#377 [Series: Why Weapons Don't Misfire Vol. 3] How Many Times a Day Do Self-Defense Officials Chant 'Clear, Safety Check!'? Confirmation Actions Are Not Rituals, But Lifelines

"Pointing and calling? That's embarrassing, isn't it? Calling out when no one is watching."

"We're all veterans here, so we know what we're doing without having to say it out loud."

"Power? I turned it off. See, the light is off, isn't it?"

"I checked it properly. ...I think I checked it, anyway."

—I suspect quite a few of you have had that last thought cross your mind.

Today, I will talk about the mechanism that creates that "I think."

Even after removing the magazine, one round remains

Last time, using a handgun as an example, I talked about foolproof design—a design that prevents operation due to carelessness.

Today, we will take it a step further and look at the rifle.

For a Self-Defense Official, the rifle is the weapon they spend the most time with.

And for the rifle, there is a series of confirmation actions that are drilled into the personnel.

Among them, the procedure after finishing shooting is strictly enforced.

Remove the magazine.

Pull the bolt back.

Visually inspect the chamber.

Insert a finger and touch it.

And report it out loud.

Why go this far? The reason is clear.

Because just removing the magazine does not mean the gun is safe to fire.

Even after removing the magazine, one round remains in the chamber.

This single round has caused countless accidental discharges around the world.

Everyone who has caused an accident says the same thing: 'I thought I had cleared the chamber.'

That is why the Self-Defense Forces do not allow 'thinking you cleared it.'

Look with your eyes, touch with your fingers, and say it out loud.

Only by mobilizing all three senses can you definitively say that it is 'safe.'

And this action is not done because someone is watching.

Whether a commander is at the range or not, or whether you are exhausted after an exercise, you do it the same way.

There is not a single member who finds it embarrassing.

Rather, those who can do it properly are the ones who are trusted.

That is the culture.

Because they know.

What happened to those who skipped the verification process.

Before entering the command post, everyone points their muzzle toward the sand.

And this verification action takes on an even higher level of rigor in actual mission environments.

In overseas deployments or actual operational environments, devices called clearing barrels are placed at the entrances and exits of facilities such as command posts, camps, and dining halls.

It is a simple piece of equipment consisting of a cylinder filled with sand or sandbags, fixed at a downward angle.

Anyone entering, regardless of rank, is required to perform the same actions.

Point the muzzle toward the barrel.

Remove the magazine.

Pull the bolt back and check the chamber.

Then, pull the trigger.

In other words, you can only enter the building after performing a dry fire.

A great deal of philosophy is condensed here.

First, the location for verification is fixed.

It is not a matter of 'check it somewhere'.

It is designated to a single point: you do it here.

Second, the direction the muzzle points is predetermined to be safe.

Even if a round remains and is fired by mistake, the sand will catch it.

It is designed with the assumption that human verification will fail, and even accounts for the resulting damage.

This is the philosophy of fail-safe, which I will discuss in a later installment.

Third, a third party is watching.

A guard stands at the entrance and verifies the action.

It is not left to the individual's memory or report.

And fourth, you cannot enter without passing through it.

There is no bypass.

The option to skip it because you are busy simply does not exist.

On the battlefield, people sometimes die from accidental discharges by their own side rather than by the enemy.

To prevent this, this 'checkpoint' is what militaries around the world have arrived at.

Verification, which was once left to individual manners, is now provided by the organization along with the location, procedure, and witness—here, the center of gravity for safety has clearly shifted from the individual to the organization.

Does your workplace have a 'place you must pass through before entering'?

This concept of a checkpoint can be applied directly to the workplace.

In many workplaces, rules regarding entry into hazardous areas exist as 'common knowledge'.

Wear protective equipment before entering.

Do not bring in fire sources.

Do not take out tools.

——These are all correct, but the fact that whether or not to follow them is left to the individual is the decisive difference from a clearing barrel.

Translated into workplace terminology, it looks like this:

(NG) 'Confirm the wearing of protective equipment before entering a hazardous area.'
→ (OK) 'Limit the entrance to one location, create a flow line that cannot be bypassed, and station a checker there.'

(NG) 'Inform everyone not to bring lighters, etc., into no-fire zones.'
→ (OK) 'Install a storage box at the entrance and implement a system where you cannot pass without depositing them.'

(NG) 'Enter restricted areas only after obtaining permission.'
→ (OK) 'Make it so that the area cannot be unlocked without receiving a permit, and clearly identify the authorizing person and the witness.'

There are four points.

Decide on a location.

Decide on a safe direction.

Have a third party observe.

Make it impossible to bypass.

If even one of these is missing, the confirmation will eventually become a mere formality.

Conversely, whether or not you can create one 'checkpoint' that satisfies these four conditions is the dividing line between being able to transition from a warning-based approach to a system-based one.

'Seeing' and 'confirming' are completely different things.

Now, let's move on to the topic of the workplace.

The testimony heard most often after an accident in the field is probably this:

"I thought I had checked."

This is not a lie.

The person really is looking.

However, looking and confirming are completely different tasks in terms of brain function.

The human eye automatically fills in 'what should be there' for familiar scenery.

If it is a switch you see every day, it looks like it is turned off.

If it is a passage you walk through every day, you will fail to notice even if there is an obstacle.

This is not a matter of attention, but an energy-saving function of the brain.

It works more strongly the more experienced you are.

What breaks this automatic processing is pointing and calling.

The action of pointing a finger, the vocalization of speaking out loud, and the sense of hearing your own voice.

By adding these, the brain is forcibly switched from 'work mode' to 'confirmation mode'.

This is not just a matter of spirit, but a fact confirmed by experiments.

In an experiment conducted by the Railway Technical Research Institute in 1994, the error rate for tasks performed without any action was approximately 2.38%, whereas it dropped to approximately 0.38% when pointing and calling were performed.

That is about one-sixth.

In other words, pointing and calling is not a ritual to get pumped up.

It is an effective technique that lowers the error rate itself by one order of magnitude.

Being embarrassed and skipping it is like throwing away effective medicine because 'it looks uncool to take it'.

Where is the 'round left in the chamber' at your workplace?

What is even more important is what you are checking.

As mentioned earlier, simply 'removing the magazine' does not make it safe.

This is because one round remains in the chamber.

When translated to the workplace, there are terrifyingly many situations where this applies.

Even if you turn off the power, the machine may still be capable of moving.

Electric charge remaining in a capacitor.

Pressure remaining in an air tank.

Pressure trapped in a hydraulic circuit.

Cylinders or tables that remain raised and could fall under their own weight.

Flywheels that continue to spin due to inertia.

Heat remaining in heated metal.

These are all equivalent to the one round left in the chamber.

The moment you reach in thinking, 'It's fine because I turned off the power,' the machine fires that last round.

That is precisely why the procedure known as LOTO (Lockout/Tagout) was established.

Turn off the power.

Lock the circuit breaker.

The worker themselves keeps the key.

Attach a tag to clearly indicate whose work is in progress.

Then, release the residual energy and actually test and confirm that it does not move.

Do you see?

The philosophy behind this is exactly the same as the confirmation procedure for a rifle.

Do not just finish by saying 'I've cut it,' but physically verify that it is 'truly in a state where it cannot be fired.'

Physically secure it so that others cannot return it to its original state on their own.

Clearly state who is responsible for it.

When translated into the language of the field, it looks like this.

(NG) 'Check the power supply before working.'
→ (OK) 'After shutting off the power, release residual pressure, press the start button to confirm it does not move, and then begin work.'

(NG) 'Call out to others so they don't turn the power on.'
→ (OK) 'Attach the worker's own padlock to the circuit breaker and keep the key in the worker's possession.'

(NG) 'Hang a tag during inspection.'
→ (OK) 'Write the worker's name, start time, and contact information on the tag, and clearly state in the regulations that only the person who hung it can remove it.'

Action plan starting tomorrow

1. Decide on just one item that corresponds to a 'residual ammunition check'.

It is not realistic to introduce LOTO to all tasks at once.

First, please choose just one.

The way to choose is simple.

Name one task where 'if the machine moved during work, it would result in more than just a serious injury.'

Then, for that task, specifically decide 'how to confirm that it will not move after turning off the power.'

Try pressing the start button.

Watch the pressure gauge reach zero.

Try pushing the moving parts by hand.

Once decided, please add it as one line to your procedure manual.

One line is enough.

Confirmations that are not written down will inevitably be skipped.

And to take it a step further, decide 'where and in front of whom' you will perform that confirmation.

The reason clearing barrels are so effective is that not only the action, but also the location and the witness are set as a package.

Instead of 'confirm before working,' it should be 'show the foreman in front of the bulletin board at the entrance before entering.'

Only when it is decided to this extent does confirmation become a habit.

2. Change pointing and calling from something 'embarrassing' to a 'mark of a professional'

The biggest reason for failure in implementation is psychological resistance.

There is only one way to overcome this.

Managers and executives must take the lead and do it in a loud voice.

In a workplace where you tell young staff to 'do it' but don't do it yourself, it will never take root.

Conversely, if the president points and calls out every time they enter the site, it will become a culture within a year.

In addition, change how you communicate it.

Instead of 'do it for safety,' say, 'This is a technique that reduces errors by a factor of six. You'd be a fool not to use it.'.

People who master effective techniques are not uncool.

They are professionals.

3. Explicitly state 'end-of-work confirmation' in the work procedure manual

In many workplaces, procedure manuals end with 'how to do the work'.

However, accidents happen just as much at the end of the work as they do during it.

This is because it is the time when people let their guard down, want to go home early, and rush to clean up.

The reason the Self-Defense Force is so strict about checks before leaving the firing range is precisely because they know this is a dangerous time.

Please add a few lines for end-of-shift checks to the end of the procedure manual.

'Have the tools been returned to their designated positions?', 'Has the safety cover been replaced?', 'Have the power and main valves been closed?', 'Have the tags and locks been collected?'

This alone can reduce accidents that occur at the start of the next morning's shift.

Can you speak up when no one is watching?

Please recall that scene once more.

A soldier who has finished an exercise, in the dark, with an exhausted body, still removes the magazine, inserts a finger into the chamber, and confirms it out loud.

No one is watching.

No one is praising them either.

Yet they still do it.

This is because they know that one action determines the difference between their life and their comrades' lives.

The level of safety management cannot be measured on the day of an audit.

Whether an exhausted worker performs confirmation actions on a Friday evening when no one is watching—that is the only place where the true answer lies.

And this is not a matter of individual consciousness.

Have you created an atmosphere where it is easy to speak up?

Have you written the confirmation items in the procedure manual?

Have those in leadership positions demonstrated it themselves?

Whether you have designed a workplace where confirmation continues—this is a management issue.

Today, at your worksite, where is the one round left in the chamber?

Next time, Vol. 4: 'The Bullet Fires Even After Releasing the Trigger—The Terror of Continuously Operating Equipment Taught by "Cook-off".'

I will discuss the troublesome reality that accidents can happen even when safety devices are functioning normally.

What did you think of the above?

If you found this relatable, it would encourage me if you could leave a comment or click 'like'.

At Wallaby Labor and Social Security Attorney Office, we support businesses in the manufacturing, construction, and transportation industries with the development of work procedure manuals, the standardization of confirmation actions, and their integration into health and safety regulations.

We receive many consultations regarding issues such as 'we introduced point-and-call, but it didn't last' or 'we have procedure manuals, but they don't match actual practice'.

Whether confirmation actions continue is not a matter of on-site awareness, but a matter of design.

For 33 years in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, I was involved in the operation of helicopter units and the investigation of aviation accidents, and I have continuously observed from the organizational side under what conditions confirmation actions are followed and under what conditions they are omitted.

From that perspective, I propose mechanisms that actually work on the ground.

Our office primarily operates completely online, so companies anywhere in the country can consult with us without the burden of travel.

Please feel free to contact us.

Wallaby Labor and Social Security Attorney Office, Labor and Social Security Attorney, Shinobu Watanabe

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