[Rethinking Philosophy] Rereading Wittgenstein: (2) Solipsism and the Path of Silence (From Middle to Late Period)

Abstract:
Taking the solipsistic perspective of the early period as a starting point, this paper reinterprets the transition from the middle to the late period as a shift in stance from "observer" to "practitioner." By introducing temporal depth—such as "training" and "custom"—into the conditions for the formation of experience, solipsism is transformed from a structure closed at the single point of the present into one that possesses a history. Silence, too, is repositioned from an attitude of discipline imposed from the outside into a form of action chosen from within the practice of language games.

Introduction: The Achievements of the Previous Paper and the Questions of This Paper

In the previous paper, I attempted to reread the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus from the perspective of solipsism.

What became clear there was a perspective that views the world by dividing it into two layers. First, "the world as the totality of facts," and second, "the range within which 'I' can experience."

Standing on this distinction, solipsism in the "Tractatus" is no longer the extreme subjectivism commonly understood. That is, it is neither a position that asserts "only what I experience exists," nor a position that claims "the world exists independently of me."
Rather, the important point was the following:

And this silence is not merely a confession of ignorance. It was an extremely intellectual and ethical attitude based on discerning the conditions of speaking.

How, then, does this position change thereafter? Did Wittgenstein abandon the problem of solipsism and silence in his middle and late periods? Or did he inherit them in a different way?

This is the question of this paper.

1. Transition to the Middle Period: How is Experience Formed?

What was decisive in the early "Tractatus" was the perspective of "whether or not one can speak now." Meaning is judged by whether or not it is established in the current proposition, and silence is required for everything outside of that.

However, in the middle period, particularly in the thinking represented by the "Blue Book," the focus shifts subtly. What comes to the foreground here is the question:"Why do we experience things this way now?"The introduction of this question can hardly be called a small change. This is because it demands a perspective that traces back to the conditions of formation, rather than accepting current experience as a mere given.

At this point, elements such as rules, training, and customs become important.

Our experience does not exist as a naked datum. Seeing something as "red," understanding a certain act as a "promise," hearing a certain sound as a "word"—these are all ways formed through past learning, repetition, and social training.
Therefore, current experience already possesses temporal depth. In this respect, the middle-period Wittgenstein arrives at the following position:

What should be noted here is that this transition is not a negation of the silence of the early period.
What the middle period is doing is strictly distinguishing between "speaking metaphysically about the unspeakable outside" and "pointing to the past as a condition for the formation of current experience." That is,

• Universally asserting whether or not an external world exists still holds no meaning.

• However, in the context of explaining how current experience was formed, referring to the past is meaningful.

At this point, solipsism is no longer a "structure closed at the single point of the present."
It is temporally extended and transformed into a solipsism with a history.

2. Late Period: Was Solipsism Negated?

In the late period, that is, when reaching the Philosophical Investigations, it is often understood as follows:
"Solipsism is negated by the private language argument, and meaning is established within social practice. Therefore, there was a shift from an individual-centered philosophy to a community-centered philosophy."

However, there is a decisive sense of discomfort with this understanding.
It lies in the fact that the subject of the question has been secretly swapped.

The problem of solipsism was originally the question, "How is the world formed for me?" However, in the general interpretation of the late period, it shifts to the question, "How does society establish meaning?"

But what Wittgenstein himself is doing is likely not such a simple shift. Is the core of the late period not in the claim that "meaning is established socially," but rather in the following point?

This recognition does not negate the solipsism of the early period. Rather, it reinterprets it from a different position.

3. Change of Stance: From Observer to Practitioner

What is decisive here is the change in Wittgenstein's own stance.

In the early period, he was positioned strictly as an "analyst." He was an entity that grasped the relationship between the world and language from the outside, strictly distinguishing what could be spoken of. As a result, the attitude of "whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" was derived.

However, in the late period, this external stance itself is called into question. We cannot step outside of language games. We cannot decide whether to speak or not from a purely neutral position. This is because that decision itself is already made within the language game.

Here, Wittgenstein repositions himself not as an "observer from the outside," but asone who is within the practice while also analyzing it. At this point, solipsism is transformed as follows:

What is presented here is not a theoretical claim.
It is rather a description of the structure of a subject that becomes involved amidst uncertainty.

4. The Transition of Silence: From Attitude to Action

This shift in position also changes the meaning of "silence."

In the early period, silence was a clear ethical attitude. It is a self-discipline of distinguishing what can be said from what cannot be said, and not speaking about the latter. It was a moderation as an observer and a principle for maintaining the purity of thought.

However, in the later period, this privileged position is lost. Both speaking and not speaking are already acts performed within a language game. Silence is no longer an attitude standing outside the world, but becomes a form of behavior chosen within practice.

What is important here is that silence has not been denied.
Rather, silence has merely changed its position.

5. Contemporary Perspective: Is This Evolution?

How should we evaluate this change?
Generally, the transition from the early to the late period is understood as an "evolution of theory." However, considering the contemporary linguistic environment, there is room to reconsider this understanding.

In modern society, the cost of speaking has dropped extremely low, and a massive amount of uncertain discourse is in circulation. In this situation, what becomes important is not "speaking at all costs," but "selecting what should be said."

From this perspective, the early attitude of silence is actually re-evaluated.
Therefore, it would not be appropriate to view this change as a simple evolution. Rather, it should be understood as a shift in stance, namely:

• Early period: An ethical attitude shown from the position of an observer

• Late period: A structural description shown from within the practitioner

is this not how it should be understood?

Conclusion: What Changed Was the Perspective, Not the Problem

Based on the above, the following becomes clear.

Wittgenstein did not abandon the problem. Nor did he simply deny solipsism. What changed was the way the problem is viewed and the standpoint for doing so.

In the early period, the attitude of silence was presented as an analyst determining the limits of the world and language from the outside.
In the middle period, temporal depth was introduced to explain the conditions for the formation of experience.
In the late period, the inevitability of speaking was described as a practitioner inside a language game.

If we base our understanding on this continuity, the silence of the early period was not denied.
Silence continues to live on, while changing the place where it holds meaning.
It has transitioned from an external attitude of an observer to an act chosen within the practice.

Whether one calls this change "evolution" or a "shift in perspective" is now merely a secondary issue. What is important is the fact that what Wittgenstein consistently continued to question—

—is the fact that the problem itself is maintained while changing its form.

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