Why Does China Repeat It? A Verification of 10 Years of Radar Lock-ons and Japan's Policy Failures
Introduction: Why does the same thing keep happening even after 10 years?
Chinese military aircraft locked their radar onto Self-Defense Force aircraft.
When I heard this report, I felt a strong sense of déjà vu.
This is because this country has been exposed to the same danger for over 10 years.
The 2013 lock-on against a Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer.
The series of incidents from 2023 to 2024.
And now, this incident in 2025.
Surprisingly, Japan has repeated almost the same response each time,
and China has escalated its actions each time.
A radar lock-on is a 'pre-attack' act.
The fact that it is repeated means that
Japan's protests are not functioning as a deterrent.
So, what is China testing?
And why has Japan 'failed to learn'?
In this column, while looking back at the 10-year history,
I will delve into the structural weaknesses that Japan has continued to harbor.
Background 1: 2013, Chinese Navy locks onto MSDF destroyer—the 'first warning'
It was in 2013 that Japan was first confronted head-on with the danger of 'lock-on acts' by China.
A Chinese naval vessel locked its fire-control radar (FCR) onto a Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer.
In military terms, this is not just intimidation, but carries the meaning of being one step away from an attack.
At the time, I felt that 'China has crossed a line.'
This is because a radar lock-on is not an accidental act during training,
but an 'action' accompanied by clear intent.
However, the attitude China took immediately after was even more shocking.
When the Japanese government protested, China completely denied it as 'baseless,'
and began using state-run media to manipulate public opinion into the narrative of a 'Japanese fabrication.'
Here, China's strategy of integrating military action and information warfare is clearly visible.
Nevertheless, Japan's reaction was extremely weak.
Although a strong protest was made, in reality, it ended with just expressing 'regret,'
and no concrete countermeasures or legal frameworks were implemented.
At this time, I felt strongly,
'China will definitely lock on again.'
Because if there is no cost to an action, the opponent will not change their behavior.
The 2013 lock-on incident was, so to speak, the 'first warning'
that China carried out to gauge Japan's 'reaction.'
However, Japan did not deeply understand the meaning of this warning.
The price for that continues to the present day, 10 years later.
Background 2: The series of lock-ons from 2023 to 2024—'proof that it is not accidental'
10 years after the 'first warning' of 2013.
China once again, and in quick succession, carried out lock-on acts against Japanese air and maritime units.
The incidents from 2023 to 2024 can no longer be dismissed with the word 'coincidence.'
Rather, it can be said to be evidence showing that China is intentionally escalating.
At that time, Chinese military aircraft were repeating provocative actions not only around the Senkaku Islands,
but also near Japan's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).
In addition to radar lock-ons, dangerous approaches, low-altitude flights, and surveillance activities by drones—
all of these could be read as 'preliminary simulations' with a Taiwan contingency in mind.
I felt that from around this time, China's principle of action had clearly changed.
It was an action of,
'measuring the boundary line of how much Japan will endure.'
The Japanese side continued to protest, but
the content was no different from 10 years ago.
'It is regrettable,' 'Extremely dangerous for national security'
—the wording was correct, but no concrete countermeasures were presented.
As a result, the message conveyed to China was this:
'Japan will not react strongly even if we lock on.'
And that leads to the lock-on in 2025.
Furthermore, within China, military hardliners were gaining momentum.
The slowdown in economic growth, the strengthening of domestic control, the maintenance of the Xi administration's authority—
all of these were used as material to justify 'external coercive actions'.
The continuous lock-ons from 2023 to 2024 were a definitive sign indicating a structure where
it is not that the Chinese military is running wild,
but rather that China is intentionally testing Japan's reactions.
In other words, this latest lock-on is not a sudden incident.
It is an 'inevitable event' that occurred as a result of Japan's response remaining unchanged for 10 years.
Impact on Japan (1): What radar lock-ons mean—'effectively one step away from engagement'
Even when many Japanese people hear the term 'radar lock-on',
they do not have a concrete image of how dangerous an act it is.
However, in military terms, a lock-on is synonymous with having a finger on the trigger.
A Fire Control Radar (FCR) is, in itself, a declaration of intent that 'I can attack at any time.'
The moment they are locked on, the defense-side pilots and crew members
could lose their lives if they make a mistake in their next move.
That is how tense the situation is.
In fact, radar lock-ons are treated globally as
'one step away from engagement'
and 'just before an accidental armed clash.'
In the international community, a lock-on is an extremely provocative act,
at a level where one could not complain even if it were considered an 'attack'.
That is precisely why I categorize this latest lock-on not as a mere provocation, but as
'a dangerous act that increases the possibility of an armed clash.'
If the Self-Defense Forces misidentify the situation and evasive maneuvers are delayed,
there is a possibility of a collision between aircraft or a chain reaction of unintended attacks.
At that moment, there is even a risk that Japan and China could enter a 'state of combat'.
Furthermore, when this type of behavior is repeated,
stress on the front lines increases, and the probability of judgment errors rises.
The series of lock-on acts from 2013 to 2025
can only be seen as 'intentionally accumulating the risk of accidental clashes.'
And what is frightening is that
the Japanese side continues to respond in the same way.
Protesting, expressing regret, and demanding the prevention of recurrence—
but China's behavior does not change.
In other words, it means that 'Japan's safety' cannot be protected under the current system.
A radar lock-on is
an action for China to test Japan's reactions,
measure Japan's deterrence,
and probe Japan's weaknesses.
Unless this reality is understood,
Japan will repeat the same mistakes as 10 years ago.
Impact on Japan (2): Impact on diplomacy and public opinion—The limits of 'repeated regrets'
One of the reasons the radar lock-on issue has become this serious
is that Japan's diplomatic stance has hardly changed in 10 years.
Every time an incident occurs, the government issues a protest
and releases a boilerplate statement saying,
'It is extremely regrettable' and 'It is absolutely unacceptable.'
But there is no 'action' that follows.
Diplomacy cannot be established with words alone.
If you cannot change the other country's behavior,
it is not called deterrence.
The very fact that China continues to repeat lock-ons
is proof that Japan's diplomacy is not having an effect.
There is also a problem with domestic public opinion.
The understanding of how dangerous a radar lock-on is
has not sufficiently permeated the general public.
Media coverage dies down in a few days and fades from people's memories.
As a result, the 'priority that should be seriously addressed' does not rise for politicians either.
China understands this 'Japanese weakness' well.
No matter how much Japan protests,
the public is not greatly agitated,
and there is no atmosphere supporting strong government measures.
In other words,
the perception that 'Japan is a country that does not take strong reactions'
is making China's behavior even bolder.
Furthermore, Japan's stance of 'consideration for China'
is also working to its disadvantage in diplomatic negotiations.
Even if they protest strongly, they do not take substantive sanctions or countermeasures.
This lacks persuasiveness even in the eyes of the international community.
Radar lock-ons are not merely a military issue,
but can be called a symbolic case
that encapsulates the weaknesses in Japan's diplomatic power, political judgment, and public awareness.
symbolic case.
Repeated expressions of regret
will not stop China's actions.
Rather,
it continues to send the wrong message
that 'Japan is a country that will not react even if we go this far.'
Unless Japan faces the 'limitations' of its diplomacy squarely,
it will repeat this problem forever.

Domestic Challenges: Delays in Legal Development and 'Indecisive Politics'
The reason Japan cannot take strong countermeasures against radar lock-ons
is not a lack of military power.
The biggest problem is that politics and the legal system have fallen into a 'structure that cannot make decisions.'
In the first place, Japan
lacks comprehensive legal frameworks for 'gray zone situations' that do not reach the level of armed attack.
Since a radar lock-on is not an attack,
Japan cannot invoke the right of self-defense.
However, the danger is clearly one step away from an armed clash.
This half-baked state
is what creates a 'Japan that can do nothing.'
Even if the government wants to take a firm stance,
because the laws are ambiguous,
it cannot step forward for fear of political risk.
As a result, it can only take the same response now as it did 10 years ago.
Furthermore, parliamentary debate is also lagging.
Despite the fact that the threat from China has been clear for over 10 years,
discussions on security have been used as political tools,
and essential legal development has been continuously postponed.
In the background of this
is the misguided trend that 'strong security policy equals heading toward war.'
This suspension of critical thinking is significantly weakening Japan's deterrent power.
I want to emphasize repeatedly that
deterrence is the 'power to avoid war,' not the power to seek it.
China continues to repeat these lock-on acts
because it understands that Japan is a 'country that will not strike back.'
Also, an old custom of 'consideration for China' remains in domestic politics.
Fearing the impact on economic relations,
many lawmakers are reluctant to send a strong message.
But prioritizing the economy at the expense of security
is, in the long run, the most dangerous choice for a nation.
Ultimately,
the radar lock-on issue is not a problem of military technology,
but a problem of 'institutional design' and 'political judgment.'
As long as legal development is delayed and politics remains stagnant,
China will likely continue these lock-on acts.
Until Japan shows the 'resolve to change,'
the same crisis will be repeated over and over again.
International Environment: US-China Tensions, Taiwan Situation, and Reactions from Allies
Even a seemingly 'localized incident' like a radar lock-on
is actually occurring within the massive flow of international affairs.
Unless this is understood, the essence cannot be grasped.
First, the US-China confrontation is no longer just 'competition'
but is entering a state of 'managed conflict.'
The US is gradually clarifying its stance to defend Taiwan,
and China is advancing 'fait accompli' through military exercises and shows of force.
Japan is caught in the middle of this.
If tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait,
the first to be affected will be Japan's Southwestern Islands.
The fact that Chinese military aircraft are increasing their activities around Japan
and contacts with the Self-Defense Forces are increasing
is neither a coincidence nor a provocation, but part of a strategic flow.
Looking at the reactions of allies,
the US is asking Japan for a 'more active role.'
Australia and the UK are also strengthening their involvement in the Indo-Pacific,
moving to solidify multilateral deterrence against China.
On the other hand, the West is not necessarily monolithic.
Europe is exhausted from supporting Ukraine,
tensions in the Middle East continue,
and there are limits to their involvement in Asia.
The expectations placed on Japan
are heavier than those of a mere 'partner' on the surface.
Taiwan is also closely watching Japan's moves.
How will Japan act in the event of an emergency?
To what extent can it provide rear-guard support?
It is no exaggeration to say that the fate of the region hinges on that single point.
In other words, Japan's radar lock-on issue is also
“the result of regional tensions converging on a single point.”
Japan's ambiguous response
even carries the risk of undermining the trust of its allies.
I believe this:
The movements of the international community
are not proceeding at a speed that allows Japan to “leisurely debate.”
Over the past decade, security in Asia has transformed by skipping stages.
Whether or not we can face that reality squarely
will determine Japan's survival over the next decade.
Proposal 1: Redefining Deterrence—Technology, Legal Systems, and “Will”
The reason the same problem has been repeating for 10 years is simple.
It is because Japan's “deterrence” remains bound by “excessive self-restraint.”
Deterrence is not about using military force.
It is the power to make the opponent think, “It is not worth it to mess with Japan.”
However, Japan currently, in terms of technology, systems, and operations,
is failing to send that message effectively.
1. Technological Aspect: The reality of being deprived of the Self-Defense Forces' “eyes and hands”
A radar lock-on is an act that can be called a precursor to an attack.
Normally, the Japanese side should immediately return a
clear message that “counterattack capabilities exist.”
・But in reality, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities are insufficient.
・Lagging behind in new domains such as drones, AI analysis, and electronic warfare.
・Counterattack capabilities are still being developed, and political judgment remains shaky.
These weaknesses are giving the opponent an “opening.”
The Self-Defense Force personnel on the ground are excellent.
The problem lies in the fact that investment in equipment and technology as a nation has been delayed.
2. Legal System: Even the public is unclear about what is “permitted”
Even when Chinese military aircraft provoke,
at what point Japan can take a strong response,
most of the public does not understand.
Even politicians sometimes avoid explaining it.
This ambiguity is the greatest factor weakening deterrence.
Establishing laws,
and drawing a transparent and consistent line that says,
“If you cross this, Japan will act like this,”
is, I believe, the practical work required to protect peace.
3. Will: What is needed in the end is “the presence of resolve”
What China values most is not the “quantity of weapons” Japan has, but the will of its people.
“Is Japan truly serious about defending its territory and its people?”
“Does it have the resolve to make the Japan-U.S. alliance function?”
“Is it a nation that will not yield to provocation?”
Without being able to answer these questions, deterrence will never be complete.
I am a pacifist.
That is precisely why I am keenly aware that to avoid fighting, we must demonstrate the resolve to fight.
Deterrence begins with aligning a nation's will before resorting to military force.
Unless this order is changed,
Japan will continue to be provoked.
Proposal 2: A National Strategy to Ensure We Do Not Repeat the Same Mistakes in 10 Years
I do not believe we should let this radar lock-on issue end as just a 'dangerous incident.'
Rather, we should be asking ourselves right now as a nation: Are we okay with Japan still facing the same situation 10 years from now?
So, what is necessary to ensure that Japan is not continuously tested by China 10 years from now?
I believe the following three things are indispensable.
① Redefine Japan's 'territorial defense' as a national strategy
First, Japan has long since passed the stage where it can call China's actions 'unexpected.'
What we have learned over the past 10 years is the fact that China is consistently
testing Japan's reactions, political judgment, and the limits of its deterrence.
If that is the case, Japan must also have
“a national strategy to force the other side to change its behavior.”
Territorial defense should be a comprehensive strategy
that encompasses technology, diplomacy, and legal systems.
② Japan must regain 'consistency in action'
The biggest reason China repeatedly locks on its radar is that Japan responds the same way every time.
Conversely, if we show a consistent national line that says, “If you lock on, you will pay a price,”
China's behavior will inevitably change.
Countermeasures are not war.
They are common sense in the international community and the foundation of deterrence.
③ The public must understand that 'peace means facing reality'
I believe public understanding is the most important factor.
This is because the essence of deterrence is not military force, but 'national will.'
In Japan, the outdated idea that “discussing security equals dangerous thinking”
still persists.
But that is precisely what has kept peace out of reach.
Peace is something maintained by
“the courage to not look away, to prepare, and to face reality.”
If this way of thinking takes root among the people, politics will change, systems will change, and China's behavior will inevitably change as well.
Japan does not need to repeat the same mistakes it made 10 years ago.
What is needed is to accept reality and, rather than being afraid,
transform into a “prepared nation.”
I feel a strong sense of hope for that future.

Conclusion: Japan can no longer afford to make the “same mistakes”
The radar lock-on by Chinese military aircraft is a dangerous act of provocation and is completely unacceptable by international standards.
However, what I take most seriously is the reality that “the situation has hardly changed from 10 years ago.”
Japan issues warnings, and China denies them.
The public feels anxious, and politics can only take limited measures.
This repetition has sent the wrong message to the other side that “Japan will not change.”
However, I am by no means pessimistic.
Rather, I feel that this issue will become a catalyst for changing public awareness.
Japan is now maturing as a nation.
In the last few years, understanding of national security has deepened significantly, and
politics has also begun to steer, little by little, toward decisions that face the “reality” of national defense.
The national security strengthening measures put forward by Prime Minister Takaichi are a symbol of this.
Rebuilding deterrence, technological development, and strengthening alliances—
all of these are “national will” that Japan did not have 10 years ago.
Of course, not everything is perfect.
But the direction is certainly beginning to move forward.
Finally, this is what I believe:
Peace cannot be protected by wishes alone.
But if we do not give up, it can certainly be protected.
There is only one answer Japan should show for the future.
It is the determination to “become a nation that does not repeat the same mistakes.”
I believe in a future where this country regains that resolve and
stands up as a pillar supporting stability in Asia.
