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Economic Security and Information Sovereignty in the AI Era: Positioning Japanese LLMs and Data Infrastructure in Pax Silica: January 25, 2026 (Sun)

藤井秀昭（『京都居候叢書』著者）

[Abstract]
Pax Silica is an international cooperation framework officially announced by the U.S. Department of State in December 2025, covering the entire technology stack of the AI era, including AI, semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, and logistics, with the goal of strengthening supply chain resilience and economic security among allies (U.S. Department of State (2025)). The background includes China's influence on critical mineral supplies, the rise of the AI and semiconductor sectors, and geopolitical risks in cutting-edge manufacturing (CRDS (2026); Business+IT (2025); Semiconductor Business Lab (2026)). While relying on this official definition, this paper reinterprets Pax Silica as a two-layer structure model consisting of a "material foundation (hard)" and an "AI ecosystem (soft)" as the author's theory, and presents the policy conclusion that the development of Japanese LLMs and public data infrastructure is strategically important for Japan to capture value domestically and ensure information sovereignty (intellectual sovereignty). Note that the two-layer structure model, the risk of becoming a "material supplier," and the indispensability of Japanese LLMs are the author's analysis and not explicitly stated in official documents.

Keywords: Pax Silica, economic security, Japanese LLM, data infrastructure, supply chain, information sovereignty (intellectual sovereignty), AI governance

[Main Text]
1. Introduction

Advanced semiconductors, critical minerals, refining and manufacturing processes, electricity, and logistics, which are the foundations of AI development, are becoming "strategic assets" in various countries. The U.S. Department of State's Pax Silica Declaration explicitly lists the entire stack—from minerals to manufacturing, semiconductors, computing resources, networks, data, software, foundation models, and applications—as subjects of cooperation, and calls for the formation of an economic security consensus among allies (U.S. Department of State (2025)). On the other hand, AI superiority strongly depends on soft areas such as model structure, training data, and language optimization. Based on the list of subjects in this declaration, this paper theorizes Pax Silica as a two-layer structure of "materials (1st layer) x software (2nd layer)" as the author's theory, and examines the conditions under which Japan's participation can cause value to flow back domestically.

2. Policy Background: Definition of Pax Silica and International Environment (Facts)

2.1 Background of Establishment and Official Definition

Pax Silica was officially announced by the U.S. Department of State in December 2025 and positioned as an international cooperation framework covering the entire technology stack of the AI era (U.S. Department of State (2025)). The declaration is distinctive in that it includes not only semiconductors and computing resources but also software and frontier foundation models (U.S. Department of State (2025)). Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced its attendance at the summit in Washington D.C. and the signing of the declaration (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2025)). In addition, the Center for Research and Development Strategy (CRDS) has organized the summary of the U.S. Department of State's announcement and the participation status of the meetings (CRDS (2026)).

2.2 Background Awareness: Demand for Supply Chain Restructuring

Multiple reports and analyses point to (1) China's expanding influence in the supply of rare earths and rare metals, (2) the rapid increase in AI and semiconductor investment, and (3) geopolitical risks due to the concentration of cutting-edge manufacturing in Taiwan as the background for the launch of the framework (Business+IT (2025); Semiconductor Business Lab (2026); CRDS (2026)). These provide a rationale for Pax Silica's aim to achieve redundancy and decentralization of the entire stack rather than a single process (U.S. Department of State (2025)).

2.3 Organization of Participating Countries and Points to Note

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly states Japan's participation by signature (Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2025)), and CRDS reports the involvement of the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, Israel, Singapore, the U.K., and others (CRDS (2026)). There are also reports that the Netherlands, the UAE, etc., participated in the meetings, but since there are discrepancies in descriptions among media outlets, definitive statements are avoided (Business+IT (2025)). This paper emphasizes the point that countries are converging on "reliable supply chain cooperation" as the framework (U.S. Department of State (2025); CRDS (2026)).

3. Analytical Framework: Two-Layer Structure Model (Author's Theory)

The following two-layer structure model is not the official definition of the U.S. Department of State, but a theoretical reconstruction by the author. However, it is officially confirmed that the area corresponding to the second layer (software/foundation models) is included in the scope of the declaration (U.S. Department of State (2025)).

1st Layer: Material Security (Hard Aspect)

Critical minerals, refining, advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, computing resources, energy, logistics, and infrastructure are strategic assets whose supply constraints immediately spread to all industries (CRDS (2026)), and the aim is to increase resilience against "shocks" through decentralization and mutual complementarity (U.S. Department of State (2025)).

2nd Layer: Software Security (AI Ecosystem)

This includes the joint development of non-English (Japanese, Korean, etc.) LLMs, the development and interoperability of Japanese data infrastructure, common standards for safety, transparency, and explainability, and cross-border human resource and research collaboration. Since the declaration includes foundation models and software applications in the target stack, the policy importance of the second layer is high (U.S. Department of State (2025)).

Implication (Author's analysis): If the second layer is weakened and left unattended, the domestic ripple effect (endogenization) of investment and cooperation in the first layer will be limited, making value capture difficult. Conversely, at the intersection of the first layer and the second layer, Japan can form a comparative advantage (Business+IT (2025); CRDS (2026)).

4. Propositions (All are the author's policy analysis and not explicit statements in official documents)

P1: The advancement of Japanese LLMs is essential for ensuring Japan's information sovereignty (intellectual sovereignty).
If one relies on the extrapolation of English models, differences in institutions, culture, and pragmatics may create structural biases in public decision-making. The Japanese government's guidelines emphasize explainability, transparency, and auditability (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry/Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2024); Digital Agency (2025a)), and optimization of the linguistic sphere is consistent with policy requirements (Digital Agency (2025b)).

P2: Without a public Japanese data infrastructure, value recovery is difficult to achieve.
The development of rights processing, anonymization, data provenance, and quality metadata has high public good characteristics, and relying solely on individual companies has limits in terms of scale and legitimacy (Digital Agency (2025a, 2025b)).

P3: Unless the second layer is incorporated into the institutional design of cooperation, the risk of Japan becoming a 'supplier of raw materials' will increase.
Although the current declaration is a declaration and not a binding clause (CRDS (2026)), making the second layer a requirement can institutionally guarantee the domestic ripple effects of first-layer investments (U.S. Department of State (2025)).

P4: Japan's comparative advantage is established at the intersection of the first layer and the second layer.
By combining strengths in materials, refining, and equipment with the strengthening of Japanese LLMs, data infrastructure, and governance, it is easier to gain the initiative in cooperative design (Business+IT (2025); CRDS (2026)).

5. Policy Design: Roadmap for Two-Layer Integration (Author's Proposal)

5.1 Short-term (within 1 year)

  • Clarification of the command center: Establish a cross-functional task force involving the Cabinet Office, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, MEXT, METI, and the Personal Information Protection Commission to oversee the implementation of AI business guidelines and government procurement guidelines (METI/MIC (2024); Digital Agency (2025a)).

  • Immediate expansion of the Japanese foundational corpus: Promote rights processing, anonymization, and standardization of official documents, judicial precedents, academic, technical, medical, financial, and educational data as a public project, and ensure auditability (provenance assignment) (Digital Agency (2025a, 2025b)).

  • Concentration of priority investment in LLMs: Develop Japanese preprocessing, tokenizers, and Japanese evaluation metrics (reading comprehension, summarization, dialogue, reasoning, safety), and establish a cross-governmental evaluation and audit process (METI/MIC (2024)).

  • Japan-U.S.-Korea 'Second Layer Clauses': Explicitly state joint data spaces, model safety evaluations, and two-way human resource exchanges in agreement documents (U.S. Department of State (2025); CRDS (2026)).

5.2 Medium-term (1–3 years)

  • Generational updates of Japanese foundational models: Deploy general-purpose models plus derivative models specialized in domains such as administration, medicine, and manufacturing.

  • Permanent establishment of a public evaluation infrastructure: Publish and update standard benchmarks for generation, reasoning, safety, and hallucination rates specialized in Japanese, and connect them to government procurement standards (Digital Agency (2025a)).

  • Institutionalization of safety and transparency: Explicitly state auditability, output explainability, and data provenance tracking, and ensure their operation (METI/MIC (2024); Digital Agency (2025b)).

5.3 Long-term (3–5 years)

  • International data space with interoperability: Design connections between Japan, the U.S., South Korea, Taiwan, and Europe based on anonymization, rights management, and federated learning (U.S. Department of State (2025)).

  • Cross-industry application layer: Develop Japanese agent groups that meet the language operation requirements of manufacturing, logistics, finance, healthcare, education, etc., and connect them to public and industrial productivity.

6. Conclusion

Pax Silica, as defined by the U.S. Department of State, is an international cooperation framework covering the entire technology stack of the AI era (U.S. Department of State (2025)), and is an internationalization of supply chain redesign to address China risk and Taiwan concentration risk (CRDS (2026); Business+IT (2025); Semiconductor Business Lab (2026)). Based on this official definition, this paper presented a two-layer structure model as the author's theory and argued that the development of Japanese LLMs and Japanese data infrastructure is policy-critically important for Japan to recover value from the framework and ensure information sovereignty (intellectual sovereignty). After clarifying that the two-layer structure, the risk of becoming a raw material supplier, and the KPIs/roadmap are the author's analysis and proposals, the direction of incorporating the second layer into cooperative design was proposed. Future research requires empirical studies and comparative analysis of institutional design regarding the composition of participating countries, binding agreement design, and funding schemes.

References

Economic Security and Information Sovereignty in the AI Era:
The Role of Japanese-Language LLMs and Data Infrastructure within Pax Silica
Sunday, January 25, 2026


Abstract

Pax Silica is an international cooperation framework formally announced by the U.S. Department of State in December 2025, covering the entire technological stack of the AI era—including AI, semiconductors, critical minerals, energy, and logistics—with the aim of strengthening supply-chain resilience and economic security among allied nations (U.S. Department of State 2025). Its background factors include China’s growing influence over critical mineral supply, its rise in AI and semiconductor sectors, and the geopolitical risks associated with leading-edge manufacturing (CRDS 2026; Business+IT 2025; Semiconductor Business Lab 2026). Building on this official definition, this paper reinterprets Pax Silica through the author’s theoretical lens as a two-layer model consisting of a “material foundation (hardware)” and an “AI ecosystem (software).” It presents the policy implication that, for Japan to recapture value domestically and secure information sovereignty (intellectual sovereignty), the development of Japanese-language LLMs and public data infrastructure is strategically essential. The two-layer model, the risk of “becoming merely a materials supplier,” and the indispensability of Japanese-language LLMs are not stated in official documents but are the author’s analytical propositions.

Keywords: Pax Silica, economic security, Japanese-language LLMs, data infrastructure, supply chains, information sovereignty (intellectual sovereignty), AI governance

Main Text

1. Introduction

Advanced semiconductors, critical minerals, refining and manufacturing processes, electricity, and logistics—the foundational elements of AI development—are increasingly treated as “strategic assets” by states. The U.S. Department of State’s Pax Silica Declaration explicitly designates the entire stack from minerals → manufacturing → semiconductors → compute → networks → data → software → foundation models → applications as areas for cooperation, aiming to build an economic-security consensus among allied nations (U.S. Department of State 2025). At the same time, AI superiority depends heavily on software domains such as model architecture, training data, and linguistic optimization. Based on the declaration’s enumeration of target domains, this paper theorizes Pax Silica as a two-layer structure—“material (Layer 1) × software (Layer 2)”—and examines the conditions under which Japan’s participation can generate domestic value.

2. Policy Background: Definition and International Context of Pax Silica (Factual)

2.1 Establishment and Official Definition

Pax Silica was formally announced by the U.S. Department of State in December 2025 as an international cooperation framework covering the entire technological stack of the AI era (U.S. Department of State 2025). The declaration is notable for including not only semiconductors and compute resources but also software and frontier foundation models (U.S. Department of State 2025). Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has publicly confirmed its participation in the Washington, D.C. summit and its signing of the declaration (MOFA 2025). The Center for Research and Development Strategy (CRDS) has summarized the key points of the U.S. announcement and the participating entities (CRDS 2026).

2.2 Background Recognition: The Need for Supply-Chain Reorganization

(1) China’s expanding influence in rare-earth and rare-metal supply,
(2) rapid growth in AI and semiconductor investment, and
(3) geopolitical risks arising from the concentration of leading-edge manufacturing in Taiwan
(Business+IT 2025; Semiconductor Business Lab 2026; CRDS 2026).
These factors justify Pax Silica’s orientation toward redundancy and diversification across the entire stack rather than any single production stage (U.S. Department of State 2025).

2.3 Participating Countries and Caveats

Japan’s participation is explicitly noted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA 2025), and CRDS reports involvement by the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Australia, Israel, Singapore, and the United Kingdom (CRDS 2026). Some media report participation by the Netherlands and the UAE, but discrepancies across sources make definitive statements inappropriate (Business+IT 2025). This paper focuses on the shared emphasis across countries on “trusted supply-chain cooperation” as the framework’s core (U.S. Department of State 2025; CRDS 2026).

3. Analytical Framework: The Two-Layer Model (Author’s Theory)

The following two-layer model is not part of the U.S. Department of State’s official definition but is the author’s theoretical reconstruction. However, the inclusion of software and foundation models—corresponding to Layer 2—is officially confirmed (U.S. Department of State 2025).

Layer 1: Material Security (Hardware Dimension)

Critical minerals, refining, advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, compute resources, energy, logistics, and infrastructure constitute strategic assets whose supply constraints immediately affect all industries (CRDS 2026). The aim is to enhance resilience to “shocks” through diversification and mutual complementarity (U.S. Department of State 2025).

Layer 2: Software Security (AI Ecosystem)

This includes joint development of non-English LLMs (e.g., Japanese, Korean), construction and interoperability of Japanese-language data infrastructure, shared standards for safety, transparency, and explainability, and cross-border talent and research collaboration. Since the declaration explicitly includes foundation models and software applications, the policy significance of Layer 2 is substantial (U.S. Department of State 2025).

Implication (Author’s Analysis):
If Layer 2 is neglected, domestic spillovers (endogenization) from Layer 1 investments and cooperation will remain limited, making value capture difficult. Conversely, Japan can form comparative advantage at the intersection of Layers 1 and 2 (Business+IT 2025; CRDS 2026).

4. Propositions (Author’s Policy Analysis, Not Official Statements)

P1:

Advancing Japanese-language LLMs is indispensable for securing Japan’s information sovereignty (intellectual sovereignty). Reliance on extrapolated English-language models risks embedding structural biases into public decision-making due to differences in institutions, culture, and pragmatics. Japanese government guidelines emphasize explainability, transparency, and auditability (METI & MIC 2024; Digital Agency 2025a), making linguistic optimization consistent with policy requirements (Digital Agency 2025b).

P2:

Without a public Japanese-language data infrastructure, value capture is unlikely. Rights management, anonymization, data provenance, and quality metadata have strong public-goods characteristics, and relying solely on private firms limits both scale and legitimacy (Digital Agency 2025a, 2025b).

P3:

If Layer 2 is not incorporated into the cooperation framework, Japan risks becoming merely a “materials supplier.” Although the current declaration is non-binding (CRDS 2026), formalizing Layer 2 requirements could institutionalize domestic spillovers from Layer 1 investments (U.S. Department of State 2025).

P4:

Japan’s comparative advantage emerges at the intersection of Layers 1 and 2. Combining strengths in materials, refining, and equipment with Japanese-language LLMs, data infrastructure, and governance enhances Japan’s ability to shape cooperation design (Business+IT 2025; CRDS 2026).

5. Policy Design: Roadmap for Integrating the Two Layers (Author’s Proposal)

5.1 Short Term (Within One Year)

• Clarify governance: Establish a cross-ministerial task force (Cabinet Office, MIC, MEXT, METI, PPC) to oversee implementation of AI provider guidelines and government procurement guidelines (METI & MIC 2024; Digital Agency 2025a).
• Expand Japanese-language corpora: Publicly fund rights processing, anonymization, and standardization of government documents, case law, academic, technical, medical, financial, and educational data, ensuring auditability (Digital Agency 2025a, 2025b).
• Concentrate LLM investment: Develop Japanese-language preprocessing, tokenizers, and evaluation metrics (reading comprehension, summarization, dialogue, reasoning, safety), and establish cross-government evaluation and audit processes (METI & MIC 2024).
• Institutionalize Layer 2 in Japan-U.S.-Korea cooperation: Codify joint data spaces, model-safety evaluation, and bilateral talent exchange in formal documents (U.S. Department of State 2025; CRDS 2026).

5.2 Medium Term (1–3 Years)

• Update Japanese‑language foundation models and develop domain‑specific variants (administration, healthcare, manufacturing).
• Establish a permanent public evaluation platform with Japanese‑specific benchmarks for generation, reasoning, safety, and hallucination rates, linked to procurement standards (Digital Agency 2025a).
• Institutionalize safety and transparency requirements, including auditability, output explainability, and data‑provenance tracking (METI & MIC 2024; Digital Agency 2025b).

5.3 Long Term (3–5 Years)

• Build an interoperable international data space—supporting anonymization, rights management, and federated learning—connecting Japan, the U.S., Korea, Taiwan, and Europe (U.S. Department of State 2025).
• Develop cross‑industry application layers, creating Japanese‑language agents tailored to linguistic requirements in manufacturing, logistics, finance, healthcare, and education.

6. Conclusion

Pax Silica, as defined by the U.S. Department of State, is an international cooperation framework covering the entire technological stack of the AI era (U.S. Department of State 2025). It represents the internationalization of supply‑chain redesign in response to China‑related risks and the concentration of leading‑edge manufacturing in Taiwan (CRDS 2026; Business+IT 2025; Semiconductor Business Lab 2026). Based on this official definition, this paper presented a two‑layer model as the author’s theoretical contribution and argued that the development of Japanese‑language LLMs and Japanese‑language data infrastructure is crucial for Japan to capture value and secure information (intellectual) sovereignty. The two‑layer model, the risk of becoming a materials‑only supplier, and the proposed KPIs and roadmap are the author’s analytical contributions. The paper proposes incorporating Layer 2 into cooperation design and identifies the need for future empirical and comparative institutional research on membership composition, binding commitments, and financing schemes.

References

Business+IT (2025) “Framework ‘Pax Silica’ Launched for AI Semiconductor and Mineral Supply Chains by Japan, U.S., Korea, Australia, etc.,” December 14, 2025, https://www.sbbit.jp/article/cont1/177009

CRDS (Center for Research and Development Strategy) (2026) “U.S. Department of State Launches ‘Pax Silica,’ an International Collaboration Focused on Economic Security in the AI Era,” January 21, 2026, https://crds.jst.go.jp/dw/20260121/2026012144145/

Digital Agency (2025a) Guidelines on the Procurement and Utilization of Generative AI for the Evolution and Innovation of Government, May 27, 2025, https://www.digital.go.jp/assets/contents/node/basic_page/field_ref_resources/e2a06143-ed29-4f1d-9c31-0f06fca67afc/80419aea/20250527_resources_standard_guidelines_guideline_01.pdf

Digital Agency (2025b) Guidance on Mitigating Risks in the Utilization of Text-Generating AI (α version), June 6, 2025, https://www.digital.go.jp/resources/generalitve-ai-guidebook

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2025) “Attendance of Senior Deputy Minister Akahori at the ‘Pax Silica Summit’ (Press Release),” December 13, 2025, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/release/pressit_000001_03107.html

METI & MIC (2024) AI Service Provider Guidelines (Version 1.0), April 19, 2024, https://www.meti.go.jp/press/2024/04/20240419004/20240419004-1.pdf

Semiconductor Business Lab (2026) “What Is Pax Silica—An Era in Which Semiconductors Shape the ‘World Order’,” January 16, 2026, https://note.com/modern_eider5829/n/n1725791ad889

U.S. Department of State (2025) “Pax Silica,” December 12, 2025, https://www.state.gov/pax-silica/

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