[Reading the Toyohashi City War Damage Reconstruction Record] Emergency Measures 2
Introduction
What was the emergency rationing and epidemic prevention system like after the war damage?
The fury that struck the post-war society—the spread of dysentery
How did the military, the city, and the administration respond?
Emergency Rationing
The provision of cooked meals continued until June 24, four days later, when prospects for obtaining emergency food supplies were secured. The city could not rely indefinitely on the dedicated assistance of neighborhood associations in the surrounding areas for cooked meals. It was necessary to implement a certain level of comprehensive emergency measures for the disaster victims. Since most goods were controlled, the city authorities, the Defense Headquarters, the police, and various control associations consulted and decided to carry out emergency rationing of daily necessities.
It is surprising that emergency rationing could be carried out at the city authority level. If they were capable of that, one wonders if they could have done a little more even in normal times.
Here, the state of rationing for household items such as staple food, side dishes, clothing, charcoal, tableware, and pots is described.
Rationing Measures by the City Hall
The city made efforts to achieve effective relief for disaster victims by accurately grasping the number of victims and conducting proper rationing administration. On June 22, through the neighborhood association chairmen of the disaster-stricken areas, disaster certificates were issued to the victims, and travel certificates were issued to those moving out of the city. On June 28, the city notified victims to apply for the issuance of rice ration books and household ration books, and this administrative task was completed in a day or two. Furthermore, on June 28, the first neighborhood association chairman meeting after the disaster was held at the library. It was intended to establish order and ensure the thoroughness of emergency measures, which had remained in the chaos following the air raid.
First and foremost, the focus was on accurately grasping the number of people remaining in the burnt-out ruins, thereby aiming to optimize the rationing of emergency supplies and daily necessities. Secondly, it instructed on preventive measures against infectious diseases arising from unsanitary environments. It communicated that three clinics had been opened in the city to provide general medical care, and that the Toyohashi Hospital would also provide treatment, urging their use.
Thirdly, while investigating the number of those who remained in the war-damaged area and fought hard, it requested that neighborhood association chairmen remain at the forefront to lead, and conveyed that materials would be rationed to them on a priority basis. This was intended to avoid the confusion and destruction of the neighborhood association organization hindering post-disaster processing.
Fourthly, it concerned the clearing of the burnt-out districts and the implementation of metal collection. The burnt-out areas had hardly been cleared, and people had only managed to pick up things they thought were necessary for their daily lives. Therefore, it was decided to set a fixed deadline for the collection of metals within that period, and the City Hall would accept the contributions from July 1 to July 12, after which it would be considered that the rights had been abandoned. However, factory machinery and equipment were excluded until separate instructions were received from the Prefectural Commerce and Industry Division. Owners were notified to mark the machinery and equipment on-site (name, equipment name, reported to City Hall). Other matters conveyed included restrictions on water supply hours, the delivery of newspapers and mail by neighborhood association units, the temporary suspension of funeral services for deceased soldiers and military civilians, and that the welcoming of remains should be small-scale, organized by groups.
It can be seen that they attempted to restore the administrative structure with the neighborhood associations at the center. However, it does not feel that totalitarian, and it feels as though efforts were being poured into the revival of daily life.
Epidemic Prevention
Wartime Epidemic Prevention System
It was said that infectious diseases were inherent to war damage, and Toyohashi could not be an exception. After the disaster, those who quickly built shacks on the burnt earth and those living in air-raid shelters were all suffering from malnutrition due to food shortages, physical exhaustion, and severe mental trauma. In addition, the sanitary environment of the ruins had deteriorated extremely. Toilets were open pits, sewage treatment could not be done at all, and the stench filled the scorched earth. Since the water supply was destroyed in many places, the use of water was also inconvenient due to restrictions on water supply hours for restoration and repairs. There were no public bathhouses to bathe in, and no home baths either. The Toyohashi Police Station gave emergency instructions regarding bathing that police permission was not required if communal baths were to be set up in the war-damaged areas. For this reason, baths using what remained after the fire were built here and there, but this also created an unsanitary environment. In addition, because it was the rainy season, there was great fear of the outbreak of infectious diseases.
The city had previously formulated an "Infectious Disease Patient Accommodation Facility Plan" and "Toyohashi City Epidemic Prevention Team Organization Guidelines" in preparation for air raid disasters and had taken thorough measures. However, for such large-scale war damage, it was impossible to follow the established plan, and new emergency measures were required.
The city immediately discussed its epidemic prevention measures. On June 28, it held a meeting of the disaster-stricken neighborhood association chairmen, gave detailed instructions to pay particular attention to health and hygiene, and also communicated that general medical care would be provided at the nine clinics that remained in the city and at Toyohashi Hospital, calling for early medical examinations.
The next day, June 29, a dysentery patient suddenly appeared among the disaster victims accommodated at the Shinkawa National School. It immediately spread throughout the Shinkawa school district, and finally, a terrifying situation occurred. The city had to make every effort to eradicate it. Patients at the beginning of the outbreak were isolated at the Minowa Infectious Disease Isolation Hospital, but it could not accommodate the patients appearing one after another. They were forced to accommodate them at Toyohashi Hospital, but it could not accommodate them either, and patients were appearing with tremendous force. Since there were no other suitable facilities, and patients were concentrated in the Shinkawa National School district, the city, at its wit's end, negotiated with the school to use it as an accommodation facility. The school side naturally opposed it, but negotiations were concluded on the condition that thorough disinfection would be carried out afterward, and patients were accommodated and treated as the temporary Shinkawa Hospital. (Omitted)
It was decided to obtain support from the military, and a "Wartime Epidemic Prevention Headquarters" was established at the City Hall, consisting of one military doctor each from the 100th Unit and the Ikari Unit, and one city official, and activities began with Military Surgeon Major Miyamoto as the head of the headquarters.
The outbreak of infectious diseases is described. Although the city claims to have taken thorough measures by formulating plans and guidelines for the outbreak of infectious diseases, it states that when dysentery patients appeared the day after the disaster-stricken neighborhood association chairman meeting was held, it spread in the blink of an eye. In the end, it seems they responded by using a school as a temporary hospital and asking for support from the military. Since this support from the military was at the request of Mayor Mizuno, who was from the Army, one wonders if more effective fire prevention and extinguishing could have been done if the mayor had made a direct request immediately after the disaster.
Epidemic Prevention Activities
Epidemic prevention activities were carried out as follows. The Toyohashi Medical Association organized a door-to-door disease inspection team, the city's health section officials organized a disinfection team, and two officers, 10 non-commissioned officers, and 10 soldiers were sent from the military to accommodate patients using trucks. (Omitted) However, treatment could not be provided perfectly. As a result, out of a total of 1,459 patients, there were as many as 367 deaths.
Although it does not reach the number of deaths from the war damage, it means that more people died from dysentery than the number of seriously and slightly injured people. Isn't this because the preparations beforehand were not well done? It is difficult to understand why dysentery spread so much in Toyohashi, which had its own water supply system, but perhaps it was unavoidable after the war damage.
Emergency measure expenses
It is said that the expenses for emergency measures were temporarily paid by the city in the amount of just under 470,000 yen, and were later reimbursed through grants from the prefecture. I previously wrote that citizens paid for the soup kitchens out of their own pockets, but since the costs for the soup kitchens are recorded here, it seems they did not pay out of their own pockets.
Summary
Regarding emergency measures, with the cooperation of the military, it seems that things progressed relatively smoothly, with the exception of the spread of dysentery. It also appears that a considerable amount of the expenses were covered by public funds, and grants were paid to war victims, suggesting that significant financial support was provided to those affected.
Although I still cannot dispel my doubts about the actions of the mayor and the military, I feel that the administration itself seems to have performed relatively well. It may be that the nationwide support system was limited to the political sphere, and that autonomy functioned relatively well in the administrative sphere.
Looking at the way emergency rations were handled, one might even feel that the administration was able to function more autonomously precisely because of the war damage. In this regard, it seems necessary to take into account the difference in jurisdiction between the military and the Ministry of Home Affairs. One might think that the Ministry of Home Affairs was at least not as centralized as the military.
Although the neighborhood associations required the recommendation of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association for their caretakers, these associations existed before the establishment of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and could be said to have been under the umbrella of the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was a decentralized bureaucratic organization. Therefore, perhaps its decentralized nature was demonstrated and functioned well in an emergency such as war damage.
Thus, war damage seems to require a multifaceted analysis.
いいなと思ったら応援しよう！
誰かが読んで、評価をしてくれた、ということはとても大きな励みになります。サポート、本当にありがとうございます。