P2P Econ@berkeley

该项目探讨了对等网络中资源贡献的经济激励机制,旨在解决个体理性与集体福利之间的矛盾,确保系统的稳定运行。
P2P Econ@berkeley
economics-informed design of peer-to-peer, ad-hoc and overlay networks

Project Overview
Fromfile-sharing to mobile ad-hoc networks, community networking toapplication layer overlays, the peer-to-peer networking paradigmpromises to revolutionize the way we design, build and use thecommunications network of tomorrow, transform the structure of thecommunications industry, and challenge our understanding of markets anddemocracies in a digital age.
The fundamental premise ofpeer-to-peer systems is that individual peers voluntarily contributeresources to the system. However, the inherent tension betweenindividual rationality and collective welfare produces a misalignmentof incentives in the grassroots provisioning of p2p services. Ourmulti-disciplinary research team is working to develop a framework forunderstanding the technical and economic characteristics of p2psystems, and to design economic mechanisms for incentive compatible p2papplications.

Publications
  • M. Feldman, J. Chuang, "Overcoming Free-Riding Behavior in Peer-to-Peer Systems," ACM Sigecom Exchanges Vol. 6.1, July 2005.[pdf].
  • M. Feldman, J. Chuang, "The Evolution of Cooperation under CheapPseudonyms," 7th International IEEE Conference on E-Commerce Technology(CEC'05), July 2005.[pdf].
  • P. Ferreira and M. Sirbu, "Inefficiency in provisioning interconnectedcommunication networks," ACM E-Commerce Conference (EC'05), June 2005.
  • M. Feldman, J. Chuang, I. Stoica, and S. Shenker, "Hidden-Action inMulti-Hop Routing," ACM E-Commerce Conference (EC'05), June 2005.[pdf].
  • M. Feldman, K. Lai, and L. Zhang, "A Price-Anticipating ResourceAllocation Mechanism for Distributed Shared Clusters," ACM E-CommerceConference (EC'05), June 2005.[pdf].
  • N. Christin, A. Weigend, and J. Chuang, "Content Availability,Pollution and Poisoning in Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks," ACME-Commerce Conference (EC'05), June 2005. [pdf].
  • N. Christin and J. Chuang, "A Cost-Based Analysis of Overlay Routing Geometries," IEEE INFOCOM'05, March 2005 [pdf].
  • M. Feldman, C. Papadimitriou, J. Chuang, and I. Stoica, "Free-Ridingand Whitewashing in Peer-to-Peer Systems," ACM SIGCOMM'04 Workshop onPractice and Theory of Incentives in Networked Systems (PINS), August2004. [pdf] (Earlier version appeared in 3rd Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security (WEIS'04), May 2004. [pdf])
  • N. Christin, J. Grossklags, and J. Chuang, "Near Rationality andCompetitive Equilibria in Networked Systems," ACM SIGCOMM'04 Workshopon Practice and Theory of Incentives in Networked Systems (PINS),August 2004 [pdf]. (Also see a preliminary version known as Technical Report TR-2004-04-CGC, April 2004 [pdf])
  • Y.-H. Chu, J. Chuang, and H. Zhang, "A Case for Taxation inPeer-to-Peer Streaming Broadcast," ACM SIGCOMM'04 Workshop on Practiceand Theory of Incentives in Networked Systems (PINS), August 2004. [pdf]
  • A. Habib and J. Chuang, "Incentive Mechanism for Peer-to-Peer MediaStreaming," 12th IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service(IWQoS'04), June 2004. [pdf]
  • M. Feldman and J. Chuang, "Hidden-Action in Multi-Hop Routing," 2nd Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, June 2004.[pdf]
  • M. Feldman, K. Lai, I. Stoica, and J. Chuang, "Robust IncentiveTechniques for Peer-to-Peer Networks," ACM E-Commerce Conference(EC'04), May 2004. [pdf]
  • N. Christin and J. Chuang, "On the Cost of Participating in aPeer-to-Peer Network," 3rd International Workshop on Peer-to-PeerSystems (IPTPS'04), February 2004. [pdf] (Companion Technical Report TR-2003-12-CC, December 2003. [pdf])
  • K. Lai, M. Feldman, I. Stoica, and J. Chuang, "Incentives forCooperation in Peer-to-Peer Networks," 1st Workshop on Economics ofPeer-to-Peer Systems, June 2003 [pdf]
  • M. Feldman, K. Lai, J. Chuang, and I. Stoica, "QuantifyingDisincentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks," 1st Workshop on Economics ofPeer-to-Peer Systems, June 2003 [ps]
Presentations
  • In Search of Homo Swappus:Evolution of Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Systems. Keynote presentation,IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, September 12005. [pdf]
  • A Cost-Based Analysis of Overlay Routing Geometries. IEEE INFOCOM'05, March 2005 [pdf].
  • Near Rationality and Competitive Equilibria in Networked Systems. ACMSIGCOMM'04 Workshop on Practice and Theory of Incentives in NetworkedSystems (PINS), August 2004. [pdf]
  • Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems. Academia Sinica 2004 Summer Institute on Peer-to-Peer Computing, August 2004. [pdf]
  • On the Cost of Participating in a Peer-to-Peer Network. 3rdInternational Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems (IPTPS'04), February2004. [pdf]
  • Incentives for Cooperation in Peer-to-Peer Networks, 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, June 2003 [pdf]
  • Quantifying Disincentives in Peer-to-Peer Networks, 1st Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems, June 2003 [pdf]
内容概要:本文介绍了一个针对电力系统连锁故障传播路径的N-k多阶段双层优化及故障场景筛选模型,该模型基于混合整数线性规划(MILP)方法构建,旨在全面评估电力系统在遭受多重故障时的脆弱性与恢复能力。通过引入故障传播路径的概念,模型能够动态模拟故障在电网中的逐级扩散过程,并结合多阶段优化策略,实现对关键故障场景的有效识别与优先排序。整个框架不仅考虑了初始故障元件的选取,还涵盖了后续因潮流转移引发的级联跳闸行为,从而提升了风险评估的准确性与时效性。该研究已在Matlab平台上完成代码实现,具备良好的可复现性和工程应用价值,适用于提升现代电网的安全防御水平。; 适合人群:电力系统、能源安全及相关领域的科研人员、高校研究生以及从事电网规划与运行管理的工程技术人员。; 使用场景及目标:①用于电力系统安全评估中识别最危险的N-k故障组合;②支撑电网应急预案制定与薄弱环节改造;③作为学术研究中关于级联故障建模与优化求解的教学与验证工具;④服务于智能电网背景下抵御蓄意攻击或极端事件的风险防控决策。; 阅读建议:建议读者结合Matlab代码深入理解模型的数学 formulation 与求解流程,重点关注目标函数设计、约束条件构建及双层优化结构的实现逻辑,同时可通过调整系统参数和故障设定进行仿真对比分析,以掌握不同因素对连锁故障演化的影响规律。
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