[Rethinking Philosophy] Rereading Wittgenstein: (5) The Riverbed of Observation and Practice

Abstract:
As a summary of this series, I present an integrated framework of understanding that replaces the conventional "resolute reading." The early period (observer) and the later period (practitioner) are redefined not as a relationship of theoretical error and correction, but as two complementary perspectives for viewing the world. I conclude that certainty is the very "reversibility" that enables movement between these two phases, and that philosophy is a training of existential attitude to avoid fixing one's position.

Introduction: Questioning the Conventional Wisdom of the Resolute Reading

In conventional Wittgenstein studies, the so-called "resolute reading" is widely shared as the mainstream understanding. That is, the metaphor of "throwing away the ladder" in 6.54 of the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus" (hereinafter "Tractatus") is read as a declaration of self-dissolution for the entire Tractatus, an understanding that in the later "Philosophical Investigations," Wittgenstein himself effectively admitted the errors of his early thought.

According to this interpretation, the propositions of the "Tractatus" are ultimately "nonsensical" and hold no philosophical significance. Philosophical work is restarted from scratch in the "Investigations." There is a rupture and a turn between the early and later periods—this is the basic composition of the resolute reading.

However, as a result of re-examining the "Tractatus" over the previous four articles from the perspectives of solipsism, silence, private language, and certainty, does a completely different landscape not emerge?

In this article, I would like to organize the overall picture and present an integrated framework of understanding to replace the "resolute reading."

1. What does it mean to "throw away the ladder"?

In 6.54, Wittgenstein states the following:

The resolute reading takes the "nonsensical" mentioned here literally and understands the propositions of the "Tractatus" as philosophically incorrect. However, this reading overly simplifies the usage of "nonsensical (sinnlos)" that Wittgenstein consistently distinguished throughout the "Tractatus."

In the "Tractatus," "nonsensical" means "cannot be constructed as a proposition with truth value", not that it is "incorrect."

Subjects such as ethics, value, the self, and the world itself are not nonsensical because they "do not exist," but because they cannot be spoken of because they cannot be depicted within logical space. In that sense, nonsensical means "inexplicable," and signifies "suspension of judgment" rather than "exclusion."

Therefore, "throwing away the ladder" means acquiring an attitude of awareness regarding the impossibility of philosophical statements, not discarding the "Tractatus" itself. Rather, the "Tractatus" functions as a training device to reach this attitude.

2. The "Tractatus" as an Observer, the "Investigations" as a Practitioner

When standing on this understanding, the relationship between the early and later periods can no longer be captured by the composition of "theoretical error and correction." Rather, both should be understood as a shift in position.

In the "Tractatus," Wittgenstein consistently stands in "the position of an observer." He attempts to view the world, logic, meaning, and ethics from the outside as much as possible and to clearly demonstrate their structure. As a result, silence regarding "what cannot be spoken" is requested. This silence is not a passive resignation, but an attitude of intellectual restraint.

On the other hand, in "Philosophical Investigations," he places himself on "the side of the practitioner." He stands inside the language game, places himself in the midst of confusion, and speaks to the reader, saying "think about it" or "imagine it." Here, speaking is inevitable, and silence is fundamentally impossible. This is because the meaning of language is determined only within action by being spoken.

This shift is not a correction of error, but a change of position.
The "Tractatus" is correct from the "perspective from the outside," and the "Investigations" is correct from the "perspective from the inside."

Therefore, the relationship between the two should be understood as a complementary relationship of:

• Early period: Expression of an attitude as an observer (ethical)

• Later period: Structural diagnosis as a practitioner (academic)

as a complementary relationship.

3. Private Language and Silence—Reconstructing Solipsism

When re-examining the "private language" problem from this position, its scope changes significantly.

Usually, the private language argument is understood in the form: "Since meaning is established by use according to rules, a completely private language is impossible." And this conclusion is often linked to the ethics of the "Tractatus" to "be silent."

However, what emerges from the discussion so far is the opposite composition. That is,

• In the field of practice, a private language cannot be established. As long as one speaks, meaning is publicized within the language game and subordinated to shared rules.

• In the field of observation, a private language can be established as a state prior to questioning possibility/impossibility. It is a form of pure experience apprehension that is not spoken, not recovered by rules, and not given meaning.

At this time, silence is not merely the cessation of speech.
It is an active attitude that reserves meaning-giving and rule-making.

The world grasped in silence is solipsistic, and the world grasped in speech is shared. The world is nothing but the superposition of this dual structure.

4. Certainty = Reversibility as a Hinge

The key concept that runs through this dual structure is "certainty."

In "On Certainty," Wittgenstein reveals the paradoxical structure that "in order to doubt, one must already have something that is not doubted." Certainty here is not a property of propositions, but rather the foundational structure that makes practice possible.

However, based on the arguments made so far, certainty is not merely an "immovable foundation." It is better understood as the reversibility that allows one to move back and forth between the positions of observer and practitioner itself.

This reversibility is precisely what Wittgenstein calls the "hinge" and the "riverbed." In other words,

• One can withdraw into observation, remain silent, and live in a solipsistic world.

• At the same time, one can throw oneself into practice, speak, and live in a shared world.

And the very fact that one can move back and forth between these two positions remains the most certain thing.

Certainty is not a claim that "something exists for certain," but rather a mode of existence in which the freedom to shift positions is guaranteed. What one can still be convinced of while moving between the solipsistic world and the shared world—that is the riverbed of certainty.

5. Redefining the 'Firm Reading'—Toward Complementarity, Not Discarding

Based on the above, the "firm reading" requires a significant redefinition.

The "Tractatus" was not wrong.
It was thoroughly correct from the position of the observer.

The "Investigations" did not negate it.
It shifted the perspective to that of the practitioner.

The ladder was not "kicked away."
It simply finished its role because the position changed.

Rather, the "Tractatus" continues to provide a perspective as an observer even in the "Investigations." Perhaps it is precisely because one knows the view outside the fly-bottle that one can show the flies lost inside how to "get out."

I suspect that what Wittgenstein aimed for—"teaching how to escape the fly-bottle"—has been unconsciously replaced in the firm reading by "acknowledging that escape is impossible in the first place, then elucidating the rules of flight within it to optimize life inside the fly-bottle."

In this sense, the "Tractatus" and the "Investigations" are in an indispensable relationship with each other as

• philosophy from the outside

• philosophy from the inside

—two perspectives that are essential to one another.

Conclusion: Philosophy is Not Fixing One's Position

What the reconstruction so far shows is that the core of Wittgenstein's philosophy lies not in the construction of a theoretical system, but in the training of an existential attitude.

Philosophy is not about determining the truth.
Philosophy is about not fixing one's position.

Silence and speech, solipsism and sharing, observation and practice.
Being able to move freely between these—that reversibility is Wittgenstein's final destination and the true nature of "certainty." Instead of the "narrative of rupture" that the firm reading has depicted, what is presented here is a history of philosophy of continuity and movement. The "Tractatus" has not ended, and the "Investigations" has not discarded it. Both are still alive today as two ways of looking at the world. I firmly believe so.