[Rethinking Philosophy] Rereading Wittgenstein: (1) Reading the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus from the Perspective of Solipsism
Abstract:
This paper reinterprets the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus from the perspective of solipsism, presenting a two-layered structure consisting of the "world as the totality of facts" and the "world of my experience." Solipsism here is understood not as extreme subjectivism, but as a logical requirement that defines the limits of what can be said. Finally, it clarifies that the "silence" to which this book leads is not merely an abandonment of cognition, but a highly ethical attitude of letting go of the desire to guarantee the world through theory.
Introduction: Why read the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus from the perspective of solipsism?
Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (hereinafter referred to as the Tractatus) has often been read as a precursor to logical positivism or as a book that denies metaphysics. At the same time, however, themes such as "solipsism," "ethics," and "silence"—which at first glance seem incompatible with a book on logic—repeatedly appear in it. This tension is likely the greatest reason why the Tractatus has continued to be read to this day.
In this paper, by reinterpreting the Tractatus from the perspective of solipsism, I will organize its internal structure and, focusing on the distinction between "having meaning" and "existing," clarify in what sense realism is rejected and in what sense it is not. Ultimately, I wish to show that the "silence" presented by the Tractatus is not merely epistemological humility, but an attitude with highly practical and ethical implications.
1. Two Layers—(1) The world as the totality of facts and (2) The world of my experience
The Tractatus begins with a famous formula.
The world is the totality of facts, not of things. (1)
The "world" referred to here is, so to speak, the world as the totality of facts. What is important is that it is nowhere written that this world is constituted by "my experience" or "consciousness." Whether I see it or not, whether I think about it or not, the world is logically posited as such.
However, at the same time, the following solipsistic thesis appears in the Tractatus.
The world is my world. (5.62)
If one were to take this sentence alone, it would look like a declaration of extreme subjectivism or solipsism. However, in order to understand both consistently, it is necessary to distinguish between two layers as follows.
(1) The world as the totality of facts: The logical totality of all states of affairs that exist.
(2) The range within which "I" can experience: The world that has meaning for me and can be grasped.
General solipsism equates (1) and (2). That is, it thinks, "Only what I experience is the world, and nothing else exists." However, Wittgenstein does not make this equation. While it is true that what appears as a "world that has meaning" is (2), there is no logical reason to exclude (1).
In this respect, the solipsism of the Tractatus is characterized as follows.
The world is my world from the perspective of meaning (solipsistic).
However, it is not said that the world itself is reduced to my experience (non-subjectivist).
Here, a unique tension between solipsism and realism already appears. This is because the statement "a world exists that is not reduced to my experience" is realism itself.
2. Organizing solipsism and realism—Difference in scope, not opposition
Usually, realism is understood as follows.
The world exists independently of the subject.
The subject perceives and discovers it.
When perceived, the world presents itself as something that "exists."
On the other hand, solipsism is considered a position that counters this by asserting that "only my consciousness (or experience) is certain, and the existence of the external world or others is not guaranteed."
However, what is at issue in the Tractatus is this very ontological opposition itself. Wittgenstein's interest lies not in the question, "Does the world exist independently of the subject?" but in the point, "Does that question have meaning?".
For him, saying about the world of (1) that it "exists/does not exist independently of the subject" is already a logical overreach. This is because such a claim attempts to describe the entire world as a single state of affairs. The entire world is not an object to be described, but remains something that is "shown" as the premise upon which description is established.
Therefore, the Tractatus does not refute realism. It prevents realism from being established as a meaningful claim.
Let's organize this.
General solipsism posits that the range I can experience (=②) is the world, and that the outside of it (=①) does not exist.
Wittgenstein posits that the range I can experience (=②) is the world, and that the outside of it (=①) cannot be explained.
It might be said that Wittgenstein's philosophy is a "philosophy of withholding judgment."
3. What does it mean to "have meaning"? — Propositions, depiction, and logical space
To understand this point, it is necessary to confirm the definition of "meaning" in the Tractatus. According to Wittgenstein, it means the following.
For a proposition to have meaning means that,
it depicts a possible state of the world, and
it is determined whether it is true or false.
In other words, meaning is not psychological understandability, but the possibility of being positioned in logical space. A proposition has meaning because it can be said that "it is true if the world is this way, and false if it is not."
What is important here is that "having meaning" and "existing" are not synonymous.
Something might exist.
However, it does not necessarily mean that a sentence speaking about it has meaning.
Ethics, values, the self, the world itself—in the Tractatus, these are not denied, but are considered "things that cannot be spoken of." Asking whether or not they exist itself has no meaning.
However, there may be doubts about this organization. Does "the world outside my experience" have no meaning? Isn't it the case that I have some new experience precisely because something is brought in from the "outside" of the world I am experiencing?
4. Empirical propositions and universal propositions—where does realism fail to hold?
Here, an important distinction is necessary. It is the distinction between empirical propositions and universal (prophetic) propositions.
For example, let's consider the following claim.
At time t, a new event appeared from outside my experiential world.
This is a proposition that is sufficiently meaningful empirically. It happens daily that we learn today a fact we did not know yesterday, and explaining it as a "causal influence from the outside" is justified both scientifically and in common sense.
The problem arises when one leaps from here to the following claim.
Outside of my experience, the world always exists.
The external world will continue to exist forever into the future.
Such a claim is no longer an empirical proposition. It is a universal, transcendental proposition about the structure of the world as a whole.
What the Tractatus rejects is not the former, but the latter.
Saying empirically that "there was an outside" is not considered philosophically meaningless. However, it solves none of the philosophical problems. This is because what is at stake philosophically are prophetic questions such as "what will happen next?" or "is the world guaranteed?"
No matter how many past observations are accumulated, no universal guarantee about the future can be provided. In this respect, the critique of realism in the Tractatus should be understood as being directed not at empirical realism, but at prophetic realism.
The claim that the outside of the world exists and that I have "experienced" something (= empirical proposition) holds true.
However, it does not follow that the outside of the world will continue to exist and that I will "experience" something (= universal proposition) is guaranteed, and therefore it is "meaningless to speak of it."
5. Why "Silence"? — Silence as the Role of Philosophy
Based on the above, the famous final proposition of the Tractatus takes on a completely different appearance.
Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent. (7)
This silence is not a confession of ignorance. Nor is it a prohibition of empirical inquiry. It is based on the following view of philosophy:
The role of philosophy is not to discover new facts.
The role of philosophy is to liberate us from the pseudo-problems that thought has created for itself.
The metaphor Wittgenstein later used, "to show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle," succinctly expresses this point.
The question "Does the external world exist?" is truly urgent not in the context of the past, but in the context of how to live from now on. However, philosophy cannot provide a guarantee for that future. The moment it tries to provide a guarantee, the words lose their meaning.
That is why there is only one meaningful attitude in the Tractatus.
To let go of the impulse to guarantee the existence of the world through theory.
Instead, to speak of what can be spoken and to act within the given world.
That attitude is what is called "silence".
Conclusion: The Intersection of Solipsism, Realism, and Silence
When reading the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus from the perspective of solipsism, what appears is neither subjectivism nor the negation of metaphysics. Rather, it is:
The world is my world (from the perspective of meaning).
However, one cannot speak of a guarantee for the world as a whole.
Philosophical confusion arises when one tries to speak of what cannot be spoken.
This is an extremely rigorous and, at the same time, practical position.
Silence does not mean denying the world. It means abandoning the desire to guarantee the world. Only after that abandonment do "what can be spoken" and "living" appear without being confused. In that sense, the Tractatus is not only a book of logic, but also a book that shows an <attitude toward life> after passing through solipsism.
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