【Uber (UBER) Q1 FY2026】Is it a company to be destroyed by AVs, or a company that will become the urban OS of the AV era?

I was looking forward to the Q1 2026 earnings of Uber Technologies (UBER).

To be honest, I had been looking at Rivian's (RIVN) earnings the other day, but the business felt lacking, so I didn't even bother to organize my thoughts into a note. At that time, I thought that a platform-type business like Uber would be more to my liking and exciting, so I decided to analyze their earnings thoroughly.

Uber is interesting.

Looking at revenue alone, it's not that flashy. Q1 FY2026 revenue was $13.203B, up 14% year-over-year. Moreover, compared to market expectations, the revenue looks a bit underwhelming.

However, I won't end my analysis of these earnings by just looking at a 'revenue miss'.

What is important when looking at Uber is not the revenue itself, but Gross Bookings—the total transaction volume generated on the app—Trips, Uber One, Non-GAAP EPS, FCF, and its connection to AVs.

AV stands for Autonomous Vehicle. It refers to cars that travel using sensors, AI, maps, and control systems installed in the vehicle without a human driver having to drive at all times. In the context of Uber, autonomous vehicles from companies like Waymo, Zoox, WeRide, Baidu, Nuro, and Rivian-related entities are important as 'new supply' that could potentially be dispatched on the Uber app in the future.

Q1 2026 Gross Bookings were $53.720B, up 25% year-over-year, or +21% in constant currency. Trips were 3.643B, up 20% year-over-year. Non-GAAP EPS was $0.72, up 44% year-over-year. GAAP operating income was $1.923B, up 57% year-over-year. Operating cash flow was $2.351B, and FCF was $2.286B.

The numbers alone are strong enough.

But that is not what I want to think about most in these earnings.

As Waymo, Tesla, Zoox, Rivian, NVIDIA, and WeRide advance autonomous driving, is Uber a company that will eventually be cut out of the loop?
Or will it become the company that controls the demand, dispatch, insurance, financing, and fleet management required to commercially operate autonomous vehicles in cities?

Judging from these earnings and the earnings call, I have leaned slightly toward the latter.

Uber is not a company that will win on autonomous driving technology itself.
However, it has the potential to become the company that turns autonomous driving into a business in cities.

I think this is the biggest point of discussion this time.


Q2’25 → Q3’25 → Q4’25 → Q1’26

・Gross Bookings: $46.756B → $49.740B → $54.140B → $53.720B
Q1’26 is QoQ -0.8%, YoY +25%, and +21% in constant currency. It is down slightly from Q4, but since Uber has seasonality, I don't view this QoQ decline alone as weak. Rather, it is important that it expanded continuously from Q2’25 to Q4’25, and continues to grow over 20% YoY while maintaining the $53B level in Q1. We can confirm that Q2’25 Gross Bookings were $46.756B, Q3’25 were $49.740B, Q4’25 were $54.140B, and Q1’26 were $53.720B.

・Revenue: $12.651B → $13.467B → $14.366B → $13.203B
Q1’26 is QoQ -8.1%, YoY +14%, and +10% in constant currency. Looking only at this, it appears to be slowing down. However, Q1’26 had a 9-point negative impact on revenue growth rate, and 8 points in constant currency, due to a business model change in the UK. The company explains that this change does not affect the underlying economics, but is a reporting impact. If you overlook this, you will misread Uber this time.

・Revenue Margin, i.e., Revenue / Gross Bookings: 27.1% → 27.1% → 26.5% → 24.6%
The company-wide Revenue Margin dropped significantly in Q1’26. However, this also includes the impact of the UK model change. Specifically, in Mobility, the Revenue Margin fell from 29.9% in Q4’25 to 25.8% in Q1’26, but this is due to a change in the reporting of driver payments. In Uber's case, it is closer to reality to look at Gross Bookings, Trips, and Segment Operating Income Margin rather than simple revenue growth.

・GAAP Operating Income: $1.450B → $1.113B → $1.774B → $1.923B
GAAP Operating Margin: 11.5% → 8.3% → 12.3% → 14.6%
The operating margin in Q1’26 is quite strong. Despite revenue falling QoQ, GAAP operating income exceeded Q4’25. This is important; Uber is not just seeing an increase in users, but operating leverage is taking effect. Q1’26 GAAP operating income was a record high of $1.923B, up 57% year-over-year.

・Non-GAAP Operating Income: $1.534B → $1.675B → $1.918B → $1.883B
Non-GAAP Operating Income / Gross Bookings: 3.3% → 3.4% → 3.5% → 3.5%
Q1’26 fell slightly from Q4’25, but it is maintaining 3.5% relative to Gross Bookings. From 2026, Uber is shifting toward prioritizing Non-GAAP Operating Income and Non-GAAP EPS over Adjusted EBITDA. I believe this is an intention to shift the market's focus to metrics closer to shareholder value as a mature company.

・Adjusted EBITDA: $2.119B → $2.256B → $2.487B → $2.481B
Adjusted EBITDA / Gross Bookings: 4.5% → 4.5% → 4.6% → 4.6%
Adjusted EBITDA is almost flat from Q4’25. Q1’26 was $2.481B, up 33% year-over-year. Profit growth is greater than revenue growth. Uber is creating a state where profit growth is faster than Gross Bookings growth.

・GAAP EPS: $0.63 → $3.11 → $0.14 → $0.13
・Non-GAAP EPS: $0.60 → $0.65 → $0.71 → $0.72
The Q3’25 GAAP EPS of $3.11 includes the reversal of tax valuation allowances and investment valuation gains, so it is dangerous to view it as operating performance as is. The Q1’26 GAAP EPS of $0.13 is also heavily affected by a $1.5B investment valuation loss. Therefore, Uber's EPS fluctuates significantly with GAAP alone. What should be looked at is Non-GAAP EPS, which has grown steadily from $0.60 in Q2’25 to $0.72 in Q1’26. Q1’26 Non-GAAP EPS is up 44% year-over-year.

・Operating CF: $2.564B → $2.328B → $2.883B → $2.351B
Operating CF Margin: 20.3% → 17.3% → 20.1% → 17.8%
Operating CF fluctuates with quarterly working capital, but Uber's cash generation ability is quite strong. Q1’26 operating CF was also $2.351B. The operating CF margin relative to revenue is 17.8%. I think this is a quite good level for a platform company.

・CapEx: $89M → $98M → $75M → $65M
・FCF: $2.475B → $2.230B → $2.808B → $2.286B
FCF Margin: 19.6% → 16.6% → 19.5% → 17.3%
This is where Uber is strong. Unlike AI factory-type companies, Uber's CapEx is currently very light. Q1’26 CapEx was only $65M, and most of the operating CF remains as FCF. Q1’26 FCF was $2.286B. The way cash flow looks is different from companies like Microsoft or Amazon, where FCF is significantly reduced by AI infrastructure CapEx.

・SBC: $475M → $465M → $451M → $473M
SBC / Revenue Ratio: 3.8% → 3.5% → 3.1% → 3.6%
SBC, or stock-based compensation expense, is not too high. Q1’26 was $473M, a 3.6% revenue ratio. It is not a structure where SBC is eating up shareholder value like small-to-mid-cap SaaS. Furthermore, because Uber is reducing its share count through stock buybacks, the management of SBC and dilution has improved significantly.

・Diluted Shares: 2.126B → 2.124B → 2.106B → 2.071B
Q1’26 diluted shares are 2.071B. It has clearly decreased since Q2’25. This is important. Even though they are issuing SBC, the share count is not increasing, but rather decreasing. With $3B in stock buybacks in Q1 alone, Uber is actually starting to return FCF to shareholder value.

・Cash + Short-term Investments: $7.37B → $9.09B → $7.63B → $6.09B
Unrestricted cash, cash equivalents and short-term investments at the end of Q1’26 were $6.1B. It is down from $7.6B in Q4’25, but this is largely due to the impact of stock buybacks. Financial leeway is still sufficient, but Uber is changing from a company that just accumulates cash to one that directs it toward growth investments, AV investments, and stock buybacks.

・MAPCs: 180M → 189M → 202M → 199M
・Trips: 3.268B → 3.512B → 3.751B → 3.643B
In Q1, MAPCs and Trips are down from Q4 due to seasonality. However, YoY, MAPCs are +17% and Trips are +20%. Usage frequency per person is also up 3% year-over-year. This is an earnings result where actual usage is increasing, not just price increases.

・Uber One Members: Over 50M
・Gross Bookings from Uber One: 50% of Mobility + Delivery
This is one of the most important KPIs this time. Uber One is not just a discount membership. It has become a membership base that spans Mobility, Delivery, Grocery, Hotels, and Travel. The company announced over 50M Uber One members and explained that members account for half of Mobility + Delivery Gross Bookings.


Summarizing the numbers, Uber is quite strong this time.

Revenue looks a bit bad.
However, Gross Bookings, Trips, Non-GAAP EPS, operating income, FCF, and share count reduction are strong.

In other words, I think this earnings result was not about 'how to view a revenue miss,' but about seeing whether Uber is changing into a platform that can grow profits and FCF more than revenue.

■ Is Uber on the side to be destroyed by AVs?

I think the most important thing in these earnings is AV.

Until now, the AV argument for Uber was seen more as a risk.

Waymo deploys Robotaxis on its own app.
Tesla releases low-cost Robotaxis with FSD and its own vehicles.
Zoox, Rivian, Lucid, WeRide, Baidu, Nuro, etc., enter the market directly.
If that happens, won't Uber be cut out of the loop?

I think this view is natural.

Uber does not own drivers, nor does it own vehicles. It is a platform that matches supply and demand. If an AV company takes demand itself, dispatches itself, and builds its own app, Uber's role will diminish.

However, reading the earnings call this time, Uber's path to victory has also become quite visible.

Management explained that even in San Francisco and Los Angeles, where Waymo is operating, Uber's category position is higher than it was six months ago. They also explained that the partnership with Waymo in Austin and Atlanta is strong, and at this point, they do not see Waymo's deployment as having a negative impact on Uber's business.

I think this is quite important.

At least at this point, AVs may be expanding the ride-hailing market itself rather than taking Uber's demand. Uber views AVs not just as 'competition' but as 'increased supply'.

Ride-sharing is a supply-constrained market. When cars increase, wait times shorten, prices drop, and reliability improves, demand increases. From Uber's perspective, AVs will not immediately replace existing drivers, but will first become an entity that expands the market as additional supply.

This view is quite convincing.

Autonomous driving will not become usable in all cities, all times, all roads, and all weather conditions at once. In reality, it will spread little by little from city centers, airports, specific areas, sunny weather, and cities with established regulations. Human drivers will remain in suburbs, bad weather, complex roads, and regions with strict regulations.

In other words, for the time being, it will be a mixed network of 'human drivers + AVs'.

What is strong in this mixed network is not a pure AV company, but a company that holds demand, adjusts prices, dispatches vehicles, and can run human drivers and AVs at the same time.

The meaning of the Hybrid Network that Uber talks about is here.

■ Uber Autonomous Solutions is a step toward AV commercialization OS

Uber is launching Uber Autonomous Solutions this time.

This is not just a story of 'we will also put AVs on the Uber app'.

To operate AVs in cities, autonomous driving software alone is not enough. What is needed is fleet management, vehicle storage, charging, repair, cleaning, insurance, financing, regulatory compliance, passenger support, data collection, demand forecasting, and pricing.

Uber is going after this.

In the earnings materials, Uber also indicated that AV Mobility trips are up more than 10 times year-over-year, currently operating in 8 cities, and expects to promote AV trips in up to 15 cities by the end of 2026. They also explained that there are over 30 autonomous partners combined for Mobility and Delivery.

What is important here is that Uber is not betting everything on which AV technology will win.

Waymo is fine.
WeRide is fine.
Baidu is fine.
Zoox is fine.
Rivian is fine.
Players using NVIDIA's foundation are also fine.

If Uber's demand, app, payment, dispatch, and operations are used when finally operating commercially in cities, Uber can capture value.

I think this is a strategy to secure the commercialization layer that will be needed when AVs become widespread, rather than trying to guess the winner of AV technology.

Of course, this is not yet proven.

Revenue from AV trips, gross margin, Uber's take rate, revenue per vehicle, insurance costs, and financing costs are not sufficiently visible. At this point, some of the story remains.

However, what I was able to confirm at least in this earnings call is that Uber is not passively viewing AVs as a 'threat to be destroyed by,' but is moving quite concretely as a supply infrastructure to incorporate them into their network.

This is hard to see just by looking at RIVN alone.

When looking at Rivian as an EV manufacturer, it tends to be about vehicle sales, gross margins, cash burn, R2/R3, and vans for Amazon. Of course, it is important, but it is difficult to deepen as an investment argument.

On the other hand, from Uber's perspective, Rivian could become part of an AV supply network. Rather than evaluating vehicle manufacturers directly, it is more interesting as a structure to look at a platformer that bundles multiple AV supplies.

■ Insurance cost improvement is fuel for re-acceleration of US Mobility

Another important point this time is insurance costs.

In Uber's Mobility, US insurance costs have been a headwind for a long time. When insurance costs rise, it is necessary to pass that on to prices. When prices rise, Trips growth slows down.

In this earnings call, the CFO explained that they expect hundreds of millions of dollars in insurance cost savings in US Mobility in 2026. And they explained that returning those savings to the market and improving the price environment is leading to an acceleration in Trips growth.

I think this is quite important.

It is not just cost reduction.
Lower insurance costs → price improvement → increased demand → increased Trips → improved network density → further reliability improvement, there is a possibility of entering this cycle.

LA in particular is considered the market where the headwind of insurance costs has been the greatest over the past few years, and it was explained that LA's trip growth trend has improved significantly more than California as a whole or the US as a whole.

This indicates the possibility that Uber's US Mobility will re-accelerate.

Of course, insurance costs are influenced by the external environment, regulations, and lawsuits. If this rises again, it will have a negative impact on profit margins and prices. However, in these earnings, I was able to confirm that insurance cost improvement is not a temporary accounting factor, but is starting to lead to demand recovery.

■ Is Uber One a discount or a moat?

Uber One is also quite important.

Uber One members are over 50M. They account for 50% of Mobility + Delivery Gross Bookings. This is not just a story about subscription member numbers.

For Uber, Uber One has become the glue that spans Mobility, Delivery, Grocery, Hotels, and Travel.

The CEO explained in the earnings call that Uber One members use the service 3 times more. Furthermore, for hotel bookings, they offer 10% Uber credits to Uber One members and 20% off at some hotels. In other words, Uber is trying to increase the value of Uber One and increase cross-platform activity, rather than just turning the economics of Hotels into profit as is.

I think this is very important.

If Uber One is just a discount, it is not a moat.
However, if Uber One increases the frequency of use of transportation, meals, shopping, and travel, and increases the user's LTV, or customer lifetime value, then this becomes a moat.

At this point, I view it as 'becoming a moat, but not yet fully proven'.

The profitability, churn rate, and LTV after discount deductions of Uber One are not sufficiently disclosed. Therefore, it is still too early to conclude it is an irreversible moat.

However, the numbers of 50M members, 50% of Bookings, and high-frequency use by members are quite strong. Uber One is becoming the core that changes Uber from a one-off dispatch app to a daily-use platform.

■ Will Uber be cut out of the loop in the AI agent era?

What was interesting in this earnings call was when they were asked about the risk of being cut out of the loop by AI agents.

If users start saying to personal agents from Meta, Google, OpenAI, Claude, or Gemini, 'call the ride that comes the fastest' or 'order the usual pizza,' won't the direct relationship with the Uber app weaken?

I think this is a quite essential question.

The CEO's answer was that Uber is building an indispensable local service. They deepen the direct relationship with Uber One and link with third-party agents via API. However, the idea is that, just like metasearch in the travel industry in the past, the final value also remains on the side of the large execution foundation.

This also connects to the AI agent arguments of GOOGL and META.

Will AI agents take all the entrances?
Or will the execution foundation that actually moves, delivers, and solves problems retain value?

In my view, Uber has the potential for the latter.

AI agents can 'call Uber'.
But the car comes, it arrives on time, the driver or AV moves safely, the price is reasonable, the delivery is warm, they can handle it when items are out of stock, and there is a refund or support if a problem occurs. This cannot be completed by AI agents alone.

In other words, even in the AI agent era, Uber's value is not just in the 'entrance' but in the 'execution'.

And Uber itself is also using AI. Cart Assistant, Earner Assistant, One Search, destination prediction, personalized recommendations, AI coding agents. In the earnings materials, it is also shown that cross-platform consumers are growing 1.5 times faster than single-business consumers.

Uber's AI utilization is not a flashy chatbot.
It is operational AI that improves matching, prediction, delivery, support, UI, and development efficiency.

This plainness is strong.

■ Is the valuation cheap?

Based on Seeking Alpha, UBER's Valuation Grade is C+.

P/E Non-GAAP FWD is 21.97x. The sector median is 20.13x. EV/EBITDA FWD is 13.58x, the sector median is 12.23x. EV/Sales FWD is 2.57x, the sector median is 2.25x. P/S FWD is 2.55x, the sector median is 1.88x.

In other words, it is not simply a cheap stock.

However, PEG Non-GAAP FWD is 0.74, which is significantly lower than the sector median of 1.73. This indicates that considering profit growth, the sense of being overvalued is not that strong.

In Seeking Alpha's consensus, the 2026 EPS forecast is $3.37, 2027 is $4.33, and 2028 is $5.52. Growth of +28.6% is expected in 2027 and +27.3% in 2028. On the other hand, revenue forecasts are $57.31B in 2026, $66.62B in 2027, and $75.09B in 2028, with revenue growth of about 10-16%.

I think this is Uber's point.

Uber is not a high-growth SaaS where revenue grows 30%.
However, it has become a company where EPS growth is faster than revenue growth.

I think what should be looked at is not P/S, but Non-GAAP P/E, FCF, share count reduction, and profit margin relative to Gross Bookings.

If Forward Non-GAAP P/E is just under 22x and Non-GAAP EPS is growing in the high 20% range, I think the valuation is within an acceptable range. At least, considering the AV option, Uber One, AI efficiency, and FCF generation ability, it is hard to say it is clearly too high.

■ The moat is expanding, but it is not yet irreversibly confirmed

In these earnings, I think Uber's moat is expanding.

The customer base is strong. MAPCs are 199M, Trips are 3.643B. Uber One is over 50M. Members account for half of Bookings.

Economies of scale are also appearing. While Gross Bookings are +25% YoY and revenue is +14% YoY, GAAP operating income is +57% YoY and Non-GAAP EPS is +44% YoY.

There is also a data advantage. They have real-time demand data for transportation, delivery, meals, shopping, and travel. Furthermore, in the AV era, dispatch, utilization rate, vehicle operation, and city-by-city operation data will have value.

Ecosystem formation is also progressing. Mobility, Delivery, Grocery, Hotels, U4B, AV, advertising, and AI are starting to connect.

However, I will not yet say that an irreversible moat is confirmed.

There are three reasons.

First, the profitability of AV is undisclosed.
Even if AV trips increase, it does not necessarily mean that Uber's take rate or profit margin will increase.

Second, the profitability of Uber One is not yet sufficiently visible.
Even if the number of members grows, if they are just buying LTV with discounts, it is not a moat.

Third, the risk of being cut out of the loop by AI agents or AV companies has not completely disappeared.
If Waymo or Tesla can capture sufficient demand with their own apps, Uber's share could be squeezed.

So my evaluation is this.

Uber has moved up from a 'good company' to a 'company that should be seriously monitored as a core candidate'.
However, it is still too early to place it in the same category as irreversible moats like NVDA's CUDA or RBRK's cyber recovery foundation.

At this point, it is a core candidate A-rank.
I think formal core status can wait until after confirming AV, Uber One, FCF, and share count reduction in the next few quarters.

Uber is not yet an irreversibly confirmed moat.
However, it has emerged as a possibility to become the urban OS of the AV era, rather than a company to be destroyed in the AV era.

With this perspective, UBER is worth following quite seriously from now on.

■ Investment Judgment

This Uber earnings result is quite strong.

However, it is not just a good earnings result.

Uber is trying to move from a dispatch and delivery company to an urban execution OS.

People move.
They order food.
They buy at supermarkets.
They book hotels.
They manage corporate travel.
In the future, they will ride AVs.
They are trying to connect all of that with Uber One, AI, and a dispatch network.

There is investment appeal here.

On the other hand, the biggest point of discussion is AV.

Is Uber a company to be destroyed by AVs?
Or is it a company that controls demand, operation, insurance, financing, and fleet management in the AV era?

In this earnings call, the answer leaned slightly toward the latter.

I do not view Uber as the 'king of AV technology'.
But I think it is quite interesting as a 'platformer that turns AV into a business in cities'.

■ Next Checkpoints

・Will US Mobility Trips growth accelerate further due to insurance cost improvement?
・Can Mobility Segment Operating Income Margin maintain the high 7% range?
・Can Delivery Gross Bookings growth and Segment Operating Income Margin coexist?
・Will Uber One member numbers and Bookings ratio continue to grow?
・Is Uber One working for LTV expansion rather than discounts?
・Will the number of AV deployment cities approach the target of up to 15 cities?
・Will there be additional disclosures regarding AV trips utilization rate, take rate, and profit margin?
・Will Uber's category position be maintained in cities where Waymo, Tesla, Zoox, etc., are deployed?
・How will AI investment affect headcount suppression and development efficiency?
・Will the SBC / Revenue ratio be maintained in the 3-4% range?
・Will diluted shares continue to decrease after stock buybacks?
・Can FCF maintain and expand to the $10B annual scale?

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(Disclaimer) This document is published for the purpose of organizing and recording the author's personal decision-making process, and it is subject to hesitation, reconsideration, revision, and hypothesis updates. Furthermore, the information provided in this document does not guarantee accuracy or other qualities. Therefore, as it may not necessarily be appropriate for all readers, please be aware that investing in stocks involves significant risk, and ensure that you make investment decisions based on your own judgment and responsibility. Please note that this does not constitute an solicitation to invest in any financial products or individual stocks, nor does it recommend any specific investment methods.