text, and ChatGPT performed fact-checking and rewriting (I have made some minor final manual corrections).