NHK 'Inside Toyota': The Depths of Next-Generation Corolla Development and China
What is the 'power to build cars' that Toyota is trying to protect, rather than competing on speed with China?
NHK General TV broadcast the NHK Special 'Inside Toyota: Close Coverage of the World's Largest Automaker's Most Important Meeting' on July 19, 2026, at 9:00 PM. The broadcast lasted from 9:00 PM to 9:49 PM. It was also streamed simultaneously and available for catch-up on NHK ONE, and rebroadcast on NHK General in the early hours of July 23. The program is an NHK-produced documentary that followed Toyota Motor Corporation's development hub over a long period, tracking the development process of the next-generation Corolla and the new vehicle platform based on it.
This program does not introduce Toyota, which reaches an annual sales volume of approximately 10 million units and sales of 50 trillion yen, as merely a massive corporation.
Placed at the center is the Corolla, which has exceeded 57 million units in cumulative global sales and has represented Toyota's mass-market vehicles for 60 years. How will the next-generation model be built? And as emerging forces, including Chinese manufacturers, increase their development speed, to what extent can Toyota change its own development methods, decision-making, production, technology, and human resources?
Through product planning, body design, collision safety, mass production preparation, executive meetings, and vehicle development at the test track, the program captured the contradictions Toyota faces.
It is the coexistence of the sense of crisis that 'if we don't become faster, we will lose' and the sense of crisis that 'if we only imitate speed, we will lose the meaning of being Toyota.'
This article organizes the program's structure, the 'Toyota-ness' discussed therein, and the meaning seen through the contrast with the Chinese automotive industry.
Starting from the 'final hurdle' of the next-generation Corolla
At the beginning of the program, the engineers responsible for the development of the next-generation Corolla appear. While checking the exterior of the vehicle, they discuss details that an average user might overlook, such as the gap between the tire and the wheel arch, the thickness of the car body, and the angle of the windshield.
If the gap between the tire and the fender is large, the lower part of the car body looks heavy and sluggish. By narrowing the gap and setting it low, the car looks taut. The engineer says that there are many people in the company who look at these details and judge them as 'cool.'
From there, the program introduces the most important meeting within Toyota that decides whether or not to launch a new product. It is a place where executives, including Chairman Akio Toyoda, and those in charge gather to discuss in front of the car under development. It is said that in the past, there have been products that were decided to be canceled at this stage.
The program adopted a structure of first presenting a scene close to the conclusion of a 'launch decision,' and then going back several months to follow the development process. As a result, viewers share a single sense of tension throughout the program: 'Will this Corolla and platform really be approved?'
Corolla development involving over 400 people
An automobile is an extremely complex industrial product consisting of about 30,000 parts. The development of the next-generation Corolla involves more than 400 members, including design, testing, styling, production engineering, factory, procurement, human resources, and schedule management.
Overseeing the development is the product planning organization within Toyota called 'Z' and the Chief Engineer.
Mr. Fukushima appears as the Chief Engineer in charge of the Corolla. He is responsible for a product group of approximately 2 million units per year, and his role is to consolidate requests from all over the world, including Japan, North America, and India.
The Corolla was born in 1966. It spread along with Japan's high economic growth and became the top-selling car in the domestic market for 33 consecutive years. It has undergone model changes over 12 generations and has been sold in more than 150 countries and regions.
Therefore, the next-generation Corolla is not just a new car.
If it fails, not only will Toyota's global mass-market vehicle strategy be weakened, but the symbol of the brand itself will be undermined. On the other hand, just protecting the conventional image of the Corolla will lead to it no longer being chosen by young customers.
The development team sought to change the conventional image of a 'practical and safe mass-market car' through a streamlined windshield and a low silhouette.
The chief engineer asks what can be presented to make people yearn for cars in an era overflowing with information and entertainment.
If they continue to build 'ordinary, ubiquitous sedans,' the Corolla name will become outdated, and the brand and its customers will age and disappear together. That sense of crisis was the starting point for the next-generation model.
The sense of crisis regarding Chinese manufacturers is not about price, but development speed.
The program introduced Tesla and BYD as Toyota's new competitors.
Regarding Tesla, the experience was shown where the starter switch is eliminated, and one can simply get into the car with a smartphone and start driving. It feels more like starting to use a smartphone than operating a car.
On the other hand, BYD was introduced as an entity with approximately 900,000 employees that carries out model changes in about two years, a process that usually takes Toyota about six years. It was explained that they have strengths not only in low costs but also in technology, including batteries.
What the program emphasized here was not a simple hierarchy where Chinese cars are more advanced than Japanese cars, or that Toyota is lagging behind global standards.
What the Toyota development team fears is the difference in the cycle of launching products into the market, improving them, and switching to the next product.
If Toyota maintains its conventional development cycle while Chinese manufacturers update their products at a speed close to 24/7, even a small initial gap will widen with each generation.
In fact, in a meeting within the program, the recognition was shared that Toyota's market share, especially in the Asian market, is beginning to be taken by Chinese competitors.
Regarding the Corolla as well, it was stated that it is necessary to transform it into a product that can be purchased by a new generation, rather than aging along with existing customers in a shrinking sedan market and meeting its end.
However, human resources are needed to shorten the development period.
In the meeting, in response to the question, 'Can we secure the necessary development resources?', a scene was shown where the person in charge frankly admitted that there is no prospect of securing sufficient personnel.
There is a sense of crisis. They want to shorten the schedule. However, there is not enough personnel or time.
The program did not hide the fact that even for a giant corporation, development resources are not infinite.
Not just the Corolla, a platform development once every 10 years.
The next-generation Corolla was given another significant mission.
It is to be the first vehicle to adopt a new platform that involves a huge investment and is renewed on a cycle of about once every 10 years.
The platform defines the basic structure of the car body, collision safety, suspension, and powertrain mounting structure. By placing different car bodies and products on a common foundation, many vehicle models can be developed efficiently.
Previously, it was common to finalize the platform first and then design the individual vehicle body on top of it.
However, this time, the next-generation Corolla and its platform are being developed in parallel. The goal was to significantly shorten the overall development period.
Moreover, the new foundation aims to support multiple powertrain types, ranging from gasoline and hybrid vehicles to electric vehicles.
For small BEVs, it is necessary to achieve an attractive design and interior space while housing the battery under the floor. On the other hand, for engine-powered vehicles, they want to realize a low-slung style.
If multiple dedicated platforms are prepared, it is easier to optimize each one. However, if demand forecasts are wrong, investments in factories and equipment will be wasted.
With demand for each powertrain type being difficult to predict, the strategy this time was to flexibly create products from a single basic framework.
Development and manufacturing sides clash head-on
However, this parallel development places a heavy burden on the manufacturing floor. In the program, representatives from the factory side throw harsh words at the development team.
Even just launching a single vehicle model pushes the design, testing, and production staff to their limits. Furthermore, if a platform capable of supporting multiple powertrain types is to be developed simultaneously in a short period, it is not simply a matter of 'just adding more people'.
'Please give us more time,' 'Can we really launch on this schedule?', 'The floor has reached a point where we cannot squeeze out anything more.'
Exchanges that would likely be cut from a typical corporate documentary were broadcast as they were.
The chief engineer side also does not assert that the schedule and man-hours are feasible, but responds by saying, 'I want to think together about how we can make this happen.'
And they express gratitude for the fact that the representative from the floor spoke up about things that are difficult to say.
Here, one can see the length of Toyota's consensus-building and the slowness of its decision-making.
But at the same time, it also shows a structure where schedules decided from above are not unconditionally forced onto the floor, and where design, testing, and production can tell each other, 'What is impossible is impossible.'
This friction is evidence of inefficiency, but at the same time, it is also a mechanism for protecting quality.
Disassembling competitor vehicles and verifying them down to the millimeter
At Toyota's Technical Center, they purchase competitor vehicles released on the market, disassemble them, and put them on display.
In the automotive industry, where external suppliers provide approximately 75% of parts, investigating the structure of competitor vehicles is related not only to Toyota but also to the technological development of numerous business partners.
In the program, multiple vehicles of interest were lined up, and their bodies, parts, and design philosophies were being investigated.
For the next-generation Corolla, the process of improving perfection by building successive prototypes—1st, 2nd, and 3rd—has been overhauled.
Vehicle evaluation staff are involved from the early stages of development, checking pedal positions down to the millimeter. The goal is to 'get it right the first time' instead of making corrections through multiple prototypes as was done in the past.
When asked for the reason, the person in charge replies, 'To win the competition,' 'The enemy is fast,' and 'The old ways no longer work.'
However, an important statement follows immediately after.
If they only do the same things as Chinese manufacturers, Toyota has no value. The challenge is to see how fast they can go while shortening development time, without sacrificing the craftsmanship and quality that can only be achieved through cars.
This is the first 'Toyota-ness' that runs through the entire program.
It is not about becoming a fast company, but about becoming fast while maintaining craftsmanship.They are trying to change their development methods while retaining their own value, rather than simply copying Chinese development methods.
Akio Toyoda's 'Ever-Better Cars'
In the middle of the program, Chairman Akio Toyoda's career and the crises Toyota has experienced are reviewed.
Toyoda became president after the Lehman Shock, a time when Toyota had fallen into an operating loss.
He says that because he was from the founding family, he was seen as having become president due to his family name rather than his ability, and there was an atmosphere suggesting he should resign quickly to take responsibility for the deficit.
Furthermore, a large-scale recall problem occurred in the United States, and Toyoda testified at a U.S. Congressional hearing. Through that experience, Toyoda came to recognize that the company's prioritization of scale expansion was one of the causes of the crisis.
From there, he put forward the slogan, 'Let's make ever-better cars.'
Initially, this expression was reportedly criticized within the company. What defines 'better'? What are the numerical targets? Are you saying current cars are bad?
However, Toyoda explains that if he were to provide specific numerical values from his position, the organization would stop at nothing to achieve those numbers.
'Ever-better cars' cannot be easily quantified. That is precisely why it was a phrase that prevented the original purpose from shifting due to short-term goals.
What Toyoda is most wary of is not competitors or technological changes. He believes that the moment the company starts thinking, 'We are amazing' or 'We are perfect,' decline begins.
The growth of Chinese manufacturers is a threat. However, the core of the sense of crisis Toyoda displayed in the program is not 'copying China because we are falling behind China.'
It was the fear that a massive Toyota would stop questioning its own success stories.
'Who is the customer?' asked at the most important meeting
A major climax of the program is the critical meeting to decide whether to continue the development of the next-generation Corolla and its new platform.
Executives and managers from around the world gather, and the chief engineer explains the sales plan, profitability, and product lineup.
The question posed by management there was not technical, but extremely simple.
'Will it really be affordable?'
The development team explains that they will create the product by simplifying the basic components to lower the price and then adding the equipment necessary for specific regions and customers. Then, the next question is fired.
'Who decides what is truly necessary, and how?'
When the development team answers, 'The customers decide,' they are further asked, 'Who is the customer?'
When a politician says, 'For the sake of the people,' who are those people? Isn't the opinion of one person who is truly willing to spend their own money and use that car for many years more important than opinions gathered from 1,000 irresponsible people?
This is not a rejection of large-scale market research or average values.
It is a warning against losing sight of the actual person buying the product due to the abstract term 'customer'.
The more a global car caters to numerous regions, markets, and price ranges, the more likely it is to become a product that no one strongly desires as a result of averaging out the requirements.
While creating a product that surprises people by making them ask, 'Is this really a Corolla?', one must not lose sight of what the people who actually pay money need.
The Toyota philosophy of 'Genchi Genbutsu' (go and see for yourself) is also evident here in their product development.
Demand forecasts are wrong. That is why superiors take the risk.
The meeting discussion shifts to the production complexity of the new platform.
Even if they try to cover gasoline vehicles, hybrid vehicles, and BEVs with one basic structure, the work on the factory side becomes complex because parts are actually added or removed.
The production side explains, 'It would be easy if everything were the same, but configurations that are similar but slightly different are mixed together.'
In response, Mr. Toyoda points out the uncertainty of demand forecasting.
Sales departments predict that things will be 'absolutely fine,' but those predictions rarely come true. The internal forecast that electric vehicles would spread all at once also missed the mark. Rather than assuming that forecasts will be accurate, it is better to assume they will be wrong.
That is precisely why a structure is needed that allows factories to flexibly produce in response to demand fluctuations.
Finally, Mr. Toyoda states that it is necessary to clarify who decides and when. This decision cannot be made through a bottom-up approach. It must be decided by those in higher positions who are expected to take risks.
The program did not portray Toyota as a simple bottom-up company.
While thoroughly absorbing opinions from the front lines, when uncertainty is high and there is no answer that everyone can agree on, those in higher positions must take responsibility and make the decision.
After a 45-minute discussion, the development of the next-generation Corolla and the new platform was approved, albeit with some conditions.
The 'way of folding' that determines the safety of tens of millions of vehicles
Even after approval, technical challenges remain. Particularly important is collision safety. The new platform will be used for numerous vehicle models with different weights, body dimensions, and powertrain systems. Moreover, it must comply with collision safety standards that differ from country to country.
It is said that collision tests require more than 50 prototype vehicles equipped with expensive sensors. At the front of the vehicle body, there are two main structural members on the left and right called front side members. By deforming in a specific order and shape during a collision, they absorb impact energy, thereby protecting the cabin where the occupants are located.
What is important is not simply making the components stronger.
It is to design them so that they fold stably from the intended position and in the intended direction during a collision. If the way they fold is not stable, the cabin cannot be reliably protected. The program showed that differences of a few millimeters in plate thickness, shape, or joint position have a chain reaction effect on collision behavior, production molds, and vehicle model deployment.
The platform will carry the fate of tens of millions of vehicles to be produced worldwide over the next 10 years.
Even if it is unclear how much BEV demand will grow, it must be capable of being shared across diverse vehicle models, and it must be light, inexpensive, and safe.
This part also served as the program's counterargument to the view that next-generation cars should only be discussed in terms of software and AI.
Cars are not smartphones
The program also touched on the view that if AI and autonomous driving become widespread, software will determine the value of cars, and automakers will become mere creators of 'boxes'.
It is the possibility that IT companies will take the lead, like in the smartphone industry. Toyota is also gathering software talent and continuing the development race.
However, what the program placed after that was a story about extremely physical car manufacturing. Automobiles are exposed to large temperature changes from minus 50 degrees Celsius to high-temperature ranges. They are subjected to vibrations, withstand rain, snow, salt damage, and collisions, and carry human lives.
If a smartphone freezes, you can restart it. However, if a car freezes while driving, it is a matter of life and death.
Chairman Toyoda says, 'Please do not equate cars with smartphones.'
Even if parts of the digital environment inside the car can be left to digital companies, the areas of driving, turning, stopping, and protecting people from collisions must be handled by automobile companies.
This statement is not a dismissal of software.
It demonstrated the complexity and responsibility of the machine as a whole, which cannot be captured by arguments that reduce automobiles to mere digital devices.
The thickness of a bolt alone can change the ride quality.
The engineers were pursuing not only collision safety and productivity but also the ride quality of the car.
When trying to make things lighter and cheaper, the discussion inevitably turns to 'why is this part necessary?'
However, removing parts or slightly changing their shape alters handling, vibration, and ride comfort.
The program explained that changing the thickness of a bolt's flange can sometimes improve a car's behavior.
Even engineers who have worked at Toyota for many years cannot fully explain why these changes occur. You can tell the difference when you drive it, but it is not easy to know exactly what to change to achieve the intended feel.
An automobile is not something that can be completed solely through blueprints and calculations.
You build the actual car, drive it, feel it, and return to the design phase. Through this iteration, technology and skills are accumulated.
This is the second aspect of the 'Toyota way' shown in the program.
Do not pretend to understand what you do not understand.
Even as a massive corporation, they acknowledge that there are areas of vehicle behavior that cannot be fully explained, and they continue to verify them with actual vehicles.
Mid-ship car development progressing on the circuit
Apart from the next-generation Corolla, the program also covered a new development vehicle that pursues driving performance from scratch.
It is a mid-ship layout sports car with the engine mounted near the center of the body rather than at the front.
By placing the heavy engine in the center of the body, sufficient load is applied to the drive wheels, increasing traction during acceleration. Since the center of gravity is closer to the center, cornering performance is also improved.
On the other hand, because the engine intrudes into the cabin, space for passengers and luggage is reduced. It is difficult to expect large sales volumes as a mass-market vehicle.
Even so, the reason Toyota develops it is to polish the basic performance of driving, turning, and stopping, and to accumulate the technology and skills that will lead to future products.
Professional drivers also participate in the development, comparing it with competing vehicles on the circuit.
In the program, there was a scene where engineers were surprised that a standard-grade Porsche, despite not being a circuit-only car, could drive in a very sporty manner without sliding while maintaining ride comfort.
'Porsche is amazing,' 'Toyota lacks certain technologies,' 'We have been studying them for a long time,' they admit frankly.
This is the opposite of corporate PR designed to showcase a company's own superiority.
Even though Toyota has the world's largest sales volume, there are aspects of driving performance that it should learn from European manufacturers. The very attitude of praising competing vehicles and acknowledging one's own shortcomings was the image of Toyota depicted by the program.
Akio Toyoda as Master Driver
Akio Toyoda is not only the Chairman but also serves as a Master Driver under the name 'Morizo'.
He drives development vehicles, checking the response when turning the steering wheel, the body sway when braking, and the posture when accelerating out of a curve, to indicate the final direction of the ride quality.
When asked in the program what determines 'good ride quality,' Mr. Toyoda compares it to video editing.
When you shoot footage and edit it repeatedly, there is a moment when you feel 'this is it,' rather than relying on logic. There is no completed recipe for ride quality either; in the end, you touch it, ride it, and decide, 'this is a bit off' or 'this is it.'
It could be called intuitive.
However, that sense is not based on personal mood, but on the accumulation of driving numerous cars, experiencing motorsports, and repeating the process with developers.
Despite being a massive corporation, the top management confirms the final product feel through actual vehicles. This was also depicted as a unique connection between management and product development at Toyota.
Manufacturing side refuses to accept blueprints
In the latter half of the program, the next-generation Corolla development team submits design blueprints to the manufacturing side to proceed with the design of mass-production molds.
According to the schedule, it was the stage where they had to move on to mold production.
However, the manufacturing side refuses to formally accept the blueprints, stating that too many important issues remain, including those regarding the front side members.
They want to accept them only after all performance requirements are finalized and then begin mold design. They argue that it is more problematic to force a start now and have everyone suffer later.
The development side proposes a plan to start mold considerations in advance for parts where issues have been resolved, but the manufacturing side does not yield easily.
The front side member is the 'main boss' that determines collision performance. If its joint position or plate thickness changes, new molds will be required.
Changes decided in a conference room over an hour must be produced every day at the factory for the six-year model life.
An example was also shown where the wire harnesses handled on a single production line reached 679 types.
Even if a difference is small to the design side, it becomes a major difference to the production side, requiring changes to molds, equipment, operations, quality assurance, and parts management.
That is why the manufacturing side says, 'We want to bring the conference room to the factory floor.'
This is the third aspect of the 'Toyota Way' depicted in the program.
Design is not superior, and manufacturing is not inferior.
A drawing that cannot be mass-produced is not a completed design. The manufacturing side has the authority to stop the schedule and reject it.
While this can be a factor that slows down decision-making, it is also an important bulwark that supports the system for stably producing 10 million vehicles annually around the world.
Not 'things,' but ultimately the people on the front lines
When asked what is most important in manufacturing, the person in charge of production answers not equipment or technology, but 'the people on the front lines.'
They say that in the end, it is the people on the front lines who help you out.
The program also touched on Toyota City in Aichi Prefecture, where Toyota's headquarters is located, and the history of Toyota.
When the headquarters plant began operations in 1938, annual production was on the scale of several thousand units. It has since grown into a company that produces approximately 10 million vehicles worldwide today.
While expanding overseas, the center of development has remained in Toyota City.
Shortly after the war, Kiichiro Toyoda left behind words to the effect that he wanted to contribute to the reconstruction of Japan as a peaceful nation and to world culture through the automotive industry.
In modern Japan, where population decline and low growth continue, a core industry to replace the automotive industry has yet to be found.
The program expands from the management issues of Toyota alone to the Japanese automotive industry, which supports 5.5 million jobs, and further to the question of what value Japan as a country provides to the world.
Not becoming a global standard, but being 'Toyota of Japan'
Toward the end of the program, Akio Toyoda expresses the view that Japan does not need to aim to become the global standard itself.
Japan is not a major power. However, he says it is important not to focus on the size of the country, but to have a presence where one is recognized as 'Japanese-like' or 'Toyota of Japan-like' no matter where one is.
What they are aiming for is not to adopt the same methods and present the same values as companies around the world.
It is to create a state where they are chosen because they are Toyota of Japan.
Furthermore, it states that Japan itself cannot survive unless it becomes a country chosen by all other nations.
This statement differs in direction from the argument that 'Japan is lagging behind the world and must catch up to global standards.'
What Toyota is questioning is not assimilation into global standards.
It is about whether they can continue to provide value that only Toyota can offer, while still responding to universal competitive conditions such as speed, software, and electrification.
The 'Toyota-ness' depicted by the program
The 'Toyota-ness' that emerges from the program as a whole is not merely generalities like quality focus, on-site focus, or a culture of continuous improvement.
1. Attempting to reconcile contradictions rather than eliminating them
Development time must be shortened. However, quality cannot be compromised. We want to standardize parts. However, we also want to meet the requirements of each individual market.
We want to produce everything flexibly from gasoline vehicles to BEVs. However, we do not want to make the factories complex.
We want to lower prices. However, we want to protect ride quality and safety.
Toyota does not discard one to simplify; it attempts to satisfy contradictory conditions simultaneously.
That is one reason why development becomes heavy and decision-making slows down. However, that very complexity has created the ability to supply 10 million vehicles annually across many regions, models, and powertrains.
2. Verifying the unknown through actual objects
Changing the thickness of a bolt can improve ride quality. Even experienced engineers cannot explain everything through theory alone.
Therefore, they build actual vehicles, drive them, break them, disassemble competitor vehicles, and compare them on the track.
Even as data and simulations become more advanced, the final judgment is made using the actual object. This attitude was presented as the current form of 'Genchi Genbutsu' (go and see for yourself).
3. The shop floor can halt management decisions
Even if development approval is obtained, mass production cannot proceed if the manufacturing side does not accept the blueprints. If the shop floor determines it is impossible to realize, they stop the schedule.
It is neither purely top-down nor infinite bottom-up. The shop floor raises issues, and the superiors take on the final risk.
4. Not reducing the car to a digital device
Software is important, and Toyota is strengthening its efforts there as well. However, a car that carries human lives and must withstand temperature changes, vibrations, and collisions cannot be built using the same logic as a smartphone.
While mastering software, they maintain hardware, vehicle dynamics, collision safety, and production technology as the core of the automotive company.
5. Do not think of yourselves as a finished product
Even as the world's top seller, they frankly praise the driving performance of Porsche and acknowledge that it possesses technology they do not have.
They also acknowledge the speed of Chinese manufacturers.
The greatest risk is not the competition, but thinking that 'we are amazing.'
The mechanism of continuing this self-denial leads to the endless goal of 'making ever-better cars.'
It was not a program comparing them to Chinese manufacturers, but one that showed what Toyota will not discard.
In the program introduction, the sense of crisis regarding Chinese manufacturers was placed at the forefront.
In fact, BYD's short product update cycles, the development speed of Chinese companies, and Toyota's declining market share in Asia are important backgrounds for the development of the next-generation Corolla.
However, if you read the theme of the program as 'Toyota falling behind China,' you miss the essence.
What Chinese manufacturers played in the program was not a global standard for evaluating Toyota. They were an external pressure that served as a catalyst for Toyota to review its conventional methods. The question was not just whether they could develop at the same speed as China.
As a result of becoming faster, will Toyota cease to be Toyota?
The developers in the program clearly state that if they only do the same things as Chinese manufacturers, they have no value of their own.
This statement is not Japanese-style spiritualism.
Even if Toyota adopts the same organizational structure, development processes, and product launch methods as Chinese manufacturers, there is no guarantee they can execute them better than Chinese companies.
Chinese manufacturers have gained speed by leveraging their massive domestic market, vertically integrated supply chains, short decision-making paths, abundant software talent, and intense price competition.
The comparative advantage that Toyota possesses lies elsewhere.
Mass production in multiple regions
Support for diverse powertrain systems
Long-term durability quality
Collision safety and vehicle dynamic performance
The ability to manage factories and suppliers around the world
Mutual checks between design and manufacturing
Production flexibility to withstand market fluctuations
The attempt with the next-generation Corolla and the new platform is to close the time gap with Chinese manufacturers while maintaining these qualities.
Chinese-style speed and Toyota-style weight
The development speed of Chinese manufacturers has become a major competitive advantage in the current automotive industry.
They reflect user feedback in products over a short period and update models without waiting for years. Software features are also continuously improved via OTA.
In contrast, the development process at Toyota shown in the program is heavy.
More than 400 people are involved, meetings are held over several months, design and manufacturing clash, the question of 'who is the customer' is re-examined in executive meetings, and even drawings are sometimes rejected.
From the Chinese perspective, this would likely appear inefficient.
However, for a company that produces 10 million vehicles a year that are used for over 10 years after sale, under different regulations, roads, climates, factories, and suppliers, there is a reason for this weight.
The challenge for Chinese manufacturers is beginning to shift from releasing products quickly to creating products that can be used stably and for a long time all over the world.
Conversely, Toyota's challenge is to release products quickly while maintaining the ability to create products that can be used stably and for a long time.
Both are approaching from opposite directions.
The new platform is a manufacturing version of the 'multi-pathway' approach
The most important technical and management decision in the program was the attempt to cover everything from gasoline vehicles to BEVs with a single basic framework.
This is not merely platform standardization.
It is a strategy that does not rely on accurate demand forecasting, but rather ensures that production configurations can be changed even if forecasts are off.
Toyota has advocated for a 'multi-pathway' approach, maintaining multiple options including electric vehicles, hybrid vehicles, plug-in hybrid vehicles, and fuel cell vehicles.
The program's new platform can be read as an attempt to translate that philosophy into product planning and factory operations.
If BEV demand increases more than expected, they will increase BEVs. If it does not grow, they will produce hybrid or engine-powered vehicles.
Rather than competing on the accuracy of predictions, they are building a structure that can minimize losses even if predictions are wrong.
In China, dedicated BEV platforms are often spoken of as a symbol of technological advancement. However, as demand fluctuates wildly, the domestic market shrinks, and the export environment becomes uncertain, the fixed-cost risk of specialization increases.
Toyota's choice is not necessarily the way to optimize a single BEV.
However, in an era where global demand is unpredictable, it is a way to optimize the entire company.
Can the Corolla change from a 'mass-market car' to a 'car of choice'?
The difficulty of the next-generation Corolla lies in more than just sales volume.
For many years, the Corolla has succeeded as a highly reliable, affordable, and easy-to-use car for many people.
However, currently, especially in the Chinese market, low price alone cannot attract young users.
Clear product value is required, such as design, cockpit, driving assistance, digital experience, electrification, and acceleration performance.
It is symbolic that the development team in the program considered being told 'Is this a Corolla?' as a compliment.
Simply protecting the traditional Corolla identity will not attract new customers.
But if they completely destroy the traditional image, they will also lose the Corolla's values of price, practicality, durability, and reliability.
'It must change, but it must not become a different car.'
The next-generation Corolla is a microcosm of the challenges facing Toyota as a whole.
Did NHK make a PR program for Toyota?
After the broadcast, there was criticism that it was close to corporate advertising because the program repeatedly featured the Corolla and Toyota. Some commentators also noted that it is unusual for an NHK Special to push the product name of a single company so strongly.
Certainly, the program has a significant public relations effect for Toyota.
Development sites, product approval meetings, prototype vehicles, and even executive discussions—usually kept from the public—were broadcast nationwide. While the content builds anticipation for the next-generation Corolla, following the narrative reveals it is not a simple success story.
Staff shortages
Unreasonable schedules
Falling behind Chinese manufacturers
Conflict between development and manufacturing
Errors in BEV demand forecasting
Technology falling short of Porsche
Incomplete crash safety design
Refusal of blueprints by the manufacturing side
These inconvenient scenes were also broadcast. It is likely that NHK's goal was not merely to introduce the new Corolla, but to use the massive manufacturing entity of Toyota to depict how Japanese manufacturing is facing the challenges of speed competition, digitalization, population decline, and uncertain demand.
The fact that the end of the program expanded from a product description of the Corolla to the broader topics of Japan's core industries, Toyota City, the people on the front lines, and what it means for Japan to be chosen by the world, also indicates this intent.
Toyota is slow. However, not all of that slowness is a weakness.
This article provides an objective introduction and analysis of the NHK program in question, and is neither a defense of Toyota's development speed nor a glorification of the speed of Chinese manufacturers.
The people involved in the program themselves admit that Toyota is slow.
The methods used until now are no longer effective. The product gap with Chinese manufacturers is widening. Development periods must be shortened.
The question is which types of slowness to discard and which to retain.
Processes based on multiple prototypes, redundant meetings, and ambiguous decision-making need to be reduced.
On the other hand, if verification regarding crash safety, the conflict between design and manufacturing, confirmation of ride quality through actual vehicles, and the veto power of the mass production floor are all cut away, Toyota's core strengths themselves will be lost.
As Chinese manufacturers expand their sales in overseas markets, they too will have to take on the burdens that Toyota has carried.
And as Toyota competes with Chinese manufacturers, it will have no choice but to incorporate the speed that the Chinese side possesses.
What this program captured was not a simple old-versus-new confrontation between traditional Japanese companies and emerging Chinese companies.
It is a phase where two models of the automotive industry are each trying to acquire the capabilities they lack.
Conclusion
NHK Special 'Inside Toyota' was a program that followed the development of the next-generation Corolla, but in reality, it was content that questioned what kind of car company Toyota will continue to be in the future.
Catching up to the speed of Chinese manufacturers.
Adapting to electrification and software.
Building platforms and factories that can withstand even if demand forecasts are off.
Changing the Corolla into something young customers want.
At the same time, not abandoning safety, ride quality, durability, production quality, and on-site skills.
The 'Toyota-ness' discussed in the program is not about protecting Japanese methods that are behind global standards.
It is about accepting the changes in the world while not becoming the same company as others.
Neither the world's highest sales volume nor past successes guarantee the future.
That is precisely why they continue to doubt themselves before their competitors do.
The vague phrase 'Let's make ever-better cars' does not look like an efficient management goal. However, based on Akio Toyoda's recognition that decline begins the moment one declares completion, it is also a phrase for Toyota to continue imposing on itself goals that can never be achieved.
Whether the next-generation Corolla will succeed in the market or if the new platform will be effective in competition with Chinese manufacturers is not yet known.
However, this program clearly showed that while Toyota acknowledges the speed of Chinese manufacturers, it is not trying to replace its own reason for existence with a Chinese-style approach.
That is precisely where the value of interpreting this program lies, not only for Japanese readers but also for readers in China and the West.
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