From World War I to the Ukraine War: Changes in Total War and the 'National Adaptability' Japan Must Prepare For

Introduction
There are views pointing to similarities between the current international security environment and the world around the time of World War I. This is because regional conflicts are becoming intertwined with great power competition, destabilizing the existing international order and potentially rendering conflict suppression by the international community ineffective.

Of course, one should be cautious about viewing the present simply as the 'eve of World War I.' There are elements that did not exist in 1914, such as nuclear deterrence, international organizations, economic interdependence, and information and communication technology. However, the possibility that local wars could develop into broader security issues due to the linkage between great power competition and regional conflicts makes looking back at history highly relevant.

So, what do World War I and the Ukraine War teach Japan?

The 'Total War' Demonstrated by World War I
One of the key characteristics of World War I was that war was no longer confined to combat between military forces.

In a protracted war requiring massive amounts of weaponry, ammunition, fuel, food, and transport capacity, a nation's industrial power, financial strength, scientific technology, and human resources began to directly influence military power.

In other words, the capacity to wage war expanded from 'military capability' to 'the capability of the entire nation.'

Japan also recognized the meaning of total war through World War I and subsequently conducted research on it. However, looking back at history, an important lesson is that the tendency to prioritize military rationality led to a loss of balance with politics, diplomacy, and the economy, resulting in strategic errors as a nation.

The lesson to be learned here is not just that 'the entire nation is needed in the event of war.' It is about how to integrate the capabilities of the entire nation under what political objectives.

What Has Changed in the Ukraine War?
The Ukraine War also shares commonalities with World War I in that war involves the entire nation.

Capabilities that cross the boundary between military and non-military, such as ammunition and weapons production, air defense capabilities, energy, communications, supply chains, economic sanctions, and international support, are all related to waging war.

On the other hand, there are significant differences.
In the Ukraine War, rapidly evolving technologies, including civilian technologies such as drones, AI, satellite communications, satellite imagery, cyber, and electronic warfare, are being incorporated into the battlefield.

What is particularly important is not merely possessing the latest technology, but the ability to reflect problems encountered on the battlefield into technical improvements in a short period.

In a discussion held at the Hudson Institute between former CIA Director David Petraeus and Jason Shue,the environment where numerous companies and startups compete in drone development in Ukraine, the mechanisms connecting the military and private companies, and rapid feedback from the field to development were pointed out as features.This can be considered an example showing the importance of a 'capability ecosystem' where the government, military, companies, and researchers mutually enhance their capabilities, rather than just the conventional relationship of 'the state procuring weapons.'

However, Ukraine has special conditions such as an existential crisis, support from Western countries, and social concentration during wartime. Therefore, it is hard to think that Japan should simply adopt the Ukraine-style model as is.



Not Just 'Total Power' but 'Adaptability' Becomes ImportantLooking at the period from World War I to the Ukraine War continuously, it is possible that the national capabilities required for war can no longer be explained by 'quantity' alone.
In World War I, mass production capacity was extremely important.

Today, in addition to that, the 'speed of adaptation to change' is considered to be important.
For example, if new electronic jamming occurs on the battlefield, engineers recognize it, devise countermeasures, create prototypes, demonstrate them in units, and improve them again. If this cycle is fast, the capability of the same equipment can be enhanced over time.

In this paper, I call this capability 'national adaptability.'

National adaptability is the ability of a nation to rapidly create, improve, and maintain the necessary capabilities in response to changes in the external environment or crises.


Japan's Challenge Is Not That 'The System Is Bad'In Japan as well, the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces are advancing research and development reforms, the utilization of civilian technology, collaboration with startups, and improvements in equipment acquisition systems.
Therefore, it is not appropriate to evaluate that 'Japan's defense organization has not changed.'

On the other hand, there are rational reasons for the systems that have been formed over a long period.

The Self-Defense Forces have carried out their missions within limited budgets, personnel, and equipment. As a result, units have emphasized maximizing the capabilities of the equipment provided. This was rational for maintaining high proficiency with limited resources.

However, in fields where the speed of technological change is extremely fast, not only demonstrating the capabilities of existing equipment but also 'mechanisms for issuing new requirements and improvement proposals from the field and reflecting them in technology rapidly' may become important.

The same applies to equipment development.

In Japan, a system has been formed to develop equipment while suppressing technical risks, ensuring safety, reliability, and accountability within a limited budget. This remains an important strength for equipment requiring high reliability, such as large vessels, aircraft, and air defense systems.
On the other hand, for AI, drones, software, etc., the method of spending a long time to create a single finished product may make it difficult to keep up with technological progress.

Therefore, what is needed is not a total denial of existing systems.
While maintaining the conventional cautious development method for large-scale, high-reliability equipment, it is conceivable to combine it with a method of repeating small-scale prototyping, early demonstration, field feedback, and short-term improvements in fields with rapid technological change.



The Capability Ecosystem Japan Should BuildWhat Japan needs is not to imitate Ukraine's system, but to form a capability ecosystem suitable for Japan's conditions.
Its components are not just the Ministry of Defense and the Self-Defense Forces.

It is necessary to think about including defense companies, startups, universities, research institutions, private companies in communications, AI, space, semiconductors, and even cooperation with allies.
At that time, realistic business viability is also necessary for the companies.

Companies cannot participate sustainably just by being asked to enter the defense sector. Long-term policy prospects, protection of intellectual property, the possibility of investment recovery, and stable procurement systems are required.
Therefore, building national adaptability should be considered a cross-cutting issue involving defense industry policy, science and technology policy, and economic security policy, not just a problem for the Ministry of Defense.



Implications for Defense CompaniesWhat will become important for future defense companies is not just the ability to deliver high-performance equipment.
The ability to design 'evolving systems' that can continuously update capabilities by combining AI, software, communications, sensors, etc., may become important.

Also, the ability to collaborate with startups, universities, and companies in different industries, rather than developing everything in-house, may become a competitive advantage.

Even more important is incorporating 'expandability' that assumes contingencies from peacetime into the design.

Rather than gathering companies only after a contingency occurs,
it is considered desirable to prepare a structure from peacetime where multiple companies can participate, improve in response to field requirements, and expand production if necessary.is considered.

ConclusionWhat World War I demonstrated is the lesson that 'if war occurs, the capability of the entire nation is needed.'
What the Ukraine War may be demonstrating is that 'how fast the capability of the entire nation can be changed' is becoming important.

Therefore, what Japan should aim for is not a return to the past national mobilization model, but

the construction of national adaptability that can flexibly create capabilities in fields with rapid change while maintaining the strengths of existing systems and organizations.In future defense system development, I believe the perspective of designing not only 'equipment that can be used in contingencies' but also 'equipment that can develop into an ecosystem that can continuously evolve in contingencies' will become an important consideration.