Is America Really That Wealthy?

Deciphering the 'true nature of wealth' from a 2025 GDP of $30.8 trillion, household net worth of $183 trillion, and net external liabilities of $21 trillion

When you actually come to America, you are struck by a strange sensation.

It is the world's largest economy, home to many of the world's massive corporations, boasts an overwhelming market capitalization in its stock market, and its dollar-denominated average income is far higher than Japan's. Yet, walking through the streets, the roads are not many times better than those in Japan. Public transportation is not overwhelmingly more convenient. Dining out is expensive, housing costs are high, and medical care and education cost a surprising amount of money. Even so, looking at the statistics, the world's wealth continues to gather in America.

So, where exactly does that 'wealth' reside?

What is America's GDP made of? Is GDP the citizens' salaries, corporate profits, or government spending? Why can the stock market rise at a speed far exceeding an economy where real GDP only grows by about 2-3% per year? Does the market capitalization of companies really represent that amount of 'value'? And if Japan were to simply quadruple its prices and wages, could it become an economy like America's?

In this article, we will consider these as a single problem.

To state the conclusion first, America's vastness cannot be explained by 'GDP' alone. In America, there are at least four different types of 'wealth': GDP as the real economy, the profits generated by companies, the market capitalization assigned to companies by the financial market, and household assets including stocks, real estate, and private companies. Furthermore, outside of that, there is another layer: $21 trillion in net liabilities to the rest of the world.

And to understand the America of today, it is more important than anything else not to confuse these.

The true nature of 'American wealth' that cannot be seen through numbers alone

The nominal GDP in 2025 is $30.7621 trillion, corporate profits are on the scale of $4 trillion, and household net worth is $183 trillion. Even so, when walking through American streets, one feels a sense of doubt: 'Is this country really many times wealthier than Japan?'

The roads and public transportation are not many times better than Japan's. Dining out, housing, medical care, and education are, if anything, surprisingly expensive. Yet, companies like Apple, Microsoft, NVIDIA, and Alphabet have market capitalizations so massive they rival national budgets, and the assets of the wealthy continue to grow through rising stock prices.

Here, a question arises.

In an economy where real GDP only grows by about 2-3% annually in the long term, why can corporate market capitalization expand far beyond that?

And one more thing.

For a company with annual profits of 10 billion yen, wouldn't it be natural for the corporate value to be 10 times the profit, or 100 billion yen? Why does the market pay 20 times, 30 times, or sometimes even 50 times more?

To solve this question, one must not treat 'GDP,' 'corporate profits,' 'stock market capitalization,' and 'household assets' as the same money.

In this article, we will break down the American economy into four layers: GDP → Corporate Profits → Stock Market Capitalization → Household Net Worth, and we will also look at the net external assets that form the foundation. We will then consider how much is actually generated value and from what point it becomes an evaluation based on expectations for the future.

By the time you finish reading, the question 'Is America really wealthy?' itself should change into a more concrete one.

Table of Contents

1. The reason why America doesn't look like the 'world's largest economy' even when you visit

2. What is GDP? It is neither personal income nor corporate revenue

3. Personal consumption accounts for about 70% of US GDP

4. High prices themselves increase nominal GDP

5. Nothing can be seen without distinguishing between nominal GDP and real GDP

6. If Japan's prices and wages were quadrupled, would its GDP also quadruple?

7. The true strength of America is not just high prices

8. Where do corporate profits fit into GDP?

9. US corporate profits in 2025 are approximately $4.1 trillion

10. Is the idea that 'corporate value is 10 times profit' wrong?

11. What do P/E ratios of 10, 20, and 30 mean?

12. The essence of corporate value is future cash flow

13. The contradiction of corporate profits growing by 10-20% while GDP grows by 2-3%

14. Compare with nominal GDP, not real GDP

15. If it is only a few companies, they can grow far beyond GDP

16. However, 'all companies' cannot continue to grow faster than GDP

17. US companies are not earning only within America

18. Market capitalization is not a 'pile of cash'

19. Even if stock prices double, the cash in society does not double

20. Market capitalization expands even just from rising P/E ratios

21. Decomposing the rise in US stocks into 'earnings, multiples, and shareholder returns'

22. What the Concentration in the Magnificent 7 Indicates

23. The Reality Behind America's $183 Trillion in Household Net Worth

24. Not Everyone Can Spend $183 Trillion at the Same Time

25. The Source of Wealth for the Affluent Is Not Salary but Ownership

26. The Structure Where the Stock Market Makes the Wealthy Even Wealthier

27. Why GDP and Asset Prices Can Diverge So Much

28. America Borrows $21 Trillion from the World—The Fifth Layer: Net International Investment Position

29. Why Corporate Value Rises Just from Lower Interest Rates

30. A Bubble Is Not a Lack of Value, but a Divergence Between Price and Assumptions

31. Thinking of the American Economy as a Four-Story Building and Its Foundation

32. Don't Just Look at GDP When Comparing Japan and America

33. The American System That Japan Should Truly Learn From

34. Conclusion: American Wealth Is a Composite of Production, Price, Ownership, and Expectation

Chapter 1: Why It Doesn't Look Like the 'World's Largest Economy' Even When You Come to America

If you look only at the numbers regarding the American economy, its sheer scale is overwhelming. According to BEA annual statistics, nominal GDP in 2025 was $30.7621 trillion. Nominal GDP for the April-June quarter of 2026 reached an annualized rate of $32.4752 trillion. Meanwhile, the real GDP growth rate for 2025 was 2.1%, showing that 'monetary scale' and 'actual growth in production' are not the same thing.

However, when you live here, there are many moments where you wonder, 'Is this country really many times wealthier than Japan?' Roads have damage, and public transportation is not as dense as in Japan. Dining out, housing, medical care, education, repairs, and various professional services come with surprisingly high price tags. Even if salaries are high, the cost of living that absorbs them is also high.

This sense of discomfort is not a mistake in the statistics. Rather, it serves as an entry point to correctly understanding 'what' the figure of GDP is actually measuring.

GDP is not an indicator that directly measures the beauty of roads, the deliciousness of food, or the convenience of public transportation. It measures the value added to goods and services newly created within a country over a certain period in monetary terms. Therefore, even for similar services, if the transaction price is high, the nominal GDP becomes larger.

However, one cannot simply dismiss America's scale as 'just high prices.' This is because a massive population, high-value-added industries, companies earning in the global market, deep capital markets, and a thick layer of people who own companies and stocks all exist simultaneously.

In this article, we will break down this complex structure into four layers: GDP → Corporate Profits → Stock Market Capitalization → Household Net Worth, and further examine the lending and borrowing with the world that lies at its foundation. By doing so, we can transform the vague question of 'Is America really wealthy?' into a concrete question of 'Who holds what kind of wealth, and through what means?'

Chapter 2: What is GDP? It is neither personal income nor corporate revenue

GDP stands for Gross Domestic Product.

Expressed by the most famous formula from the expenditure side,

GDP = C + I + G + (X - M)

is the result.

C is personal consumption, I is private domestic investment, G is government consumption and investment, X is exports, and M is imports.

What is important here is that GDP is not the "sum of individual salaries." Nor is it the "sum of corporate revenues."

If you add up all corporate revenues, raw materials and intermediate goods are counted multiple times. GDP measures the value added that is newly created.

For example, suppose a bakery buys flour for 100 yen and sells bread for 300 yen. The value added newly created by the bakery, simplified, is 200 yen. If you accumulate the value added by the flour supplier and the bakery, it corresponds to the value of the final product.

On the other hand, you can also look at GDP from the income side.

The value added created by companies is distributed to someone as employee salaries, corporate profits, interest, rental income, taxes, etc. Therefore, the explanation that "GDP becomes someone's income" is generally correct, but "GDP = salary" is not.

If you do not make this distinction, you end up treating America's GDP, personal income, corporate profits, stock prices, and household assets all as the same "money."

That is one of the biggest reasons why the American economy is difficult to understand.

Chapter 3: Personal consumption, which makes up about 70% of US GDP

The biggest characteristic of the American economy is the sheer size of household consumption.

The nominal GDP for the April-June 2026 quarter, converted to an annual rate, is approximately 32.48 trillion dollars. Looking at the breakdown by BEA expenditure items, personal consumption is approximately 22.08 trillion dollars, accounting for 68.0% of GDP. Private domestic investment is approximately 5.72 trillion dollars at 17.6%, government consumption and investment is approximately 5.55 trillion dollars at 17.1%, and net exports are approximately negative 0.87 trillion dollars, or negative 2.7%.

Within the 22.08 trillion dollars of personal consumption, services are particularly large. Service consumption is approximately 15.18 trillion dollars, equivalent to 46.7% of total GDP. Consumption of goods is approximately 6.90 trillion dollars at 21.3%.

Here, you should not imagine only purchasing products at supermarkets or department stores from the word "consumption." American households pay huge amounts of money for housing-related services, medical care, insurance, finance, education, dining out, lodging, communications, entertainment, professional services, and more.

In other words, almost half of US GDP is composed of the amount households pay for services.

On the other hand, it is also a mistake to read the 17.1% government sector simply as "public works." The federal government accounts for approximately 6.1%, and state and local governments account for approximately 11.0%, which includes the provision of government services and capital investment. Federal government defense-related spending is approximately 3.7% of GDP. It is clear that the center of US GDP is household consumption, not government spending.

Furthermore, the composition of private investment also reveals the characteristics of modern America. Equipment investment is approximately 1.87 trillion dollars, and investment in intellectual property products is also approximately 1.87 trillion dollars, making them roughly the same scale. Investment in research and development, software, and creative works stands shoulder to shoulder with investment in machinery and equipment.

This is extremely important.

In the 20th-century economy, when people heard about growth investment, they thought of factories, machinery, roads, and buildings. In today's America, investment in intangible assets such as code, research, patents, data, and content rivals investment in physical equipment. High profit margins and the potential for global scalability are not unrelated to this investment structure.

And net exports are negative. America is not a country that increases its GDP through a trade surplus. Rather, it is one of the world's largest buyers.

In short, the profile of America's GDP is not that of a "giant factory nation."

It is a domestic demand-driven economy supported by private investment and the government sector, centered on massive household consumption, especially high-priced service consumption.that is.

Chapter 4: High Prices Themselves Increase Nominal GDP

Let's consider an extremely simplified example.

Suppose a haircut costs 4,000 yen at a hair salon in Japan, and an equivalent service costs 100 dollars in America. If we set a comparative exchange rate of 150 yen to the dollar, the American side would be equivalent to 15,000 yen. Even though the amount of physical service—a single haircut—is the same, the nominal transaction amount is 3.75 times higher.

This difference is also reflected in nominal GDP.

The same thing happens with medical care, housing, university tuition, childcare, legal services, accounting, repairs, hotels, and so on. Therefore, "GDP per capita is twice as high, so the real-world richness of life is also twice as high" is not necessarily true.

This phenomenon exists not only between countries but also within America itself.

The BEA's 2024 Regional Price Parities (RPP) is a regional price index with the national average set at 100; California is 110.7, Hawaii 110.0, and New Jersey 108.8. On the other hand, Arkansas is 86.9, Mississippi 87.0, and Iowa and Oklahoma are 87.8.

There is a difference of about 27% between the highest and lowest levels.

Looking at housing rents alone, the difference is even greater. The housing rent RPP for California is 154.3, while for West Virginia it is 54.2, showing a gap of about 2.8 times on the index.

In other words, even with the same "100,000 dollar annual income in America," purchasing power varies greatly depending on the state in which one lives.

The fact that California's GDP per capita is high is a mix of both the effect of generating truly high added value and the effect of high prices and housing costs. Adjusting for price levels narrows the gap between states, but it does not disappear completely.

This is the important point.

While high prices create nominal wealth, those high prices themselves erode the purchasing power of consumers.

Therefore, to evaluate America's wealth, one must look not only at nominal income but also at real income, regional prices, housing costs, and medical expenses all together.

Furthermore, healthcare is the sector that most symbolizes this structure where "high prices boost nominal GDP."

According to CMS National Health Expenditure statistics, U.S. healthcare spending in 2024 was $5.3 trillion, which is 18.0% of GDP, or $15,474 per capita. This is a 7.2% increase from the previous year.

A scale of 18% of GDP is comparable to the ratio of total government sector spending and investment, or the ratio of private domestic investment.

If healthcare costs increase, nominal GDP increases. However, that does not necessarily mean an improvement in health status or life expectancy. The portion paid more for the same treatment or insurance also boosts GDP.

Even if income does not increase much, if payments for healthcare and housing increase, nominal GDP will grow.

This point is one of the reasons why the actual feeling of living in the United States seems to diverge from GDP statistics.

Chapter 5: You Cannot See Anything Unless You Distinguish Between Nominal GDP and Real GDP

When you hear in economic news that "GDP has increased," what you must always check is whether it is nominal or real.

Nominal GDP is calculated at the prices of that time.

Real GDP attempts to see how much the quantity of produced goods and services has increased by excluding the effects of price fluctuations.

For example, suppose a country was selling 100 products at 100 yen each.

The GDP is 10,000 yen.

Suppose that the following year, they only produced 100 items again, but the price became 200 yen.

The nominal GDP becomes 20,000 yen.

However, the production volume remains at 100 items.

Therefore, real GDP has hardly increased.

Understanding this difference allows you to answer the question, "If you quadruple prices, does GDP also quadruple?"

Nominal GDP will become larger. However, real wealth does not increase at the same rate.

Chapter 6: If Japan's Prices and Salaries Were Quadrupled, Would GDP Also Quadruple?

Suppose that in Japan, almost all prices and salaries quadrupled overnight.

Suppose an annual income of 4 million yen becomes 16 million yen, a 1,000 yen lunch becomes 4,000 yen, and 100,000 yen in rent becomes 400,000 yen. Assume that corporate sales, salaries, profits, and service prices have all increased fourfold in nominal terms.

In this case, nominal GDP would increase significantly, and if the conditions were simplified, it would be nearly four times higher.

However, this does not mean the real purchasing power of the Japanese people would quadruple. Even if annual income is four times higher, the cost of living is also four times higher.

It is easier to understand if we use the actual Japanese economy as a benchmark. According to the Cabinet Office's 2025 calendar year figures, Japan's nominal GDP was 662.7885 trillion yen, a 4.5% increase from the previous year. On the other hand, real GDP was 590.6759 trillion yen, an increase of only 1.1%. There is a significant gap between the growth of nominal values and real values.

Personal consumption has also increased to approximately 351 trillion yen in nominal terms, but the growth in real terms is much smaller. This is because "the amount paid increased" and "the quantity purchased increased" are two different things.

If we simply multiply the nominal GDP of 662.8 trillion yen by four, it becomes approximately 2,651 trillion yen. In terms of numbers alone, it becomes enormous.

Assuming an exchange rate of 159 yen to the dollar, it would be approximately 16.67 trillion dollars.

Meanwhile, America's nominal GDP was 32.4752 trillion dollars at an annualized rate for the April-June 2026 quarter.

Even if prices and salaries were quadrupled, Japan's nominal GDP would only reach a scale equivalent to about 51% of America's.

Moreover, this is not the result of quadrupling physical production capacity. It is merely a thought experiment where yen-denominated prices are quadrupled. However, if the number of factories, the number of houses, the number of patients a doctor can examine, the number of meals a restaurant can provide, and the amount of physical services produced by one worker do not change, the society's physical production capacity has not quadrupled.

Exchange rates also significantly fluctuate dollar-denominated GDP.

If 662.8 trillion yen is converted at the actual rate of 159 yen to the dollar as of August 2026, it is approximately 4.17 trillion dollars. At 100 yen to the dollar, it would be approximately 6.63 trillion dollars. Even if the production capacity within Japan does not change at all, the dollar-denominated GDP changes by nearly 60% based solely on the exchange rate.

This is not a hypothetical scenario. At the end of July 2026, the yen fell to the 164 yen per dollar range, and Japanese and U.S. authorities intervened in coordination. The level in mid-August is in the 159 yen range.

Over these few weeks, not a single factory, worker, or hospital in Japan has changed. Yet, the size of the Japanese economy as seen in dollar terms has expanded and contracted by hundreds of billions of dollars.

That is the kind of figure a dollar-denominated nominal GDP ranking is.

Therefore, when considering a country's wealth, a dollar-denominated nominal GDP ranking alone is insufficient.

What should be looked at are real GDP, per capita productivity, real disposable income, purchasing power, overseas corporate earnings, and capital accumulation.

What Japan should truly aim for is not "quadrupling prices."

It is to increase the value-added generated by each person and create an economy where those results circulate into real wages, corporate profits, and investment..

Chapter 7: The True Strength of America is Not Just High Prices

If you dismiss the size of the U.S. GDP by saying it is just because prices are high, you miss the essence.

America possesses a strength that cannot be explained by price differences alone.

First, there is a massive single market of 341.8 million people. Second, it can attract high-level talent and capital from all over the world. Third, it has created global companies in industries that easily generate high added value, such as software, cloud computing, AI, semiconductor design, finance, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, and digital advertising. Fourth, the dollar and U.S. capital markets attract global investment funds.

Furthermore, if you look at America only as a single country, you overlook the massive disparities within it.

According to the BEA's 2025 state-level GDP, California is approximately $4.25 trillion, Texas is approximately $2.90 trillion, and New York is approximately $2.47 trillion. These top three states alone account for about 31% of the total U.S. GDP. Including Florida and Illinois, the top five states account for about 41%.

To convey this sense of scale to Japanese readers, one comparison is the fastest way.

The nominal GDP of California alone is approximately $4.251 trillion. Japan's nominal GDP is also in the $4 trillion range in dollar terms, making them roughly the same size.

One state, one country. They are almost neck and neck.

Moreover, California's population is about 39 million, which is less than one-third of Japan's. Texas and New York also each have economic scales comparable to major countries around the world.

In other words, America's economic power is not spread evenly across the 50 states.

There is also a large gap in GDP per capita. New York is about $123,000, Massachusetts is about $115,000, Washington state is about $112,000, and California is about $108,000. On the other hand, Mississippi is about $56,000.

Income presents an even different map.

The 2025 per capita personal income was approximately $76,400 on a national average. While Connecticut was about $98,900, Massachusetts about $97,500, and California about $91,100, Mississippi was about $54,500.

GDP is the "added value generated within that state," while personal income is the "income received by residents of that state," and they are not the same. The two figures diverge due to factors such as people commuting across state lines, corporate profits, transfer payments, and investment income.

Consumption also differs by state. According to the BEA's state-level PCE, the 2023 per capita consumer spending was $56,202 on a national average, $69,101 in Massachusetts, and $42,131 in Mississippi. The 2024 national nominal PCE increased by 5.6%, with medical care and housing/utilities being major drivers.

This figure is important.

When U.S. consumption grows, it does not necessarily mean that people were able to buy more goods. It is also the result of paying more money for essential services such as medical care and housing.

Therefore, America's strength needs to be considered in two parts.

The part where nominal values increase due to high prices.

And,

The segments that truly generate high added value through high productivity, global markets, intellectual property, and capital markets.

The American economy is where these two things coexist.

Chapter 8: Where Do Corporate Profits Fit into GDP?

Corporate profits are distinct from GDP, but they are not unrelated to it.

The value added generated domestically is distributed among compensation for employees, corporate profits, taxes, and so on.

Therefore, corporate profits are an important component of national income.

What we should note here is that the definition of profits for companies listed on the stock market differs from the "corporate profits" measured by the BEA in the National Income and Product Accounts.

The figures change depending on the purpose, such as accounting net income, S&P 500 company profits, pre-tax profits, and profits adjusted for inventory valuation and capital consumption.

According to the BEA, "corporate profits from current production" in 2025 were approximately $4.0775 trillion. In 2024, they were approximately $3.8018 trillion.

In other words, while the profits generated by the U.S. corporate sector are enormous, they still only account for 13.3% when compared to the 2025 nominal GDP of $30.7621 trillion, and are not the entire GDP itself.

Comparing this figure of approximately $4.1 trillion with the tens of trillions of dollars in market capitalization of the U.S. stock market raises the following question.

Why are groups of companies that generate trillions of dollars in annual profits valued at tens of trillions of dollars?

Chapter 9: U.S. Corporate Profits in 2025 Were Approximately $4.1 Trillion

According to the latest BEA statistics, corporate profits in 2025 were approximately $4.08 trillion, an increase from approximately $3.80 trillion in 2024.

The growth rate is approximately 7.3%.

This figure is interesting.

Even if real GDP only grows by about 2–3% in the long term, corporate profits can have a higher growth rate than that.

This is because corporate profits are influenced not by real GDP, but by nominal sales, profit margins, overseas earnings, tax systems, interest rates, cost structures, and so on.

If real GDP increases by 2% and the inflation rate is 2–3%, nominal GDP could potentially increase by about 4–5%.

Since corporate sales are also nominal values, it is more natural to consider a growth rate close to nominal GDP as the long-term benchmark for the economy as a whole.

Furthermore, if companies improve their profit margins through productivity gains, profits can grow by 6-8% even with only 4-5% sales growth.

However, there is an upper limit to this.

If corporate profits were to grow faster than GDP indefinitely, the ratio of corporate profits to GDP would rise without limit, eventually exceeding the entire economy.

Therefore, while it may be possible in the short term, it cannot continue forever.

Chapter 10: Is the idea that 'corporate value is 10 times earnings' a mistake?

The intuition that 'a company's value is roughly 10 times its annual profit' is by no means strange.

Rather, it is a very easy-to-understand starting point when considering mature companies that do not grow.

Consider a company that earns 10 billion yen in profit annually forever and can return it all to shareholders.

If an investor seeks a 10% annual return, paying 100 billion yen would result in 10 billion yen per year, or a 10% earnings yield.

This is a P/E ratio of 10.

P/E stands for Price-Earnings Ratio, and you can think of it as

Market Capitalization ÷ Annual Profit

.

A P/E ratio of 10 means an earnings yield of approximately 10%.

A P/E ratio of 20 means 5%.

A P/E ratio of 25 means 4%.

A P/E ratio of 50 means 2%.

Of course, companies do not distribute all their profits as dividends. They can reinvest profits to increase future earnings.

Therefore, there is a rationale for assigning a P/E ratio higher than 10 to growth companies.

What is important is not 'what multiple is correct,' but whether the assumptions about growth and risk that justify that multiple will truly be realized.

What ultimately determines corporate value

When considering corporate value, one eventually returns to a very simple question.

How much money can that company return to investors in the future?

Even if sales are high, if there is no profit, the value is limited.

Even if profits are high, if those profits cannot be maintained, it is difficult to assign a high value.

Even if profits grow, if that requires massive additional capital investment, the cash remaining for shareholders might be small.

Therefore, what one should look at is:

Sales growth rate, operating profit margin, free cash flow, return on invested capital, competitive advantage, room for reinvestment, debt, interest rates, number of shares, and the capital allocation of management.

The P/E ratio is merely a compression of those results into a single number.

A P/E ratio of 10x does not necessarily mean it is cheap.

A P/E ratio of 40x does not necessarily mean it is expensive.

However, when the P/E ratio of the entire market is significantly higher than the long-term average, one must not forget the fact that 'such high future growth is truly required.'

When considering the enormous market capitalization of American companies, the most important thing is not 'Is this company wonderful?', but rather,

how wonderful must the future be that the current stock price is demanding?

to calculate backwards.

That is the core of thinking about the reason why a huge market capitalization is established in a country with 2-4% GDP growth, and its sustainability.

Chapter 11: What do P/E ratios of 10x, 20x, and 30x mean?

The P/E ratio is sometimes explained as the simple 'number of years to recover the investment.'

The explanation is that a P/E ratio of 20x means you can recover your investment in 20 years.

While intuitive and easy to understand, it is strictly insufficient.

Corporate profits change every year, and it is not just dividends but also retained earnings that remain as corporate value. Furthermore, money in the future is worth less than money today.

Even so, the P/E ratio serves as an excellent entry point for understanding market expectations.

It is difficult to pay a P/E ratio of 30 times for a high-risk company with zero growth.

On the other hand, for a company whose profits grow by 20% every year and can maintain that for a long period, paying 30 times current earnings can sometimes be rationalized.

The question is, 'How many years can it sustain 20% growth?'

If a profit of 100 increases by 20% every year, it will become approximately 249 in five years and approximately 619 in ten years.

In ten years, the profit will have increased more than sixfold.

There are extremely few companies that can achieve this kind of growth.

Therefore, a high P/E ratio does not simply mean a 'good company,' but also means a 'company that has already priced in very high expectations.'

Chapter 12: The Essence of Corporate Value is Future Cash Flow

In financial theory, the intrinsic value of a company is considered to be the future cash flows it generates, discounted to their present value.

In a very simple perpetual growth model, it can be expressed as:

Corporate Value = Next Year's Cash Flow / (Required Rate of Return - Perpetual Growth Rate)

For example, if it generates 10 billion yen annually with zero growth and a 10% required rate of return, it is worth about 100 billion yen.

If the growth rate is 4% and the required rate of return is 10%, the theoretical value becomes larger.

However, this formula has a dangerous characteristic.

The smaller the difference between the required rate of return and the growth rate, the more rapidly the corporate value inflates.

In other words, the theoretical price changes significantly just by interest rates falling, investors taking a lighter view of risk, or assuming a slightly higher perpetual growth rate.

This is why market capitalization is not the 'substance itself,' but rather a 'conversion of assumptions about the future into a price.'

This is the reason why market capitalization is not the 'substance itself' but rather a 'conversion of assumptions about the future into a price'.

Why do technology companies tend to command higher P/E ratios than manufacturing companies?

Traditional manufacturing companies often need to increase factories, equipment, inventory, and personnel to increase sales.

On the other hand, once software companies create a product, the marginal cost of providing it to additional customers is relatively small.

Expanding software for 1 million users to 10 million users does not necessarily require increasing factory capacity tenfold.

While this characteristic cannot be oversimplified because cloud and AI now require massive capital investment, software and platforms still possess features such as high gross margins, recurring revenue, and network effects.

Investors do not pay high P/E ratios simply because it is "technology."

They do so because they expect high returns on capital, high growth rates, strong competitive advantages, and long runways for growth.

Conversely, if capital expenditures balloon due to AI competition, depreciation and electricity costs rise, and prices fall due to competition, it is possible that the high profit margins seen until now may not be sustainable.

In the AI era, the conventional wisdom that "tech companies are asset-light" may itself change.

Chapter 13: The Contradiction of 10-20% Corporate Profit Growth Despite 2-3% GDP Growth

This is one of the biggest points of discussion here.

Why is 10%, 20%, or sometimes even higher profit growth expected in the stock market when U.S. real GDP only grows by about 2-3% annually over the long term?

First, one should not directly compare real GDP with corporate profits.

Corporate sales and profits are nominal values.

If, for example,

Real GDP growth rate is 2% and inflation rate is 2.5%,

then nominal GDP will grow by roughly 4.5%.

Furthermore, if companies improve their profit margins,

Sales +4.5% and profit margin improvement equivalent to +1-2%,

it is possible for profits to increase by 6-7%.

Furthermore, if the number of outstanding shares decreases due to stock buybacks, earnings per share (EPS) will grow faster than the company's overall profit.

For this reason,

Real GDP +2%, Nominal GDP +4-5%, Corporate Profits +5-7%
EPS +6-8%

is a perfectly plausible structure.

However, 15-20% profit growth cannot continue indefinitely for the entire market.

Why is there a period where corporate profits grow faster than GDP?

It is not unusual for corporate profits to grow faster than GDP.

In the early stages of an economic recovery, sales increase while fixed costs remain low, which can lead to a sharp rise in profits.

For example, consider a company with sales of 100, costs of 90, and profit of 10.

If sales increase by 10% to 110 and costs only increase to 95, the profit becomes 15.

Sales increased by 10%, but profit increased by 50%.

This is operating leverage.

Conversely, during an economic recession, even a slight decrease in sales can lead to a significant drop in profits.

Therefore, corporate profits are more volatile than GDP.

Also, companies can reduce the ratio of labor costs and other expenses through automation, AI, overseas procurement, and economies of scale.

As a result, the ratio of income going to labor versus the ratio going to corporate profits within GDP changes.

Due to this 'change in income distribution,' corporate profits can grow faster than GDP for a certain period.

However, there is a limit to profit margins.

A company that had a profit of 10 on sales of 100 might be able to increase it to 20, but the profit margin cannot exceed 100% and rise forever.

Therefore, rising profit margins are not a permanent growth engine.

Chapter 14: Comparing with Nominal GDP, Not Real GDP

Stock prices and corporate profits are nominal values expressed in dollars.

Therefore, for long-term comparisons, it is necessary to look at nominal GDP, not just real GDP.

For example, even if the real economy grows by only 2%, if prices rise by 3%, the nominal economy expands by about 5%.

If a company sells the same quantity of goods as the previous year at a 3% higher price, nominal sales increase.

Wages also increase in nominal terms, rents increase in nominal terms, and corporate profits increase in nominal terms.

The market capitalization of stocks is also expressed in nominal dollars.

Therefore, the comparison that "it is strange for stock prices to rise by 8% when GDP only grows by 2%" is not correct as it stands.

A more appropriate approach is to break down:

Nominal GDP growth, corporate profit growth, earnings per share growth, dividends, and P/E ratio changes.

is to break it down.

By performing this breakdown, it becomes clear how much of the stock return is due to substantive profit growth and how much is due to an increase in valuation multiples.

Chapter 15: Individual Companies Can Grow Far Beyond GDP

Even if the economy as a whole grows by 2%, there is no contradiction in some companies growing by 30%.

This is because market share shifts.

For example, the newspaper advertising market shrinks, while the digital advertising market expands.

On-premise server spending decreases, while cloud spending increases.

Investment in conventional CPUs slows down, while investment in AI accelerators surges.

A portion of retail store sales shifts to e-commerce.

In this case, even if the overall increase in GDP is small, winning companies can grow rapidly by taking sales and profits from existing industries.

The background behind the high growth rates of companies like NVIDIA, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, and Meta lies in their ability not only to create new demand but also to shift existing spending into their own domains.

Therefore, the idea that 'because GDP is 2%, NVIDIA can only grow by 2%' is incorrect.

However, while this logic can be applied to individual companies, it cannot be applied directly to the market as a whole.

AI investment increases GDP, but it does not necessarily justify stock prices.

Investments in data centers, GPUs, power facilities, and communication equipment boost private investment in GDP.

It also leads to sales for construction companies, semiconductor firms, power companies, and cloud providers.

However, the fact that 'AI investment increases GDP' and the fact that 'the current market capitalization of AI companies is appropriate' are separate issues.

Even if hundreds of billions of dollars are invested in AI infrastructure, if sufficient cash flow cannot be recovered from that equipment in the future, shareholder value will not increase.

A larger investment amount does not mean higher corporate value.

What is important is the return on invested capital.

A business that invests $10 billion to generate $3 billion in additional annual profit has a completely different value from a business that invests $10 billion to generate only $500 million in profit.

When looking at the AI investment boom, it is necessary to look at 'how much profit can be recovered from that investment' rather than 'who is investing the most'.

Chapter 16: However, 'all companies' cannot continue to grow faster than GDP.

This is where the most important constraint appears.

One company can grow faster than GDP.

Ten companies can also do it.

An entire industry can do it for a certain period.

However, the profits of the entire corporate sector cannot grow significantly faster than GDP forever.

Checking our current position with actual figures for 2025, the ratio of BEA corporate profits of $4.0775 trillion divided by nominal GDP of $30.7621 trillion is 13.3%.

In other words, about 13.3% of the value added generated by the United States in one year belongs to the corporate sector as corporate profits.

If we assume that GDP continues to grow at 5% per year and corporate profits at 10% per year, the ratio of profits to GDP will rise to approximately 21% in 10 years, 34% in 20 years, and 54% in 30 years.

In the long term, since labor compensation, taxes, and self-employment income also exist within GDP, it is arithmetically unsustainable for corporate profits alone to continue increasing their ratio at this speed.

Eventually, it would reach an impossible state where corporate profits occupy the entire economy, pushing out labor income, taxes, and other forms of income.

Therefore, in the long term, the growth rate of corporate profits is subject to the gravity of the economy as a whole.

Long-term stock returns cannot escape the constraint of how much of a share corporate profits can ultimately capture within GDP.

The same applies to the stock market as a whole.

If stock prices rise faster than corporate profits forever, the P/E ratio will rise indefinitely.

A P/E ratio cannot continue to rise from 20x to 30x, 50x, 100x, and 200x.

At some point, profits must catch up, stock prices must adjust, or they must remain flat for a long period.

Chapter 17: U.S. Companies Do Not Earn Only in America

However, there is a major caveat when comparing U.S. GDP with U.S.-listed companies.

Giant U.S. corporations are global companies.

Apple does not sell iPhones only in America.

Microsoft's cloud, Alphabet's advertising, Meta's platforms, and NVIDIA's semiconductors are all sold in the global market.

Therefore, the profit growth rate of U.S. companies depends not only on U.S. GDP but also on global GDP, global digitalization, and the expansion of their share in the global market.

This is an important reason why U.S. companies can grow faster than the domestic economy.

Furthermore, for software, semiconductor design, and digital advertising, the marginal cost of additional sales is relatively small once a massive platform is built.

As a result, 'operating leverage' can occur, where profits increase faster than sales growth.

However, there are limits to the global market as well.

If the entire S&P 500 continues to grow its profits faster than the global economy forever, U.S.-listed companies would eventually monopolize almost all global corporate profits.

In reality, competition, regulation, startups, foreign companies, and technological shifts keep that in check.

Chapter 18: Market Capitalization Is Not a 'Mountain of Cash'

When considering America's wealth, market capitalization is the most misunderstood concept.

Market capitalization is calculated as

stock price × number of shares outstanding

.

For example, if a company has 1 billion shares outstanding and the stock price is $100, the market capitalization is $100 billion.

However, that does not mean the company has $100 billion in its bank account.

It also does not mean that all shareholders combined have paid $100 billion into the company.

It is a 'market valuation' calculated on the assumption that because some shares are trading at $100 in the market, all shares can be valued at $100.

This distinction is critically important.

Just because market capitalization has increased by $1 trillion does not mean that $1 trillion in new cash has been created in society.

It means that market participants have begun to place a higher price on the company's future earnings than before.

Can you 'buy a company with a market cap of 100 trillion yen for 100 trillion yen'?

I would like to think about market capitalization a little more deeply.

When there is a company with a market capitalization of 100 trillion yen, one might be tempted to think, 'If I prepare 100 trillion yen, I can buy the whole company.' However, in actual corporate acquisitions, it is not that simple.

If an acquirer tries to purchase a large volume of shares, demand may increase and the stock price may rise. Also, in many cases, it is necessary to add a premium to the market price to get existing shareholders to relinquish management control.

Conversely, if all shareholders want to sell due to a management crisis or similar, it is possible that the company could only be sold at a price far lower than the current market capitalization.

In other words, market capitalization is not the 'total amount for which all shareholders can buy and sell at the current price simultaneously.'

This leads to the concept of liquidity.

Although there is a massive amount of trading in the stock market every day, it does not mean that all of a company's outstanding shares are being exchanged daily.

The trading price of a portion of shares becomes the valuation standard for all remaining shares.

Therefore, the valuation of financial assets does not mean that 'that amount of cash is in the warehouse' like physical inventory.

If you do not understand this point, it leads to the misunderstanding that 'an increase in global stock market capitalization by tens of trillions of dollars means that the same amount of new money has been created in the world'.

Chapter 19: Even if stock prices double, the cash in society does not double.

Suppose a company's stock price goes from $100 to $200, and its market capitalization goes from $1 trillion to $2 trillion.

An unrealized gain is displayed in the shareholder's securities account.

The financial assets of all holders combined increase by $1 trillion on paper.

However, $1 trillion in cash was not newly printed and distributed to the shareholders' bank accounts.

If shareholders sell in small amounts, they might be able to cash out at around $200.

But if all shareholders try to sell at the same time, there will not be enough buyers at $200, and the stock price will fall.

In other words, market capitalization is based on the premise of 'valuing all shares at the current price'.

This is similar to real estate.

If a detached house in the neighborhood sells for 100 million yen, the valuation of surrounding houses also rises.

However, if all residents in the area sell their homes on the same day, there is no guarantee that all houses will sell for 100 million yen.

Asset price is a valuation that applies a marginal transaction price to a large volume of existing assets.

A stock price decline does not reduce GDP by the same amount.

Even if the market capitalization of US stocks falls by $5 trillion in one day, it does not mean that the day's GDP falls by $5 trillion.

This is because a stock price decline is a change in asset valuation, while GDP is a flow of production activity.

However, there are indirect effects.

When stock prices fall, households may feel poorer and reduce their consumption. Companies may find it harder to raise funds through stocks and might curb their investments. The value of stock-based compensation decreases, which also affects employees' consumption and job-changing behavior.

This is called the wealth effect.

Conversely, rising stock prices can increase consumption and investment among the wealthy, stimulating the economy.

Therefore, while GDP and stock prices are different things, they are not completely disconnected.

Chapter 20: Market Capitalization Expands Even Just Through P/E Ratio Increases

Stock prices can rise even if corporate profits do not increase at all.

If profits are 10 billion yen and the P/E ratio is 15 times, the market capitalization is 150 billion yen.

Even if profits remain at 10 billion yen, if the P/E ratio becomes 30 times, the market capitalization becomes 300 billion yen.

The current profit generated by the company has not increased by even one yen.

What has changed is the price that investors are willing to pay for one yen of profit.

This phenomenon is called 'valuation expansion' or 'multiple expansion'.

Why does the P/E ratio rise?

Possible reasons include lower interest rates, higher growth expectations, lower risk perception, inflows of investment capital, the expansion of index investing, and enthusiasm for specific themes.

The opposite can also happen.

Even if profits are increasing, if the P/E ratio drops from 30 times to 15 times, the stock price will not rise, or it will fall.

Therefore, when analyzing the stock market, looking only at whether profits have increased is insufficient.

One must separate profits from valuation multiples.

Chapter 21: Decomposing U.S. Stock Gains into 'Earnings, Multiples, and Shareholder Returns'

Long-term shareholder returns can conceptually be thought of in three parts.

The first is earnings per share, or EPS growth.

The second is shareholder returns, such as dividends and share buybacks.

The third is changes in valuation multiples, such as the P/E ratio.

For example, if EPS grows by 6% annually, the dividend yield is 1.5%, and the P/E ratio remains unchanged, long-term shareholder returns are generally formed based on these factors. On the other hand, if the P/E ratio increases from 20x to 30x over a few years, the stock price appreciation rate for that period will significantly exceed profit growth.

The 2025 S&P 500 serves as a concrete example for considering this breakdown. The total return of the S&P 500 was 17.9%. According to First Trust Advisors' calculations, approximately 13.5 percentage points of this is attributed to EPS growth, about 2.5 points to P/E expansion, and about 1.9 points to dividends.

If we adopt this estimate, the explanation that 2025 was a 'year where only the P/E ratio expanded' is not accurate. The core of the stock price increase was actual profit growth.

However, the story does not end there.

It is necessary to confirm whether profit growth was spread evenly across the entire market. In reality, as will be discussed later, the concentration of contribution from giant technology companies was extremely strong.

Share buybacks are also important when looking at EPS.

If a company's total profit is $10 billion and there are 1 billion shares outstanding, the EPS is $10. If the company buys back its own shares and the outstanding shares become 900 million, the EPS becomes approximately $11.1 even if the profit remains at $10 billion.

In other words, even if the company's total profit has zero growth, the earnings per share will increase.

Therefore, the GDP growth rate, corporate profit growth rate, EPS growth rate, and stock price appreciation rate can each be different figures.

However, share buybacks are not magic that unconditionally creates value. If a company buys back a large amount at an overvalued stock price, it may misallocate capital, and if it does so by increasing debt, financial risk also rises.

Ultimately, what is important is to separate what percentage of the stock price increase is true profit growth, what percentage is a change in capital structure, and what percentage is an increase in the market's valuation multiple.

Chapter 22: What the Concentration in the Magnificent 7 Indicates

It is not accurate to understand the recent rise in US stocks as 'all American companies are uniformly strong'.

In the 2025 market attribute analysis by S&P Dow Jones Indices, against the S&P 500's annual total return of 17.9%, the Magnificent 7 contributed to approximately 42% of the 2025 S&P 500 total return. According to S&P Dow Jones Indices' calculations, excluding the Magnificent 7, the 17.9% return becomes about 10.4%. In another contribution calculation, NVIDIA alone accounted for 15.5% of the annual increase.

When viewed by sector, the concentration becomes even clearer. Just two sectors, information technology and communication services, accounted for 63.1% of the index's total return.

The return of the S&P 500 excluding these two sectors was only 6%.

In other words, the '17.9% rise' in US stocks in 2025 was a 6% year if you look only at the parts other than technology and communication services. Even with the same index and the same year, the landscape looked very different depending on which companies or sectors you held.

In short, the rise in the index was not distributed evenly among the 500 companies. In a market-cap-weighted index, the larger the company, the greater its impact on the index. The profit growth and stock price rise of a few companies change the impression of the entire market.

This provides one answer to the question, 'It makes no sense for stock prices to rise by double digits when GDP growth is only around 2%.'

Some companies can grow much faster than GDP.

Moreover, if those specific companies account for a very large proportion of an index, the market index can also rise at a rate significantly higher than GDP.

However, this also implies concentration risk.

The more a small number of companies account for a large portion of an index's earnings and market capitalization, the more the growth rate, profit margins, capital expenditure recovery, and AI demand of that group of companies will dictate the future returns of the entire market.

Therefore, when evaluating current US stocks, looking only at the 'S&P 500 P/E ratio' is not enough.

Which companies are increasing their profits? Which companies are driving the index's rise? How many years can that profit growth be sustained?

Only by breaking it down to this level can one judge whether stock prices are backed by actual earnings or if expectations are running ahead.

Chapter 23: The Reality of America's $183 Trillion in Household Net Worth

According to the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds accounts, the net worth of US households and non-profit organizations as of the end of March 2026 was approximately $183.0 trillion.

However, this $183 trillion is not $183 trillion in cash.

The household sector's total assets are approximately $204.5 trillion, and liabilities are approximately $21.6 trillion. The difference is about $183 trillion.

Looking at the composition of the assets, the nature of this figure becomes immediately clear.

Direct and indirect holdings of corporate stocks are approximately $64.8 trillion. Owner-occupied real estate is approximately $48.7 trillion. Deposits and MMFs are approximately $20.6 trillion. Defined benefit pension entitlements are approximately $16.7 trillion. Holdings in private companies are also approximately $16.6 trillion, and bonds are approximately $12.2 trillion.

In other words, the center of household wealth is not bank deposits.

It consists of assets evaluated by market price or future value, such as stocks, real estate, pensions, and private company holdings.

In particular, the $64.8 trillion in stocks is the largest asset category, exceeding owner-occupied real estate.

On the liability side, home mortgages are approximately $13.8 trillion, and consumer credit is approximately $5.1 trillion.

Considering revisions to FRB statistics, it is easier to understand by looking at the trend in balances rather than just lining up quarterly increases and decreases as fixed values. Household net worth has increased from approximately $143.7 trillion at the end of 2022, to $156.3 trillion at the end of 2023, $169.8 trillion at the end of 2024, $182.9 trillion at the end of 2025, and $183.0 trillion at the end of March 2026.

It has increased by tens of trillions of dollars in just a few years.

However, that entire amount was not created as new factories, new housing, or new cash. Rising stock and real estate prices have contributed significantly.

In the first quarter of 2026, stock valuations pushed household assets down by approximately $1.8 trillion, while other assets such as real estate offset a portion of that.

In a single quarter, 'wealth' fluctuates by the trillion-dollar scale.

This is precisely what demonstrates that market capitalization and household net worth are figures of a completely different nature than GDP.

Chapter 24: Not Everyone Can Spend $183 Trillion at the Same Time

If there is $183 trillion in household net worth, can Americans immediately purchase $183 trillion worth of goods?

Of course not.

Stocks and homes are only converted into cash once they are sold.

And a sale requires a buyer.

If the entire nation were to try to sell their assets and consume them, stock prices and real estate prices would plummet.

In other words, household net worth is a 'stock valued at current market prices,' and it does not directly imply an equivalent amount of spending power.

GDP is a flow over one year.

Household net worth is a stock at a specific point in time.

One cannot directly compare these two and think, 'Since assets are six times GDP, we can spend six years' worth of GDP.'

However, it does not mean that having large assets is meaningless.

It has a major impact on the economy through collateral capacity, retirement funds, inheritance, investment capacity, consumer sentiment, and capital supply to companies.

The important thing is to distinguish between 'asset value' and 'cash.'

Chapter 25: The Source of Wealth for the Rich Is 'Ownership,' Not Salaries

So, how many wealthy people are there actually in America?

The Census Bureau's population estimate as of July 1, 2025, is approximately 341.8 million. According to the UBS Global Wealth Report 2026, there are approximately 23.6 million US dollar millionaires with a net worth of $1 million or more in the United States.

When divided simply by the total population, it is approximately 6.9%.

However, since the millionaire ratio should ideally use adults as the denominator, the total population ratio is just a reference value. On an adult basis, it is generally around 9%, making the United States a country with an exceptionally large wealthy class by global standards.

Moreover, being a "millionaire" does not mean having one million dollars in cash. It is net worth calculated by subtracting liabilities from assets such as homes, 401(k)s, IRAs, stocks, mutual funds, and equity in private companies.

What is important is that the source of wealth changes depending on the income bracket.

For households up to the middle class, the core of income is wages or employment-related compensation. However, the higher the bracket, the greater the proportion of income derived from capital, such as dividends, capital gains, business income, and corporate equity.

According to an analysis by the Peter G. Peterson Foundation, which organized CBO data, about two-thirds of income for the bottom 80% is labor-related income. In contrast, for the top 1%, labor income accounts for only about one-third of their income, with the remaining 63% coming from investments, about half of which consists of capital gains and dividends.

The same structure appears in tax statistics. According to IRS data for the 2023 tax year, there were approximately 153.1 million filings, with a total Adjusted Gross Income (AGI) of about $15.2 trillion.

The threshold to enter the top 1% is an AGI of $675,602. Approximately 1.53 million filings fell into this bracket, earning 20.6% of the total AGI and bearing 38.4% of individual income taxes. The average tax rate is 26.3%.

Meanwhile, the bottom 50% had an AGI of less than $53,801, and their income tax burden was 3.3% of the total, with an average tax rate of 3.7%.

Furthermore, the AGI share of the top 1% has been declining, from 26.3% in 2021 to 22.4% in 2022, and 20.6% in 2023. This is because not only tax systems and occupational composition, but also fluctuations in realized capital gains significantly affect the reported income of the top tier.

The income of America's top 1% is strongly influenced not just by how much they work, but by at what price and when they realize their held assets.

In other words, the turning point is not just "how high a salary you receive."

It is how much you own in assets that can appreciate in value, such as companies, stocks, real estate, and funds.

If the corporate value of a company where a founder holds 20% of the shares grows from $1 billion to $10 billion, the valuation of their stake increases from $200 million to $2 billion. Even if their salary does not increase tenfold, their net worth increases tenfold.

The keyword for understanding the source of wealth for the American wealthy class is "ownership" rather than labor.

Chapter 26: The Structure Where the Stock Market Makes the Wealthy Even Wealthier

Stock price increases do not provide the same benefits to all citizens.

The Federal Reserve's Distributional Financial Accounts break down household assets by net worth bracket. As of the end of March 2026, out of approximately $183 trillion in household net worth, the top 1% held about 31.6%, the 90th–99th percentiles held about 36.3%, the 50th–90th percentiles held about 29.6%, and the bottom 50% held about 2.5%.

In other words, the top 10% alone hold approximately two-thirds of the total.

When narrowed down to stocks, this concentration is even stronger.

In the distribution of $64.8 trillion in equity assets such as corporate stocks and mutual funds, the top 0.1% holds 24.2%, the top 1% holds 50.2%, the 90th–99th percentile holds 37.2%, the 50th–90th percentile holds 11.6%, and the **bottom 50% holds 1.1%**.

The top 1% owns half of all stocks, and the top 10% holds 87.4%.

On the other hand, the distribution of $48.7 trillion in owner-occupied real estate is completely different. The top 1% holds 13.3%, while the 50th–90th percentile is the largest holding group at **46.5%**. For the middle class, the home remains their largest asset.

When looking at debt, the picture is completely reversed. In consumer credit, which includes credit cards, auto loans, and student loans, the top 1% bears 3.3% of the burden, while the **bottom 50% bears 51.8%**.

Lining up these three figures, the structure of this country becomes clear at a glance.

The bottom 50% of Americans hold 1.1% of stocks and bear 51.8% of consumer credit.

So, what is the current state of that consumer credit?

According to the Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit released by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York on August 11, 2026, total U.S. household debt in the April–June 2026 quarter was $18.8 trillion. This was almost flat, a decrease of $13 billion from the previous quarter. Mortgage debt was $13.1 trillion, and credit card balances were $1.26 trillion, an increase of $21 billion from the previous quarter, approaching last year's record high of $1.28 trillion.

Note that this $18.8 trillion is a tally of individual debt based on credit information, and its definition differs from the $21.6 trillion in household liabilities seen in the flow of funds statistics in Chapter 23.

The problem is not the balance, but its composition.

The share of credit card balances that are 90 days or more delinquent has reached 12.8%. It was 7.6% in the July–September 2022 quarter. Researchers at the NY Fed describe this as a "level not seen since the Great Recession."

However, the rate of transition to new delinquency has remained almost flat for nearly two years, at 6.97% of the balance over the past year. In other words, it is not that the number of people falling into new delinquency is surging. It is that those who have fallen in once are unable to return.

The ratio of any form of delinquency to total debt is 4.7%, which has actually improved slightly.

Researchers at the NY Fed explain this seemingly contradictory combination as follows:

"For us, this is a reflection of a K-shaped economy. There are many households living from paycheck to paycheck."

Of the approximately 175 million Americans who hold credit cards, about 60% carry a revolving balance.

What we saw in Chapter 23 was the figure of $183 trillion in household net worth. What we saw in the first half of this chapter was the distribution where the top 1% holds 50.2% of those stocks, while the bottom 50% holds only 1.1%.

And what we are looking at now is the fact that, in the same country at the same point in time, one in eight credit card accounts is delinquent by three months or more.

A K-shaped economy is a state where the average is trending upward while the median and below are trending downward.

What does this structure mean?

If stock prices rise by 50%, the top tier, which holds a large amount of stock, gains trillions of dollars in valuation. On the other hand, for households with few stocks, the wealth effect is small even with the same rate of increase.

Conversely, if interest rates rise, those with fewer assets are more likely to feel the burden through variable interest rates, new borrowing, credit cards, and auto loans.

Therefore, 'stock prices rose' does not mean 'all Americans became wealthy'.

Even within the same country, the view of the top tier looking at the asset market is different from the view of the median household looking at salaries, rent, and medical expenses.

This is a key reason for the feeling that 'while America is overwhelmingly wealthy in statistics, not everyone looks wealthy when you walk down the street'.

Chapter 27: Why Can GDP and Asset Prices Diverge So Much?

GDP is the value added produced in one year.

Stock prices are the present value of profits for decades to come.

This is the reason why the two can diverge significantly.

For example, if a company with an annual profit of 10 billion yen continues to generate profit for the next 30 years, its corporate value is not determined solely by this year's 10 billion yen.

Profits for next year, the year after, and beyond are also included in the price.

In other words, market capitalization is also a figure that borrows from the future.

On the other hand, GDP basically measures economic activity for that one year.

Therefore, it is not abnormal for the market capitalization of the stock market to exceed GDP.

The problem is not a simple line in the sand about 'what multiple is appropriate'.

The appropriate level changes depending on future profits, interest rates, risks, overseas earnings, profit margins, capital efficiency, and so on.

However, if the stock market capitalization relative to GDP has risen significantly historically, it is necessary to break down whether the background is an increase in corporate profits, the globalization of listed companies, or an increase in the P/E ratio.

Points to note in the argument that 'the stock market is too large compared to GDP'

The so-called 'Buffett Indicator,' which divides stock market capitalization by GDP, is known as a reference indicator for looking at the valuation level of the entire market. However, since the figures change depending on the scope of the stock market adopted and the timing of the GDP, it is dangerous to conclude 'overvalued' or 'undervalued' based on a single level.

The indicator that divides stock market capitalization by GDP is often used as a reference to see whether the entire market is overvalued or undervalued.

Intuitively, it is easy to understand.

This is because GDP represents the annual value added of an economy, while stock market capitalization represents the market valuation of companies.

However, there are problems with simple comparisons.

First, listed companies earn profits from overseas.

Second, GDP also includes non-listed companies, the government, and the household sector.

Third, the composition of listed companies changes over time.

Fourth, a reasonable P/E ratio changes depending on interest rate levels.

Fifth, companies centered on intellectual property have different revenue structures than those centered on tangible assets.

Therefore, one cannot mechanically conclude that a market cap-to-GDP ratio at an all-time high will necessarily lead to a crash.

On the other hand, when this ratio rises, it is highly valuable to investigate whether corporate profit margins, overseas profits, interest rates, or P/E ratios are the cause.

Chapter 28: America Holds $21 Trillion in Net External Liabilities to the World—The Fifth Layer: 'Net International Investment Position'

So far, we have looked at America's wealth through a four-story structure: GDP, corporate profits, stock market capitalization, and household net worth.

Before broadening our perspective to the outside, I would like to organize the debt side within the United States.

According to the Federal Reserve's Flow of Funds accounts, the debt balance of the U.S. non-financial sector as of the end of March 2026 is as follows.

• Households: $21.1 trillion

• Non-financial corporations: $22.6 trillion (of which $14.5 trillion is business corporations)

• Government: $38.2 trillion (of which $34.5 trillion is federal, and $3.7 trillion is state and local)

• Total: $81.9 trillion

This is equivalent to 2.57 times GDP.

When placed alongside the $183 trillion in household net worth we saw in Chapter 23, the composition becomes clear.

Households have an extremely healthy balance sheet, with $204.5 trillion in assets against $21.6 trillion in liabilities. However, in the country where these healthy households reside, corporations and the government have borrowed a combined total of over $60 trillion. In particular, the federal government's debt stands at $34.5 trillion and continues to grow at an annual rate of 6.7% as of the January-March quarter of 2026.

Household wealth and the debt owed by the government, corporations, and households are not the same thing. It is premature to conclude that "America is wealthy" or "America is in danger" by looking at only one side.

And the question of who holds this $81.9 trillion in debt leads to the next topic.

When we broaden our perspective to include the world outside the country, another important figure emerges.

According to the International Investment Position published by the BEA, as of the end of March 2026, America's net international investment position was negative $21.27 trillion.

The breakdown is approximately $43.37 trillion in assets held by U.S. residents abroad and approximately $64.64 trillion in assets held by foreign residents in the U.S., resulting in a net liability of approximately $21.27 trillion.

In other words, the world's largest economy is also a country with a massive net external liability. The term "external liability" here includes not only government and corporate bonds but also U.S. stocks and direct investments held by foreigners, so it is not accurate to simply call the $21 trillion "debt."

This adds an important caveat to the expression that "the world's wealth gathers in America."

Global capital continues to flow into America. However, that capital is also a liability from America's perspective, as it is held by foreigners in the form of U.S. stocks, U.S. Treasury bonds, corporate bonds, and direct investments.

The U.S. current account deficit in 2025 was approximately $1.12 trillion, or about 3.6% of GDP. The deficit for the January-March quarter of 2026 was approximately $226.8 billion, or about 2.9% of GDP.

As we saw in Chapter 3, America's net exports are negative. America is one of the world's largest buyers, purchasing many goods and services from abroad. One mechanism for bridging that gap is the purchase of U.S. assets by foreign entities.

In other words,

America buys the world's goods and pays for a portion of them by handing over its own financial assets to the world.

However, it is not accurate to simply interpret this as "living on debt."

America holds over $43 trillion in assets abroad, while foreign countries hold over $64 trillion in assets in America. Because the types of assets and liabilities, rates of return, and currency compositions differ, one cannot judge America's external earning power based solely on the net debt figure.

Even so, the $21 trillion figure cannot be ignored.

Outside the massive domestic wealth of $183 trillion in household net worth, there is a net liability of approximately $21 trillion to the rest of the world.

Therefore, to fully understand America's wealth,

GDP → Corporate Profits → Stock Market Capitalization → Household Net Worth

in addition to these four layers,

The fifth layer of external assets and external liabilities

is something that needs to be examined.

The very power to attract capital from around the world is part of America's strength.

Chapter 29: Why Corporate Value Increases Just by Interest Rates Falling

When considering corporate value, interest rates are extremely important.

The right to receive 100 dollars in the future is not the same as having 100 dollars today.

This is because you can invest 100 dollars in a safe asset today and earn interest.

If interest rates are high, the present value of profits in the distant future becomes smaller.

If interest rates are low, profits in the distant future can be valued more highly.

Growth companies, in particular, where much of the profit is expected in the distant future, are susceptible to changes in interest rates.

For this reason, the monetary policy of a central bank can significantly change the market capitalization of the stock market without directly increasing a company's factories or employees.

If the P/E ratio rises due to a decline in interest rates, stock prices will rise even if corporate profits remain the same.

Conversely, when interest rates rise, stock prices may fall due to a lower P/E ratio, even if profits are increasing.

Asset prices are created not only by the real economy but also by the "discount rate."

Chapter 30: A Bubble Is Not About Having "No Value," But About the Divergence Between Price and Assumptions

One cannot simply conclude that "high market capitalization equals a bubble."

Excellent companies have real value.

A massive customer base, technology, brand, network effects, data, patents, semiconductor design capabilities, and cloud infrastructure are all real competitive advantages.

The problem with a bubble is not whether a company has value or not.

It is whether the assumptions required to justify that value are realistic.

For example, even for an excellent company, it is dangerous if the stock price is based on the assumption that 'for the next 20 years, no competitors will emerge, profit margins will not decline, and the company will grow by 20% every year'.

Even if a company grows as expected, if expectations are set even higher, the stock price may fall.

Conversely, even for an ordinary company, if the stock price is sufficiently low, it can be a good investment.

'A good company' and 'a good stock price' are not the same thing.

This principle is also important when considering today's giant technology companies.

Chapter 31: Thinking of the U.S. Economy as a 'Four-Story Building and Its Foundation'

To summarize the discussion so far, it is easy to understand the U.S. economy if you view it as a four-story building with a foundation underneath.

1st Floor: Real Economy

Population, labor, productivity, factories, housing, services, consumption, investment, etc.

The representative indicator for this is GDP. It is $30.7621 trillion in 2025, and $32.4752 trillion at an annual rate in the April-June quarter of 2026.

2nd Floor: Corporate Profits

Profits attributable to companies from the real economy.

BEA corporate profits in 2025 were approximately $4.0775 trillion, which is 13.3% of GDP.

3rd Floor: Financial Market Valuation

Stock market capitalization, which is corporate profits multiplied by a multiple such as the P/E ratio.

This includes future growth, interest rates, risk, and market sentiment. The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP is at a high level, but it should not be evaluated based on a single number because the value changes depending on the market scope adopted.

4th Floor: Household Assets

Net assets, which are the sum of stocks, real estate, pensions, private companies, deposits, etc., minus liabilities.

It was approximately $183.0 trillion at the end of March 2026. However, the increase from the previous quarter was only $0.1 trillion, which is the result of real estate and other assets offsetting the decline in stock valuations.

Foundation: Lending and Borrowing with the World

And this four-story building is not floating in mid-air.

Net international investment position is negative 21.27 trillion dollars. Foreign assets held in the United States of 64.64 trillion dollars exceed the 43.37 trillion dollars in assets that the United States holds abroad.

U.S. asset prices and investment activities are supported not only by domestic funds but also by capital flowing in from overseas. However, since external liabilities also include items like stocks, it is not appropriate to understand this simply as 'wealth through debt'.

These five things are related, but they are not the same.

Just because GDP has increased by 5% does not mean that household assets have also increased by 5%.

Just because stock prices have risen by 20% does not mean that corporate profits have also increased by 20%.

Just because household assets have increased by 10 trillion dollars does not mean that 10 trillion dollars in new cash has been created.

And household net worth of 183 trillion dollars does not mean that the country as a whole holds 183 trillion dollars in net assets against the world.

Simply making these distinctions makes the true nature of America's 'enormous wealth' much easier to see.

Chapter 32: Do Not Look Only at GDP When Comparing Japan and the United States

When comparing Japan and the United States, looking only at nominal GDP in dollars causes you to overlook many things.

What you should look at are real GDP per capita, purchasing power parity, real disposable income, housing costs, medical expenses, education costs, labor productivity, corporate profit margins, overseas corporate sales, stock market capitalization, household financial assets, and median assets.

America has high salaries. However, housing costs are also high. Medical expenses are also high. Education costs are also high. Service prices are also high.

Furthermore, it is necessary to distinguish between the mean and the median.

The UBS Global Wealth Report 2026 shows this divergence very clearly. The U.S. adult per capita average wealth is 696,277 dollars, ranking 2nd in the world. On the other hand, median wealth is approximately 69,000 dollars, ranking 28th in the world.

The average is about 10 times the median.

In other words, if you imagine the 'assets of an average American' using the mean, it is far removed from the reality of the median household. The America that appears in statistics is the America of the mean, while the America you see when walking down the street is closer to the America of the median.

The Census Bureau's real median household income in 2024 was approximately 83,730 dollars. Compared to approximately 83,260 dollars in 2019, this level could not be called a statistically clear increase.

On the other hand, the FRB's household net worth has increased significantly from 143.7 trillion dollars at the end of 2022 to 182.9 trillion dollars at the end of 2025.

These two facts do not contradict each other.

The median real income is close to 'how much income a typical household earns each year'.

Household net worth includes 'how much stocks, real estate, business equity, etc., are valued at current prices'.

Moreover, stock ownership is heavily concentrated among the upper class.

Therefore, it is possible for the real income of the median household to barely increase even if asset prices rise significantly.

Furthermore, it is necessary to look at the items that consumers actually pay for. In the 2024 state-by-state consumption statistics, healthcare and housing/utilities were major drivers of nominal consumption.

If income does not increase much while payments for housing and healthcare rise, consumers feel that 'even though GDP and stock prices are at record highs, I am not becoming wealthier'.

That feeling is not necessarily an illusion.

For a true comparison between Japan and the United States, one must look at:

not just averages but medians, not just nominal but real figures, not just income but cost of living, and not just GDP but the distribution of asset ownership

as well.

Chapter 33: The American System That Japan Should Truly Learn From

If the goal is simply to increase Japan's nominal GDP, there is also the method of raising prices through inflation.

However, that alone is meaningless for enriching the lives of the people.

What is needed is to increase the value added generated by each individual worker.

Increase high-value-added sectors that Japan can sell to the world, such as AI, software, robots, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, materials, precision machinery, content, finance, and tourism.

Companies should earn profits not only domestically but also from the global market.

Those profits should circulate into wages, research and development, capital investment, dividends, and startup investment.

The assets of successful entrepreneurs and employees should be invested into the next generation of companies.

New companies should be born from universities and research institutions.

Capital markets should support the long-term growth of companies.

This cycle is important.

America's true strength is not that 'GDP is large because hamburgers cost three times as much as in Japan'.

It lies in creating OS, cloud, AI, semiconductors, advertising platforms, financial services, and pharmaceuticals that people around the world use, having that corporate value evaluated by global investors, and using those valued stocks as a means for further capital procurement.

This cannot be created by mere inflation.

There is meaning in Japan increasing its 'nominal GDP' itself.

I have stated that increasing only prices does not lead to an increase in real wealth.

However, this does not mean that an increase in nominal GDP is meaningless.

When deflation or low inflation continues for a long period, nominal values such as corporate sales, salaries, tax revenue, and investment amounts become difficult to grow.

An economy where moderate inflation and wage increases progress simultaneously, and where companies can pass on costs, can sometimes be easier to invest in than a deflationary economy.

The problem is when 'only prices' rise.

If prices rise by 3% and salaries by 1%, real income declines.

If prices rise by 2% and salaries by 4%, and there is productivity improvement in the background, the standard of living can improve.

Therefore, what Japan needs is not 'prices four times higher', but

productivity increase → corporate profit increase → wage increase → consumption increase → investment increase

a cycle like this.

Chapter 34 Conclusion: America's wealth is a composite of 'production', 'price', 'ownership', and 'expectation'.

Coming to America and feeling 'is this country really many times wealthier than Japan?' is an important starting point for seeing the difference between numbers and reality.

U.S. nominal GDP in 2025 was $30.8 trillion. In the April-June quarter of 2026, it reached an annual rate of $32.5 trillion. Personal consumption accounts for about 68% of that, and service consumption alone reaches nearly half of GDP.

Therefore, the sheer size of America's GDP is significantly related to the high prices of housing, medical care, finance, education, dining out, and professional services.

However, that is not all.

Investments in intellectual property, such as research and development and software, are comparable to capital investment, and giant technology companies derive profits from the global market. Looking at it by state, California, Texas, and New York alone account for about 30% of the total U.S. GDP. Economic activity, corporate profits, and assets all have a highly concentrated structure.

U.S. corporate profits in 2025 are approximately $4.08 trillion on a BEA basis.

By the market incorporating profit expectations for years or decades into the future, a stock market capitalization in the tens of trillions of dollars is formed.

The idea of a P/E ratio of 10 is a sufficiently reasonable starting point when considering mature companies that do not grow.

To justify P/E ratios of 20, 30, or 50, one needs correspondingly large future profits, strong competitive advantages, and low capital costs.

It is possible for a single company's profits to grow significantly faster than GDP.

However, the corporate sector as a whole cannot grow much faster than GDP forever.

Stock prices also cannot rise faster than corporate profits forever.

At some point, profits must catch up, P/E ratios must decline, or stock prices must stagnate for a long period.

And the U.S. household net worth of approximately $183 trillion does not mean that $183 trillion in cash exists.

Total assets of approximately $204.5 trillion include about $64.8 trillion in stocks, about $48.7 trillion in owner-occupied real estate, pensions, and equity in private companies. If stock prices or real estate prices change, household "wealth" moves in the trillions of dollars.

Furthermore, this $183 trillion is a figure looking only at domestic households.

When looking at the country as a whole, including its balance of payments with the world, the net international investment position is negative $21.27 trillion. Of America's stocks, bonds, real estate, and companies, $21 trillion net belongs to foreigners. When U.S. stocks rise, a portion of the fruits flows to pension funds and individual investors around the world. Japanese investors buying S&P 500 investment trusts is also a part of this.

Global capital continues to flow into America. And the moment that capital is gathered, it also becomes a liability to someone.

Furthermore, that wealth is not owned equally.

The higher the income bracket, the more stocks they hold, while the lower brackets have less stock ownership and a relatively heavier burden of consumer credit. Even if the average values for GDP or household net worth are high, the lived experience of the median household does not improve at the same rate.

Breaking it down this far, it is easy to understand American wealth as being made up of four elements.

Production—how much value-added was actually created.

Price—at what price those goods and services are traded.

Ownership—who owns the companies, stocks, and real estate.

Expectations—how much the market prices future earnings.

If you confuse these four, America looks like nothing more than a "super-wealthy country with a GDP exceeding $30 trillion."

However, when you look at them separately, a more complex picture emerges.

The real economy is certainly strong.

Corporate profits are also enormous.

The world's largest capital market is also the real deal.

On the other hand, a significant portion of market capitalization and household net worth is driven by future expectations and asset prices, and asset ownership is heavily concentrated in the upper class.

Therefore, the answer to the question "Is America really wealthy?" is not a simple yes or no.

America is a country that generates extremely high value-added globally, while simultaneously being a nation that converts that wealth into massive asset values through financial markets, and furthermore, one where that wealth is owned in a highly skewed manner.

This is the "true nature of American wealth" that becomes visible after breaking down GDP, corporate profits, stock market capitalization, household assets, and international lending and borrowing one by one.

Reference Data

GDP and Composition

• US Nominal GDP: $30.7621 trillion in 2025. Annualized rate of $32.4752 trillion for the April-June quarter of 2026.

• US Real GDP Growth Rate: +2.1% in 2025.

• GDP Composition for April-June 2026: Personal Consumption 68.0%, Private Domestic Investment 17.6%, Government Consumption/Investment 17.1%, Net Exports -2.7%.

• Service Consumption: 46.7% of GDP.

• Intellectual Property Product Investment: Approximately $1.8724 trillion. Roughly the same scale as equipment investment at approximately $1.8726 trillion.

• Government Sector: Federal 6.1% (of which 3.7% is defense), State/Local 11.0%.

• National Health Expenditures: $5.3 trillion in 2024, 18.0% of GDP, $15,474 per capita.

Corporate Profits and the Stock Market

• 2025 BEA corporate profits: $4.0775 trillion. 2024 was $3.8018 trillion, a 7.3% increase year-over-year.

• Corporate profits as a percentage of GDP: 13.3% in 2025.

• 2025 S&P 500 total return: 17.9%.

• Approximate breakdown of that return: 13.5 points from EPS growth, 2.5 points from P/E expansion, and 1.9 points from dividends.

• Contribution of the Magnificent 7: 42%.

• Contribution of NVIDIA alone: 15.5%.

• Contribution of Information Technology + Communication Services: 63.1%. Excluding both sectors, the index return is 6%.

Household Assets

• Net worth of households and non-profit organizations as of the end of March 2026: $183.0 trillion.

• Total assets of $204.5 trillion, liabilities of $21.6 trillion.

• $64.8 trillion in corporate equities, $48.7 trillion in owner-occupied real estate, $20.6 trillion in deposits and MMFs, $16.7 trillion in defined benefit pensions, and $16.6 trillion in equity in non-corporate businesses.

• Net worth distribution: top 1% 31.6%, 90-99% 36.3%, 50-90% 29.6%, bottom 50% 2.5%.

• Equity-type assets: top 1% 50.2%, top 10% 87.4%, bottom 50% 1.1%.

• Owner-occupied real estate: largest at 46.5% for the 50-90 percentile.

• Consumer credit: 51.8% for the bottom 50%.

The Wealthy and Income

• U.S. population: approximately 341.8 million (estimated as of July 1, 2025).

• U.S. dollar-denominated millionaires: approximately 23.6 million.

• Ratio to total population: approximately 6.9%, and roughly around 9% of the adult population.

• Average assets per U.S. adult: $696,277.

• Median wealth per US adult: approximately $69,000.

• IRS 2023: Top 1% AGI threshold $675,602, AGI share 20.6%, income tax burden 38.4%, average tax rate 26.3%.

• Bottom 50%: AGI less than $53,801, income tax burden 3.3%, average tax rate 3.7%.

• Top 1% income composition: labor income about one-third, investment income 63%.

State-by-State and Price Levels

• 2025 State GDP: California approx. $4.25 trillion, Texas approx. $2.90 trillion, New York approx. $2.47 trillion.

• Top 3 states account for about 31% of US GDP.

• 2025 Per capita personal income: US approx. $76,393.

• 2024 RPP: California 110.7, Arkansas 86.9.

• Housing rent RPP: California 154.3, West Virginia 54.2.

• 2023 Per capita PCE: US $56,202, Massachusetts $69,101, Mississippi $42,131.

Household Debt and Non-Financial Sector Debt

• Total household debt (NY Fed, Q2 2026): $18.8 trillion. Down $13 billion from the previous quarter.

• Mortgage debt $13.1 trillion, HELOC $459 billion.

• Credit card balances: $1.26 trillion. Up $21 billion, or 1.7%, from the previous quarter.

• Credit card balance 90+ day delinquency rate: 12.8% (7.6% in Q3 2022).

• Transition rate to new delinquency over the past year: 6.97% of balances.

• Total debt in some stage of delinquency: 4.7%. Student loan 90+ day delinquency: 10.6%.

• Approximately 175 million credit card holders, of which about 60% carry a revolving balance.

• Total non-financial sector debt (FRB Flow of Funds, end of March 2026): $81.9 trillion, 2.57 times GDP.

• Breakdown: Households $21.1 trillion, non-financial corporations $22.6 trillion, government $38.2 trillion (of which federal is $34.5 trillion).

External Balance

• Net international investment position as of the end of March 2026: -$21.27 trillion.

• External assets: $43.37 trillion.

• External liabilities: $64.64 trillion.

• 2025 current account deficit: approximately $1.12 trillion, about 3.6% of GDP.

• Current account deficit for the first quarter of 2026: approximately $226.8 billion, about 2.9% of GDP.

Comparison with Japan

• Japan's 2025 nominal GDP: 662.7885 trillion yen.

• Japan's 2025 real GDP: 590.6759 trillion yen.

• Japan's personal consumption: nominal approximately 351 trillion yen, about 53% of GDP.

• The GDP of California alone is close in scale to Japan's total nominal GDP in dollar terms.

Key References

1. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Gross Domestic Product
   https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gross-domestic-product

2. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Corporate Profits
   https://www.bea.gov/data/income-saving/corporate-profits

3. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP by State
   https://www.bea.gov/data/gdp/gdp-state

4. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Personal Income by State
   https://www.bea.gov/data/income-saving/personal-income-by-state

5. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, Real PCE by State and Regional Price Parities
   https://www.bea.gov/news/2026/real-personal-consumption-expenditures-state-and-real-personal-income-state-2024

6. Federal Reserve, Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1, released June 11, 2026)
   https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/recent_developments.htm

7. Federal Reserve, Distributional Financial Accounts
   https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/efa/efa-distributional-financial-accounts.htm

8. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Investment Position
   https://www.bea.gov/data/intl-trade-investment/international-investment-position

9. U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. International Transactions and Investment Position, 1st Quarter 2026
   https://www.bea.gov/news/2026/us-international-transactions-and-investment-position-1st-quarter-2026-and-annual-update

10. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditure Data
    https://www.cms.gov/data-research/statistics-trends-and-reports/national-health-expenditure-data/historical

11. U.S. Census Bureau, Population Estimates
    https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/popest.html

12. U.S. Census Bureau, Income in the United States: 2024
    https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2025/demo/p60-286.html

13. UBS, Global Wealth Report 2026
    https://www.ubs.com/global/en/wealthmanagement/insights/global-wealth-report.html

14. S&P Dow Jones Indices, U.S. Equities Market Attributes
    https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/commentary/article/us-equities-market-attributes/

15. Peter G. Peterson Foundation, How Do We Tax the Top 1 Percent?
    https://www.pgpf.org/article/how-do-we-tax-the-top-1-and-what-that-means-for-the-federal-budget/

16. Tax Foundation, Summary of the Latest Federal Income Tax Data, Tax Year 2023
    https://taxfoundation.org/data/all/federal/who-pays-federal-income-taxes-tax-year-2023/

17. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Quarterly Report on Household Debt and Credit, 2026Q2
    https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/research/2026/20260811

18. Liberty Street Economics, How Distressed Are Consumers? Reconciling Diverging Credit Card Delinquency Measures
    https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2026/08/how-distressed-are-consumers-reconciling-diverging-credit-card-delinquency-measures/

19. Cabinet Office, Economic and Social Research Institute, "System of National Accounts"
    https://www.esri.cao.go.jp/jp/sna/menu.html

Hashtags

#USeconomy #AmericanEconomy #GDP #NominalGDP #RealGDP #PersonalConsumption #CorporateProfits #CorporateValue #MarketCap #PER #S&P500 #NASDAQ #Magnificent7 #NVIDIA #BuffettIndicator #StockInvestment #HouseholdAssets #Wealthy #Millionaire #WealthGap #IncomeInequality #CapitalGains #GDPbyState #California #Texas #NewYork #PurchasingPowerParity #FRB #BEA #CMS #NYFed #NIIP #NetInternationalInvestmentPosition #CurrentAccountBalance #GovernmentDebt #HouseholdDebt #CreditCard #DelinquencyRate #KShapedEconomy #MedicalExpenses #FlowOfFundsStatistics #JapaneseEconomy #JapanUSComparison #Capitalism