Has Elbridge Colby 'Changed His Tune'?

—From a Taiwan contingency to Western Hemisphere hegemony: The quiet shift in American strategy

The central figure effectively designing the Trump administration's security strategy is Deputy Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby.

Before taking office, Colby was a well-known hardline critic on China who repeatedly stated that the top priority for American security strategy was a Taiwan contingency. He was a proponent of the view that

NATO member states should increase their defense spending, leaving Russia to NATO, while the U.S. concentrates its limited military resources on the Asia-Pacific. This was a consistent and highly realist strategic vision.

He was also someone keenly aware of the limitations in American weapons manufacturing capacity and ammunition stockpiles.
He was clearly opposed to exhausting limited offensive capabilities—which should have been reserved for a Taiwan contingency—on low-priority military actions like clearing out the Houthis.

However, Colby's stance since taking office appears to have clearly changed.

Under his leadership, the U.S. has sanctioned highly escalatory military actions, such as deploying carrier strike groups, launching a surprise attack on the capital of a country (Venezuela), and detaining its president (Maduro).

This appears to directly contradict the conventional image of Colby as someone who 'extremely dislikes the depletion of weapons.'

But is this change a 'change of heart'? I do not think so.

Rather, it is more natural to think that over the past year, the U.S. assessment of its chances of winning in a Taiwan contingency has been significantly downgraded. It is highly likely that a Taiwan contingency will no longer be a short, decisive war. China's A2/AD capabilities have evolved, and American forward bases and aircraft carriers could suffer significant damage in the initial stages. Moreover, the U.S. lags behind China in the replenishment speed of precision-guided munitions and ammunition.

In addition, domestic politics in allied nations such as Japan, South Korea, and European countries have become unstable, making it more opaque than before 'to what extent they will cooperate at the decisive moment.'

Under these conditions, a Taiwan contingency is

transforming from a war that can be won into a war that could be lost.

If Colby were the type of person to bet all of the nation's resources on a 'main front with a high probability of not winning,' he would be betraying the realism he has advocated until now.

That is precisely why the strategic axis has shifted.

What Colby began to prioritize after taking office was
the ' establishment of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere,' reminiscent of the Monroe Doctrine. The American media is calling this move the ' Donroe Doctrine' or the ' Trump corollary.'

From the American perspective, the Western Hemisphere has short supply lines,
can be controlled as a sphere of influence rather than through allies, and is difficult for players from other regions like China or Russia to intervene in significantly.

In other words, it is the only space where one can build a 'hegemony that cannot be lost,' let alone one that 'can be won'.

Rather than chasing an uncertain victory in Taiwan, solidify a certain hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.

This is not a retreat. It is a strategic redeployment.

At first glance, the surprise attack on the Venezuelan capital seems to contradict Colby's philosophy.

But in reality, it is merely the result of selecting 'where to expend resources.'

By distancing the U.S. from the high-risk, high-cost theater of Taiwan and visualizing American power in the low-risk, high-certainty space of the Western Hemisphere.

If you consider this a show of force for that purpose, this series of moves is actually extremely Colby-esque.

Cuba will likely be the next target. Greenland might also be taken away from Denmark. There is no such thing as international law there. All that exists is the 'exercise of power' using American military might to the fullest. Countries that do not follow the U.S. will be crushed. It is the Monroe Doctrine 2.0.

Colby has not changed his tune. He has directly factored in the probability of defeat in a Taiwan contingency.

And that may indicate that the U.S. is already shifting from 'global hegemony' to a ' redefinition of winnable hegemony.'