rac sga cache_buffer_size "V$BH"

本文介绍了Oracle数据库中V$BH视图的详细内容,包括各字段的意义及使用方法。通过示例展示了如何查询缓冲区状态以及如何刷新缓存。

V$BH:This is a Real Application Clusters view. This view gives the status and number of pings for every buffer in the SGA.
--记录了sga缓冲区中的object及其状态

ColumnDatatypeDescription
FILE#NUMBERDatafile identifier number (to find the filename, query DBA_DATA_FILES or V$DBFILE)
BLOCK#NUMBERBlock number
CLASS#NUMBERClass number
STATUSVARCHAR2(6)Status of the buffer:
  • free - Not currently in use

  • xcur - Exclusive

  • scur - Shared current

  • cr - Consistent read

  • read - Being read from disk

  • mrec - In media recovery mode

  • irec - In instance recovery mode

XNCNUMBERNumber of PCM x to null lock conversions due to contention with another instance. This column is obsolete and maintained for backward compatibility.
LOCK_ELEMENT_ADDRRAW(4 | 8)Address of the lock element that contains the PCM lock that is covering the buffer. If more than one buffer has the same address, then these buffers are covered by the same PCM lock.
LOCK_ELEMENT_NAMENUMBERThe address of the lock element that contains the PCM lock that is covering the buffer. If more than one buffer has the same address, then these buffers are covered by the same PCM lock.
LOCK_ELEMENT_CLASSNUMBERThe address of the lock element that contains the PCM lock that is covering the buffer. If more than one buffer has the same address, then these buffers are covered by the same PCM lock.
FORCED_READSNUMBERNumber of times the block had to be reread from the cache because another instance has forced it out of this instance's cache by requesting the lock on the block in exclusive mode
FORCED_WRITESNUMBERNumber of times GCS had to write this block to cache because this instance had used the block and another instance had requested the lock on the block in a conflicting mode
DIRTYVARCHAR2(1)Y - block modified
TEMPVARCHAR2(1)Y - temporary block
PINGVARCHAR2(1)Y - block pinged
STALEVARCHAR2(1)Y - block is stale
DIRECTVARCHAR2(1)Y - direct block
NEWVARCHAR2(1)Always set to N. This column is obsolete and maintained for backward compatibility.
OBJDNUMBERDatabase object number of the block that the buffer represents
TS#NUMBERTablespace number of block

SQL>  select sum(BLOCK#),status from v$bh group by status;

SUM(BLOCK#) STATUS
----------- ---------------------
1.0537E+11 xcur
1.1988E+10 cr

SQL> alter system flush buffer_cache;

System altered.

SQL> select sum(BLOCK#),status from v$bh group by status;

SUM(BLOCK#) STATUS
----------- ---------------------
    854666 xcur
1.1735E+11 free

内容概要:本文详细记录了对一个Android ARM64静态ELF文件中字符串加密机制的逆向分析过程。该ELF文件的所有字符串均被加密,无法通过常规strings命令或IDA直接识别。作者通过分析发现,加密字符串存储在.rodata段,其解密所需信息(包括密文地址、长度和16位密钥)保存在.data.rel.ro段的40字节描述符中。核心解密函数sub_10F408采用自反的双pass流密码算法,结合固定密钥KEY_TERM(由.data段24字节数据计算得出),实现字节级非线性、位置与长度相关的加密。文章还复现了完整的Python解密脚本,并揭示了该保护机制的本质为代码混淆而非强加密,最终成功批量解密全部956条字符串,暴露程序真实行为,如shell命令模板、设备标识篡改、网络重置等操作。此外,文中还提及未启用的自定义壳框架及其反dump设计。; 适合人群:具备逆向工程基础的安全研究人员、二进制分析人员及对ELF保护技术感兴趣的开发者。; 使用场景及目标:①学习ELF二进制中字符串加密的典型实现方式与逆向突破口;②掌握从结构识别、函数追踪到算法还原的完整逆向流程;③理解“绑定二进制”的完整性校验设计及其局限性;④实践编写IDAPython脚本自动化提取与解密敏感数据。; 阅读建议:此资源以实战案例驱动,不仅展示技术细节,更强调逆向思维与验证方法,建议读者结合IDA调试环境,逐步跟随文中步骤进行动态分析与算法验证,深入理解每一步的推理依据。
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