What is the Veto Power That Blocked UN Membership? Decoding the UN Security Council During the Cold War
This is History Lab, where I post history videos on YouTube.
I have compiled this as a reading piece based on the content of the videos I have posted.
The theme this time is the path Japan took after the end of the war to achieve UN membership and return to the international community.
The content of this article can also be viewed in the video on our homepage.
Please take a look at that as well if you like.
Chapter 1: What is the United Nations? The Return to the International Community Aimed for by Post-War Japan
The United Nations (UN) is an international organization born from the lessons of World War II. It creates a "place" for countries to talk, cooperate, and suppress conflicts. Building on the failure of the League of Nations, which could not prevent war, it was launched in 1945 as a more effective mechanism.
At the center of the UN is the Security Council (UNSC). It includes the permanent members—the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China—who hold "veto power." In other words, no matter how many countries are in favor, if even one permanent member opposes it, a decision cannot be made. This powerful system would become the biggest obstacle to Japan's UN membership after the war.
Meanwhile, immediately after the end of the war, Japan was not in a state where it could act as a "member" of the international community at all. After its surrender in September 1945, Japan was placed under the occupation of the Allied Powers, and democratization and demilitarization were promoted under GHQ. With its sovereignty as a nation restricted and its diplomatic freedom severely bound, a period of focusing on domestic reconstruction followed.
That is precisely why returning to the international community was a "long-cherished wish" for Japan. For a defeated country to be recognized in the world again, it had to cross the first hurdle. That was the conclusion of a peace treaty and the restoration of sovereignty.
Chapter 2: Restoration of Sovereignty Through the San Francisco Peace Treaty, But Challenges Remained
In September 1951, a peace conference was held in San Francisco, USA. 52 countries gathered. The plenipotentiary for Japan was the then-Prime Minister, Shigeru Yoshida. Post-war Japanese diplomacy was tested through this peace conference on whether it could "restart as a nation."
Ultimately, 49 countries, including Japan, signed the treaty. However, a significant "omission" occurred here. The Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia refused to sign, and the fact that the Soviet Union did not join weighed heavily on Japan's later diplomacy. Furthermore, China was not invited to the conference due to the conflict over representation (the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China). In other words, even though the peace treaty was concluded, the division of international politics remained.
The treaty came into effect on April 28, 1952, and Japan was freed from occupation and regained its sovereignty. The day had come to stand up as an independent nation. However, at the same time, it was confronted with the harsh reality regarding its territory and regions. The renunciation of rights to Taiwan and the Kuril Islands was stipulated, and Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands remained under US administration.
For Japan, which had regained its sovereignty, the next goal was clear: membership in the UN. Joining the UN and conducting diplomacy on an equal footing with other countries held symbolic meaning as the "final touch of post-war reconstruction." However, that wish would not be easily granted. This is because the UN has the Cold War mechanism of veto power.
Chapter 3: 1952, The Application for UN Membership and the Wall of the Soviet Veto
In June 1952, shortly after regaining sovereignty, Japan applied for UN membership. However, at the time, the world was in the midst of the Cold War. The capitalist camp led by the United States and the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union were in fierce conflict, and the world was split in two. In Asia, the establishment of the People's Republic of China and the Korean War further heightened tensions.
The membership application was deliberated in the Security Council and gathered overwhelming support with 10 votes in favor and 1 against. Even so, membership was not granted because the Soviet Union, which opposed it, exercised its veto power. Although the excuse of "premature" was used, in short, the Soviet Union did not want to easily accept Japan, which was trying to return to the side of the West. While the UN held up ideals, real international politics were moved by the intentions of the great powers—it was a moment when that harshness was exposed.
Even if Japan obtained a resolution of support in the General Assembly, it could not break through as long as there was the Security Council veto. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked on Asian and African countries to try to expand the circle of support, but the final key was held by the Soviet Union. Here, the Japanese government realized painfully that the path to UN membership could not be opened without repairing relations with the Soviet Union.
In other words, UN membership was not just a "procedure," but became diplomacy itself, questioning where Japan stood within the Cold War structure and how it would face its neighbors.
Chapter 4: Ichiro Hatoyama and the Moscow Negotiations! The Steep Road to Normalizing Japan-Soviet Diplomatic Relations
A turning point came with the inauguration of the Ichiro Hatoyama cabinet in December 1954. Hatoyama made the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union his top priority, aiming for an "independent diplomacy" that differed from the Yoshida line, which was centered on cooperation with the United States. He believed that what was necessary for UN membership was a change in the Soviet Union's attitude. His idea was that the only way forward was to negotiate directly.
However, the negotiations were fraught with difficulties from the start. The biggest point of contention was the Northern Territories. Japan demanded the return of the four islands, while the Soviet Union refused to budge. The discussions went in circles, revealing the reality that mutual distrust was far too deep even before considering the "restoration of diplomatic relations."
In 1956, as the situation reached a stalemate, the Soviet Union took a hardline approach by unilaterally drawing the "Bulganin Line" to restrict fishing in the waters north of Hokkaido. Japanese fishing boats were seized, and the people who had gone out to fish were taken into custody. The blow to the fishing industry was severe, and strong pressure was placed on the Japanese side. Diplomatic negotiations were encroaching on the realities of daily life.
Even so, Hatoyama did not back down. He sent his close aide, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry Ichiro Kono, to Moscow to continue the negotiations. Then, in October 1956, Hatoyama made the decision to go to Moscow himself. Despite his advanced age and poor health, he likely had the determination that "if I don't act now, the path will never open."
The negotiations began on October 13, with Hatoyama representing Japan and Prime Minister Bulganin and Khrushchev representing the Soviet Union. A comprehensive agreement on the territorial issue was not reached. Nevertheless, they explored a realistic compromise by agreeing to hand over the Habomai Islands and Shikotan Island after the conclusion of a peace treaty.
On October 19, the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration was signed, deciding on the end of the state of war, the restoration of diplomatic relations, and the repatriation of Siberian detainees. Most importantly, it was explicitly stated that the Soviet Union would support Japan's UN membership. Removing the greatest barrier—the veto—through diplomatic negotiation became the decisive factor for UN membership.
Chapter 5: December 18, 1956, the Long-Cherished Wish of UN Membership Finally Realized
On December 12, 1956, about two months after the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration, Japan's UN membership was deliberated again at the Security Council. This time, the Soviet Union voted in favor, and membership was supported unanimously. It was the moment the door, which had been blocked by a veto in 1952, finally opened.
Then, on December 18, at a General Assembly held at the UN headquarters in New York, Japan's membership was officially approved. Japan was welcomed as the 80th member state. Eleven years after the end of the war—having overcome numerous hurdles such as occupation, the restoration of sovereignty, the wall of the Cold War, and Japan-Soviet negotiations—Japan was finally recognized as an "official member" of the international community.
Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu attended the accession ceremony and pledged to respect the purposes of the United Nations and devote efforts to world peace. This news spread throughout Japan, and newspapers and radio stations reported it extensively. UN membership was not merely a diplomatic achievement; it was a "proof of return" for postwar Japan and became a milestone that remained in people's hearts.
Having completed this major task, Prime Minister Hatoyama resigned, and subsequent administrations continued to place UN-centrism at the core of their diplomacy. Japan was eventually elected as a non-permanent member of the Security Council many times, advancing as a major country supporting the UN. Its presence grew in terms of financial contributions as well, and its role as a donor country supporting UN activities became significant.
On December 18, 1956, Japan shed its status as a defeated nation and returned as a member of the international community. The history that followed is also a history of continuously facing the question, "What can we do for the world as a peaceful nation?"
※ This article is a summary based on research conducted as a hobby, utilizing AI tools and other resources.